Bhupehdra Singh vs State of U.P. and Others

Ashok Srivastava, J.—This special appeal is directed against the Judgment and order dated 26.2.2010, passed by learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 72081 of 2005.

The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that there is an Akhil Bhartiya Gujar Vidya pracharni Sabha which is a registered society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The society has its own registered bye-laws. The election for the office of the President and the Secretary of the society alone are held amongst the members of the General Body and the aforesaid two office bearers, thereafter, co-opt the other office bearers of the society.

In the present case, the dispute relates to the election of the President of the society. The election of the President and Secretary of the society took place on 15.6.2005. The counting was done on the same day and the petitioner-respondent Mahipal Singh was elected as President. The oath was administered by the Election Officer before the statue of Multan Singh on the same day. The appellant Bhupendra Singh who had lost the election of the President filed an application before the Election Officer for recounting of votes levelling certain allegations of bungling and malpractice in the counting process. After receiving the said application, the matter was referred to the Executive Committee by the Election Officer and the agenda was circulated on 17.6.2005 fixing 21.6.2005 for considering the recounting of the votes. The Executive Committee met on 21.6.2005 and after due deliberations, the decision was taken for recounting of votes and 27.6.2005 was fixed for the purpose. Challenging the decision and consequential order for recounting passed by the Executive Committee, the respondent No. 5 Mahipal Singh filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46925 of 2005 which was dismissed on 18.7.2005 as not pressed with liberty to file a fresh writ petition.

On the date fixed, i.e., 27.6.2005 recounting of votes was done and in the recounting 1,233 votes were counted in favour of respondent No. 5, Mahipal Singh and 1,282 votes in favour of the appellant. On the basis of recounting, the result was declared on 27.6.2005 itself in which the appellant was declared as President. It appears that pursuant to the declaration of the result dated 27.6.2005 electing the appellant as President, an order was passed by the Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U. P., Lucknow on 13.7.2005 approving the said election. This order of the Registrar was challenged through Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52761 of 2005 which was allowed by this Court and the Prescribed Authority was directed to decide the matter afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, pursuant to the reference made by Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits. Thereafter, an order was passed by the Prescribed Authority on 24.10.2005 keeping in view the above mentioned directions given by this Court. Feeling aggrieved by the said order. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 72081 of 2005 was filed which was allowed by the learned single Judge vide his order dated 26.2.2010, impugned in this special appeal.

We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records.

Mr. M. D. Singh Shekhar, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of this special appeal. He has submitted that the impugned order, passed by the Prescribed Authority has been passed u/s 25(1) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. An order passed by the Prescribed Authority u/s 25(1) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is final, so far as the Act of 1860 is concerned. He has further contended that once an order u/s 25(1) is passed by the Prescribed Authority recognizing the State of elections it automatically follows that the list of office bearers is to be registered and if the elections are disapproved, the list would lose its sanctity. It has also been submitted by Mr. Shekhar that the Act of 1860 does not contemplate any appeal or revision against the order of the Prescribed Authority passed u/s 25(1) and it cannot be disputed that an order passed under this section in respect of right given to the office bearers of the society is final and conclusive. It is also contended that merely because an order passed by the Prescribed Authority is subject to orders of the civil court will not make it an order which has not attained its finality and, therefore, merely because an order of the Prescribed Authority u/s 25(1) can be challenged by way of a civil suit will not mean that the order has not become final so far as the Act of 1860 is concerned.

In support of his contention Sri Shekhar has filed before us a'' Division Bench ruling of this Court which is Mohd. Tabib Khan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, .

No law or ruling has been cited from the side of the appellant against Mohd. Tabib Khan''s case (supra).

Relevant paragraphs No. 26 and 27 of the abovementioned case are as follows:

We are in full agreement with the Judgment and order of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jai Prakash Agarwal (supra) and that the Full Bench of this Court has not laid down any law to the controversy in the case of Sri Kashi Raj Mahavidyalya. Aurai (supra) and therefore, hold that the present special appeal which has been filed under Chapter VIII. Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 against the Judgment and order of the learned single Judge arising out of an order of the Prescribed Authority u/s 25(1) of the Societies Registration Act is legally not maintainable.

The special appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.

In the instant case, the order of the Prescribed Authority has been challenged by way of writ petition which has been disposed of by the learned single Judge, therefore, the Judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge cannot be challenged by way of special appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.

Keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in Mohd. Tabib Khan''s case (supra), we are of the view that this special appeal is not maintainable.

Therefore, the special appeal is dismissed as not maintainable, however, without imposing any cost.