BISHNU DAYAL SAHU & ORS. vs SMT. LAXMI GUPTA

Mr. B. D. Das, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. C. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent were heard.

This petition under Section 482 CrPC has been filed praying for quashing the complaint and the criminal proceeding in CR Case No. 224/2016,

arising out of such complaint pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhemaji.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The respondent Laxmi Gupta was wedded to Om Prakash Sahu (since deceased) on 11.05.2014. However, they could not pull on together

smoothly and the marital boat moved into rough weather giving rise to various litigations between the parties. The respondent Laxmi Gupta lodged

a complaint against the husband and other members of his family under Section 406/420/34 IPC, on the basis of which CR Case NO. 48/2014

was registered. It was alleged in the said complaint that the parents of the complainant gave him Rs. 1,60,000/- as gift at the time of marriage. The

said amount was given for purchasing furniture and a motorcycle respectively and the money was entrusted to the husband of the complainant. But,

the husband of the complainant did not purchase those articles. Subsequently, the husband of the complainant in connivance with other members of

the family demanded further Rs. 2,00,000/- and the complainant was subjected to torture for such demand. Eventually, the complainant was

thrown out of the matrimonial home forcing her to take shelter in her parents'' house. It was also stated in the complaint, that besides Rs.

1,60,000/-, the other articles narrated in the complaint were also given to the complainant and all those articles and money were retained by her

husband and other members of the family and the articles were refused to be returned. Therefore, the complainant lodged the complaint

aforementioned. Learned Judicial Magistrate upon receiving such complaint took cognizance and issued process.

The four accused persons named in the complaint filed a criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC before this Court praying for quashing the

complaint, as in the meantime, the husband of the complainant died. The said criminal petition was registered as Crl. Pet. No. 98/2015 by this

Court. While issuing notice of motion, this court passed an interim order staying further proceeding of CR Case No. 48/2014. The said criminal

proceeding having been stayed, the complainant/respondent filed another complaint on the same set of facts and allegation under Section 406/493

IPC, which was registered as CR Case No. 224/2016. The present criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC has been filed for quashing the

second complaint and the CR No. 224/2016 arising out of the second complaint. Although, in the earlier complaint, the husband was also made an

accused, in the subsequent complaint, the husband was not made a party because in the meantime he had expired.

The respondent by filing a counter affidavit stated that the earlier complaint in CR No. 48/2014 was dismissed for default by order dated

31.10.2015, because of absence of both the parties, as the stay order passed in Crl. Pet. No. 98/2015 was never communicated to the learned

Magistrate and therefore, the complaint in CR No. 48/2014 was no longer pending and the CR No. 224/2016 arose out of a subsequent

complaint. There is however, no dispute with regard to dismissal of CR Case No. 48/2014

ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL

On the above factual matrix, learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. B. Das placing reliance on a decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court in H.P. Agro

Industries Corporation Vs. M.P.S. Chawla reported in 1998 (92) CompCas 686 HP and T.T. Anthony Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2001) 6

SCC 181, submitted that dismissal of the complaint resulted in acquittal of the accused/petitioners and therefore such order of dismissal was

amenable to appeal under Section 378 (4) CrPC and no second complaint on the same set of facts is maintainable. The Himachal Pradesh High

Court while dealing with the consequence of dismissal of a complaint under Section 256 CrPC held as under:

There is no denying that the dismissal of the complaint in default under Section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code, entails the acquittal of the

accused. Once an accused has been acquitted of the offence, the law provides a remedy by way of an appeal against the order of acquittal. Once

a remedy by way of appeal is available to the petitioner under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the failure of the petitioner to

avail of such a remedy, this court is not to exercise the inherent powers for interfering with the impugned order.

Refuting the above submission, learned counsel for the respondent Mr. C. Barua submits that second complaint is maintainable in the event of

dismissal of the first complaint. To buttress his submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions:

AIR 1962 SC 786 (Pramatha Nath Talukdar Vs. Saroj Sarkar)

(2010) 2 SCC 631 (Poonam Chand Jain Vs. Fazru)

DECISION & REASONS THEREOF

Before adverting to the rival submissions of the learned counsel, let me make one thing clear, that the complaint in the instant case was lodged

under Section 406/420 IPC giving rise to CR No. 48/2014. Both the offences were cognizable and triable by warrant procedure. Section 244 to

250 CrPC provides the procedure for trial of warrant case instituted otherwise than on police report i.e. complaint. The procedure for trial of

summons case by Magistrate is provided in Chapter XX of the CrPC. The consequence of absence or death of the complainant during pendency

of the criminal proceeding in warrant and summons cases have been provided in Section 249 and 256 CrPC, respectively.

Section 249 CrPC provides that ""when the proceeding has been instituted upon complaint and on any date fixed for hearing of the case, the

complainant is absent, and the offence may be lawfully compounded or is not cognizable offence, the Magistrate may in his discretion,

notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained at any time before the charge has been framed discharge the accused.

Section 256 provides as under:

Non- appearance or death of complainant.

(1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to

which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained,

acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day: Provided that where the

complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal

attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.

(2) The provisions of sub- section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non- appearance of the complainant is due to his

death.

A plain reading of the provision of Section 249 CrPC would show that when in a case instituted on the basis of the complaint and triable by

warrant procedure, the effect of dismissal of a complaint for non-appearance of the complainant is discharge, and as such order under Section 249

CrPC can be passed only before the charge is framed and either of the condition i.e. offence is non-cognizable or lawfully compoundable is

satisfied. The offence in the instant case being triable by warrant procedure and also being compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, the order of

dismissal of the complaint in the instant case has to be construed to be an order under Section 249 CrPC, having the consequence of discharge of

the accused. On the other hand, the dismissal of a complaint under Section 256 CrPC entails acquittal of the accused.

Mandate of the statute is thus amply clear, that consequence of order of dismissal passed under Section 249 and 256 CrPC are different,

inasmuch as, dismissal of complaint under Section 249 CrPC entails discharge of the accused, whereas dismissal of the complaint under Section

256 entails acquittal of the accused. An order of discharge before framing charge, in a warrant case can be passed, for non-appearance of the

complainant, under Section 249 CrPC, provided the offence is/are compoundable or the offence is/are noncognizable. In the present case, the

offence was compoundable and the charge was yet to be framed, and as such, the order passed by the learned Trial Court was well within its

competence and does not suffer from any infirmity inasmuch as, there is no dispute about the fact that the stay order passed by this Court was not

communicated to the learned Magistrate.

What therefore follows is that the order in the present case was passed under Section 249 CrPC, which entails discharge of the accused. The

next question which comes for consideration is whether upon dismissal of a complaint and consequent discharge of an accused under Section 249

CrPC, a second complaint is permissible.

Since the consequence of dismissal of the complaint in the present case was apparently discharge of the accused, I am not inclined to enter into

further discussion to burden this judgment, as to whether after acquittal of the accused under Section 256 CrPC, a second complaint will be

maintainable or not.

Section 300 CrPC is also sought to be pressed into service by learned Sr. Counsel Mr. B. Das in support of his contention that the second

complaint amounts to double jeopardy. Section 300 CrPC provides that once a person has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an

offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remain in force, not be liable to be tried again for the

same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence, for which a different charge from one made against him might have been made under

sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. The Explanation to Section 300 CrPC

clearly provided that ""dismissal of a complaint or discharge of the accused is not an acquittal for the purpose of this Section."" Thus, the explanation

appended to Section 300 CrPC makes it abundantly clear that discharge of an accused, or dismissal of a complaint shall not be a bar under

Section 300 CrPC for second trial on the same facts. In the present case, complaint having been dismissed under Section 249 CrPC with the

necessary consequence of discharge of the accused, Section 300 CrPC cannot be pressed into service to obstruct the second complaint on the

same facts.

The Apex Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar (supra) relied by learned counsel for the respondent while dealing with a case of maintainability of

second complaint, when the first complaint was dismissed on merit under Section 203 CrPC, held, that after dismissal of a compliant on merit

under Section 203 CrPC, second complaint shall be maintainable only under certain special circumstances. The Apex Court observed that ""an

order of dismissal under Section 203 of Criminal Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same

facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e.g. (i) where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or (ii) on a

misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or (iii) it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or (iv) where new facts which could not, with the

reasonable diligence have been brought on record in the previous proceedings have been adduced.

The Apex Court in Poonam Chand Jain Vs. Fazru (supra) reiterated and followed the decision of Pramatha Nath Talukdar''s (supra) case. The

decision rendered by the Apex Court in T.T. Anthony Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 dealt with the lodging and effect of

second FIR. Since the second FIR and second complaint do not stand on the same footing, the decision in T.T. Antony (supra) may not be of

much help in the present case.

It needs to be borne in mind that dismissal of a complaint under Section 203 CrPC on merit and dismissal of a complaint for default of the

complainant and resultant discharge or acquittal of the accused under Section 249 or 256 CrPC are altogether different. In the former case, after

examining the complainants and his witnesses and materials brought on record under Section 200 CrPC and after investigation or enquiry under

Section 202 CrPC, the court on being satisfied regarding absence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused dismisses the complaint

on merit. Whereas, in the later case, the dismissal of a complaint under Section 249 or 256 CrPC and for default are not on merit. The distinction

between the consequence of dismissal of a complaint for default of the complainant and dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 CrPC was

considered by the Apex Court in Jatinder Singh Vs. Ranjit Kaur reported in AIR 2001 SC 784, where the Apex Court observed as under:

There is no provision in the Code or in any other statute which debars a complainant from preferring a second complaint on the same

allegations if the first complaint did not result in a conviction or acquittal or even discharge. Section 300 of the Code, which debars a second trial,

has taken care to explain that the dismissal of a complaint or the discharge of an accused is not an acquittal for the purpose of this Section.

However, when a magistrate conducts an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code and dismisses the complaint on merits, a second complaint on the

same facts cannot be made unless there are very exceptional circumstances. Even so, a second complaint is permissible depending upon how the

complaint happened to be dismissed at the first instance.

If the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit but on default of the complainant to be present there is no bar in the complainant moving the

magistrate again with a second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on merits the

position could be different. There appeared a difference of opinion earlier as to whether a second complaint could have been filed when the

dismissal was under Section 203. The controversy was settled by this Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar Vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar (AIR 1962 SC

876).

What therefore follows from the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Jatinder Singh (supra) is that second complaint on same facts after

dismissal of the first one under Section 203 CrPC is maintainable subject to the conditions and circumspection laid down by the Apex Court in

Pramatha Nath Talukdar (supra).

Whereas the second complaint on the same facts, in the event of dismissal of the first complaint for default of the complainant, not being on

merit, is not circumscribed by any preconditions laid down in the case of Pramatha Nath Talukdar (supra) case.

When a second complaint is filed on the same facts after dismissal of the first one, under Section 203 CrPC, the complainant has to satisfy the

Magistrate the conditions laid down by the Apex Court in Pramatha Nath Talukadar''s case (supra) . In such case, the Magistrate has the

discretion to refuse to entertain a second complaint on the same facts, if the complainant fails to satisfy the Magistrate regarding the pre-condition

prescribed in Pramatha Nath Talukdar''s case (supra). Whereas, filing of the second complaint on the same set of facts because of dismissal of first

complaint for default of the complainant is not circumscribed by any condition and therefore the Magistrate does not have any discretion in respect

of entertaining a second complaint on the same set of facts in the event of dismissal of first one, for default of the complainant. Thus, right of filing a

second complaint on the same set of facts, after dismissal of the first one under Section 203 CrPC is circumscribed and not unfettered, whereas

right to file second complaint after dismissal of the first one, due to default of the complainant is not circumscribed by any fetter.

In the present case, admittedly, the first complaint was dismissed for default having consequence of discharge and therefore second complaint

on the same facts is not barred, nor the right of the complainant in the present case is circumscribed by any pre-condition. This being the settled

position of law as of now, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on the basis of such second complaint on the same set of facts in the

present case cannot be faulted.

Being of the above view, I am constrained to hold that the present criminal petition is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed.

Send down the LCR.