Bhushan Kumar vs Malkiat Singh

Mahesh Grover, J.—These two revision petitions are being disposed of by a common order as these pertain to the same premises which have been taken on rent by the petitioner and on account of which two separate eviction petitions were filed by the respondent-landlord.

Initially the respondent-landlord filed eviction petition u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 against the petitioner seeking his eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. It was pleaded by him that a rent note was executed between the petitioner and the respondent which contemplated the monthly rent of the premises @ Rs. 1,200/- per month to be increased @ 5% per annum. At the time of filing of the petition it was claimed that the rate of rent was Rs. 1,260/- per month and the petitioner was said to be in arrears of rent w.e.f. February, 2005 till the time of filing of the petition.

The petitioner controverted the allegations. The Rent Controller disbelieved the version of the petitioner and ordered his eviction and directed him to make the payment of rent within a period of one month from the date of passing of the order. The petitioner did not comply with the order of the Rent Controller but chose to challenge the same. In appeal the findings were affirmed. However, at the time of commencement of the appeal the petitioner was granted some time to deposit the rent which he did. During the pendency of these proceedings the respondent-landlord filed another petition for eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question by taking the plea of personal necessity as well. The Rent Controller upon appraisal of the material before it qua the issue of personal necessity accepted the plea of the respondent and ordered the eviction of the petitioner. The Appellate Authority did likewise. This is the subject-matter of Civil Revision No. 8130 of 2010, while the other civil revision bearing No. 8204 of 2010 is the outcome of the grievance of the petitioner against the orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in a petition which was preferred by the respondent pertaining to non-payment of rent alone.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent is a retired Army official who superannuated in the year 2001 and at that point of time he never expressed his desire to start his business and the petition was preferred on the ground of personal necessity in the year 2006. He contended that the bona fides of the respondent are seriously in question for the simple reason that when the initial petition was filed it was merely on the ground of nonpayment of rent and the ground of personal necessity was never raised. He contended that the respondent-landlord is a man of affluence and consequently it cannot be expected of him to run a business from a shop at Adampur which is about 40/50 Kms. from Jalandhar where the respondent-landlord resides. He next contended that the petitioner has been in occupation of the shop for the last about two decades and it would be extremely harsh if the eviction of the petitioner is ordered.

I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the material on record.

In so far as the question of rent is concerned, it need not be answered at this stage for the reason that the petitioner has paid the desired amount of rent to the respondent-landlord. However, as far as the question of personal necessity is concerned, the same stands answered against the petitioner and the contentions that have been raised before this Court and as noticed above are hardly persuasive to offset the findings which have been recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority.

The Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1998 (2) RCR 533, made the following observations :

The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms of the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.

In Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., it has been observed as under :-

...It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter...

Similarly, in Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal and Others, it was observed as under :-

...It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business....

It is evident from the aforesaid extracted observations of the Supreme Court that it is not for the tenant to question the need of the landlord and the mere fact that he happens a man of influence and has sufficient property, cannot discredit his expression of bona fide need which he has expressed in the petition. Besides, the apprehension of the petitioner that the demised premises may not be used for the purpose they have been got retrieved by the landlord, is also allayed by the necessary provisions in the Act which permit the tenant to repossess the premises in the eventuality of the same being not put to use as expressed in the petition.

No ground to interfere.