Bismambar Dass vs Chhaju ram and Another

Shamsher Bahadur, J.—This is an appeal of Bishamber Dass whose suit for possession for the disputed premises consisting of a house in Mohalla Saidhan, Ludhiana was decreed by the trial Judge but in appeal of the Defendants, has been dismissed by the lower appellate Court.

It is common ground that the house in question was evacuee property and a sale certificate was granted in favour of the Appellant on the 29th January, 1964. The sale was to take effect with effect from the 28th February, 1963. Beli Ram, lather of the Defendants, Chhaju Ram and Chaman Lal, was in occupation of the house as an allottee Beli Ram, therefore, enjoyed the protection afforded by Section 39 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, for a period of two years. Beli Ram died some time in February, 1965. After the death of Beli Ram, his sons continued to remain-in possession and inspite of the notice served on them,, they refused to vacate the premises. The Plaintiff was, therefore, obliged to bring the present suit for possession.

The only plea raised by the Defendants was that they were not trespassers and had become tenants u/s 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The only issue framed in the case was this:

Whether the Defendants are the tenants of the Plaintiff u/s 29 of the Central Act No. 44 of 1954.

The lower appellate Court found that no such tenancy has been established to exist u/s 29 of the Central Act, The suit was accordingly decreed.

Despite the specific plea taken by the Defendants, the lower appellate Court found that the sons of Beli Ram, continued to enjoy protection of the Rent Acts and if they continued to pay the rent they could hold on to the property. Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, says that:

Where any person to whom the provisions of this section apply, is in lawful possession of any immovable property...notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, such person shall, without prejudice to any other right which he may have in the property, be deemed to be a tenant of the transferee on the same terms and conditions as to payment of rent or otherwise on which he held the property immediately before the transfer:

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any such terms and conditions, no such person shall be liable to be ejected from the property during such period not exceeding two years as may be presrcibed in respect of that class of property, except.

It is the case of the Appellant that Bell Ram had become a statutory tenant and was entitled to the protection to remain in the premises for a period of two years. This position has not been controverted. All that has been contended is that the Defendants who are the heirs of Beli Ram continued to enjoy the rights of the tenants. Beli Ram was plainly a statutory tenant and his rights are not heritable. In a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrict Act (3 of 1949). It was held by the Hon''ble Chief Justice in Gauri Shankar v. Smt. Shakuntla Devi and Ors. 1968 P.L.R. 87, "that a person having protection of a statute like the East Punjab Act 3 of 1949, is a tenant under the statute and has no estate in the property in his possession and he has only a personal right to remain in possession because such right to possession is protected by the statute. On the death of such a person he transmits no estate to his heirs. He has no estate in the building and so his heirs inherit not even the right to possession of the building. What is true of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949), is applicable equally to the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1994. The Plaintiffs have made out a case for possession and the lower appellate Court did not act according to law in reversing the decree granted by the trial Court. In this view of the matter the appeal must be allowed with costs and the decree of the trial Court restored. The Defendants are given time uptil 1st of November, 1969, to vacate the premises.