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Judgment
21 paragraphs · 1,024 wordsHeard Mr. Abhay Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner.
Heard Mr. Sunil Kumar Dubey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party-State.
This petition has been filed for the following reliefs: -
"That in the instant criminal miscellaneous application, the petitioner prays for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in connection with O.C.R. Case No. 101/2008 including the order dated 14.11.2008, whereby and whereunder cognizance of offence under Section 22 (A) and 22(a) of Minimum Wages Act has been taken against the petitioner and also the order dated 18.11.2009, whereby the petition filed for dropping the proceeding has been dismissed, now pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pakur, and also for quashing the order dated 29.1.2011 passed in Cr. Rev. No. 54/2009 by the Learned Sessions Judge, Pakur, in connection with O.C.R. No. 101/2008 by which the order passed on 18.11.2009 in O.C.R. Case No. 101/2008 has been upheld.
AND During pendency of hearing of this application, stay all the further proceeding of O.C.R. Case No. 101/2008 pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pakur."
Arguments of the petitioner
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present petition has been filed only on the point of jurisdiction, in as much as, the criminal case has been instituted by the Labour Enforcement Officer appointed by the State Government and not by the Labour Employment Officer appointed by the Central Government and Appropriate Government in the present case is the Central Government. He relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 189 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Mohanlal Devichand Shah) to submit that it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Item 8 of the Schedule and Section 2(b) of the Minimum Wages Act, when read together, it would seem that the definition demarcates the jurisdiction of the Central Government and the State Governments in this way: If the employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing is in a quarry then it is within the jurisdiction of the Central Government and if the employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing is not in a quarry, it is the State Government that will have the jurisdiction. Arguments of the opposite party
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party opposes the prayer and submits he has filed a counter-affidavit in the present case annexing a copy of the inspection report and in view of the inspection report there is no merits in the case of the petitioner.
Findings of this Court
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the Inspection Report annexed as Annexure-A/1 to the counter-affidavit, this Court finds that the allegation of violations of the provisions of Minimum Wages Act against the petitioner has been levelled for the crushers said to be situated outside the mining area.
At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner has denied the aforesaid fact mentioned in the inspection report.
The Hon'ble Supreme court, in the judgment relied upon by the petitioner i.e. State of Maharashtra v. Mohanlal Devichand Shah, AIR 1966 SC 189 , while considering the definition of "appropriate government" as defined under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 with respect to stone crushing in quarry held in para 10 and 11 as under :-
"10. If the word "mine" is held to include a quarry, the next question that arises is whether stone breaking or stone crushing in a quarry is within the Schedule. While interpreting Entry 8 in the Schedule, this Court observed in Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Association v. Regional Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur as follows: "When we speak of stone-breaking or stone-crushing normally we refer to stone in the sense of 'piece of rock' and that would exclude manganese. Employment in stone- breaking or stone-crushing in this sense would refer to quarry operations."
This Court thus read Entry 8 to refer to quarry operations, and we hold that stone-breaking or stone-crushing in a quarry is within the Schedule.
Thus reading Item 8 of the Schedule and Section 2(b) of the Act together, it seems to us that the definition demarcates the jurisdiction of the Central Government and the State Governments in this way: If the employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing is in a quarry then it is within the jurisdiction of the Central Government; if the employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing is not in a quarry, it is the State Government that will have jurisdiction. We are unable to appreciate the observations of the High Court that the operation of stone-breaking and stone-crushing in a stone quarry does not fall within Item 8 of the Schedule and that it is necessary that Parliament should amend Item 8 of the Schedule."
This Court finds that on the face of the allegation mentioned in the Inspection Report that all the crushers are situated outside the mining area and considering the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 189, it cannot be said that with respect to the stone crushers which are alleged to be situated outside the mining area, the State Government has no jurisdiction. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the crushers were situated within the mining area is a disputed fact which cannot be decided at this stage. This Court further finds that neither any rejoinder to the counter-affidavit has been filed nor any such statement has been made in the present petition that the crushers are situated within the mining area.
Accordingly, this Court, at this stage, does not find any merit in the plea raised by the petitioner that the Labour Enforce Officer appointed by the State Government has no jurisdiction to launch the present prosecution. However, it will be open to the petitioner to raise all points before the learned trial court at appropriate stage.
This petition is accordingly dismissed.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also dismissed as not pressed.
Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned court below through 'e-mail/FAX'.
