Bhikam Ram vs The District Judge and Others

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—The Petitioner is in occupation of accommodation in the U.S. Club, Simla. It appears that the Executive Engineer, Simla Division No. III, wrote to the Estate Officer, Himachal Pradesh Government, Simla, that the Petitioner was a trespasser in the said public premises and action should be taken to evict him under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. On November 29, 1968, the Estate Officer issued a notice under the said Act to the Petitioner to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. On March 21, 1969, the Estate Officer, issued a notice u/s 5(1) of the Act ordering the Petitioner to vacate the premises failing which he would be liable to eviction. The Petitioner appealed, and the appeal was dismissed on June 16, 1969, by the Appellate Officer. The Petitioner prays for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

A number of contentions have been raised by the Petitioner.

The first contention is that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 is ultra vires and therefore an order of eviction u/s 5(1) of that Act is void. That question has already been decided against the Petitioner by a Full Bench of this Court in C. Baljees v. Union of India Civil Writ Petition No. 44 of 971 decided on February 17, 1973.

The Petitioner next contends that no proceedings could be validly taken under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, inasmuch as that Act did not apply, and it was the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act 1959, which did. The submission is that all along when Simla formed part of the erstwhile State of Punjab, it was the Punjab Act of 1959 which applied to the premises in question, and that even thereafter when Simla became part of the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh by virtue of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966, Section 88 of that Act continued the Punjab Act of 1959 in operation so far as the premises in question were; concerned. It is urged that the Central Act of 1958 does not come into play. The contention, in my opinion, is misconceived.

Section 5(1), which is in Part II of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, declares that on and from appointed day, i.e. November 1, 1966, the district of Simla, hitherto forming part of the territories of the existing State of Punjab, would be added to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh and thereupon would cease to form part of the existing State of Punjab.

Section 88 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act provides:

The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial reference in any such law to the State of Punjab shall, until otherwise provided by a competent legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day.

In its application to the district of Simla, what Section 88 provides is that although the district of Simla no longer forms part of the existing State of Punjab and is now-added to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh the law enforced in that territory immediately before the appointed day would continue to have effect. In other words, a law made by the Punjab Legislature would continue lo operate in the district of Simla. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that therefore the Punjab Act of 1959 could be invoked but not the Central Act of 1958. Now, the question whether the Punjab Act of 1959 or the Central Act of 1958 applies to the premises in question falls to be decided on the terms of those enactments. In order that the Punjab Act should apply, the public premises musi, by Section 2(d) of the Act, be "any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State Government, or requisitioned by the competent authority under the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953, and includes any premises belonging to any district board, municipal committee, notified area committee or panchayat." In 1968 when proceedings were taken by the Estate Officer under the Central Act of 1958, the U.S. Club, Simla, had ceased to belong to the Punjab Government. By virtue of Section 48 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, all land -and by Section 48(6) "Land" includes immovable property of every kind and any rights in or over such property belonging to the existing Stale of Punjab passed to the successor State in whose territories they were situated. On November 1, 1966, therefore, the U. S Club, Simla, passed to the Union of India, which was the "successor State" by the definition contained in Section 2(m) and 2(n) of that Act in respect of the territories transferred to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh.

Section 48 contained in Part VI of the Punjab Re-organisation Act performs a different role from Section 5(1) contained in Part II of the Act. Section 5(1) is concerned with the transfer of territories, while Section 48 is concerned with the apportionment of assets. For that reason Section 88, which deals with the territorial extent of laws in force, refers to the provisions of Part II only. It contains no reference to the provisions of Part VI. Upon its plain terms it is concerned solely with continuing the original ambit of the territorial operation of the laws in force immediately before the "appointed day." That is its entire object, and it does not affect the operation of Section 48.

Consequently, the U.S. Club, Simla, cannot be treated as property belonging to the existing State of Punjab as from November 1, 1966, and therefore, it is not covered by the definition of ''public premises'' set out in Section 2(d) of the Punjab Act. While the Punjab Act may by virtue of Section 88, have territorial application in the distinct of Simla, it cannot be applied to the premises in question because the definition of ''public premises'' in that Act can no longer extend to the said premises. The mere territorial operation of the Punjab Act does not make it applicable to the said premises. For the same reason, its repeal in 1971 by the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises Act, 1971, has no significance here.

The Central Act of 1958 mentioned above extends to the whole of India. It operates in the district of Simla. It can be invoked in respect of all public premises which fall within its terms. Section 2(b) of that Act defines ''public premises'' to mean "any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned or on behalf of the Central Government." When the Estate Officer took proceedings against the Petitioner, the premises in question belonged to the Central Government. Therefore, the Central Act of 1958 was clearly applicable. Now, the Central Act of 1958 was followed by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Proceedings taken by reference to Section 5(1) of the Central Act of 1958 have been validated by Section 20 of the Central Act of 1971, and proceedings taken under the former Act must be deemed to have been taken under the latter Act. The Petitioner has relied upon Bhaiyalal Shukla Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, ; Rattan Lal and Co. and Another Vs. The Assessing Authority and Another, . Ramdas Vs. State of M.P. and Others, Smt. Bhagwan Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and Others, and M.S. Goruk Mal, v. H.P. Govt. 1969 P.L.R. 136. For the reasons set out above those cases afford no guidance in the decision of the question before me.

The contention of the Petitioner that the proceedings should have been taken under the Punjab Act of 1959 and not under the Central Act, of 1958 is rejected.

The Petitioner''s next contention is that he is a tenant and not a trespasser. As to that, the Estate Officer and the Appellate Officer have held to the contrary. Their finding is a finding of fact and I am not satisfied that it is vitiated by any apparent error of law.

By way of further contention, the Petitioner points out that while the order dated March 21, 1969, made by the Estate Officer directing the Petitioner to vacate the premises recites that he is satisfied that the Petitioner is in unauthorised occupation of the premises, no material has been disclosed in the order for such satisfaction. The contention is not well founded. The order clearly states that the Petitioner has continued to occupy the public premises in question without any authority from the Government. It was not necessary that the entire material on the basis of which the Estate Officer had come to that conclusion should have been set out.

Finally, the Petitioner says that he was in occupation originally as a tenant and having entered into possession under a valid arrangement he cannot be evicted. Reliance is place on Rajkumar Devindra Singh and Another Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, That case is clearly distinguishable. The Supreme Court was concerned with applying Section 3(a) of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 which defines ''unauthorised occupation'' as referring to a case where a person has entered into possession of public premises otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant. The Supreme Court observed that as the property was not public premises on the date when the Appellants entered into possession thereof, Section 3(a) did not apply. In the present case, the expression ''unauthorised occupation'' in the Central Act of 1958 means occupation by a person of public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by a person of the public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. Even assuming that the Petitioner was allowed into possession of the accommodation as a tenant, from the finding that he is now a trespasser it is clear that he is in unauthorised occupation.

None of the contentions raised by the Petitioner have any force. The petition fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.