High Courts

Bimla Devi vs Faquir Singh

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 20 September 2004 · Citation: (2005) 2 LJR 834 : (2004) 4 RCR(Civil) 485

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.M.Jain, J
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 220 of 2004
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Judgment

6 paragraphs · 366 words

V.M. Jain, J.—This Regular Second Appeal has been filed by Smt. Bimla Devi defendant against the judgments and decrees of the courts below, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed by the Trial Court and the appeal filed by defendant Smt. Bimla Devi was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge.

2.

Since the present appeal was barred by time, an application under 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed seeking condonation of 973 days delay in filing the appeal. The application is accompanied by the Affidavit of Smt. Bimla Devi appellant. Notice of this application was given to the plaintiff respondent.

3.

After hearing the counsel for the parties and perusing the record, in my opinion, there are no sufficient grounds to condone the delay of 973 days i.e. delay of two years and 243 days in filing the appeal. The ground taken in the application is that the defendantappellant was informed by her counsel Shri G.S. Khurana, Advocate that she was not required to appear in the appellate Court and for that reasons she did not come to know about the decision of the appellate Court and she come to know about the same when she received a letter from Shri D.S. Khurana, Advocate (son of Shri G.S. Khurana, Advocate) in this regard.

4.

A perusal of the record would show that Smt. Bimla Devi defendant was a resident of Jagadhri. The Courts were at Jagadhri and the counsel was also at Jagadhri. That being so, nothing prevented the appellant from contacting her counsel to enquire about the fate of the appeal. The learned Additional District Judge had decided the appeal on 13.3.2001, whereas the present appeal has been filed in this court on 3.12.2003. In my opinion, the allegations made in the application would not constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 2 years and 243 days in filing the appeal.

5.

In view of the above, finding no merit in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the same is hereby dismissed.

Once the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been dismissed, the main appeal is also dismissed as being barred by time.