Bindeshwar Prasad vs Emperor

Wort, J.—This rule is directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge upholding the conviction of the petitioner u/s 6, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, being Act 11 of 1890.

It is stated as one of the points in the case that the original complaint was filed against the employee of the petitioner, that is to say, the bullock-driver and not against the petitioner, and that when the Magistrate issued a summons against the petitioner, who was not named in the complaint, the trial was without jurisdiction.

In my judgment that argument cannot be supported. In the case of Charu Chandra Das v. Narendra Krishna Chakravarti 4 C.W.N. 367 the same question came up for disposal by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, and in the course of the judgment it is stated that

it appears to us that this is not a matter in which the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction. The matter was before him on the complaint made against another person and as the evidence disclosed the fact which has been found by the Magistrate that the petitioner was concerned in that offence process was issued against him. It seems to us that the Magistrate was competent to act in this manner and that he was not barred, as stated in the petition made to this Court on which the rule was granted by reason of Section 190 (c), Criminal P.C.,

in other words, the Magistrate acted u/s 190(c): and the Court goes on to hold that the trial was not without jurisdiction. It is to be noted that the statement to which I have referred was this. In the evidence it was disclosed that another person was concerned in the matter. That is really the substantial point in this case whether another person was concerned in the matter in other words, whether the petitioner, who was the master, was concerned. The argument is based on the fact, which I do not think is disputed, that the master, who was the owner of this bullock, was a way at Barh at the time, and it is stated therefore that he had no knowledge of the fact that the bullock-driver was using a sick bullock in a bullock cart. Section 6, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act provides:

If any person employs in any work or labour any animal which by reason of any disease, infirmity, etc., he shall be guilty of an offence under the Act.

The second part of that section says:

or permits any such unfit animal in his possession or under his control to be so employed.

The argument addressed to me by the learned advocate who appears on behalf of the petitioner is that the use of the word "permits" in that section connotes some conscious act on the part of the petitioner and that in the circumstances at any rate the petitioner being absent and being ignorant of the use of this bullock, it cannot be said that he permitted the use of his bullock. The learned Sessions Judge points out that the expression used in the Act is "permits such use" and not "knowingly permits such use."

In the first place it is obvious that on fundamental principles of the criminal law, apart from statute, a person cannot be convicted of a crime of another unless the evidence is such as to prove that he abetted or instigated the crime. But it is to be remembered that in this case we have to construe the statute and it is upon the construction of that statute and not upon the general principles of the criminal law that this matter is to be determined. I am inclined to agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the expression "permits" does not involve any conscious act on the part of the person who is held to be liable under the section. But it is not for that reason only I would uphold the conviction. The Act says:

If any person employs in any work or labour any animal.

There is no doubt in this case that the bullock was the property of the petitioner and that it was employed in the work of the petitioner; it is none the less employed by the petitioner by reason of the fact that the petitioner employs a bullock driver to drive this bullock or other bullocks. It seems to me therefore that the section aims not only at the liability of a person actually in charge of the animal but also aims at the person who owns it in other words, he cannot shelve his responsibility by pleading ignorance of the fact. In my judgment this petitioner employed the bullock within the meaning of Section 6, and therefore the conviction was right. The rule is discharged.