Bhuj Veer Singh vs Preetam Singh and Others

Devi Prasad Singh, J.—Since common prayer has been made by the respondents in all these bunch of petitions to defer the proceeding of the contempt petitions on identical grounds, hence objections raised by the respondents in these bunch of petitions are decided by the present order.

By applications as well as orally it has been prayed that the proceeding of the contempt petitions may be deferred on account of pendency of Special Appeals filed by the State against the judgments and orders in question. A common ground has been raised by the respondents with the averment that against the orders pending for compliance, they have preferred Special Appeals under the rules of the Court or their applications for vacation of the interim orders are pending in the original writ petitions. Hence, the proceedings of the Contempt petitions may be deferred.

Criminal Misc. Case No.905(C)/2003 has been filed for non compliance of the judgment and order dated 9th of August, 2000 passed in 4964(S/S)/1990. The reason assigned by the opposite parties for non compliance of the aforesaid judgment and order is pendency of a Special Appeal in this Court.

In Criminal Misc. Case No.25(C)/2004, petitioner has approached this Court on account of non compliance of the judgment and order dated 9th of August, 2000 passed in W.P.No.5763(S/S)/1998. By the judgment and order dated 9th of August, 2000 passed in the said writ petition, opposite parties were directed to pay the salary of the post of Collection Amins in the pay scale of Rs.14002300/ revised from time to time. The reason assigned by the opposite parties for non compliance of the judgment and order is the pendency of a Special Appeal in this Court filed against the said judgment.

Criminal Misc. Case No.2016(C)/2004 has been filed by the petitioner on account of non compliance of the interim order dated 12th of July, 2004 passed in W.P.No.940(S/B)/2004. By the interim order, petitioner was allowed to continue as a Teacher till the end of the session. The reason assigned by the opposite parties for non compliance of the interim order in this case is pendency of a Stay Vacation Application in the writ petition concerned filed alongwith Counter Affidavit.

In Criminal Misc. Case No.2188(C)/2004, by the interim order dated 18th of September, 2004 passed in W.P. No.142(S/S)/2004, opposite parties were directed to pay salary to the petitioner w.e.f. September, 2004 and permit him to discharge duty. The reason assigned by the opposite parties for non compliance of the interim order is pendency of a Stay Vacation Application filed in the writ petition alongwith Counter Affidavit.

In Criminal Misc. Case No.114(C)/2005, grievance of the petitioner relates to non compliance of the interim order dated 21.12.2004 passed in W.P.No.7454(S/S)/2004. By the interim order, petitioner has been restored in service, staying the oral order of termination of service.

In Criminal Misc. Case No.310(C)/2005, petitioner has approached this Court feeling aggrieved with the non compliance of the interim order dated 21st of December, 2004 passed in W.P.No.1835(S/B)/2004 by which petitioner was given benefit of continuity of service upto the end of academic session as a teacher. The reason assigned by the opposite parties for non compliance of the interim order is pendency of Stay Vacation Application filed alongwith Counter Affidavit in the writ petition.

Rules for preserving discipline is essential to the administration of justice came into existence with the law itself, and Contempt of Court (Contemptus curiae) has been a recognized phrase in English law from the twelfth century to the present time. In the Anglo Saxon laws and through Domesday Book, the records of Curia Regis and the Parliament, the first treatises on law and the Year books, the development of �contempt� in the legal sense can be traced. By the fourteenth century the principles upon which punishment was inflicted to restrain disobedience to the King and his courts as well as other acts which tend to obstruct the course of justice, had become firmly established.

Civil Contempt is distinguished from the Criminal Contempt, which is wrong for which law awards reparation to the injured party. Virtually, the contempt is a wrong of a private nature as between subject and subject and the King is not a party to the proceedings to punish it. The punishment is a form of execution for enforcing the right of a suitor.

Contempt of Court is disobedience to the Court, by acting in opposition to the authority, justice and dignity thereof. It signifies a willful disregard or disobedience of the Court''s order. It also signifies such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute. (vide 17 Corpus Juris Secundum pages 5 and 6. Contempt by Edward N. Dangel (1939) Edn. Page 14, Oswald''s of Court (1910) Edn.Pages 5 & 6).

Being the court of record, High Court has got all powers of such courts including the power to punish for Contempt itself in view of the provisions contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is the independent power vested in the High Court to punish a person guilty of deliberate and intentional disobedience of its order.

However, the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (in short referred as an ''Act'') defines the Civil Contempt as well as Criminal Contempt and also lays down the procedure for taking action against the contemner.

Subsection (b) of the Section 2 of the Act defines Civil Contempt which is reproduced as under:

�2. (b): �Civil Contempt� means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.�

Section 12 of the Act empowers the High Court to punish for Contempt of Court. For convenience, Section 12 of the Act is reproduced as under:

�12. Punishment for contempt of Court(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both;

Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.

ExplanationAn apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.

(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time of contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the businesss of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person;

Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (4), where the contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.

ExplanationFor the purpose of subsection (4) and (5)

(a) �Company� means any body corporate and includes firm or other association of individuals; and

(b) �director�, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.�

However, Section 13 of the Act creates a bar on the power of the High Court laying down that a person should not be punished unless it is found that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. For convenience, Section 13 of the Act is reproduced as under:

�13. Contempt not punishable in certain casesNotwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice.�

All these bunch of petitions relate to Civil Contempt where either the Judgments or interim orders of this Court have not been complied with on the ground that Stay Vacation Application is pending or a Special Appeal has been filed.

Apart from the statutory powers and duties assigned to this Court under Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act, the Apex Court under Article 129 and this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, being the court of record, possess all such powers including the power to punish for contempt itself. Language of Article 129 and Article 215 of the Constitution of India are literally identical extending the powers to High Court as well as Hon''ble Supreme Court to punish for Contempt of itself.

Thus, this Court has got not only the statutory power under the Act but also being the court of record, it possesses the power to punish a person for contempt of itself.

The power vesting in this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India as settled by the Apex Court is an inherent power and the jurisdiction so vested is a special one not derived from any other statute but derived only from Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the constitutionally vested right can not be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down nor can they be controlled or limited by any statute or law.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in case reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2176, Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others, where the C.J.M. of Nadiad, DistrictKheda of the State of Gujarat was handcuffed and tortured by the police officer, discussed the power of this Court as well as of the Apex Court conferred by Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. For convenience, relevant portion from Delhi Judicial Services Association, Tis hazari Court''s case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�30���.Where jurisdiction is conferred on a Court by a statute, the extent of jurisdiction is limited to the extent prescribed under the statute. But there is no such limitation on a superior court of record in matters relating to the exercise of constitutional powers. No doubt this court has appellate jurisdiction under S.19 of the Act, but that does not divest it of its inherent power under Art.129 of the Constitution. The conferment of appellate power on the Court by a statute does not and cannot affect the width and amplitude of inherent powers of this Court under Art.129 of the Constitution.

We have already discussed a number of decisions holding that the High Court being a court of record has inherent power in respect of contempt of itself as well as its subordinate courts even in the absence of any express provision in any Act. A fortiori the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country and superior court of record should possess the same inherent jurisdiction and power for taking action for contempt of itself, as well as for the contempt of subordinate and inferior courts. It was contended that since the High Court has power of superintendence over the subordinate courts under Article 227 of the Constitution, therefore, the High Court has power to punish for the contempt of subordinate courts. Since the Supreme Court has no supervisory jurisdiction over the High Court or other subordinate Courts, it does not possess powers which High Courts have under Article 215. This submission is misconceived. Article 227 confers supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and in exercise of that power High Court may correct judicial orders of subordinate courts, in addition to that, the High Court has administrative control over the subordinate Courts. Supreme Court''s power to correct judicial orders of the subordinate courts under Article 136 is much wider and more effective than that contained under Article 227. Absence of administrative power of superintendence over the High Court and subordinate Court does not affect this Court''s wide power of judicial superintendence of all the Courts whose orders are amenable to correction by this Court would be subordinate Courts and therefore this Court also possess similar inherent power as the High Court has under Article 215 with regard to the contempt of subordinate Courts. The jurisdiction and power of superior Court of Record to punish contempt of subordinate Courts was not founded on the Court''s administrative power of superintendence, instead the inherent jurisdiction was conceded to superior Court of Record on the premise of its judicial power to correct the errors of subordinate Courts.

Advent of freedom, and promulgation of Constitution have made drastic changes in the administration of justice necessitating new judicial approach. The Constitution has assigned a new role to the Constitutional Courts to ensure rule of law in the country. These changes have brought new perceptions. In interpreting Constitution, we must have regard to the social, economic and political changes, need of the community and the independence of judiciary. The Court cannot be a helpless spectator, bound by precedents of colonial days which have lost relevance. Time has come to have a fresh look to the old precedents and to lay down law with the changed perceptions keeping in view the provisions of the Constitution �Law� to use the words of Lord Coleridge, ''grows�, and though the principles of law remain unchanged, yet their application is to be changed with the changing circumstances of the time.� The considerations which weighed with the Federal Court in rendering its decision in Gauba''s (AIR 1942 FC 1) and Jaitley''s cases, (1944 FCR 364) are no more relevant in the context of the constitutional provisions.�

Again Hon''ble Supreme Court in one another case reported in 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529, Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh has discussed the power of the High Court as well as the Apex Court conferred by Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Pritam Pal (supra), an advocate was tried and punished for contempt of Madhya Pradesh High Court. While discussing the power of High Court under Article 215 of Constitution of India, Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Pritam Pal''s case (supra) held as under:

�29. Reference also may be had to a decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay v. �P� 10 wherein it has been held that the jurisdiction which each Judge of the High Court possesses and uses as constituting a Court of Record is a jurisdiction which is inherent in the Court itself for punishment for contempt of court, whether it is ex facie the Court or otherwise and that for the exercise of that jurisdiction it is not necessary to refer either to the letters patent or the Rules framed by the Court thereunder and that it is a jurisdiction which is being exercised in the same manner as was exercised in the Court of King''s Bench Division in England.

The position of law that emerges from above decisions is that the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively is an inherent power and that the jurisdiction vested is a special one not derived from any other statute but derived only from Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India (See: D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal) and therefore the constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down. Nor can they be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules. The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly, that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemnor should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.�

In view of the aforementioned proposition of law, now the question arises whether in the event of filing of a Special Appeal or vacation of application for interim order or pendency of the Stay Vacation Application, this Court should await the outcome of the Application or Special Appeal even if the interim order or final judgment is full of clarity and command. We can take notice of the fact that application for vacation of the Interim order as well as Special Appeal are pending in this Court without any final outcome for years to come rather for decades. In such situation in case, the Stay Vacation Application is rejected or the writ petition is allowed or the Special Appeal is dismissed confirming the Judgment of Hon''ble Single Judge of this Court, then undoubtedly the litigant may suffer not only with extreme hardships but also with irreparable loss and injury. There may be situation that during the pendency of a writ petition or Special Appeal for decades, a litigant may leave for heavenly abode without enjoying the fruit of petition preferred by him to get justice from this Court.

The data relating to filing of contempt petition in this Court as provided by the office and referred hereinabove primafacie shows that orders of this Court are not complied with on one or other ground. Primafacie, it also reflects that the State which is expected to protect the fundamental rights of a citizen is not implementing the Judgments or orders of this Court expeditiously or avoiding to do so on one or other pretext.

In the above facts and circumstances, we have to examine the questions raised by the respondent.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri A.P. Singh, Sri B.R. Singh, Sri Balram Yadav, Sri H.S. Jain, Sri R.S.Pandey, Sri Hari Om Singh and other advocates of the connected contempt petitions and Sri S.S. Chauhan, learned Addl. Advocate General vehemently argued and relied upon various judgments of the Apex Court to strengthen their arguments. Sri Jyotinjay Verma, learned counsel was also requested to assist the Court had submitted that even the case relied upon by the respondents i.e. Modern Food Industries, does not create a ground to defer the proceeding.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1972 SC 2466; Sri Barada Kant Mishra v. Sri Bhim Sen Dixit, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641; Ravi S. Nayak v. Union of India & others, AIR 1967 SC 1386; Mool Raj v. Murti Raghu Nath Mahraj, (1990) 1 SCC 234; Shiv Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose, AIR 1965 SC 745; Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, Special Reference No.1 of 1964, (1994) 4 SCC 34; Mohammad Iqbal Khandav v. Abdul Mazid Rather, 2004(7) SCC 26; Prithvi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand & others, 1997(3) SCC 443; Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and another v. Hind Rubber Industries Ltd. & Others, 2001 (10) SCC 496; K.G. Derasari and Another v. Union of India and others and (2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 400; R.N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others.

On the other hand Sri S.S. Chauhan, learned Addl. Advocate General supported by Sri Lalit Shukla proceeded to rely upon the cases reported in (1991) ALR 23; Ram Ashish Ram v. Security Officer, (1992) Suppl (1) 43; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Mohd. Yaqub Khan, (1995) (3) UPLBEC 1472; Raja Rajan v. V.S. Vasudevan, 2005(2) Supreme Court 684; India Literacy Board v. Veena Chaturvedi, (1995) Suppl (4) SCC 465; Modern Food Industries v. Sachchidanand Das as well as one unreported judgment in Criminal Appeal No.841/2001, Ram Avadh Singh v. Lalji Yadav decided on 20th of August, 2001.

The main thrust of the arguments of learned Addl. Advocate General is based upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case reported in (1995) Suppl (4) SCC 465; Modern Food Industries v. Sachchidanand Das (supra) as well as in the case of Ram Avadh Singh (supra). The law laid down by the Apex Court delivered by two Hon''ble Judges in Prithvi Nath Ram''s case (supra) shall not be applicable to decide the present controversy.

A plain reading of the judgment of the Modern Food Industries'' case (supra) does not seem to extend the blanket power to the State not comply with the judgment or interim order of this Court, in case, application for vacation of Interim order is pending or a Special Appeal has been filed. In the case of Modern Food Industries (supra) which was decided on 21st of September, 1992, the facts and circumstances of the case was relating to a controversy where disobedience of the order was likely to cause prejudice to a party. Hon''ble Supreme Court held that to keep the prayer for stay standby and to insist upon proceeding with the complaint for contempt might in conceivable cases, cause serious prejudice. In the same case, Hon''ble Supreme Court held that mere filing of appeal or application for stay do not themselves absolve the appellants from obeying the order under appeal and that any compliance of the order of learned Single Judge shall be subject to final result of the appeal.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Modern Food Industries (supra) further held that an application should be made for early disposal of the appeal or application for Interim Relief filed therein. However, the general law as settled by Apex Court does not absolve the contemner from contempt proceeding. For convenience, relevant portion from Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd.''s case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�It is true that a mere filing of an appeal and an application for stay do not by themselves absolve the appellants from obeying the order under appeal and that any compliance with learned Single Judge''s order would be subject to the final result of the appeal. But then the changes brought about in the interregnum in obedience of the order under appeal might themselves be a cause and source of prejudice. Wherever the order whose disobedience is complained about is appealed against and stay of its operation is pending before the Court, it will be appropriate to take up for consideration the prayer for stay either earlier or at least simultaneously with the complaint for contempt. To keep the prayer for stay stand by and to insist upon proceeding with the complaint for contempt might in many conceivable cases, as here, cause serious prejudice. This is the view taken in State of J & K v. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan.�

Thus it emerges from the Modern Food Industries'' case (supra) that in case, an appeal filed against the order or judgment of Hon''ble Single Judge, may be expedited at an early date and simultaneously its proceeding is going on then proceeding of the contempt petition may be deferred for a reasonable period. The crux of the matter is that the petitioner who is arrayed as respondent in the appeal must cooperate for expeditious disposal of the appeal. However, in any case, the provision of the appeal may not be permitted to be abused by the state or authorities who are duty bound to comply with the interim order or Judgments of the courts. In case, it is borne out from the facts and circumstances of a particular case that merely by filing a stay vacation application or Special Appeal or appeal, respondents of a writ petition had forgotten the case and stay vacation application or the appeal is being kept pending, then it shall not create a ground for deferment of the contempt petition.

In the case of Modern Food Industries (supra), the writ petitioner was not cooperating with early disposal of the appeal or stay vacation application moved therein. Subsequent development has taken place and compliance of the order passed by the learned Single Judge could have caused prejudice to the parties, hence Apex Court held that the Contempt proceeding should be deferred and the High Court was directed to decide the appeal expeditiously.

In the case of Mohd. Yaqoob Khan (supra), the Apex Court has observed that in case interim order is obtained by fraud or concealment of material facts by the petitioner, then proceeding of the contempt petition may be deferred till the disposal of the stay vacation application. Similar proposition of law has been laid down by the Apex Court in a case reported in 2005 LAB.I.C. 439, State of Bihar and others v. M.S.E.S.K.K. Mahasangh and others.

In the case of Ram Avadh Singh (supra), Hon''ble Supreme Court held that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the said case, contempt proceeding should have been deferred till the disposal of the appeal. A plain reading of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Avadh Singh''s case (supra) shows that it is the judgment in personam. No general law has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Avadh Singh (supra) which may be treated as judgment in �Rem�. The order dated 20th of August, 2001 was passed keeping in view the facts and circumstances of that particular case.

In the case of Prithvi Nath Ram (supra), though decided by two Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court, it has been categorically held that mere pendency of appeal or stay vacation application will not create a ground for deferment of the contempt proceedings.

The claim and counter claims raised by the parties'' counsel for settlement of issue in question, should be considered within the purview of the fact that it is a settled law that power to exercise jurisdiction of the contempt of court either under the Act or under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India, is a power of a superior court and the matter is between the court and the contemner and the third person has got right to claim for adjudication of contempt proceeding or its disposal or withdrawal. The third person or a litigant may only invite the attention of the court to the effect that order of the court has not been complied with or something has been done which amounts to contempt of court either civil or criminal. It is for this Court either to exercise jurisdiction or drop the proceeding keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in another case reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court 791, Shri Amrit Nahata v. Union of India and others, proceeded to hold that a person who has filed the contempt petition, has got no right to withdraw the same. It is matter between the court and the contemner. For convenience, relevant portion from Amrit Nahata''s case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�7. While considering the request for withdrawal of the proceedings initiated for taking action for contempt of the Court, the court would generally be guided by the broad facts of the case and more particularly whether respect for judicial process would be enhanced or dwindled by either granting or refusing to grant the request. There is a marked difference between a complaint made by an individual for wrong done to him and a petition moved before this court inviting the court to take notice of the fact that its contempt has been committed. The contempt is of the court and not of the individual. Therefore, Sec.15 of the above Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 confers power on this Court as well as on the High Court to take suo moto action or on a motion made by, amongst others, the Solicitor General. It is for the court to determine whether the act complained of tending to scandalize the Court if viewed with certain severity with a view to punishing the person would in the larger interest of the society enhance respect for the judicial process, or too sensitive attitude in such matter may even become counter productive. The power to commit for contempt of court has to be exercised with the greatest caution. Neither too sensitive attitude nor an easy escape from performing the harsh duty would help in maintaining respect and decorum for the judicial process which is essential for establishing a Society based on the rule of law. The Court is to steer clear between two extremes but it must be remembered that the petitioner who has moved for taking action in contempt is not entitled as matter of right to withdraw the petition whenever it suits his purpose. Once the act, which prima facie shows that contempt of the court has been committed, is brought to the notice of the court, it is the court which has to decide whether the contempt has been committed or not or whether it is appropriate to take action or at a later date whether to drop the proceedings. The matter is primarily between the court and the contemnor. It is for this reason that while we are inclined to grant request for withdrawal of petitions we consider it proper to give a few reasons why we consider it proper at this stage to permit withdrawal of the two petitions.�

Hon''ble Supreme Court in another case reported in (2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 171, Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and another, reiterated the settled proposition of law that the power to proceed under the contempt law is a discretionary power which is to be exercised by the higher Court with certain restraints keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case. No right accrues to a person either to press the application for contempt for disposal on merit or to withdraw an application for contempt at his own sweet will. For convenience, relevant portion from Om Prakash Jaiswal''s case (supra) is reproduced as under;

�17. The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is summary but the consequences are serious. That is why the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings in contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in spite of a case of contempt having been made out are both discretionary with the court. Contempt generally and criminal contempt certainly is a matter between the court and the alleged contemner. No one can compel or demand as of right initiation of proceeding for contempt. Certain principles have emerged. A jurisdiction in contempt shall be exercised only on a clear case having been made out. Mere technical contempt may not be taken note of. It is not personal glorification of a Judge in his office but an anxiety to maintain the efficacy of the justice to move or not to move in a contempt jurisdiction. Often an apology is accepted and the felony condoned if the Judge feels convinced of the genuineness of the apology and the prestige of the court having been restored. Source of initiation of contempt proceedings may be suo motu, on a reference being made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or any other person with the subordinate court in case of criminal contempt. A private party or a litigant may also invite the attention of the court to such facts as may persuade the court in initiating proceedings for contempt. However, such person filing an application or petition before the court does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or relator. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the court. It is thereafter for the court to act on such information or not to act though the private party or litigant moving the court may at the discretion of the court continue to render its assistance during the course of proceedings. That is why it has been held that an informant does not have a right of filing an appeal under Section 19 of the Act against an order refusing to initiate the contempt proceedings or disposing of the application or petition filed for initiating such proceedings. He cannot be colled an aggrieved party.�

In the case of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Another (supra), the controversy was relating to non compliance of the temporary injunction granted in a suit in pursuance to the power conferred by Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since, the temporary injunction granted by the trial court was not complied with on the ground that Civil Court was having no jurisdiction and when the matter came up before the High Court, it was held that since the Civil Court was having no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the disobedience of the temporary injunction shall not create a ground to punish the contemner. Hon''ble Supreme Court had set aside the order of the High Court and held that the findings of the High Court was not correct as plaintiff approached the Civil Court bonafidely under the presumption that Civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Hence, it was incumbent on the defendants to comply with the injunction granted by the trial court. Relevant portion from Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Another''s case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�14. The first and foremost question in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in holding that since it has been found ultimately that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the interim orders made therein are non est and hence Defendants 1 and 2 cannot be punished for their violation even if they had flouted and disobeyed the said interim orders when they were in force. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not right in saying so.�

16��.The question is whether the said decision of the High Court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e. for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court (on the question of jurisdiction), no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of the Rule of Law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where a suit was filed in the wrong court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the Civil Court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Court''s decision on the question of jurisdiction.�

In the same case, Hon''ble Supreme Court had relied upon the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in the case reported in 1990 (1) SCC 234, Shiv Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose and reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641, Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, in the following manner:

�17. In Shvi Chander Kapoor v. Amar Bose, J.S. Verma, J. speaking for a threeJudge Bench observed this, with reference to the statement of law at pp.35153 of Wade''s Administrative Law (6th Edn.) (SCC p.247, para 23)

�Void� is meaningless in absolute sense; and unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. In the words of Lord Diplock, �the order would be presumed to be valid unless the presumption was rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue.

We may also refer to yet another decision of this court in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (SCC at p.662) S.C. Agrwal, J. speaking for the Division Bench, observed: (SCC p. 662, para 40)

�In the obsence of an authoritative pronouncement by this Court the stay order passed by the High Court could not be ignored by the Speaker on the view that his order could not be a subject matter of court proceedings and his decision was final. It is settled law that an order, even though interim in nature, is binding till it is set aside by a competent court and it cannot be ignored on the ground that the court which passed the order had no jurisdiction to pass the same. Moreover the stay order was passed by the High Court which is a superior Court of Record and ''in case of superior Court of Record, it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction. (See: Special Reference No.1 of 1964 (Keshav Singh, Re (Mulraj v. Murti Raghonathji Maharaj).�

In a famous case where there was clash on the rights and duties of the judiciary and legislature, Hon''ble Supreme Court had held that the power vesting in the High Court being the Court of record include the power to punish for contempt of Court. The case has been reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 745 (Special Reference No.1 of 1964). For convenience, relevant portion from judgment of the Special Reference No.1 of 1964 under Article 143 of the Constitution of India is reproduced as under:

�(137). In the course of his arguments, Mr. Seervai laid considerable emphasis on the fact that in habeas corpus proceedings, the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant interim bail. It may be conceded that in England, it appears to be recognized that in regard to habeas corpus proceedings commenced against orders of commitment passed by the House of Commons on the ground of contempt, bail is not granted by courts. As a matter of course, during the last century and more in such habeas corpus proceedings returns are made according to law by the House of Commons, but �the general rule is that the parties who stand committed for contempt cannot be admitted to bail.� But is difficult to accept the argument that in India, the position is exactly the same in this matter. If Art. 226 confers jurisdiction of the order of commitment even though the commitment has been ordered by the House, how can it be said that the Court has no jurisdiction to make an interim order in such proceedings? As has been held by this Court in State Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1952 SCR 28: (AIR 1952 SC 12), an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to a party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceedings. Indeed, as Maxwell has observed, when an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution (3). That being so, the argument based on the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the decision of the Privy Council in Jairam Das v. Empror, 72 Ind. App. 120 (AIR 1945 PC 94) is of no assistance.�

(138) We ought to make it clear that we are dealing with the question of jurisdiction and are not concerned with the propriety or reasonableness of the exercise of such jurisdiction. Besides, in the case of superior Court of Record, it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine for itself question about its own jurisdiction.

�Prima facie� says Halsbury, �no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so. While nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court (31).�

(142) Before we part with this topic, we would like to refer to one aspect of the question relating to the exercise of power to punish or contempt. So far as the courts are concerned, Judges always keep in mind the warning addressed to them by Lord Atkin in Andre Paul v. Attorney General of Trinidad, AIR 1936 PC 141 Said Lord Atkin �Justice is not cloistered virtue, she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though spoken comments of ordinary men.� We ought never to forget that power or punish for contempt large as it is, must always be excised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the court, may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct. No venture to think that what is true of the Judicature is equally true of the Legislatures.�

In the case of Sri Barada Kant Mishra (supra), Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that non compliance of the order passed by High Court used to undermine the respect of law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. It has been further held by the Apex Court that any deliberate and malafide conduct by not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermined the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Non compliance of the order of the High Court or non compliance of earlier judgment not only undermines the constitutional authorities and respect of the High Court generally but is also likely to subvert the rule of law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law. Accordingly, conviction of the members of subordinate judiciary holding high posts by the High Court for non compliance of earlier judgment as precedent was upheld by the Apex Court.

In the case of Ravi S. Nayak (supra), it has been followed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that due reference in Tayyabbhai M. Bagasarwalla''s case (supra) which has been discussed herein above.

The case of Mool Raj (supra) does not seem to be relevant to recite (sicdecide) the present controversy.

In the case of Shiv Chandra Kapoor (supra) Hon''ble Supreme Court held that order remains enforceable unless necessary proceedings are taken to establish a cause of invalidity or/and to get it quashed or otherwise upset. Relevant portion from the judgment of Shiv Chandra Kapoor''s case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�22. There is another aspect of the matter. The Controller''s permission when granted to create a limited tenancy under Section 21 of the Act is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise. It is, therefore, for the person assailing its validity to get such a declaration from a proper forum in a proper proceeding. Unless this is done, the order remains enforceable. The duty is clearly on the tenant himself to raise the plea of invalidity and unless the order is declared invalid at his instance, its enforceability cannot be doubted.�

In the case of Mohammad Iqbal Khanday (supra), non bailable warrant was issued on account of non compliance of the order passed by the High Court. In the said case, though the Hon''ble Supreme Court had directed for early disposal of the writ petition on merit on account of the fact that the order passed by the High Court was impossible for compliance at the instance of contemner. But at the same time, Hon''ble Supreme Court held that contemner should have challenged the order passed by the High Court instead of not complying the same. For convenience relevant portion from the Judgment of Mohd. Iqbal Khanday''s case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�18. At the same time, we are constrained to observe that the conduct of the appellant necessitating issue of non bailable warrant is not in keeping with the responsibility of the office he holds. Greater respect should have been shown to court and if he was aggrieved by the order, he should have taken prompt steps to invoke the appellate procedures. The appellant could not ignore the order and plead the difficulties of implementation at the time contempt proceedings are initiated. It will be proper for the appellant to tender an unconditional apology before the High Court for these lapses.�

In the case of Prithvi Nath Ram (supra), the Apex Court ruled that rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be raised as subject in a contempt proceeding. Flouting of the order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. Relevant portion from the case of Prithvi Nath Ram (supra) is reproduced as under:

�8. If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order which in its opinion is wrong or against rules or its implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it should always either approach to the Court that passed the order or invoke jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non compliance with which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration. It shall deal with the application in its proper perspective in accordance with law afresh. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion regarding acceptability or otherwise of the application for initiation of contempt proceedings.�

In the case of K.G. Derasari and Another (supra), Hon''ble Supreme Court held that power to punish for committing contempt has been laid down. The correctness of the order can not be looked into by the tribunal while dealing with the contempt matter.

In another case reported in (1999) 9 Supreme Court Cases 58, Welfare Association of Absorbed Central Govt. Employees in Public Enterprises and Another v. Arvind Verma and others, the order of Hon''ble Supreme Court was not complied with by the Tribunal on account of certain ambiguity and their Lordships had clarified the order and given a chance for its compliance instead of proceeding with the contempt case. Relevant portion from Welfare Association of Absorbed Central Govt. Employees in Public Court case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�6. After hearing counsel on both sides, we make it clear that the respondents are liable to restore not only the pension as ordered by this Court in the said judgment but also all the attendant benefits as given to the Central Government pensioners. We hold that there was some genuine doubt on the part of the respondents in construing and giving effect to the judgment of this court and therefore, there is no contempt. We now direct the respondents to comply with the judgment of this Court as explained herein before within three months from this date.�

In another case reported in (1984) 2 Supreme Court Cases 646, Union of India and others v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. and others, where the order of the High Court was not complied with as no time limit was provided by the High Court, Apex Court ruled that in the absence of any time limit, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to proceed with the contempt proceedings. Relevant portion from the judgment of Union of India and others'' case (supra) is reproduced as under:

�7��The High Court not having set any limit of time for the disposal of the applications, it was not for the writ petitioners to impose a time limit and demand that their applications should be disposed of forthwith. If the petitioners were aggrieved by the failure of their authorities to dispose of their applications expeditiously. It was open to seek a further direction from the court to fixing a limit of time within which the applications were to be disposed of. We failed to see how the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports could be said to have committed any contempt of court, even primafacie, by their mere failure to take action in the matter of the disposal of the applications of the writ petitions. In the circumstances, we perceive the application to commit the authorities for contempt of court to be a device to exact licenses from them.�

In another case reported in (2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 400, R.N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others, the Apex Court ruled that the power of contempt should not be used for execution of a decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. It was further held by the Apex Court that once the order has been made by suppressing the material facts by commission of fraud then the contempt proceeding does not call for. Relevant portion from R.N. Day and others'' case is reproduced as under:

�7. We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt of not be used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to the court is to be exercised for maintenance of the court''s dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist that the court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is between the contemner and the court. It is true that in the present case, the High Court has kept the matter pending and has ordered that it should be heard along with the first appeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that under the coercion of contempt proceeding, appellants cannot be directed to pay the compensation amount which they are disputing by asserting that claimants were not the owners of the property in question and that decree was obtained by suppressing the material fact and by fraud. Even presuming that the claimants are entitled to recover the amount of compensation as awarded by the trial court as no stay order is granted by the High Court, at the most they are entitled to recover the same by executing the said award wherein the State can or may contend that the award is nullity. In such a situation, as there was no willful or deliberate disobedience of the order, the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly unjustified.�

In another case reported in 2003 (1) Allahabad (sicARC) 545, Savitri Devi (Smt.) v. Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gorakhpur and others, after considering various pronouncement by the Apex Court as well as this Court Hon''ble Single Judge (Hon''ble Justice (Dr.) B.S. Chauhan) held that the proceeding under Order 39 Rule 2A was initiated on account of wilful disobedience of the injunction order is partly a quasi criminal proceeding and punitive in nature. Special provision shall prevail over general law while dealing with the law relating to contempt under Contempt of Courts Act vis�vis provisions contained in Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Savitri Devi (supra) relying upon the various judgment of the Apex Court as well as Privy Council, it has been held that if a deed is executed in violation of an interim order, the same shall be nullity under the law (Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathi Maharaj, AIR 1967 SC 1386) and action taken in disobedience of the court''s order shall be nullity. It has been further held that proceeding under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure are analogous to the contempt proceedings. But the special provisions contained in a statute shall prevail over the general law of contempt under the Contempt of Court''s Act. A person can be punished for committing contempt of court even if the matter is disposed of finally. For convenience, relevant portion from the judgment of Savitri Devi''s case is reproduced as under:

�18. In Kochira Krishnan v. Josheph Desouza, AIR 1986 Kr. 63, it has been held that violation of injunction or even undertaking given before the Court is punishable under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Code. The punishment can be imposed even if the matter stood disposed of, for the reason that the court is concerned only with the question whether there was a disobedience of the order of injunction or violation of an undertaking given before the court and not with the ultimate decision in the matter. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Eastern Trust Co. v. Makenzie Mann and Co. Ltd., AIR 1915 PC 106, wherein it had been observed as under:

�An injunction although subsequently discharged because the plaintiffs'' case failed, must be obeyed while it lasts���

In Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General for Trindiad and Tabrgo, AIR 1936 PC 141, the Privy Council has observed that the proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act are quasi judicial in nature and the orders passed in those proceedings are to be treated as orders passed in criminal cases. In Sukhdeo Singh v. Hon''ble The Chief Justice Teja Singh and Hon''ble Justice The Par Pepsu High Court at Patila, AIR 1954 SC 186, the Supreme Court has taken the same view.�

In another case reported in (2005) 6 Supreme Court Cases 98, Director of Education, Uttranchal and others v. Ved Prakash Joshi and others, the Apex Court has again reiterated the principles discussed herein above and held that the contempt of court is concerned, with the question as to whether its order has been complied with or not. It shall not be permissible for the contempt court to examine the correctness of earlier judgment or order and for any grievance, only option open for the parties concerned is to approach the higher forum. Flouting of an order of court shall render a party liable for contempt. Neither it can traverse beyond the order nor it can test the correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. Relevant portion from the case of Director of Education, Uttranchal and others is reproduced as under:

�7. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view different than what was taken in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non compliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside.�

In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law that the court dealing with the contempt matters has got no right to look into the correctness or illegality of an order. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted for the adjournment of the contempt proceedings either on the ground of pending of Special Appeal or application for Vacation of interim order. Some of the Special Appeals have been filed alongwith the applications moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in which notices have been issued but delay has not been condoned. In some of the cases, Division Bench has heard the Special Appeals, but has not passed any interim order inspite of arguments advanced by the appellants'' counsel. In some cases, applications for vacation of the Interim Orders are pending since last several years. Simultaneously, in some cases, Special Appeals are pending without any interim orders.

In the case of Ram Ashish Ram (supra), it has been held that in case, stay vacation application is not decided within two weeks, interim order shall be deemed to be vacated in view of the provision contained in Clause 3 of the Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been further held in said case that proceeding of contempt of Court is the matter between the court and the contemner. Petitioner has only right to invite attention of the court to the facts and circumstances which according to him, contempt has been committed. It is for the court to consider whether its'' contempt has been actually committed or not? Hon''ble Single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid case has further held that it shall be highly unjust on the part of the court to proceed with the contempt proceedings without deciding the Stay Vacation Applications and punish the contemner. However, the observations made by the Hon''ble Single Judge does not have got support in view of the various pronouncements of the Apex Court referred herein above.

In the case of Jammu & Kashmir (supra), Hon''ble Supreme Court had observed that contempt proceeding should be deferred in case the order under the writ jurisdiction is passed by concealing material facts and more so when the time for compliance was not provided by the High Court while passing the interim order. Hon''ble Supreme Court had further held that while dealing with the contempt proceedings a contemner may not be called upon to make the merit of the claim at the risk of being punished.

In the case of Raja Ram (supra), Hon''ble Single Judge while interpreting the Sections 10 & 12 of the Contempt of Court Act, held that the provisions of Contempt of Court can not be used like executing a decree of the Civil Court. Plaintiffs have to prove the wilful default on the part of the contemner and the contemner will have a right to show that order sought to be enforced was incapable of being executed.

In another unreported Criminal Misc. Case No.551 (C)/1998, Ram Pratap Singh v. V.D. Maurya, decided on 24th of April, 1998, this Court had relied upon the Apex Court judgment in the case of Mohd. Yaqub Khan while deferring the contempt proceedings.

In the case of India Literacy Board (supra), without expressing any opinion on merit, the Apex Court had directed the High Court to decide the Writ Petition which was ripe of hearing.

We may take notice of the fact that during the last 10 years filing of contempt petitions in this Court (Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court) has been on increasing trend. It shows that interim orders or judgments of this Court are not being complied with by the authorities for one or the other reason. The situation seems to be alarming. The litigants are being compelled to approach this Court under the contempt jurisdiction. In case, appropriate steps are not taken, then it shall shake up people''s faith in the administration of justice. According to office report from the year 1994 to 2004, the number of contempt cases instituted before the Single Judge as well as Division Bench are as under:

Year Single Judge Division Bench

1994 1299 5

1995 833 9

1996 1194 5

1997 1276 2

1998 956 4

1999 1790 5

2000 2676 4

2001 2003 16

2002 2036 5

2003 1855 5

2004 2280 7

It can safely be inferred that in the respective cases referred hereinabove the litigants were compelled to approach this Court under contempt jurisdiction. It can not be said that in all those cases the petitioners had approached this Court on unfounded ground or without reasonable cause or by fraudulent acts. It shall be a bad day for the democracy when people will lose their faith in the administration of justice. Orders and judgments of this Court should be honoured and enforced. This Court is not powerless to enforce its orders.

FINDINGS

In view of the above, from the facts and circumstances and provision of law discussed herein above, the law emerges on the questions raised before this Court may be summarized as under:

(1) Mere filing of Stay Vacation application or pendency of a Special Appeal, ordinarily shall not be a ground to defer the contempt proceedings, awaiting the outcome of the Special Appeal or Stay Vacation Application.

(2) In case, an interim order is passed or final judgment is given relying upon the pleadings based on the concealment of material facts or fraudulent act, then contempt proceeding should be deferred till the final outcome of Stay Vacation Application or appeal.

(3) In case, the compliance of interim order may cause serious prejudice to the parties and application for Vacation of interim order filed in the Special Appeal or in the writ petition is likely to be taken up at an early date and the petitioner of the contempt petition is cooperating for expeditious disposal of the Special Appeal or Stay Vacation Application, then Hon''ble Judge in his discretion may defer the contempt proceeding for a reasonable period, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

(4) In case, a Stay Vacation application is filed or a special Appeal is pending without any final outcome or the provision of appeal or pendency of stay vacation application is abused without making any effort for their disposal, then it shall not be necessary for the contempt Judge to defer the contempt proceedings.

(5) In case a time barred Special Appeal is filed alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the same is pending without deciding the application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, then the contempt proceeding ordinarily may not be deferred and the contempt Judge seized with the contempt matters may proceed with the petition.

(6) Moreover, since the controversy relating to contempt of court is a matter between the court and contemner, it shall always be open to the contempt judge to take appropriate decision subject to observation made hereinabove as the implementation of order or judgment of this Court is necessary to maintain the majesty of law and to get alive the people''s faith in the administration of justice.

(7) Since as settled by Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Nahata (supra) as well as in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) and other cases that the power to proceed under Contempt of Court Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary power, it is for the contempt Judge to exercise such discretionary power keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case subject to aforementioned restraints.

The applications or objections raised by the respondents in these bunch of petitions are disposed of accordingly. Let the petitions be listed before appropriate court for further proceedings in accordance to law.

(Ordered accordingly)