Bhimrao vs Land Tribunal, Kustagi and Another

Balakrishna, J.-The point for consideration is whether the Tribunal has fulfilled the requirements of enquiry as contemplated under sub-section (1)(b) of Section 67 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and whether a reasonable opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the petitioner?

2.Section 67(1)(aa) & (b) of the Act read as follows:

"Where a portion of the holding declared before a Tahsildar is situated within the jurisdiction of another Tahsildar, the former shall send a copy of the declaration to the latter, who shall make the verification and determination specified in item (i) and (ii) of clause (a) in respect of such portion and send the copy of the declaration and the connected records to the former Tahsildar, who shall place them before the Tribunal."

Sub-section (b): Thereupon and after such enquiry as may be prescribed, the Tribunal shall determine the extent of the holding and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area."

Thus, the said provisions mandate that after the information is placed by the Tahsildar before the Tribunal, it is incumbent upon the Tribunal to hold an enquiry, as may be prescribed and determine the extent of the holding and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling limit.

In the instant case, there is no indication of an enquiry having been actually conducted. There is no recording of statements of the petitioner. There is no evidence of any opportunity having been given to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his declaration. In short the requirements of reasonable opportunity of hearing are conspicuous by their absence. The case of the petitioner is that the family partition took place anterior to the date on which the Act came into force and the partition has not been taken into account by the Tribunal before passing the impugned order.

According to the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, if the fact of partition had been taken into consideration there will be no excess holding of land at all and this aspect is very relevant and material for the purpose of the case. It is also submitted that if an enquiry had been held in consonance with the Rule prescribed in the Act, it would have been possible for the petitioner to substantiate the contention that there was a family partition.

I am of the opinion in the facts and the circumstances of the case, there is a violation of the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 67(1) of the Act besides an infraction of Rules of natural justice, apart from procedural violation which has defeated the rights of the petitioner.

In the case of Govinda Reddy P. v State of Karnataka & Others (1979(2) Kar.L.J. p. 211) it is held as follows:

"Section 67(1)(b) requires the Tribunal to act upon the information furnished by the Tahsildar only after holding an enquiry. In fact, it provides in express terms that the Tribunal, after it obtains the information regarding the declaration from the Tahsildar, has to hold an enquiry before determining the holding of the declarant and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area. If regard is had to the context in which the enquiry is required to be held by the Tribunal, it becomes clear that the enquiry is intended to safeguard the interests of the declarant in that the Tribunal in determining the extent of the holding of the declarant and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area may not act on the information furnished by the Tahsildar, if the declarant can prove the incorrectness or unreliability of such information. Thus, in my view, the duty to enquire imposed on the Tribunal by Section 67(1)(b) having regard to the purpose sought to be achieved by it, must be taken to include by necessary implication, the right of the declarant to make a representation in the Course of the enquiry by the Tribunal. In fact, the enquiry contemplated in the provision, if it fails to take within its ambit, the right of the declarant to make an effective representation against the information furnished by the Tahsildar to the Tribunal and intended to be used against the declarant, the provision for enquiry loses both its purposes and meaning."

While deciding the first question, I have pointed out that the enquiry required to be held by the Tribunal under Section 67(1)(b) of the Act, by necessary implication, includes the right of the declarant to make a representation as regards the information in respect of the declaration, made available by the Tahsildar. The fact that clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 67 makes it obligatory for the Tribunal to make an order after an enquiry which affords opportunity of representation to the party likely to be affected by such order and the further fact that clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 67 of the Act makes the order so made by the Tribunal, final, impels me to hold that the requirement of a ''speaking order'', i.e., an order containing reasons for its conclusion, is also implied in the said provisions inasmuch as the recording of reasons is usually regarded as a necessary requirement of a fair decision. Moreover, it is well settled that any order made by a quasi-judicial Tribunal, which is required to make orders in discharging of statutory obligations imposed upon it and affecting rights to property of citizens, has to make a speaking order, that is, an order which contains reasons for its conclusions. The necessity for making such speaking orders becomes obvious when such orders are not immune from judicial reviewability. Hence, in my view, if a non-speaking order is made by the Tribunal, in exercise of its powers under Section 67(1)(b) of the Act, the same has to be treated as an illegal order and as such, a nullity."

I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Judge in the said case and I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order deserves to be quashed.

For the reasons stated above, writ petition is allowed and the impugned order under Annexure-A is quashed.

Writ petition allowed.