Bikramjit Singh vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited

K. Kannan, J.

CM No. 9227 of 2014

Application is allowed, as prayed for. Document Annexure P19 is taken on record.

Civil Writ Petition No. 6779 of 2011

The writ petition contains a prayer for a mandamus to issue LPG dealership to the petitioner. The petitioner was a scheduled caste candidate who had applied for three different locations pursuant to an advertisement notification and selection held in the year 2009. The selection was by assigning marks as per the scheme set out in the notification. The experience of working in the similar field had relevance for being assigned maximum marks of 4 and in all the three places for which the petitioner had applied, he had lost out by less than 2 marks against the candidate who had been short listed as having obtained higher marks. An earlier round in CWP No. 14482 of 2010 was that he had given adequate proof of the fact that he had been employed by Sunsui Power Controls and had produced an experience certificate that qualified him for being assigned 4 marks against 2 marks which had actually been assigned to him. His contention was that if additional 2 marks had been assigned, as indeed it had been done by the Corporation itself for a location at Doda but who had still not qualified with the highest marks of another candidate, the Corporation was wrong in assigning only 2 marks for the two other sites where this 2 marks would have made difference and secured to him higher position than his nearest rival. The Corporation at that time did not act on the experience certificate though it took a stand that the employer Company did not exist. This court had disposed of the writ petition giving an opportunity to the petitioner to submit better proof and make a representation again. The petitioner rest contended with the experience certificate which he had given already and did not improve the situation but though the Corporation found that the Company did exist, it did not find the experience certificate already produced as sufficient to lend credibility to his assertion that he was actually working in the said Company. The rejection of his candidature again was a subject of present writ petition.

During the pendency of the writ petition, two different set of circumstances have taken place. One, through an order issued by the court allowing the petitioner to bring additional materials to substantiate the truth of his assertion regarding his employment status and experience, while the Corporation itself put through a fresh selection process for 11 different locations including 2 locations for which the petitioner was biding for after the rejection in one location for Doda where even 4 marks assigned did not help. The petitioner had produced documents before the court pursuant to the opportunity given to him, namely, a bond of agreement which the petitioner had entered into with Sunsui Power Controls on 22.04.2004 where there was a recital that provided that the petitioner as a trainee after undergoing training for a period of 8 weeks would after completion of his B.Tech and showing his B.Tech clearance certificate, he would be appointed (promoted) as Sales Executive/Control Engg. The provisional certificate had been issued on 04.08.2004. This, according to the petitioner, afforded the necessary proof of not merely the existence of the company but also the fact that he had actually secured his appointment.

The counsel for the Corporation would point out that the bond agreement contemplated his appointment only after showing his B.Tech certificate and if the provisional certificate itself had been issued only in August 2004, he could not have been granted appointment even before its production in June 2004, as contended by the petitioner. The petitioner would join issue on this response by a submission that although he did not have even the provisional certificate in June 2004, appointment, however, had been given based on the results obtained and posted on the website declaring him as passed. It is possible that the petitioner had really secured appointment, but what is essential for consideration is whether the Corporation could have a justifiable reason for not acting on the documents filed. An explanation of what is offered before the court was not an explanation which was available for the Corporation and, therefore, if there was a mismatch between what could have secured to him as appointment under the bond and when actually the certificate had been issued, there was surely a scope for raising a doubt on his employment and experience status. An act of selection surely involves certain forensic skills but it is not the same thing as delivering of judgment setting out extensive reasons, which is not an act that is expected of a public authority. The reasonableness of the action is what is put to test before a court and not extracting reasons that are penchant for persons trained in law and judgment writing.

Even this gets to be in some sense a technical exercise for what has ultimately come to prevail is a situation of even persons who had been assigned the highest marks for two other locations were not awarded distributorship. On the other hand, the selection panel appears to have been scrapped and a fresh advertisement had been given for other locations including two locations left out. In writ petition brought at the instance of yet another person challenging the fresh advertisement and his non-selection in a previous selection process, this court had held in Rakesh Chander Gupta Versus Indian Oil Corporation Limited rendered on 19.02.2013, relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Sr. Divisional Retail Sales Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. through Poa Holder and Others Vs. Ashok Shankarlal Gwalani, that if an irregularity is detected in the matter of selection or preparation of a panel, it was desirable to have a fresh selection instead of rearranging the panel which was found to be vitiated. The Supreme Court was holding that an authority which is empowered to appoint is a competent authority to decide as to whether the panel should be discarded and that there should be a fresh selection. This court in Rakesh Chander Gupta (supra) applied this principle set out by the Supreme Court to hold that it would not be appropriate to interfere with the selection made under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In this case, I must observe, before parting that what was noticed was not any irregularity as it was found in the Supreme Court''s judgment. It was a case of a selection process being not complete on account of certain circumstances such as inability of the Corporation to approve any of the candidates. As far as the petitioner was concerned, I have already set out that the Corporation had reasons to doubt the certificate and I would not find fault for the doubt that it had the reasons already explained. If in the ultimate bargain, they had decided to scrap the list and went for a fresh selection, it should have been perfectly possible for the petitioner to stake his claim and then apply for an allotment in any of the places that would have included the places for which he had bid earlier. The counsel for the petitioner points out that this court had allowed any further selection to be made subject to the outcome of this writ petition. I thought for a while if it was appropriate for the Corporation to have gone through the fresh selection process without taking permission of the court. Though it would have been an ideal situation, a larger public interest would have dictated an immediate conclusion of a selection process. It is not at all times easy for a court to predicate a definite time frame before when a case could be decided. Objectively speaking, it should have been difficult for even a court to oppose a proposal for a fresh selection process, for, after all, the selection for distributorship is for making basic amenities available for the public. There was surely an element of an urgency for making the allotment, which urgency, we in our jurisdiction, are unable to apply at all times. This is not an occasion to engage in a discourse to what constitutes delays in our courts but, however, it would still relevant that the Corporation had itself reasons to hasten its own process and completed the selection. I do not find there is any justifiable ground for scuttling a selection that was made which excluded the petitioner in the process. I, therefore, dismiss the writ petition.