Bhura Ram @APPELLANT@Hash State of Rajasthan & Ors.

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:

“It is therefore, humbly and respectfully prayed that this writ petition of the petitioner may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate writ, order or direction:

(i) the order dated 11.4.2008 (Annex.11) passed bythe respondent No.3 may please be quashed and set aside,

(ii) Any other appropriate order or direction, which thisHon’ble Court deems fit and just in favour of the petitioner be also passed.â€​

In bare essentials, the facts of this case, as noticed by this Court, are that the petitioner was selected as Constable in the Rajasthan Police against the vacancy for the year 2005-2006 and was posted as Police Constable

at District Rajsamand by the respondent No.3 vide order dated 11.04.2006, which is Annexure1 of the writ petition.

The petitioner applied for four days’ leave on 02.01.2008, and while the same was sanctioned, the petitioner proceeded on leave.

The petitioner went to Doongarpur on 06.01.2008, while accompanying the nephew of one of his colleague, who was to appear in the written examination for the post of Police Constable scheduled to be held on

06.01.2008 at Doongarpur. On the same day i.e. 06.01.2008, the petitioner faced the FIR bearing No.06/2008, which was registered against him at Police Station Kotwali, Doongarpur for the offences under Sections 447 &

379 IPC and Section 6 of the Rajasthan Public Examination Act, 1992.

The petitioner thereafter, was arrested and remained in custody till 17.01.2008, and was released on bail by the competent court on 18.01.2008. On 18.01.2008 itself, after his release on bail, the petitioner joined his duties

at Police Lines, Rajsamand.

The respondents sought explanation from the petitioner regarding the aforementioned FIR being registered against him, whereupon the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation on 09.01.2008.

The petitioner was thereafter, suspended, while invoking the provisions of Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (henceforth to be referred to as ‘the CCA Rules’)

by the respondents, while an enquiry was contemplated against him.

On 24.01.2008, a charge-sheet, which is Annexure-4 of the writ petition, was issued against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, and the same was received by him on 28.01.2008; the petitioner submitted a

detailed reply to the said charge-sheet on 28.02.2008.

On 05.03.2008, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked, and on the same date, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rajsamand was appointed as enquiry officer in the departmental enquiry pending against the

petitioner.

Thereafter, the enquiry officer issued a notice to the petitioner on 27.03.2008, while directing him to remain present in his office on 03.04.2008. While the enquiry proceedings were being initiated, the petitioner was

served with an order dated 11.04.2008 passed by the respondent No.3, whereby the petitioner was discharged from the service, on completion of his probation period, on account of grave misconduct of the petitioner. The

respondent No.3 discharged the petitioner from service, while invoking the provisions of Rule 39 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989.

The aforementioned impugned order dated 11.04.2008 is quoted hereinbelow, for ready reference:-

“dk;kZy; ftyk iqfyl v/kh{kd] jktleUn ¼jkt½

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                               fnukad % 11-04-08

vknsâ€​k

Jh Hkwjk jke dkafu u-702 rSukr iqfyl ykbZu jktleUn dks bl dk;kZy; ds vkns’k Mhvksch Øekad 307 fnukad 11-4-06 }kjk nks o""kZ dh ifjoh{kk/khu vo/kh ij fu;qDr fd;k Fkk] ftldh vuqikyuk esa dkfu }kjk fnukad 15-4-06

dks iwokZg~u esa TokWbZu dh gSA dkfu dh nks o""kZ dh ifjoh{kk/khu vo/kh fnukad 15-04-08 dks iw.kZ gks jgh gSA dkfu dk ifjfo{kk/khu vo/kh dk dk;Zfooj.k ns[kk x;k rFkk O;fDrxr x;kA dkfu- dk ifjfo{kk/khu vo/kh esa

xaHkhj nqjkpj.k ik;k x;k] ftlls iqfyl dh cnukeh gqbZA dkfu dk ifjfo{kk/khu vo/kh esa xaHkhj nqjkpj.k ik;k tkus ,oa dk;Z larks""ktud ugha gksus ls dkfu dks jktLFkku iqfyl vf/kuLFk lsok fu;e] 1989 fu;e 39 ds vUrxZr rqjUr

izHkko ls jkT; lsok ls i`Fkd fd;k tkrk gSA

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ftyk iqfyl v/kh{kd jktleUnâ€​

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.Pritam Solanki has submitted that the order dated 11.04.2008 is contrary to the settled principles of law, as the petitioner was discharged from service on the ground of grave

misconduct, and since the order of discharge from the service was punitive and casts a stigma on the petitioner, therefore, it was imperative upon the respondents to hold a regular departmental enquiry, before doing so.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the impugned order was bad in law, as the departmental enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules was already initiated, and thus, the

petitioner could not have been discharged from service on the sole ground of completion of his probation period.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the impugned order has attributed serious misconduct against the petitioner, and therefore, the order was stigmatic, and thus, calls for a regular departmental

enquiry, rather than summary discharge of the petitioner from the service, on count of the petitioner being on probation.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that had the order of discharge of the petitioner from service been passed on account of his services being unsatisfactory during the probation period, then the

respondents could have justified the impugned order; but in light of the fact that the departmental enquiry had already been initiated against the petitioner and the fact that the impugned order was extremely stigmatic and

punitive, such discharge of the petitioner from service was bad in law.

In reinforcement of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India & Anr., reported in AIR

1984 SC 636, relevant portion of which reads as under:-

“12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged to go behind the

form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the court would not be

debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee.

In the instant case, the period of probation had not yet been over. The impugned order of discharge was passed in the middle of the probationary period. An explanation was called for from the appellant regarding the

alleged act of indiscipline, namely, arriving late at the gymnasium and acting as one of the ringleaders on the occasion and his explanation was obtained. Similar explanations were called for from other probationers and

enquiries were made behind the back of the appellant. Only the case of the appellant was dealt with severely in the end. The cases of other probationers who were also considered to be ringleaders were not seriously taken

note of. Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation

of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the

alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been

afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

The Union of India has placed before us all the relevant material including the recommendation of the Director of the National Police Academy that the appellant may be reinstated. In this case, as stated above,

explanation was called for from the appellant and other probationers. Explanations were received and all the probationers including the appellant were individually interviewed in order to ascertain facts. Explanation

submitted by him and the answers given by others had weighed with the Director before making the recommendation to the Government of India on the basis of which action was taken. The only ground which ultimately

prevailed upon the Director was that the appellant had not shown any sign of repentance without informing him that his case would be dealt with leniently if he showed any sign of repentance. In fact in the very first reply

he gave to the Director on being asked about the incident which took place on June 22, 1981, the appellant stated “I sincerely regret the lapseâ€. Neither in the letter which the Director first wrote to the Central

Government nor in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court, due importance has been given to the said expression of regret and it is further seen that no additional lapse on the part of the appellant between June 22, 1981 and

the date on which the Director wrote the letter to the Central Government, which would show that the appellant had not shown any sign of repentance is pointed out, although there is a reference to his reporting to duty late

on an earlier date on June 1, 1981. On going through the above record before the Court and taking into account all the attendant circumstances we are satisfied that the Director wished to make the case of the appellant an

example for others including those other probationers who were similarly situated so that they may learn a lesson therefrom.

A narration of the facts of the case leaves no doubt that the alleged act of misconduct on June 22, 1981 was the real foundation for the action taken against the appellant and that the other instances stated in the course

of the counteraffidavit are mere allegations which are put forward only for purposes of strengthening the defence which is otherwise very weak. The case is one which attracted Article 311(2) of the Constitution as the

impugned order amounts to a termination of service by way of punishment and an enquiry should have been held in accordance with the said constitutional provision. That admittedly having not been done, the impugned

order is liable to be struck down. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and the impugned order dated November 9, 1981 discharging the appellant from service. The appellant should now be reinstated in

service with the same rank and seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order was passed as if it had not been passed at all. He is also entitled to all consequential benefits including the appropriate year of allotment

and the arrears of salary and allowances upto the date of his reinstatement. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

The appellant had to face this case just at the commencement of his career. We have allowed his claim in the name of the Constitution. This should help him to regain his spirit and also encourage him to turn out to be a

public servant in the true sense of that expression.â€​

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in V.P. Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (2000)

3 SCC 239, relevant portion of which reads as under:-

The observation of the High Court that:

“The impugned order is not stigmatic and nothing at all has been urged that may detract from such an order being passed during the currency of probation.†is surprising, to say the least. The order by which the

services of the appellant were terminated has already been quoted by us above. The order, ex facie, is stigmatic as also punitive. The order is founded on the ground that the appellant had failed in the performance of his

duties administratively and technically. It is for this reason that the services of the appellant were terminated. As pointed out above, the order, ex facie, is stigmatic.

Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the appellant, after appointment, was placed on probation and though the period of probation was two years, his services could be terminated at any time during

the period of probation without any notice, as set out in the appointment letter. It is contended that the appellant cannot claim any right on the post on which he was appointed and being on probation, his work and conduct

was all along under scrutiny and since his work was not satisfactory, his services were terminated in terms of the conditions set out in the appointment order. This plea cannot be accepted.

A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the

principles of natural justice.

The affidavits filed by the parties before the High Court as also in this Court indicate the background in which the order, terminating the services of the appellant, came to be passed. Such an order which, on the face of

it, is stigmatic, could not have been passed without holding a regular inquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant.

The entire case-law with respect to a “probationer†was reviewed by this Court in a recent decision in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences [(1999) 3 SCC 60 : 1999

SCC (L&S) 596 : AIR 1999 SC 983 : JT (1999) 1 SC 396] . This decision fully covers the instant case as well, particularly as in this case, the order impugned is stigmatic on the face of it.

For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment dated 26-3-1999, passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition of the appellant is allowed. The order dated 2-121998, by which the services

of the appellant were terminated, is quashed with the direction that he shall be put back on duty with all consequential benefits. No costs.â€​

Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic

Sciences, Calcutta & Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60, relevant portion of which reads as under:-

“33. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee, Model Inter College [(1984) 3 SCC 384 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 555] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. In that case,

the order of termination of probation, which is extracted in the judgment, reads as follows: (SCC p. 386, para 1)

“With reference to the above (viz. termination of service as Principal), I have to mention that in view of Resolution No. 2 of the Managing Committee dated April 27, 1969 (copy enclosed) and subsequent approval by

the D.I.O.S., Bulandshahr, you are hereby informed that your service as Principal of this Institution is terminated….â€​

Now the copy of the resolution of the Managing Committee appended to the order of termination stated that the report of the Manager was read at the meeting and that the facts contained in the report of the Manager

being serious and not in the interests of the institution, that therefore the Committee unanimously resolved to terminate his probation. The report of the Manager was not extracted in the enclosure to the termination order

but was extracted in the counter filed in the case and read as follows: (SCC p. 388, para 3)

“It will be evident from the above that the Principal's stay will not be in the interest of the Institution. It is also evident that the seriousness of the lapses is enough to justify dismissal but no educational institution should

take all this botheration. As such my suggestion is that our purpose will be served by termination of his services. Why, then, we should enter into any botheration. For this, i.e., for termination of his period of probation, too,

the approval of the D.I.O.S. will be necessary. Accordingly, any delay in this matter may also be harmful to our interests.

Accordingly, I suggest that instead of taking any serious action, the period of probation of Shri Inder Pal Gupta be terminated without waiting for the period to end.â€​

It was held by Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) (p. 392) that the letter of termination referred to the resolution of the Managing Committee, that the said resolution was made part of the order as an enclosure and that

the resolution in its turn referred to the report of the Manager. A copy of the Manager's report had been filed along with the counter and the said report was the “foundationâ€. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) held

that the Manager's report contained words amounting to a stigma. The learned Judge said: “This is a clear case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing a penalty of

termination of service on the ground of misconduct …â€, that these findings in the Manager's report amounted to a “mark of disgrace or infamy†and that the appellant there was visited with evil consequences. The

officer was reinstated with all the benefits of back wages and continuity of service.

It will be seen from the above case that the resolution of the Committee was part of the termination order being an enclosure to it. But the offensive part was not really contained in the order of termination nor in the

resolution which was an enclosure to the order of termination but in the Manager's report which was referred to in the enclosure. The said report of the Manager was placed before the Court along with the counter. The

allegations in the Manager's report were the basis for the termination and the said report contained words amounting to a stigma. The termination order was, as stated above, set aside.

The above decision is, in our view, a clear authority for the proposition that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer but might be contained in any

document referred to in the termination order or in its annexures. Obviously, such a document could be asked for or called for by any future employer of the probationer. In such a case, the order of termination would stand

vitiated on the ground that no regular enquiry was conducted. We shall presently consider whether, on the facts of the case before us, the documents referred to in the impugned order contain any stigma.

On this point, therefore, we hold that the words amounting to “stigma†need not be contained in the order of termination but may also be contained in an order or proceeding referred to in the order of termination or

in an annexure thereto and would vitiate the order of termination. Point 3 is decided accordingly.â€​

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, Mr.Anil Bissa has submitted that the petitioner was involved in unfair means scandal in connection with the police constable recruitment examination, and when the

petitioner was arrested, he was found in possession of the question paper of the said examination alongwith cash of Rs.60,000/- and a mobile phone.

Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the petitioner was directly involved in the unfair activity by solving the question paper for a candidate namely, Prem Prakash, in lieu of Rs.60,000/-, and

therefore, the local police registered an FIR against the petitioner and he was arrested, and thereafter, released on bail by the competent court, as mentioned above.

Learned counsel for the respondents also justified the invocation of Rule 39 of the Rules of 1989 by the respondents, for the purpose of discharging the petitioner from service.

Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the departmental enquiry against the petitioner was not completed, as the petitioner was undergoing his probation period, and the respondents were thus,

justified in doing away with his services in accordance with the Rules of 1989.

Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chaitanya Prakash & Anr. Vs. H. Omkarappa (Civil Appeal No.2786/2007 decided on 12.01.2010),

relevant para 20 of which reads as under:-

In our considered opinion, the ratio of the abovereferred decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The respondent was time and again informed during the probation period about his deficiencies

and was given ample opportunities to improve them. Therefore, enough precautions were taken by the appellants to see that the respondent improved his performance and such an opportunity was provided to him. But such

advices and opportunity were totally misplaced as the respondent considered the same as unnecessary encroachment and interference in his work and wrote back rudely in an intemperate language. Whether or not a

person is suitable to be retained and confirmed in service could be considered and assessed by the Managing Director, namely, appellant no. 1, but he after making an appraisal submitted his report along with all other

records of the respondent before the Board of Directors, who finally took the decision. The Board of Directors constituted of responsible persons and they while deciding the suitability of the respondent not only considered

the Performance Assessment Report but also considered all other records, and thereafter they took a considered and conscious decision that the respondent was not suitable for confirmation and terminate his service. The

said decision of the Board of Directors appears to be in parity with the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of this Court (supra). The reasons mentioned in the letter dated 29.11.1999 terminating the services of the respondent

cannot be said to be stigmatic. The appellant had time and again specifically brought to the notice of the respondent his short comings and no misconduct as such is alleged against the respondent by the appellant and

therefore the present case is a case of termination simpliciter due to unsuitability of the respondent and not a case of punishment for misconduct.â€​

Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Kohli Vs. High Court of J & K & Anr. (Writ Petition (Civil) No.95/2004 decided on

21.09.2010), relevant portion of which reads as under:-

“23.In the present case, the order of termination is a fall out of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. Such satisfaction even if

recorded that his service is unsatisfactory would not make the order stigmatic or punitive as sought to be submitted by the petitioner. On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, the matter was referred to the State

Government for issuing necessary orders.

24.One of the issues that were raised by the petitioner was that he was granted two increments during the period of two and a half years of his service. Therefore the stand taken by the respondents that his service was

unsatisfactory is belied according to the petitioner because of the aforesaid action even on the part of the respondents impliedly accepting the position that his service was satisfactory.

25.The aforesaid submission of the petitioner is devoid of any merit in view of the fact that since the petitioner was continuing in service, therefore, the case for granting increment was required to be considered which was

so granted. The mere granting of yearly increments would not in any manner indicate that after completion of the probation period the full court of the High Court was not competent to scrutinize his records and on the

basis thereof take a decision as to whether or not his service should be confirmed or dispensed with or whether his probation period should be extended. The High Court has a solemn duty to consider and appreciate the

service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service. The district judiciary is the bedrock of our judicial system and is positioned at the primary level of entry to the doors of justice. In providing the opportunity of

access to justice to the people of the country, the judicial officers who are entrusted with the task of adjudication must officiate in a manner that is becoming of their position and responsibility towards society.

26.Upright and honest judicial officers are needed not only to bolster the image of the judiciary in the eyes of litigants, but also to sustain the culture of integrity, virtue and ethics among judges. The public's perception of the

judiciary matters just as much as its role in dispute resolution. The credibility of the entire judiciary is often undermined by isolated acts of transgression by a few members of the Bench, and therefore it is imperative to

maintain a high benchmark of honesty, accountability and good conduct.â€​

Learned counsel for the petitioner, in his rejoinder arguments, has however, shown to this Court the order dated 06.09.2013 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Doongarpur in Criminal Case

No.396/2012 (CJM Court60/08), acquitting the petitioner in the said criminal case, while giving him the benefit of doubt.

Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case alongwith the precedent laws cited at the Bar.

On a bare perusal of the impugned order dated 11.04.2008, this Court finds that the respondents have clearly attributed the proven misconduct against the petitioner. Had the respondents passed the impugned order

only on the count of unsatisfactory services of the petitioner during the probation period, then the impugned order would have been justified. But in this case, this Court finds that the respondent authority has categorically

attributed serious misconduct to the petitioner, which has caused defame to the police service.

This Court also takes note of the fact that the petitioner has been acquitted by the competent court, vide its order dated 06.09.2013, from the criminal proceedings, that were lodged against him in pursuance of FIR

No.06/2008, which was registered against him at Police Station Kotwali, Doongarpur for the offences under Sections 447 & 379 IPC and Section 6 of the Rajasthan Public Examination Act, 1992.

This Court further finds that though the petitioner was on probation, and this kind of conduct of the petitioner shall definitely entitles the respondents to discontinue the services of the petitioner on the count of the same

being unsatisfactory, but since the respondents have chosen to attribute serious misconduct to the petitioner and have pronounced him guilty of such misconduct in the impugned order, therefore, the impugned order would

not fall within the term of termination/discharge simpliciter, which could be done to an employee on probation.

The rigours of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India provides for a constitutional scheme of protecting the government employee, and once the foundation of the impugned order is traceable to a stigma, then the

respondents cannot be permitted to pass such an order discharging the petitioner from service, on the ground of misconduct, with the mark of disgrace and defamation to the police force. The respondents could not have

done the same without conducting a proper regular departmental enquiry. The respondents had a chance to pass the order of discharge of the petitioner from service simpliciter, or to have gone ahead with the departmental

enquiry, which was already initiated against the petitioner vide charge-sheet dated 24.01.2008 (Annexure-4 of the writ petition).

On a bare perusal of the precedent laws cited by learned counsel for both the parties, this Court finds that the Hon’ble Apex Court has also settled the law, in no uncertain terms, that if the termination order was

passed on the basis of a criminal case being registered against the delinquent employee, the authority concerned shall be required to conduct a proper enquiry under the CCA Rules.

Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India gives a reasonable opportunity to all the government employees, and the same reads as under:

“(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in

respect of those charges Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be

necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply

(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank ins satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry;

or

(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.â€​

It is clear from the aforementioned precedent laws that the impugned order of discharge/termination from service is a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct, and the order virtually is an order of

punishment, as it would debar the employee from any future employment, and shall infringe his deep-rooted constitutional rights conferred by law upon the employee.

It is not disputed that the undergoing probation period entitles the employer to discharge the employee from service, on his services being found unsatisfactory, but once it has been categorically mentioned in the

impugned order that there was proven serious misconduct against the petitioner, then it is inevitable that such an order of discharge from service should fall on the ground, as the petitioner has not been afforded the

reasonable opportunity to defend himself, as envisaged in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, as reproduced hereinabove.

It is also apparent that the petitioner has been acquitted by the competent court in the criminal case, registered against him, in pursuance of the aforementioned FIR, and the sole basis for passing the impugned order

was the proven misconduct of the petitioner bringing defame to the police force.

Thus, this Court finds that it is clearly a case, which attracts the rigours of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, as the impugned order amounts to termination/discharge from service by way of punishment, which

could not have been done, without holding a proper regular departmental enquiry, in accordance with law.

Although, this Court is conscious of the fact that the allegations against the petitioner are unbecoming of a police personnel, and if proved, would definitely cast a shadow on the police force as a whole, but being

weighed against the constitutional protection available to the petitioner under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, this Court is left with no other option, but to maintain the constitutional protection already available to

the government employee.

In light of the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition is allowed, to the extent of quashing and setting aside the  impugned order dated 11.04.2008 (Annexure-11). The respondents are directed to reinstate

the petitioner back in service forthwith. However, the fate of the petitioner’s service would be subject to the respondents deciding to complete the departmental enquiry initiated against the petitioner vide charge-sheet

dated 24.01.2008 (Annexure-4 of the writ petition). However, the respondents shall be at liberty to proceed with the proceedings in consequence of the said charge-sheet and reach to a logical conclusion, if they so deemed

it appropriate. In such an eventuality, the future of the petitioner in service shall depend upon the outcome of the departmental enquiry under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, as already initiated by the respondents. However, if

the respondents choose not to go ahead with the said enquiry, then the petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential service benefits. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be entitled for notional benefits, for

the period he has not served the respondents.