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Judgment
The Board of Directors of Allahabad Agricultural Institute, a registered Society managing the said institution known as Allahabad Agricultural Institute and the institution are the two petitioners in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 8111994 passed by the ViceChancellor, University of Allahabad whereby the order of the Director dated 7111994 suspending Mr. David Vinai Watford, respondent No. 4, during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding against him on two charges, has been revoked by the ViceChancellor.
When this writ petition was filed by Sri Ravi Kant and Sri J. Nagar on 16111994, the opposite parties accepted notice and it was directed that affidavits be exchanged so that the matter be heard finally at the admission stage. The opposite party No. 4 Sri D. V. Watford is represented by Sri Ashok Khare while the ViceChancellor, Allahabad University is represented by Sri Ashok Bhushan and respondents No. 2 and 3 who are officers of State, are represented by Sri D. R. Chaudhary, Standing Counsel. Since affidavits have been exchanged and the matter appears urgent, as prayed by learned counsel for the parties the petition is being finally disposed of.
The controversy centres round the only point as to whether on the facts and circumstances arising in the instant case the ViceChancellor could interfere with the order of suspension which was passed by the Director for and on behalf of the Institute during the disciplinary proceeding against the said teacher,
At the outset it may be mentioned that Shri Ashok Khare drew the attention of the court to paragraph No. 2 of the counter affidavit filed by Opposite Party No. 4, the teacher concerned. On the strength of these averments it was argued that the order of suspension as well as the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings ate accentuated with mala fide intention and bias on the part of the Director.
While it is true that the petitioner has filed two writ petitions in this Court, against the Director and the Institute challenging the appointment of the Director (Dr. R. B. Lai). In one of the petitions some further informations have been sought by court. Neither of the petitions have been admitted nor has any order been passed.
Suffice it to say that this writ petition has to be decided on the materials existing herein and no, observation or finding in this case may be used in any of the pending writ petition.
Relevant provisions contained in U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 (for short, the Act) some provisions contained in the first Statutes of the University and some provisions in the Memorandum of Association of the Institute as amended upto date were referred to at the time of arguments by the learned counsel for the parties. The petitioners argument is that the opposite party No. 4 is admittedly a teacher of the Institute and charge sheet has already been served upon him in disciplinary proceeding which is going on. Therefore, it was open to the Director to pass an order of suspension because of emergency prevailing. Objections have been raised on behalf of the respondents about existence of emergency and it was argued on behalf of the respondents that both the charges could be asked to be dropped on the ground that there was absence of material and nonapplication of mind on the part of the petitioners.
Reliance was placed on Article 11 of the Memorandum of Association which empowers the Director to
"..........shall take such measures as are necessary for :
(i) over all management and administration of the Institute and its allied activities
(ii) proper order and discipline
......shall have special responsibility for the coordination between the teaching activities and other sections of the Institute.
In view of the Article 11 contained in the memorandum of Association, the Director has absolute power to initiate disciplinary proceeding.
Sri Ashofc Khare on behalf of opposite party No. 4 as well as Sri Ashok Bhushan on behalf of Allahabad University referred to some of the provisions of the Act and argued that action of ViceChancellor in revoking the suspension order on the very next day was fully in accordance with the provisions of Act and therefore, need not be interferred with. The attention of the court was drawn to the definition of the word management and it was argued that according to proviso to subsection (2) of Section 35 of the U. P. State Universities? Act, 1973, in case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the Management dismissing, removing or reducing in rank or punishing in any other manner any teacher shall not require the approval of the ViceChancellor, but shall be reported to him and unless he is satisfied that the procedure prescribed in this behalf has been followed, the decision shall not be given effect to.
This necessitates a book on the first statute dealing with this contingency. Sri Khare placed reliance on the Statute 17.07 which for the ready reference may be quoted as below :
"17.07. The Management shall have the power to suspend a teacher during the pendency or in contemplation of an inquiry into charge against him, on the grounds mentioned in subclauses (a) to (e) 0f clause (1) of Statute 17.04, In an emergency (in the case of a teacher other than Principal) this power may be exercised by the principal in anticipation of the approval of the Management. The principal shall immediately report such case to the Management, The order of suspension if passed in contemplation of an Inquiry, shall cease at the end of four weeks of its operation, unless the teacher has in the meantime been communicated the charge or charges on which the inquiry was contemplated."
12 It was argued that the aforesaid first Statute 17.07 was squarely exercisable only by the principal if emergency existed and that top in anticipation of approval of management. The argument proceeds that in the instant case, the Director had passed the order who was not the principal of the Institute and therefore, he was not empowered in view of the first statute to pass suspension order.
The argument in reply is that Articles of Association treats the principal to be Deputy Director who becomes exofficio member of the Board of Directors and also becomes an Executive officer of the Institute and reference was made to Article X of the Memorandum of Association. The Director is admittedly a superior officer to Deputy Director. The Management has given power to Director under the Articles to institute disciplinary proceeding against staff. Therefore, argument of Sri Khare that management may not be including the Director is devoid of force and is hereby rejected.
The learned counsel for the respondents argued that newspaper reports have admittedly been published in the local newspaper which contains wild allegations against the Institute and its management including its officer.
In this connection opposite party No. 4 has filed supplementary affidavit today and has made averments to the following effect :
"That as far as the first charge is concerned it was considered in the meeting of the Executive Board on 17994 and vide resolution No. E. C. 9473 titled as "Disciplinary action on Staff" following resolution was passed:
"RESOLUTION
E. C. 9473
Disciplinary action on staff:
(1) Shri D. V. Watford denies his links with the news items published, Mr. D. V. Watford personally visited,the Director and Principal and gave satisfactory explanation, thus the proceedings against D. V. Watford be dropped."
Sri Ravi Kant drew the attention of the court to the rejoinder affidavit and reiterated the same in reply to the averments made in para 3 of supplementary affidavit. The averments in para 8 of the rejoinder affidavit may be quoted for ready reference
"8. That the averments made in para 6 of the counter affidavit of respondent No. 4 as they stand are denied, it is wrong to allege that the chargesheet and the suspension order are motivated on account of mala fide of the deponent towards the respondent No. 4. In fact, the respondent No. 4 along with other teachers of the Allahabad Agricultural Institute filed writ petition No. 32582 of 1994, Dr. A. K. Gupta v. ViceChancellor, University of Allahabad, and others on 4101994. Shortly after memos of recorded warning were issued to them on 791994. The deponent has no knowledge of any complaint having been made by the respondent No. 4 to the Ecumenical Church Loan Fund of India against the deponent. It is wrong to allege that issuance of chargesheet and passing of suspension order against the respondent No. 4 is illmotivated and is on account of mala fide of the deponent towards respondent No. 4. Further it is wrong to allege that the charge levelled against the respondent No. 4 are nonexistent charges and are not covered by Statute 17.04(1) of the first Statutes of University of Allahabad. It is submitted that the management is prima facie of the opinion that the re jpondent No. 4 was closely connected with the publication of the news materials, which are Annexures ''CA4'' to the counter affidavit. As regards charge No. 2 levelled against the respondent No. 4 it is submitted that the material on which charge No. 2 was framed has been given to the Enquiry Officer alongwith the chargesheet and other relevant documents and the respondent No. 4 can obtain copies thereof from the Enquiry Officer. It is submitted that since the charges levelled against the respondent No. 4 are refraining themselves from giving a detailed reply in this regard."
Suffice it to say that chargesheet has been served on the opposite party No. 4 and an Enquiry Officer has been appointed, and enquiry is going on.
The learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 prayed that this earlier writ petition may be disposed of expeditiously. For this purpose, the parties may approach the Hon''ble Chief Justice for expeditious disposal of the writ petition.
Before we end we may observe that the petitioner is a minority Institution and this fact has not been challenged. In this connection, observations have been made in Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India, (1986)4 SCC 707 which is quoted as under :
"While there could be no objection in setting up a high authority to supervise the teaching staff so as to keep a strict vigilance on their work and to ensure that security of tenure for them, but the authority concerned must be provided with proper guidelines under the restricted field which they have to cover before coming to any decision which may be binding on the managing committee, the head of the institution or the senior members of the managing committee must be associated and they should be allowed to have a positive say in the matter. In some cases the outside authorties enjoy obosolute powers in taking decisions regarding the minority institutions without hearing them and these orders are binding on the institution. Such course of action is not constitutionally permissible so far as minority institution is concerned because it directly interferes with the administrative autonomy of the institution."
Therefore, the ViceChancellor has acted in the instant case in hot haste and did not apply his mind to the gravity of the situation. He should have taken due note of the fact that if charges levelled were true, the matter appears serious enough. Moreover, the ViceChancellor did not even think it proper to hear the institute or the Director before passing the impugned order. We are constrained to set aside and quash the order of the ViceChancellor, on the facts and circumstances of this case.
In view of the above observations, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of ViceChancellor dated 8111994 Annexun4 to the writ petition is quashed and the order dated 71194 ordering the suspension passed by the Director is restored. It is directed that disciplinary proceeding shall be concluded within a period of two months from the date of first hearing i. e. 8121994. Sri J, Nagar appearing on behalf of the Institute has assured that subject to respondent No. 4 cooperating, they would comply with this order of the Court. Costs easy.