Binod Kumar Yadav vs Management of Bank of Baroda and Others

S.N. Hussain, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging letter No RM CWB:PD:18/P PFC 184/797 dated 08.04.1997 (Annexure-1) by which the Disciplinary Authority, namely the Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda, Regional Office, Patna (respondent No. 2) imposed penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner and dismissed him from his service and also for directing the respondents to allow the petitioner to join his duties alternatively to be kept under suspension till the disposal of Cr. Appeal No. 285 of 1996 pending for hearing before this High Court in which the petitioner had challenged the judgment of conviction dated 20.09.1996 (Annexure-4) by which 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Patna punished the petitioner for two years rigorous imprisonment in Sessions Trial No. 375 of 1995. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed in the services of Bank of Baroda, Eastern Zone (hereinafter referred to as ''the Bank'', for the sake of brevity) on 28.05.1982 and as per his posting he joined his service at Dhanbad Branch on 07.06.1982. From there the petitioner was transferred to Patna City Branch of the Bank in the year 1984 where he discharged his duties satisfactorily till his dismissal from service with effect from 08.04.1997 vide the impugned order of the authority concerned.

It is also not in dispute that in the year 1994 Alamganj P.S. Case No. 95 of 1994 was instituted against the petitioner for offences punishable under sections 302/34 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code on the allegation of subjecting his wife Uremia alias Pramila Devil to cruelty and harassment due to non fulfillment of dowry and her subsequent murder in the night of 24.03.1994. Due to initiation of the said proceeding and his arrest, the petitioner was put under suspension by the authorities of the Bank vide order dated 14.09.1994 (Annexure-3).

It is also apparent from the records of the case that the aforesaid criminal case was committed to the court of session where it was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 375 of 1995 and after a full trial it was found that the petitioner was guilty for offence punishable u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court came to the conclusion that the petitioner along with his family members were inflicting mental torture and ill-treatment to the deceased as she was not blessed with a child and he also threatened to marry another girl, who was acquainted with him and hence, the petitioner was sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment for the said offence vide judgment dated 23.09.1996 and sentence dated 23.09.1996 (Annexure-4).

It further transpires from the record that after coming to know about the said conviction of the petitioner, the authority of the Bank sent notice dated 05.02.1997 (Annexure-6) to the petitioner asking the petitioner to show-cause why his services should not be terminated by the Bank under Clause 19.3 (a) of the Bipartite Settlement and section 10(1)(b) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'' for the sake of brevity) as the punishment given to him was for an offence involving moral turpitude. In response to the said show-cause notice the petitioner filed a reply on 13.02.1997 (Annexure-7) only on the ground that he had already filed an appeal against the judgment of his conviction and the said appeal had been admitted by the High Court where it was pending.

From the impugned order dated 08.04.1997 (Annexure-1), it is quite apparent that the authorities considered the said plea of the petitioner submitted in show-cause and found that it did not bar or restrain the authorities from proceeding further in the matter and hence, taking into account the provision of section 10(1)(b) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966 and having considered the conviction of the petitioner for offence involving moral turpitude the authorities imposed the penalty of dismissal without notice upon the petitioner with immediate effect.

It is true that against the judgment and conviction dated 23.09.1996 passed by 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Patna in Sessions Trial No. 375 of 1995, the petitioner filed Cr. Appeal No. 285 of 1996 before this court, which was admitted for hearing by a Bench of this court on 13.12.1996 (Annexure-5/1) and lower court records were called for and notice was issued to the State of Bihar through the Advocate General. The record of the said criminal appeal has been produced before this court from which it is found that Cr. Appeal No. 285 of 1996 was finally heard by a Bench of this court on 16.05.2011 and it was found that the deceased had been tortured and the ingredients of section 498A of the Indian Penal Code were satisfied as the prosecution had been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and hence, conviction of the appellant u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code was maintained.

Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently challenged the impugned order of his dismissal dated 08.04.1997 on the ground that there was no question of any moral turpitude in the instant case as the petitioner was convicted only for offence punishable u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code. In this connection, he relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of Allahabad Bank and Another Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola, .

Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that even a convicted employee cannot be legally terminated from his service without any departmental proceeding, but in the instant case, the petitioner''s services were terminated without initiating any departmental proceeding and without even giving a charge-sheet to the petitioner in that regard, hence, the order of his termination was ab initio void. In this connection, he relied upon a decision of this court in case of Ram Sarowar Pd. Singh Vs. State of Bihar and Others, .

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Bipartite Settlement between the Banking Companies and their workmen did not define moral turpitude and hence, the petitioner had committed no offence, as mentioned in Clauses 19.2 and 19.3 of the said settlement. He further averred that Clause 19.6 of the said settlement did not relate to Clause 19.2 thereof as Clause 19.6 is with respect to gross misconduct whereas Clause 19.2 is with respect to offence involving moral turpitude.

Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the conviction of an employee in a criminal case is completely different from the dismissal of service and hence, the trial and departmental proceedings being completely different the dismissal of petitioner without any departmental proceeding is clearly violative of principle of natural justice. In this connection he relied upon a decision of the Apex court in case of Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, etc., . Hence, he claimed that the impugned order of termination of petitioners services dated 08.04.1997 (Annexure-1) was absolutely illegal and perverse and was fit to be quashed and the petitioner should be reinstated.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-Bank of Baroda and its authorities opposed the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner was convicted for offence punishable u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which was affirmed up-till the High Court and the said offence is an extreme case of moral turpitude due to which the wife of the petitioner had to commit suicide. Hence, he submitted that according to the provisions of the Act as well as the Clauses of Bipartite Settlement there was no occasion for initiating a departmental proceeding against the petitioner, but in spite of that the authorities sent a show-cause notice to the petitioner which he replied and only thereafter the impugned order of dismissal from service was awarded to the petitioner. Hence, there was neither any violation of any provision of the Act or of the settlement nor there was any denial of natural justice.

Considering the averments made by learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record, it is quite apparent that the main dispute is with respect to the interpretation of the term ''moral turpitude.'' In the case of Allahabad Bank and another (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Apex court had held that "what is an offence involving "moral turpitude" must depend upon the facts of each case. But whatever may be the meaning which may be given to the term "moral turpitude" it appears to us that one of the most serious offences involving "moral turpitude" would be where a person employed in a banking company dealing with money of the general public, commits forgery and wrongfully withdraws money which he is not entitled to withdraw".

From a bare reading of the aforesaid decision, it transpires that forgery and wrongful withdrawal of money is not held to be the only case of "moral turpitude" and is said to be one of the most serious offences involving "moral turpitude". Hence, according to the said decision, there can be other serious offences, which could involve "moral turpitude" also.

The Apex Court in case of Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and another, specifically held that "moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently bias, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. In another decision, a Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Baleshwar Singh Vs. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras and Others, observed as follows:--

The expression ''moral turpitude'' is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore, the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man.

From the meaning of expression "moral turpitude" as held by the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of the High Court, it is quite apparent that anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals will come within the meaning of "moral turpitude" which also implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct towards another individual or to the society in general. In the instant case, the allegation against the petitioner, which was upheld up to this court, is severe torture to his wife forcing the victim to commit the extreme act of suicide. This is a high case of "moral turpitude".

So far the service conditions of the employees of the Bank of Baroda are concerned, they are regulated by a Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966 between the Banking Companies and their workmen u/s 12 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which is binding upon both, namely the Bank as well as the employee including the petitioner. Although the term "moral turpitude" is not defined in the said settlement but the following provisions of the settlement are necessary to be considered while deciding this case:-

19.2: By the expression ''offence'' shall be meant any offence involving moral turpitude for which an employee is liable to conviction and sentence under any provision of law.

19.3(b): If he be convicted he may be dismissed with effect from the date of his conviction or be given any lesser form of punishment as mentioned in clause-19.6 below:-

19.6 : An employee found guilty of gross misconduct may;

(a) be dismissed without notice; or

(b) be warned or censored or have an adverse remark entered against him; or

(c) be found; or

(d) have his increment stopped;

(e) have his misconduct and grossly discharged.

The aforesaid provisions clearly give a power to the authorities of the Bank to dismiss the services of its employees without notice, if they had committed any act of "moral turpitude". The aforesaid provisions also show that the expression ''offence'' shall mean any act of "moral turpitude" for which the employee is liable for conviction and hence, it would include gross misconduct also. In this connection, the relevant provision of law is specifically given in section 10(1) (b) of the Act, which reads as follows:--

10(1): Prohibition of employment, Managing Agents and restrictions on certain forms of employment;

(b) Shall employ, or continue the employment of any person;

(i) Who is, or at any time has been adjudicated insolvent or has suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude.

The abovementioned provisions of the Act and of the settlement are applicable to the respondent-Bank as well as to the petitioner and both are bound by them. According to the said provisions no separate departmental proceeding was required, specially when there was total prohibition of continuation of employment of such person as provided under the Act and the procedures were to be followed as prescribed under the settlement specially when everything was clear from the records of the criminal case and the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the criminal court, which clearly showed "moral turpitude" involving gross misconduct and which was affirmed by this court also.

So far the issue of equity and justice is concerned, there is no denial or violation of the said principles as sufficient notice was given by the authorities of the Bank to the petitioner regarding their intention quoting the specific provisions of law. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitioner has miserably failed to show any illegality in the impugned order of the authority concerned and accordingly this writ petition is dismissed.