Board of Revenue Referring Officer vs Poosarla China Appalanarasimhulu

Subba Rao, C.J.—This is a reference by the Board of Revenue, Andhra u/s 57 of the Indian Stamp Act. The following points are propounded lor the decision of this Court:

Whether the document in question is not an instrument of partition within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act and is not, therefore, liable to stamp duty or penalty?

Whether P. Sriramamurthi, one of the co-sharers, being the'' person that produced the documents before the Commercial Tax Officer, he alone was the person who could be proceeded against for the realisation of the duty and penalty and that it was not right to order collection from all the three brothers in equal shares? and

Whether the Revenue Divisional Officer, having called upon Sriramamurthi to pay the stamp duty and penalty by order, dated 6-1-1947, was not Justified in subsequently reviewing the same by means of his order, dated 13-7-1948 in which the applicant and the other two brothers were asked to pay the stamp duty and penalty in equal shares? The facts necessary to appreciate the questions mayabe briefly stated. Parvatheesam & Srirama-murtltf, sons of Poosarla Pcda Brahmaji garu, and Chinna Appala Narasimham, son of the Poosarla Chinna Brahmajee garu, were members of a joint Hindu family. Sriramamurthi filed before the Commercial Tax Officer a deed purporting to be list of properties partitioned between the brothers.. The Commercial Tax Officer impounded it and sent it to Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasapatnam u/s 38(2) of the Indian Stamp Act for taking action u/s 40 of the Act. The Revenue Divisional: Officer levied stamp duty and also penalty at five times the stamp duty. On 6-11-1947, he made an order directing the recovery of the said amounts from Sriramamurthi. But, his successor who fpund the calculation and levy of the stamp duty on the document to be erroneous, made a reference to the District Collector soliciting instructions. On 5-7-1948, the District Collector issued orders authorising the Revenue Divisional Officer to levy the correct stamp duty and penalty on the instrument. . Thereupon, the Revenue Divisional Officer levied''a stamp duty of Rs. 1252-8-0 and a penalty of Rs. 6262-8-0 and recovered the fun amount from the three parties to the document in proportion to their respective shares in the whole property partitioned.

2 The first question is whether the document in question is an instrument of partition within the meaning of S/2U5) of the Indian Stamp Act. Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act reads:

Instrument of partition means any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide or agree to divide such property in severalty, and includes also a final order for effecting a partition passed by any Revenue-authority or any Civil Court and an awarded by an arbitrator directing a partition.

The short question is whether the document in question is one whereunder the co-owners of the property divided or agreed to divide their property mentioned therein in severalty. The heading of the document runs thus:

The following is the list of properties partitioned among (1) Parvateesam (2) Sreerama-murthi, sons of Poosarla Peda Brahmaji garu and (3) Chinna Appala Narasimham, son of Poosarla Chinna Brahmajee garu residing at Chodavaram, on this day, the 1st day of July 1946.

Then follows "Particulars of the debts due to us". The debts are shown as Rs. 1,25,033-15-0. Then the "Debts due by us" are given. The total of the debt:; is shown as Rs. 49,233-12-0. Then follows the "Particulars of the properties falling to the share of Poosarla Parvateesam garu". Thus, the particulars contain the debts due to him and the debts due by him.

Then the particulars of the properties falling to the share of Poosarla Chinna Appalanarsimham-julu garu or given, which includes the debts due to him and debts due by him. So, too, the particulars of the properties falling to the share of Poosarla Sriramamurthi are shown. The document is signed by the three parties to the document and duly attested by two witnesses. This document, therefore, gives the joint properties owned by the three co-owners and allots to each one of them the properties that have fallen to his share. The document is duly signed by the parties to it and attested by witnesses. I have no doubt that it is a document where under co-owners of joint property divided their properties in severalty within the meaning of S, 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act. The document is so clear and the terms are so unambiguous that it would be unnecessary and even pedantic to refer to the cases cited at the bar. I hold that the document in question is an instrument of partition within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act, and answer the first question accordingly.

There is conflict of judicial opinion on the second question. Before considering the cases cited at the bar, it would be convenient at the outset to refer to the relevant sections of the Indian Stamp Act. SECTION 2(12):

Executed" and "execution" used with reference to instruments, mean "signed" and "signature.

SECTION 2(15):

Instrument of" partition" means any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide or agree to divide such property in severalty, and includes also a final order for effecting a partition passed by any Revenue Authority or any Civil Court and an award by an arbitrator directing a partition:

All instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in India except Part B States Shall be stamped before or at the time of execution.

SECTION 29:

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the expense of proving the proper stamp shall be borne.

(g) in the case of an instrument of partition by the parties thereto in proportion to their respective shares in the whole property partitioned, or. when the partition is made in execution of an order passed by Revenue-authority or Civil Court or arbitrator, in such proportion as such authority. Court or arbitrator directs. SECTION 40:

(1) When the Collector impounds any instrument u/s 33, or received any instrument sent to him u/s 38, Sub-section (2), not being an instrument chargeable with duty of one Anna or half an anna only or a bill of exchange or promissory note, he shall adopt the following procedure.

(b) If he is of opinion that such instrument is chargeable with duty and is not duly stamped, he shall require the payment of the proper duty or the amount required to make up the same, together with a penalty of Ave rupees; or, if he thinks fit. an amount not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper duty or of the deficient portion thereof, whether such amount exceeds or falls short of five rupees:

SECTION 44:

When any duty or penalty has been paid u/s 35. Section 37, Section 40 or Section 41 by any person in respect of an instrument, and, by agreement or under the provisions of Section 29 or any other enactment in force at the time such instrument was executed, some other person was bound to bear the expense of providing the proper stamp for such instrument, the list mentioned pair on shall be entitled to recover from such other person the amount of the duty or penalty so paid.

SECTION 48:

All duties, penalties & other sums required to be paid under this chapter may be recovered by the Collector by distress and sale of the moveable property of the person from whom the same are due, or by any other process for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land-revenue.

SECTION 62:

(1) Any person (b) executing or signing otherwise than as a witness any other instrument chargeable with duty without the same being duly stamped, shall for every such offence be punishable with fine which mav extend to five hundred rupees. ARTICLE 45 or SCHEDULE I: Partition. The same duty payable as a Bond for the amount of the value of the separated share or shares of the property.

The aforesaid provisions lay down the stamp of a particular denomination to be affixed to a document, the parties liable to pay it, and the manner in which the deficit duty and the penalty have to be levied and realised. In the case of a partition deed. Section 2 (15) defines it and Article of Schedule I prescribes th8 duty payable on it. u/s 17. the partition deed will have to be stamped with the requisite duty at or before the time of execution. u/s 29. in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the expense of providing the proper stamp shall be borne in the case of an instrument of partition by the parties thereto in proportion to their respective shares in trie whole propei ty partitioned, Section 40 enables the Collector to impound the instrument, and if, in his opinion, the instrument is not duly stamped, to require the payment of the proper duty together with the penalty imposed by him. Section 48, which was newly added by the present Act, empowers the Collector to recover the same from the persons from whom they are due by distress and sale of the moveable property of that person or by any other process for the time being in force for tiles recovery of arrears of- land-revenue. Under the previous Act. the stamp duty and penalty could not be enforced, and the only effect of non-payment was that the instrument in respect of which the payment of duty and penalty "was ordered could not be admitted in evidence. Apart from the recovery of the duties and penalties in the manner prescribed by the Act u/s 62 the person executing or signing otherwise than as a witness any instrument-chargeable with duty without the same being duly stamped is liable to be punished with fine. Under the aforesaid provisions, a partition deed is defined, and a particular stamp duty is prescribed. The document will have to be stamped before execution. The said charges should be borne by the parties, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, in proportion to their respective shares in the whole property partitioned. If not duly stamped, the document will be impounded & the deficient duty will be collected by the Collector in the same manner prescribed from the persons liable to pay. Reading the provisions, uninfluenced by the case law on the subject, I do not see any difficulty in holding that the persons liable to pay the stamp duty u/s 29 are the persons from whom the same is due within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act. The fact that S, 29 is not exhaustive of all the persons from whom the stamp duty under the Act may create the difficulty for ascertaining the persons from whom the stamp duty on the documents not provided by Section 29 is recoverable. That circumstances in itself cannot make me ignore the express provisions of Section 29 creating a liability in the case of documents dealt with by that section. Indeed. Section 48, which empowers a Collector to recover the duties and penalties from the persons from whom the same are due, was not in existence in the old Act, and the only effect of nonpayment of any duty before the present Act was that the instrument in respect of which the payment of duty and penalty was ordered could not be admitted in evidence.. It may be that in respect of documents not mentioned in Section 29, the legislature did not intend to depart from the old procedure, or it may be that the liability of persons to pay duty in respect of such documents will have to be inferred from other sections of the Act. It, therefore, appears to me to that the parties to a partition deed are liable to pay stamp duty in proportion to their respective shares in the whole property partitioned unless there is an agreement to the contrary, and they are the persons from whom the duty and penalty are due. The Collector can, therefore, proceed u/s 48 only against each of the parties in respect of the proportionate amount of the duty due from him.

Now, I shall proceed to consider the three leading decisions on the question taking divergent views. The earliest is that of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of State for India v. Bashara-tulah ILR 30 AH 271 (A). There, the Plaintiffs produced in Court an improperly stamped document executed in favour of their predecessor in title of the Plaintiffs in support of their claim. The learned Judge held that the Plaintiff was primarily the person from whom the requisite stamp duty penalty should be recovered u/s 40 of the Irdian Stamp Act. At page 272, the view of the Court was expressed thus:

"Further. we are of opinion that as it was the Plaintiffs who wished the documents admitted in evidence in support of their claim, they are the persons from whom the Collector, in the first instance can recover tjie duty and penalty required before the documents can be admitted in evidence, The provisions of Section 44 are important as showing "that when any duty or penalty has been recovered from any person in respect of an instrument, and some other person was bound to bear the expense of providing the proper stamp, the person from whom the duty and penalty has been recovered shall te entitled to recover from such other person the amount of the duty and penalty so recovered.

The conclusion of the learned Judges will lead to many anomalies and hardships, it has now been held, and it is not necessary to express our final opinion on this question in this case, that Section 44 gives a right only to an innocent party, and it does not apply to one of several persons who are under a common liability to bear the expenses of a proper stamp. It has also been held that a parson, who is himself in default, has no right of contribution in respect of the duty and penalty levied owing to the common default of himself and others. See Raman Chetty Vs. Nagappa Chetty, ; Athipalli Sundararamireddi Vs. Athipalli Pattabhiramireddi, ; Kashinathsa Yamosa and Others Vs. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa and Others, and Parshottam Ram Vs. Sheo Mangal Ram and Others, . Further under Sub-section (3) of Section 44. in the case of persons who are parties to a suit, unless the said amounts are included in the decree for costs, no further proceedings for the recovery of that amounts shall ''oe maintainable. If so, a party to a suit or a proceeding, who produces a document executed by others, will be compelled to pay the duty and penalty in the first instance even though the stamp duty and p-nalty levied is disproportionate to his claim, and even though he does not want to get that document exhibited in his suit. It is not an answer to say that after paying the heavy duty he can recover it from the executant of the document u/s 44 of the Act. If he insists upon the document going into evidence no doubt he will have to pay the stamp duty and the penally. But it he gives up the document, I do not see anv reasons or principle why he should be mulcted with the burden of . paying the heavy duty voluntarily or by coercive "V[i 8uu3Aoo?.t sui jo aouraip-jjo t.re U/)IA\\ ssaoo.iu amount paid in a subsequent proceeding, Where such a partv fails in the suit, the Court may not pass an order in his favour, and if the executants are not parties to the suit, no such order can be made. Unless the provisions of the Act are clear and unambiguous in this case there is no express provision imposing the initial liability on such a person I cannot infer from the provisions a liability with such dire consequences.

The next decision is that of the Special Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mahomed Hussain v. Emperor ILR (1940) Lah 637 : AIR 1940 Lah 315) (SB) (P). The facts in that case were, on the ''16th January 1912, one Chiragu-ud-din executed a document settling his property on his sons daughters and wives in certain proport''ons and appointing one of his sons named Aldul Majid as manager of the property left to him and three of his brothers, namely, Abdul Hamced, Abdul Rashid and Mohammad Seed. The document was executed on a stamp paper of annas eight only '' After the death of Chiragu-ud-din the docu-ment was produced by Hakim Mohammad Hussain, one of his sons, in a Civil Suit, but an objection was taken that the document was insufficiently stamped. The learned Sub-Judge impounded it and sent it on to* trie Collector u/s 38C2) of the Indian Stamp Act for necessary action. The Collector, purporting to act under the provisions of Section 40 of that Act. required Mohammad Hussain, who preduced the document, to pay stamp duty amounting to Rs. 498-8-0 and a penalty of Rs. 500/-., Mohammad Hussain applied for revision of the order of the Collector, and the Financial Commissioner referred the matter for the decision of the H''gh Court. The learned judges: held that the provisions of the Act do not enable the Collector to compel the person, who wishes to have an insufficiently stamped document admitted in evidence, to pay the duty or the penlaty when he is not a person who was originally bound to bear the expenses for providing the duty. The learned judges made the following observations at page 643 (of ILR Lah): (at pp. 317-318 of AIR).

"As already pointed out, there is no provision in the Act, making a person who merely presents an insufficiently stamped document for being admitted in evidence liable for payment of the requisite stamp duty or penalty on the document. He cannot therefore be considered to be a person from whom the stamp duty or penalty is due and consequently the same cannot be recovered from him u/s 48. If the stamp duty or penalty has to be recovered compulsorily, it can be legally recovered u/s 48 only from the person from whom the same is due. In order to ascertain the person or persons from whom the duty or penalty is due we must go back to Section 29. But it may be observed that if it is found that the Indian Stamp Act does not in fact fix the liability for payment of stamp on any particular person in the case of any instrument, the consequence will presumably be that the Collector will ke:p the impounded document in his custody and no person interested in the document will be able to maks use of it until and unless the necessary stamp duty and penalty is paid"

I generally agree with the aforesaid observations. The liability of the persons to pay the duty, as the learned judges pointed out, is fixed u/s 29 and the Collector can only recover the deficient duty & the penalty for not paying the duty only from these persons from whom the amount is due. The liability imposed u/s 29 is enforced u/s 48. This view works evenly on the persons liable to pay the duty and the State. This, not only stairs clear of many anomalies that would arise if the contrary view is accepted, but also can reasonably be supported on a legal basis, The only comment that can be made, and is made, against this view is that Section 29 is not exhaustive of all the documents liable to duty. But, I have pointed out that that cannot be a reason for ignoring the section affording a legal basis in search of implying one from doubtful provisions though a search may be necessary to discover imposition of legal liability in the case of documents not covered by Section 29 of the Act. It would be unnecessary to express my final opinion In this case on the question whether in the cuse of documents not covered by Section 29, the only penalty is that the person interested in the document will not be able to make any use of it until and unless the necessary stamp duty and penalty are pa''d or whether the said amounts can be recovered by coercive process u/s 48.

The third decision is that of a Divisional Bench of the Madras High Court in Subramaniam Chettiar Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Another, . Tlic learned Judges, t "Rajamaiinar C. J. and Panchapakesa Iyer J. discussed the question at some length and adopted a view, which is different from that taken by either of the two aforesaid cases. Panchapakesa Iyer J-I ''delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench, after noticing the provisions of the Act and the . judgments of the Allahabad and Lahore High Courts observed at page 132 (ot: Mud LJ): (at p. 458 of -AIR):

"We are unable to agree with the views of either Bench in full. We are of opinion that a distinction must be made between the person liable �in the first instance to pay the stamp duty and penalty under the agreement between the parties or u/s 29, which provides for that liability in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, and The person from whom the Collector can levy the -stamp duty and penalty under Sections 40 and 48. The state, obviously, is not a party to any such agreement between the parties and cannot be, therefore, �bound by any such agreement, or by the provisions of Section 29 fixing the liability for the stamp duty on one of the parties in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. So, Section 29, relied on so much by the learned Judges in ILR 1940 Lah 637 : AIR 1940 Lah 315) (SB) (F) can have no application to the Collector''s powers under Sections 40 and 48. Section 44 relied on so much by the learned judges in ILR 30 All 271 (A) provides only for the case of parties who have agreed to pay stamp duty inter se or who would be bound under the provisions of Section 29, or any other enactment in force, at the time when the instrument was executed, to pay the stamp duty in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Section 44 does not deal with the right of the State to levy the stamp duty and penalty under Sections 40 and 48. Nor does it provide for the State applying to the Court for a provision, as regards the stamp duty & penalty payable to it, in its order of costs in the suit or proceeding," After failing to discover the legal liability under any of those provisions, the learned Judges were able to imply that liability under Sections 17 and 62 of the Act. The reasons for their implying such a liability are stated at page 133 (of Mad LJ): (at p. 458 of AIR) thus:

"Thus, these Sections read together indicate, In the opinion of the learned Advo-jate-General, with which opinion we entirely agree, that the ex--ecutant of such document is the person against whom the Collector should proceed under Sections 40 and 48 for collecting the stamp duty and penalty. It_is significant that the proviso to Section 62 makes ihintion also about the penalty levied u/s 40 and "makes a provision for its deduction from the fine. Sections 17 and 62 show that the agreement between the parties and the provisions of Sections 29 and 44 are applicable only between the parties, leaving the Collector''s right under Sections 40 and 48 unaffected."

They proceeded to state:

"We may add that where several persons jointly execute a document, the Collector can proceed under Sections 40 and 48, against any of them, as they are all jointly and severally liable. He is not bound to collect the Pro Rata Shares from each. The Pro Rata division is a matter for them to effect amicably or get settled in suits for contribution, or by moving the Court to include in its order of costs where suits & proceedings are pending, That Section 29 will not bind the Collector under Sections 40 and 48 is not only clear from the fact that that section and Section 44 relate only to rights between the . D.ajties (the Collector is. of course not one of them) out''can also be deduced from the ruling of Ven-(August) 1957 Andh. Fri. D.P./16 kataramanarao, J. in Chunduri Panakala Rao Vs. Penugonda Kumaraswami, . The conclusion of the learned Judges may be shortly put thus. By Implication, Sections 17 and 62 of the Act impose a statutory liability jointly and severally on the executants of a document. The Collector can enforce that liability u/s 48 of the Act. Section 29 only creates a liability Inter Se between the executants, and the Collector not being a party to the document or a collateral agreement apportioning the liability, is not bound by the provisions of Section 29. I cannot agree. Whatever justification there may be in the other cases, in this case I am not expressing my final opinion in it, for inferring or applying a statutory liability under Sections 17 and 62 of the Act.there is none in the case of a partition deed or other documents covered by Section 29. Section 29 does not embody only an internal arrangement between the executants. It'' creates a statutory liability. Under that saction,] in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,] the expense of providing the proper stamp shall be borne in the case of an instrument of partition by the parties thereto in proportion to their respective shares in the whole property partitioned. The fact j that the statutory liability is subject to an agreement will not make it any the less a statutory liability, for the statute itself may fix the liability on the basis of an agreement. This device of fixing a statutory liability subject to an agreement to the contrary is not a new one and is adopted in many statutes. The section fixes the liability on an equitable basis proportionate to the respective shares of the execur tants in the whole property partitioned, and the liability so imposed is expressed in general terms and not for any particular purposes. If the executants pay the deficient duty, it has been held that a suit for contribution is not maintainable unless perhaps an apportionment is made by an order of Court. Otherwise, the declaration of liability u/s 29 would become a pious wish if the Collector is enabled to ignore the statutory liability fixed u/s 29. for, one of the executants may be compelled to pay the entire amount & he may not be in a position to recover the amount paid in excess of their shares from the others. Nor does-the argument that in some cases the Collector may have to take evidence or consider other material to ascertain the agreement, if any, between the parties fixing their liability contrary to the provisions of the Statute, appeal to me. If the document itself embodies the agreement, the liability of the parties is easily ascertained. If a collateral agreement is set up, it is for the Collector to ascertain that fact, as he did in the present case, & to enforce the liability. In almost every case of statutory liability, the taxing authority will have to ascertain some fact or facts before imposing or enforcing the liability. That circumstance cannot be a reason for ignoring the clear expression of the statutory liability u/s 29. I do not see, therefore, any justification for restricting the liability-fixed u/s 29 as one Inter Se between the parties to a document. I answer the second question accordingly.

Now. coming to the third question, the relevant facts "may briefly be recapitulated. On 6-11-1947 the Revenue Divisional Officer directed the Tahsildar of Chodavaram to collect Rs. 765/- being the deficient stamp duty and Rs. 3825/- being the penalty from Poosarla Srirama Murthi, and if it was not recovered from him, from the executants. This order or direction was made without giving notice to the parties. On 23-12-1947, Sriramamurthi filed a petition before the Revenue Divisional Officer questioning the correctness of the stamp duty and die penalty imposed and also bringing to his The Reveme divional officer on the callicula and the levy of the stamp duty on the document to be erroneous and made a reference to the .patriot Collector on 17-6-1948 for instructions whether he could rectify the error committed by his predecessor.

The District Collector, by his order dated 5-7-1948, authorised the Revenue Divisional Officer to levy the correct stamp duty and , penalty on the instrument. Thereupon, the Revenue Divisional Officer issued notices to all the parties,"'' and after hearing their objections, by his order dated 13-7-1948 directed the Tahsil-daj to collect from the three brothers in three equal shares Rs. 1252-8-0 towards stamp duty, and Rs. 6262-8-0 towards penalty before 20-7-1948. The amounts were duly recovered from them. The contention of the Respondents is that the Revenue Divisional Officer having made an order dated 6-11-1947 fixing the .deficient duty and the penalty and directing the same to be collected in the first instance from Srjrainamurthi. had no power to review the same i '' and . Increase the duty and the penalty and direct ''it to be collected from the three brothers. It is Bald ''that that duty of the Revenue Divisional Officer u/s 40 is a judicial act, and he has no Dower under the statute to review his order. On th,e other hand, it is contended for the Government that the Revenue Divisional Officer in fixing the duty and collecting the deficient duty and penalty is only acting administratively and he can "correct, the mistakes Suo Motu or when brought to his notice. ''Further, it is argued that no question of review of an order arises in the present case, as no order made against the Respondents was subsequently reviewed by him.

The first question is whether Section 40 of the "Indian Stamo Act imposes on the Collector a duty to" act judicially. u/s 40, when a Collector impounds any instrument, and If ho is of opinion that such an instrument is chargeable with duty and is not duly stamped, he shall require the payment of the proper duty and the amounts required to make up the same together with a penalty of five rupees, or if he thinks fit, an amount not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper duty or of the deficient portion thereof, whether such amount exceeds or falls short of fire rupees. Before he requires the payment, the Collector must come to a conclusion that such instrument is not duly stamped. The powers exercisable u/s 40 Is subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. u/s 56(2), If the Collector feels doubt in ascertaining the amount of duty with ''which the instrument is chargeable, he is ; authorised to draw up a statement of the case and ; refer It with his own opinion thereon for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. On the receipt of the statement of the case and the opinion of the Collector, such authority shall consider the case and send i\\ copy of the decision to the Collector, who shall thereupon proceed to assess and charge the duty in conformity with such decision. The Chief Controlling Reyenue Authority may refer the case with its opinion, to the High Court. The auestion referred shall be decided by the High Court, and u/s 59(2), the Revenue Authority shall, on receiving the order of the High Court, dispose of the case conformably to such "judgment,- These sections are part of an integral for ascertaining the quantum of stamp duty penalty payable on a document which and the provisions of the stamp Act and which someone m 4erans say that the opinion of the Collector should be expressed and implemented after giving notice to parties, the principles of natural justioe require that it should be done so. The Revenue Divisional Officer, in the instant case, expressed an opinion and gave a direction to, the Tahsildar without hearing the parties. When the mistake was discovered the successor issued notices to the parties, & after hearing them made the order now in dispute. The subsequent order, in the circumstances, is not one made to review the earlier one, but one made for the 1st time after hearing the parties, which the previous Revenue Divisional Officer should have done. The fact that the Collector advised him to do so cannot make the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer any the less a legal order if he is otherwise competent to do so. In this view, the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondents in support of his contention that a Tribunal cannot review its final order unless the statute confers expressly such a power on it are beside the point. Whether the 1st order made in violation of the principles of natural justice is deemed to have no legal existence at all or whether the subsequent order made after hearing the parties is considered to be made for the first time, so far as the parties to that order are concerned, the legal position would be the same. In either view, the second order was an order reviewing the earlier order but one made for the first time after complying with the principles of natural justice; I therefore answer the third question accordingly.

The Respondents will pay the costs of the Board of Revenue. Advocate''s fee Rs. 150/-.

Bhimasankabam, J.

This is a reference made by the Board of Revenue. Andhra u/s 57 of the Indian Stamp Act. Three questions have referred for our decision.

(1). Whether the document in question is not an instrument of partition within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act and is not, therefore, liable to- stamp duty and penalty?

(2). Whether P. Sriramamurthi, one of the co-sharers, being the person that produced the document before the Commercial Tax Officer he alone was the person who could be proceeded against for the realisation of the duty and-penalty and that it was not right to order collection from all the three brothers in equal shares? and (3). Whether the Revenue Divisional Officer, having called upon Sriramamurthi to pay the stamp duty and penalty by his order, dated 6-1-1947, was not justified in subsequently reviewing the same be means of his order dated 13-7-1948 In which the. applicant and the other two brothers were asked to pay the stamp duty and penalty In equal shares?

The material facts leading up to the reference are these:--In connection with an enquiry presumably under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, one Poosarla Sriramamurthy produced before the Commercial Tax Officer, Vlsakhapatnam the document in question which is a de"d of partition among three brothers. It contains lists of the properties which each of them got at the division. The Commercial Tax Officer Impounded it and sent it to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narasapataam u/s 38(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, for action to be taken u/s 40 of that Act. On 11-6-1947, the Revenue Divisional Officer determined a sum of Rs. 4500/.- as being leviable for stamp duty, and penalty (fixed at 5 times the stamp duty) and ordered its recovery from Sriramamurthi. Soon after this order was made, the officer was succeeded by another who discovered that the duty determined as payable by his predecessor was less than what was due and made a reference to the District Collector seeking instructions as to whether the error could be rectified. On 5-7-1948, the District Collector directed the Revenue Divisional Officer to make the necessary correction and to collect the amount of the duty and the penalty from the three brothers, in proportion to the value of then-shares nrthe property which was partitioned among them. Accordingly, a stamp''duty of Rs. 1252-8-0 and a penalty of Rs. 6262-8-0 was imposed upon all the brothers together and collected from them proportionately to the value of their shares. One of the brothers China Appala Narasimhulu unsuccessfully filed an appeal to the collector against'' the order and then a revision before the Board of Revenue. Madras, Thereupon, hv i''-Unl W P No. 734 of 1951 on the file of the Madras High Court for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the Board to draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court for its opinion u/s 57 of the Act., The Mandamus sought for having been issued, the Board of Revenue, referred the '' three questions mentioned above. The reference is now treated as a reference made by the Board of Revenue, Andhra to this High Court.

The first question is easily answered. The document begins by saying "The following is the list of properties partitioned among (1) Parvatee-sam (2) Sr.eeramamurthy, sons of Poosarla Peda Brahmajee Gam & (3) China Appala Narasimham, son of Poosarla China Brahmajee Gam'' residing at Chodavaram, on this day, the 1st day of July, 1946." This is followed by a list of the properties held in common followed by three separate lists each being headed by the description "Particulars of the properties falling to the share ot". Now S 3 of the Indian Stamp Act read with Article 38 of Schedule 1-A of the Indian Stamp Act read with Article 38 of Schedule 1-A of the Madras Amendment necessitates the payment of stamp duty on an instrument of partition and such an instrument is defined by Section 2 Clause (15) of the Act. The definition, so tar as it is material for our present purpose, is as follows.

2(15), "instrument of Partition" means any instrument whereby co-owner''s of any property divide or agree to divide such property in severalty.

In Reference under Stamp Act, Section 46 ILR 12 Mad 198 (FB) .(I) it was held that where parties purported to be co-owners of the property and in that capacity agreed to divide the property in severalty by written instrument, the documents were "Instruments of partition" within the meaning of the above definition, A later case, ILR 12 Mad 198 (FB) (I) decided that when "three out of seven brothers constituting an undivided Hindu family. executed documents whereby each acknowledged the receipt of cerium property made over to him, "a division of family property having been effected'''', and acknowledged himself liable for one-seventh of the debts of the family, the documents were liable to be stamped as instruments of partition." A decision of the Bombay High Court reported in The Superintendent of Stamps Vs. Chimanlal Lalbhai, is to the same effect. The real tests in these cases are (1) whether the parties purport to deal with the property as co-owners and (2) whether the document effects actual division or embodies an outspent to divide the properties held in Plaintiff the answers to these two questions are in the affirmative, then the instrument is one of partition and liable to stamp duty The case would be different if the document is a mere memorandum of, a past transaction or only contains lists of properties without recital whatever that each of the sharers be entitled to enjoy in future the properties listed under his name absolutely and in his own right. It cannot be seriously disputed and in fairness to Mr. Venkatesam it must be said that he did not dispute that the document now in question recites air actual division and was intended by the parties to constitute the sole evidence of the details of properties that fell to each of the sharers,. I agree in the answer proposed to this question by the learned Chief Justice.

The second question, However, is one considerable difficulty and also of great importance. In order to answer it, it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act. The statute is a taxing Statute and its object is to impose duties on certain instruments. Section 2 contains definitions. Section 3 describes the instruments chargeable with duty with certain exceptions and exemptions. It provides inter alias that every instrument mentioned in the schedule to the Act shall be liable to duty. Section 4 provides how a single transaction employing several instruments should be stamped. Section 5 deals with the way in which an instrument comprising or relating to several distinct matters is to be chargeable with duty. Section 6 provides for an. instrument so framed as to come within two or more of the descriptions in the schedule. Section 8 relates to stamps payable in respect of bonds, debentures or other securities be which loans are raised by any local Authority. Ss. 10 to 16 deal with the mode of paying duties. Section 17, to which a more detailed reference will be made hereafter, provides that the duties are payable before or at the time of execution. Sections 18 and 19 make provision concerning instruments executed out of British India. Sections 20 to 28 lay down the manner in which the duty payable is to be evaluated In certain cases. Section 29 to which reference will again be made mentions the persons who, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, are to bear the expenses for providing the proper stamp in the case of certain instruments. Section 30 deals with an obligation of persons to give duly stamped receipts. Sections 31 and 32 enable the Collector of a District to decide as to what is the proper duty chargeable on a particular instrument when he is approached for his opinion and to issue a Certificate. Chapter IV of the Act which contains Sections 33 to 48 deals with "instruments not duly stamped.'''' Section 33 directs the Impounding by public officers of documents not duly stamped and Section 35 prohibits the admissibility in evidence of such documents in any legal or official proceedings. Section 38 provides for the forwarding of the impounded document to the Collector, while Section 40 enables the Collector, when dealing with an impounded document, to declare that It is duly stamped or if it is not so duly stamped, to require the payment of the proper duty with penalty. Chapter v. deals with allowances to be made in the case of spoiled, misused stamps or stamps not required for use etc., Sections 56 to 61 provide for reference and revision to the Board of Revenue and to the High Court. Sections 62 to 70 deal with offences in violation of the terms of the Act, the penalties there for and the procedure relating thereto. Chapter VXII contains Sections 73 to 78 which are supplementary provisions to which reference is unnecessary for our present purposes.

It is remarkable, however, as pointed out fe''a very recent decision of the Madras High Court fir ( (S) Subramaniam Chettiar Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Another, that the Act is silent as to the person against whom tine authorities are to proceed for recovering the Stamp duty and penalty in the case of documents "pd dull stamped". When thc Collector impounds an instrument or receives an instrument sent. to feim by any public officer impounding it, he is direct-edrby/S. 40 either to certify that it is duly stamped* or.'' to require the payment of the proper duty (together with penalty.. Section 48 is in these terms:

AIL duties, penalties and other sums required to be paid under this chapter may be recovered By. the Collector by distress and sale of the moveable property of the person from whom the same. are due, or by any other process for the time being'' tn force for the recovery of arrears of land-revenue.

In the decision mentioned above, the learned Judges W Jiffib-tthe solutipn to the question as to who is the person against whom the Collector can proceed under ..S. 48 by following what they call the clue afforded by Sections 17 & 62 of the Act and held that Sections 29 and 44 do not throw any light. In order to appreciate the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Judges, in to necessary to bear in mind the exact langvage of those sections in so far as it is material for the present discussion.

Section 29 reads:

In the absence of an agreement to the clothe expense of providing the proper stamp jihau: be borne,-

(2), in the case of an instrument of partition the parties thereto in proportion to their respective shares in the whole property partitioned," Section 44 runs thus:-

"44 (1). When any duty or penalty has been paid u/s 35, Section 37, Section 40 or Section 41, by any person fn .respect of an instrument, and by agreement or under the provisions of Section 29 or any other enactment in force at the time such instrument was executed, some other person was bound to bear the expenses of providing the proper stamp for such instrument, the first mentioned person shall be'' entitled to recover from such other person the amount of the duty or penally so paid.

(2). For the purpose of such recovery any certificate granted in respect of such instrument under this Act shall be conclusive evidence of the matters therein certified.

(3) Such amount may, if the Court thinks fit, be included in any order as to costs in any suit or proceeding to which such persons are parties and in which such instrument has bum tendered in evidence. If the Court does not include the amount in-such order, no further proceedings for the recovery of the amount shall be maintainable." Section 62(1) Clauses (a), (b) and (c) are in these terms:-

"62 (1). Any person- "

(a) drawing, making, issuing, endorsing or transferring, or signing otherwise than as a witness, or presenting for acceptance of payment, or accepting, paying or receiving payment of, or in any manner negotiating, any bill of exchange (payable otherwise than on demand) or promissory note without the same being duly stamped; or (c) voting or attempting to vote under any proxy not duly stamped;

shall for every such oilcake be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees; Provided that, when any penalty has been paid in respect of any instrument u/s 35, S. 40 or S. 61. the amount of such penalty shall be allowed in reduction of the fine (if any) subsequently imposed under this section in respect of the same instrument upon the person who paid such penalty". The learned judges in 1956-2 Mad LJ 126: ( (S) Subramaniam Chettiar Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Another, were/of the view that as the State will not be a party to any agreement between the parties such as is referred to in S. 29, it cannot be bound by any such agreement or even the alternative provisions therein where there is no agreement. They further thought that S. 44 also is applicable only between the parties, leaving the Collector''s right under Ss, 40 and 48 unaffected. "Following the clue therefore afforded by Ss. 17 and G2'''' they came to the conclusion that the person against whom the Collector should proceed in regard to instruments chargeable with duty and not duly stamped, is the "executant of the document". To use their own words''.

"Thus these sections read together indicate, in the opinion of the learned Advocate-General, with which opinion we entirely agree, that the executants of such document is the person against whom the Collector should proceed under Sections 40 and 48 for collecting the stamp duty and penalty., It is significant that the proviso to S. 62 makes mention also about the penalty levied u/s 40 and makes a, provision for its deduction from the fine. Sections 17 and 62 show that the agreement between the parties and the provisions of Sections 29 and 44 are applicable only between the parties, leaving the Collector''s right under Sections 40 and 48 unaffected. ..

We may add that where several persons jointly execute a document, the Collector can proceed under Sections 40 and 48, against any of them, as they are all jointly and severally liable. He is not bound to collect the pro rata shares from each. That pro rata division is a matter for them to effect amicably or get settled in suits for contribution, or by moving the Court to include in its order of costs where suits and proceedings are pending."

The learned Judges derived support for the position that S. 29 will not bind the Collector from the decision of Venkataramanarao J., in Chunduri Panakala Rao Vs. Penugonda Kumaraswami, . They then discussed the question as to the meaning of the word "executed", & elucidated it with reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Puran Chand Nahat-ta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherjeo ILR 55 Cal 532 : AIR 1928 PC 38 ) (K)." They concluded that the word "executants" does not include all persons signing in the documet but only persons who,, by valid cxeeuti:m have entered into an Obligation under the - document. While noticing that Section 62 exempts only persons signing the document otherwise than as witnesses from liability to prosecution and penalty, they proceeded to say that "even other persons, like persons in whose favour the document is executed, but who undertake no obligation under the document, will not be executants for purposes of being proceeded against under Sections 40 and 48". With great respect to the learned Judges, I am unable, to accept this reasoning. It is to be observed that Section 62 provides that all persons executing or signing otherwise than as a witness any other instrument chargeable with duty without the same being duly stamped shall be liable for punishment with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. It also provides that even persons "presenting for acceptance of payment, or accepting, paying or receiving payment of or in any manner negotiating, any bill of exchange or promissory note without the same being duly stamped" are liable to punishment. Even a person voting or attempting to vote under any proxy not duly stamped is punishable under this Section. Therefore, Section 62 does not deal merely or mainly with "executants''''. It deals with a very large class of persons associated or dealing in any particular way with improperly stamped instruments. Again, it seems to me that S. 17 which Feely says . that "all instruments chargeable with duty-and executed by any person in British India-shall be stamped before or at the time of execution" throws no light upon the persons who are liable.

Nor can I agree with the extreme view expressed in early Allahabad case reported as ILR 30 All 271 (A) that a person who produced an unstamped or improperly stamped document and who wished the document to be admitted in evidence in support of his claim, is the person primarily liable for the stamp duty and penalty recoverable by the Collector u/s 40 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 though he, in his turn, might recover it from the other parties liable by a suit u/s 44 This view of a divisional Bench of the Allahabad High Court was strongly criticised by a Special Bench of Lahore High Court in ILR 1940 Lah 637 : AIR 1940 Lah 315) (F) Bhide J., who spoke for the Special Bench made these observations, at page 640 (of ILR Lah): (at pp. 316-318 of AIR) in discussing the question before the Court. "Whether stamp duty and penalty can be recovered from the person who nresents an insufficiently stamped document to the Court when he is not himself the ''executant''":

"The only authority which the learned Ad-Yocate-General was able to cite in support of his contentions was ILR 30 All 271 (A), in which it was held that it is the person who wishes a document to be admitted in evidence in court from whom the Collector can recover the duty and penalty in the first instance. The learned Judges who decided that case seem to have relied merely on the provisions of Section 44 of the Indian. Stamp Act in support of this conclusion, but with the greatest respect I must say that that action does not appear to be at all conclusive on the point. It may be observed at the outset that the person who wishes a document to be admitted in evidence in Court may be - and very often is- different from the executants as well as from the person who has the custody of the document and actually produces it in Court - If a person, who happen to have the document in his custody merely produces it in court on being required by the court to do so. there seems to be no reason whatever why he should be mode liable to pay the duty or penalty and even the Allahabad ruling cited by the learned Advocate General does not seem to go by the lath of Holding that such a person can be "required" to pay the stamp duty or deficiency. The ruling does hold that a person who wishes to have the document admitted in evidence in court can be required to pay the requisite duty or penalty in tin; lli''st instance. But Section 44 of the Indian Stamp Act on which reliance has been placed in that ruling does not appear to support such a conclusion. That section merely enables a person who has paid the duty and penalty under Sections 35, 37, 40 or 41 to recover the same from the person who was bound to bear the expense of providing it; but it does not throw any light on the question before us, viz., what person or persons can be ''required'' to pay the stamp duty or penalty u/s 40. If the intention of the Legislature was that the necessary duty or '' penalty should be recovered from the person who wishes to have the document admitted in Court, one would have expected to find some provision to that effect in the section itself or at least some where else in the Act. But no such provision has been made. The reason is, I think, not far to seek. When a person wishes to have a document admitted in Court for the purpose of his case it may often be to his interest to pay the duty and penalty at once in order to get the document admitted in evidence as the person who was originally bound to bear the expense of providing the stamp duty may not be traceable at the time or may not be prepared to pay the duty or penalty voluntarily. If he does so to suit his convenience the provisions of Section 44 enable him to recover the same from the person who was originally bound to bear the expense of providing the duty. But there is nothing in Section 35 or Section 40, to enable either the court of the Collector to compel the person who wishes to have the document .admitted in evidence in Court to pay the duty or penalty. The only reasonable inference in the circumstances seems to be that the payment of such duty or penalty is left to his choice, under those sections.

If he does not choose to pay the duty and penalty u/s 35 or 40, he has to take the consequence of not being able to use the document. But it would be obviously hard and unfair to compel such a person to pay the duty on the document merely because he attempted to produce it in evidence. The stamp duty may be heavy and he may not be even in a position to pay it, or it may not be worth his while to do so, for the purposes of his case The Legislature, therefore, seems to have advisedly left the matter to his choice.

If the stamp duty or penalty has to be recovered compulsorily, it can be legally recovered u/s 48 only from the person from whom the same is due. In order to ascertain the person or persons from whom the duty or penalty is due we must go back to Section 29 It has been urged that Section 29 is not exhaustive that there are several classes of instruments for which no provision is made in that section and the section would therefore be of no assistance in fixing the liability for payment of duty and penalty in the case of such instruments. This contingency does not however, arise in the present instance as a deed of settlement is covered by Section 29 and the point need not therefore be considered for the purposes of this reference But it may be observed that if it is found that the Indian Stamp Act does not in fact fix the liability for Payment of stamp duty on any particular person in the case of any instrument, the consequence were presumably be that the Collector will keep the impounded document in his custody and no person interested in the document will be able to make any use ox it until and unless the necessary stamp duty is paid."

The meaning of the last sentence in this Prefer is that where Section 29 points to a person as liable to pay the Collector can collect the stamp duty and penalty from him and where there is no pointer in that section, then the Collector cannot collect the stamp duty from any person but can only keep the impounded document in his custody, thus preventing any person interested in the document from making > any use of it. I cannot however speaking for myself see why the Legislature should have made any difference between instruments referred to in Section 29 and other instruments. Indeed, Section 62 does not recognise any such difference.

In the case of every instrument chargeable with duty there should in my opinion be a person from whom it is due within the meaning of Section 48 If the Legislature meant to confine the liability to the executants or executants as laid down by the Madras High Court in the above-mentioned decision, viz., 1956-2 Mad LJ 126: (CS) AIR 1956 454) (Q), it would have been easy enough for the Legislature to have used the term "Executant" In the section instead of the expression "the person from whom the same are due." Further, the result of that view would be, in my opinion, considerably to restrict the power of the State to collect the duties and penalties payable. Where there Is only a single executant and he dies, the State would be powerless, in such a view, to collect the ''tax from his legal representatives or the persons who obtained benefits under the deed. I do not think that such a result was intended by the legislature though the fact that they are not personally guilty of non-payment of the duty that may be payable may, of course, influence the Collector in determining the amount of penalty to be imposed u/s 40 (b). The learned Judges of the Lahore ''High Court rule in the case already referred to that where an insufficiently stamped document has been impounded, the Crown (now the stepson pursue its claim against the estate of the fdeceased executants in the hands of his legal representatives. In my judgment, that view is correct."

To sum up, in my view, the solution of the Toole as to who the person is from whom the tax Is eligible is to be arrived at from clues afforded not merely by Sections 17 and 02 but also by Sections 29 and 44 and indeed the whole scheme and purpose of the Act.. As I have already pointed put. the scheme of the enactment is clearly to impose duties on instruments and not on persons. That being so, persons who are executants as well as other parties to an instrument though not executants (such as are mentioned in Section 29) would be liable. Of course, other persons who want to use such documents must pay the duty & penalty imposed before they could use it. That would be only a voluntary payment not enforceable under 6. 48. Such persons would clearly be entitled to reimbursement in the manner provided by Section 44.

Now. it is true, as pointed out in the above Madras decision, that where there is an agreement between the parties to a document as to who is to bear the expense of providing the stamp duty, the agreement is binding only INTER SE and the stats not being a party thereto, cannot, under the general law, enforce it. But in my opinion, though the State may not avail itself of any such agreement, it surely can. Suppose, for instance, the instrument itself recites that a particular person should pay and that such a person is a party thereto: the Government can proceed on the footing that he is the person from whom the tax is due within the meaning of Section 48, because it is; the instrument that is liable to duty and under the instrument he has agreed to be liable. When there is an oral agreement not mentioned in the instrument, the State may ignore it. Strictly speaking, the agreement derives its force under the terms Of the statute, that is to say, it is the statute that mates a party, who has agreed to pay, liable. He may not improperly be described as a "person from whom the duty is due". But, that is not to say that Section 29 is binding upon the State, Agreement or rip agreement between the parties, the State is free to proceed against all persons who would be liable u/s 29 and in cases not provided by Section 29. it can proceed against all the parties to an . Instrument. I am unable to agree that the Government cannot take advantage of the provisions of Section 29 in the sense explained above if they choose to do so.

It is also noteworthy that Section 29 does not .speak of a person by whom the duty is pay-

able but speaks of a person bearing "the expense of providing the proper stamp" while Section 48 refers to the person from -whom the duty is DUE. No person who. u/s 29, is under an obligation to bear the expense, can complain when the State collects the proper duty from him, because that would only be enforcing against him a liability imposed upon him, either by agreement or by the statute or in sense by both. But, the state is not bound to confine itself to the provisions of Section 29. A person who is at all liable is liable, so far as the state is concerned, for the whole of the deficient duty and if he has no right of contribution u/s 44 as held in some cases, it is in tire nature of an appropriate punishment for violating the law.

The question has also been mooted before us as to when one of the executants has paid the deficiency duty and the penalty, he would be entitled to "recoup it from a coexistent. It was decided in "a case reported as Raman Chetty Vs. Nagappa Chetty, that "Section 41 of the Stamp Act was intended to give a right to an innocent party, who himself was not guilty of any default in the matter of the proper stamping of a document......and that it was not intended to enable one of several persons, who were under a common duty to pay the proper stamp in proportionate shares, to claim recovery of the proportionate amount of the duty or penalty, the whole of which he was afterwards obliged to pay owing to the common default".

This ruling has been followed by a single judge of the Madras High Court in Athipalli Sundararamireddi Vs. Athipalli Pattabhiramireddi, and a single judge of the Allahabad High Court in Parshottam Ram Vs. Sheo Mangal Ram and Others, . In (S) Kashinathsa Yamosa and Others Vs. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa and Others, , a divisional Bench of the Bombay High Court expressed the same opinion. Tile contrary view was rejected by the learned Judges in that case with particular reference to the language employed in Section 44. They observed that Sub-section (1) of Section 44 provides not for contribution but for recovery by any person who had paid the duty and the penalty, of "the amount of the duty or penalty so paid" from "such person as was bound to bear the expense of providing the proper stamp by agreement or under the provisions of Section 29 or any other enactment in force." The learned judges also stressed the contradiction between "any person" who has paid the duty and penalty and "some other person" bound to bear the expense of providing the proper stamp. I do not have to decide that question in the present case and therefore I do not propose to deal with that line of authority,

As a result of the foregoing reasoning, it follows, in my opinion, that the answer to the first part of the second question should be that Sriramamurthy was not the only person against whom the Collector could proceed and that the answer in regard to the second part of the question should be that the Collector was right in ordering collection from all the three brothers in equal shares.

I find little difficulty in answering the third question. u/s 40, it is the collector who has to determine the duty and the penalty. It is true that in the present case, the Revenue Divisional Officer, a subordinate of the collector did . it in the first instance. Section 76rA of the Act which enables delegation of certain powers does not provide for the delegation of this power of the Collector u/s 40 to any of his subordinates, and in any case the statutory duty of the Collector is an obligation to require the payment of the "proper" duty or the amount required to make up the same and impose penalty -thereon, and if there has Been an error or mistake in the calculation, it certainly can be rectified, because the Collector must collect the "proper" duty. Further, in deciding what is the amount payable and who is to pay it, he is exercising only executive functions and not ''QUASI JUDICIAL AUTHORITY as contended for by: Mr. Venkatesam. Therefore, there is no question but that he can demand at any time from any person who is liable to pay the PROPER duty payable so long as it remains unpaid together with the penalty that he may choose to impose. If his order is wrong, it is subject to revision and if it is contrary law. it is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case, the Revenue Divisional Officer, to whom the document was sent by the Commercial Tax Officer in the first instance made an incorrect determination of the amount to be collected. His successor-in-office consulted the Collector and made the necessary alteration to bring it into conformity with the statute. I can see no objection to the course pursued by him. The answer to the third question must, in my opinion, be that the officer was .justified in subsequently reviewing the order dated 6-1-1947,

Krishna Rao, J.

I agree with the judgment delivered by My Lord the Chief Justice and do not consider it necessary to add anything to it.