Bhutnath Kumar vs Nilkantha Narain Singh and Others

In this appeal by the plaintiff the only question is whether the Court below was right in dismissing the suit on the ground that he is not a registered money-lender.

The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff advanced the sum of Rs. 6,000 to the defendants on the security of a mortgage bond dated 18th June 1943. In the bond the plaintiff is described as a zamindar and not a money-lender. The bond recites that as a certificate case was instituted against the borrowers they were taking the loan to pay up the decretal amount.

In the evidence it was established that the plaintiff was an ijardhar with respect to one-third share in the estate of Indra Kumari and the defendants are also co-sharers therein, that the defendants were arrested in execution of a certificate case for the arrears of road cess for that estate and the plaintiff advanced money to them for that purpose. It is also established in the evidence that the plaintiff has not advanced any loan to anybody else. The learned Subordinate Judge finds that

the plaintiff has not advanced money to any other person and that be baa not carried on the profession of money-lending in general sense of the term and so I mast hold that he has advanced only this loan, to his co-sharers in order to oblige them as the plaintiff was also a co-sharer by virtue of an ijara deed.

The question for consideration is whether the learned Subordinate Judge was right in dismissing the suit on these findings by applying the stringent provisions of the Bihar Money-lenders Act.

The argument which appealed to the learned Subordinate Judge and which has also teen strenuously advanced by Mr. R.S. Chatterji is that it is immaterial for the purposes of the Bihar Money-lenders Act that the lender is a professional money-lender or a casual money-lender and he draws attention to the fact that the exception is made by the legislature when a person has advanced loans up to a sum of Rs. 500 and Mr. Chatterji submits that when a loan exceeds that limit the provisions of the Act must apply to the transaction, however harsh or inequitable it may seem to be. In the course of the argument attention was drawn toy us (our attention was drawn?) to the decision of the Privy Council in Srimati Renula Bose v. Rai Manmatha Nath Bose A.I.R.1915 P.C. 108, where their Lordships have observed that the provisions of the Bengal Money-lenders Act do not draw any distinction between a casual money-lender and a professional money-lender.

Since the judgment of the Subordinate Judge was pronounced there is a decision of this Court in Mt. Surajbansi Kuer v. Mt. Larho Kuer A.I.R.1946 Pat. 310, where a Division Bench has come to the conclusion that the provisions of the Act as to registration cannot apply to casual money-lending. It is pointed out, that where a person has lent money casually and does not propose to carry on any money-lending business, how can he fill up the relevant columns in the application for registration of his name where he has to show the name under which the money lending business is to be carried on and the place where the business is Jo be carried on? We are bound by the decision of the Division Bench and, therefore, cannot admit the argument of Mr. Chatterji to distinguish it on the ground that in that case the Joan was a mere accommodation loan and not a loan in the real sense of the term. If I may say so, I respectfully agree with the correctness of that decision for the following reasons--the definition of the term ''money-lender'' must be read subject to the essential qualifications "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context." The definition of the term "moneylender" is undoubtedly wide and would appear to include a casual money-lender, but read along with Sections 4 and 5 the definition must apply only to professional moneylenders or those persons who carry on business as money lenders. Unless it is read in that sense, there would be a repugnancy and contradiction in the different parts of the statute. It is a well-known rule of construction that every attempt should be made to harmonise the different parts of the statute and that each part should be construed so as to expound every other parts of the statute: see the observations in the Full Bench case of this Court in Deonandan Singh v. Ramlakhan Singh AIR 1948 Pat. 225.

The argument based upon the remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1945 108 (Privy Council) , is not of any avail to Mr. Chatterji as those remarks were in connection with a different Act of the Bengal Legislature where the provisions as to registration were different--the other provisions of the Bihar Money-lenders Act will apply to all money-lenders.

It is clear from the authorities--and this was not denied by Mr. Chatterji on behalf of the respondents--that the plaintiff was not a money-lender in the strict sense of the term as pointed out in Sano Kashinath Chowdhury v. Patitto Sabuto AIR 1942 Pat. 384.

For these reasons we would allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and decree the plaintiff''s suit with costs both in this Court and in the Court below.