Bidhan Debbarma VsSukeshan Das

All these Civil Revision Petitions, filed u/s 115 of the CPC, are taken up together for disposal by a common judgment as the identical question wades through the challenge.

The orders dated 31.03.2014 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Divn., South Tripura, Udaipur in Civil Misc. 51 of 2013 (arisen from TS 40 of 2013), in Civil Misc. 58 of 2013 (arisen from TS 43 of 2013), in Civil Misc. 52 of 2013 (arisen from TS 44 of 2013) and in Civil Misc. 57 of 2013 (arisen from TS 42 of 2013) have been called in question in these Civil Revision Petitions.

The petitioners were the defendants in the suit. By filing a petition under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the CPC the petitioners urged the Civil Judge, Sr. Divn., South Tripura, Udaipur to reject the plaint with exemplary cost inasmuch as the suit is ex facie barred by the provisions of Section 187(F) of the Tripura Land Revenue & Land Reforms Act, 1960 (TLR & LR Act, 1960, in short). Section 187(F) of the TLR & LR Act, 1960 which has been incorporated by the Tripura Land Revenue & Land Reforms (6th Amendment) Act, 1994, which came into force w.e.f. 18.10.1996, provides as under:

"187(F) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no suit for declaration of title over any land belonging to the Scheduled Tribes shall lie in a civil court and no Civil Court shall pass a decree or order by which title of land stands transferred from a person belonging to the Scheduled Tribes to a person not belonging to the Scheduled Tribes."

Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has emphatically contended that Section 187(F) of TLR & LR Act, 1960 has barred institution of any suit for declaration of title in respect of any land belonging to the Scheduled Tribes in a civil court. The said provision has expressly barred the jurisdiction of the civil courts postulating that no civil court shall pass a decree or order by which title of the land stands transferred from a person belonging to Scheduled Tribes to a person not belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the plaint wherefrom it appears that the suit is for declaration that the suit land cannot come under prohibition of Section 187(1) of TLR & LR Act, 1960 and the transfer of the said land to one Sona Miah at all cannot be held to be a transfer by a tribal to a non-tribal as the original owner Nidan Laskar belonged to Desi Tripuri Community, which has been by way of notification excluded from the list of the Scheduled Tribes in Tripura. No doubt, a declaration has been sought challenging the entry showing the land as illegally transferred in violation of the provisions of Section 187(1) of TLR & LR Act, 1960 but this is a consequential declaration. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has submitted that by rejecting the prayer for rejection of the plaint by the impugned order, the Civil Judge, Sr. Divn., South Tripura, Udaipur has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him.

Order-VII, Rule-11(d) of the CPC provides that where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint to be barred by any law the plaint shall be rejected. Having referred to this provision Mr. D.K. Das Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs has categorically submitted that in the plaint it has been categorically stated that the petitioner defendant has been recorded as the rayat in the record of rights, contrary to the title acquired by the respondent through Sona Miah etc. who by way of exchange got the title of the suit land transferred in favour. Thereafter Soma Miah et al transferred the land to the respondent-plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, Sona Miah had acquired the title from one Nidan Laskar. Said Nidan Laskar belonged to Desi Tripuri community which was subsequently excluded from the list of Scheduled Tribes for Tripura and hence the transfer from Nidan Laskar to Sona Miah etc. so far the suit land is concerned cannot be treated as transfer from a member of the tribal community to a non-tribal person. Moreover, the defendant-petitioner does not have any title over the suit land. He is a complete stranger and managed to get his name entered in the record of rights collusively. Thus, such prayers in the suit are required to be made by the plaintiff-respondent. The question of the title, therefore, cannot be established ex facie and it is a complicated question of title and for that purpose the disputes require to be duly adjudicated by the civil court. Thus, it is not a declaration simpliciter within the meaning of Section 187(F) of the TLR & LR Act, 1960 as stated by the defendant-petitioner. This is a complex question of title. Unless it is adjudicated by the civil court, no revenue court can decide such issue. Hence, there is no infirmity in the impugned orders. There is no failure in exercising the jurisdiction vested in the Civil Court while passing the impugned orders. Mr. Das Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs has relied on a decision of the apex court in Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, and a full bench decision of Gauhati High Court in Daulatram Lakhani Vs. State of Assam and Others,

This Court has scrutinized the records so produced with the petitions and appreciated the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. On a minute scrutiny of the plaint what has surfaced before this Court is that the defendant petitioners'' title over the suit land has been challenged and the entries made in the record of rights are also consequentially challenged in the suit by seeking declaration. The respondents have instituted the suit for declaring the title in their favour on two counts viz. (1) they acquired the title from one Sona Miah et al and (2) they are in the possession of the land from much before 01.01.1969 and the defendant-petitioner was never in possession of the land. The entries in the record of rights are the product of collusion. For the purpose of rejection of the plaint under Order-VII, Rule-11(d) of the CPC it must appear from the statements made in the plaint before the Court that the suit is clearly barred by any law. This is not the case presently in hand. In the The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and Others, on the question of exclusion of the civil court''s jurisdiction in relation to industrial dispute the apex court culled out four propositions which are quoted hereunder:

"(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court.

(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.

(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.

(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.

After referring that decision it was pointed out by the apex court in Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Union of India (UOI), that:

"Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations in this regard are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common-law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provides machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy haying been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of exclusionary provision, the civil court''s jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement is provided, without expressly excluding civil court''s jurisdiction, then both the common-law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the person concerned."

In Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, it is held that summary remedy for eviction provided for by the statute could be resorted to by the Government only against those persons who are unauthorized occupants of any land. It was pointed out that if there was a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it and on the basis of such decision provided by the act evict the person who is squatting. It was further observed showing kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated question of title. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the adverse possession has to be inferred in a properly constituted suit, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily. What has emanated as the general test or principles, which would govern a case, are as under:

(1) The bar would not operate if it could be shown that the entire proceeding before the revenue authority is illegal and without jurisdiction.

(2) The bar would not also apply where the remedy provided by the provisions in the Regulation is not sufficient or adequate. Similar view has also been expressed in AIR 1947 78 (Privy Council) Of course, this test is not always decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court

(3) Where there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title, the summary remedy visualized by Rules 18(2) and 18(3) of the Rules would not be sufficient to exclude the civil court''s jurisdiction.

(4) Where the right affected be one existing under the general or common law, and not created by the Regulation, jurisdiction of civil court is also open.

The Civil Court can also by framing a preliminary issue in the appropriate cases examine the question of jurisdiction even if the plaint is not rejected at the threshold. On a cursory survey it appears that the suit is poised with a complex question of title and thus it cannot be held that the suit is hit by the provisions of Section 187(F) of the TLR & LR Act, 1960 at this stage.

Having held so and without any further comment, this Court is of the considered opinion that the plaint does not warrant to be rejected by virtue of what appears from the statements in the plaint. The impugned orders, therefore, do not suffer from any infirmity. Hence, the revision petitions are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

Before parting, it is clarified that rejection of these revision petitions shall not create any bar from raising objection as to the jurisdiction of the civil court in the process of adjudicating the disputes raised in the suit.