Biswanath Saha vs State of West Bengal

Biswanath Somadder, J.—Let the affidavit of service filed in Court today be kept on record.

This is an application taken out by the writ petitioner essentially claiming compensation against acquisition of some standing trees over plot nos.2708, 2709 & 3471 situated in Mouza - Koshigram under Police Station - Katwa, District - Burdwan.

It appears that the entire plinth of the writ petitioner''s case is based on a memo dated 8th March, 2016, issued by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Burdwan, addressed to the Senior Manager (HR), NTPC, Katwa, Katwa Super Thermal Power Project, District - Burdwan. Upon receipt of a copy of the said memo dated 8th March, 2016, the petitioner made a representation on 18th March, 2016, addressed to the Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan, as well as the Managing Director, WBPDC Ltd., Bidyut Bhaban, Salt Lake City, Kolkata - 64.

A bare perusal of the said representation reveals, the case of the petitioner is that in spite of filing objection on 11th November, 2009 against the acquisition of the property-in-question where the trees were situated, such objection against acquisition was not entertained and the property was acquired.

It appears from the records that the petitioner received compensation from the competent authority on 8th December, 2010. From the representation dated 18th March, 2016, it appears that, thereafter, the petitioner made at least eleven representations seeking compensation in respect of the standing trees situated in the acquired plot. However, not a single application was made before the Court within the statutory time-frame as stipulated under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

In such a factual backdrop it has to be considered whether it is at all possible - at this belated stage when the writ petition has been filed on 3rd May, 2016 - for this Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus, which, in effect, will determine payment of compensation amount in respect of the standing trees situated in the acquired plot of land.

The answer to this issue is clearly in the negative. It is the admitted position that the petitioner never made any reference before the Court under section 18 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is also not in dispute that section 3 (a) of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides as under:-

"3. Definitions. -.

(a) the expression "land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;"

Not only the statutory definition, as quoted above, is all inclusive in nature and includes trees standing on the land so acquired, compensation, in fact, was paid to the petitioner which included compensation in respect of trees situated in the acquired land. In the event, the petitioner was not satisfied with the compensation so awarded, he ought not have waited till the year 2016 and filed a writ petition. He was, instead, required to approach the Court by filing a reference under section 18 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894, which, admittedly, he never did.

In Karnataka Power Corporation Limited through its Chairman and Managing Director & Anr. v. K. Thangappan & Anr., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 : AIR 2006 SC 1581, it has been held in paragraphs 9 and 10 as follows:

"9. It was stated in State of M. P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (AIR 1987 SC 251) that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K. V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore (AIR 1967 SC 993). This was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose case (AIR 1970 SC 470) by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray (AIR 1976 SC 2617) making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik [AIR 1976 SC 1639] also.)"

A Division Bench of this Court in Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Kalavanti Doshi Trust & Ors., reported in 2011 (1) CHN (CAL) 182, has observed in paragraph 13 of its judgement as under:

"13. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Chattrisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., 2010 (5) SCC page 23, in this type of cases, there is even no scope of application of section 5 of the Limitation Act by taking aid of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and as such, it is apparent that on the date of presentation of the writ-application, the remedy of the writ petitioners was totally barred. It is now settled law that a Writ Court should not by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India revive a barred remedy."

The two judgments referred above and the facts of the instant case, as discussed hereinbefore, clearly negate the possibility of the petitioner to seek such mandatory reliefs, as prayed for, herein.

As such, the writ petition is liable to be summarily dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties.