BOC India Limited vs State of Jharkhand and Others

M.Y. Eqbal, J.—This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment dated 14.5.2008 passed in W.P. (C) No. 4830 of 2007 whereby the learned Single Judge after holding that the decision making process in the allotment of work was improper, dismissed the writ petition without giving any relief on the ground that the work allotted to respondent No. 5 was completed. However, learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner-appellant, if so wishes, would be at liberty to file suit for damages.

The case has a chequered history. The respondent No. 3, namely, Rejendra Institute of Medical Sciences, Ranchi (in short ''the Institute'') floated a notice inviting tender dated 10.2.2007 from reputed tenderers for installation and supply of complete system of Centralised Liquid Medical Oxygen with medical gas pipe line for Oxygen, Carbon dioxide, Nitrous oxide and compressed air, etc on turnkey basis in 1000 bedded various departments and wards of the Institute. The appellant as well as respondent No. 5 besides others submitted their tenders. When by memo No, 4529 dated 25.6.2007 issued by the Director of the Institute informing the petitioner as well as respondent No. 5 regarding opening of price bid of commercially and technically successful bidders, the appellant challenged the said notice by filing W.P. (C) No. 4203 of 2007 making the grievance that respondent No. 5 does not fulfill the condition of technical bid and as such, he should not have been invited by the said letter. The said writ petition was disposed of giving liberty to the petitioner-appellant to file representation in continuation of his earlier representation before the Director of the Institute which shall be considered and appropriate reasoned order will be passed.

According to the petitioner, by the time representation was filed, the work order was issued in favour of respondent No. 5. The appellant then challenged the said decision by filing a fresh writ petition being WP (C) No. 4830 of 2007. The writ petition was eventually dismissed by the learned Single Judge by passing the following orders:

In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the work order issued in favour of the respondent No. 5, on the decision of the Tender Committee.

It has been stated that the petitioner had earlier moved this Court for the same relief. This Court by order dated 31.7.2007 had disposed of the petitioner''s writ petition being WP (C) No. 4203/07 giving liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh representation in continuation of his earlier representation before the Director, Rajendra Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), Ranchi and the said respondent was directed to consider the petitioner''s representation and pass appropriate reasoned order, if the final decision has not already been taken the work has not already been allotted.

The ''Director, RIMS, Ranchi by his letter No. 6832 dated 8.9.2007 informed the petitioner that the final decision was already taken and the work order was already issued on 25.7.2007. The process became final and respondent No. 5 has commenced the work and the process is not required to be scrutinised.

Mr. M.S. Mittal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the fact and the ground on the basis of which the consideration of the petitioner''s representation has been denied, are wholly baseless and incorrect. Neither the final decision was taken nor the work was allotted on 25.7.2007 and the same have been wrongly stated only in order to arbitrarily deny the consideration of the petitioner''s representation and his claim. It has been submitted that the respondents have unduly favoured the respondent No. 5 M/S Scimed Overseas Inc., Patna and arbitrarily allotted the work in its favour, though there is no comparison between the petitioner and the respondent No. 5 in the concerned field and the respondent No. 5 is not even technically qualified. It has been submitted that the respondents'' mala fide is apparent from the fact that when the order was being passed by this Court on 31.7.2007, it was not informed on behalf of the respondents that the tender has already been finalised and the work order has already been issued on 25.7.2007. The process of dealing with the tender and taking decision is, thus, tainted with mala fide and arbitrariness and the same is liable to be quashed by this Court.

A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents-RIMS stating, inter alia, that the Technical Committee had gone through all the points and requirements in its meeting held on 23.6.2007 and on consideration of all the aspects, the Committee had recommenced the price bids of two technically successful bidders, namely, the petitioner and the respondent No. 5. Their price bids were opened in their presence and a comparative price statement was prepared. On going through the comparative price quoted by both the bidders, the members of the Committee had recommended for the respondent No. 5 as he was found as L-1 and over all price difference between the said respondent No. 5 and the petitioner is Rs. 1,12,29,111/- (Rupees One Crore Twelve Lakh Twenty Nine thousand one hundred eleven only). The bid was, thus, decided in favour of the respondent No. 5 and vide order dated 26.7.2007, the work order was also is-sued. The contentions made by learned Counsel for petitioner have been disputed by the respondents in various paragraphs of the counter affidavit.

After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and considering the facts and materials appearing on record, I find that the respondents have claimed that the tender has already been finalised on the recommendation of the Tender Committee whereas the petitioner has disputed the same and has raised several disputed questions of fact. The said factual controversies cannot be adjudicated upon and decided in writ jurisdiction of this Court. Since the letter of the Director, RIMS, Ranchi dated 8.9.2007 clearly mentions the reason for disposing of the petitioner''s representation, this Court cannot go into the correctness or incorrectness of its contents, which are factually disputed, as the same is beyond the scope of adjudication by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. I, therefore, find no ground to entertain this writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the petitioner preferred L.P.A. No. 319 of 2007. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding that the learned Single Judge rightly held that the issue raised by the appellant relating to disputed question of facts which cannot be gone into the writ petition. The appellant then moved the Supreme Court by filing Civil Appeal No. 2008 which was disposed of by the Supreme Court by passing the following orders:

Leave granted.

The single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court have dismissed the writ petition by observing that the disputes questions of fact are involved which cannot be decided in a writ petition. We do not subscribe to the view taken by the High Court.

In the present case, there is hardly any question of disputed fact. Facts are evident from the documents already put on record. No oral evidence is to be led. The High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case should have decided the writ petition on merits.

Since the matter is a tender matter, we would request the Hon''ble Chief Justice to post the writ petition before a Single Judge for hearing immediately and we would also request the Single Judge to decide the writ petition as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the posting of the case before him.

The appeal is allowed in the above terms.

After the matter was remanded back by the Supreme Court, the writ petition was again heard by the learned Single Judge who in terms of the impugned judgment dated 14.5.2008 disposed of the writ petition mainly on the ground that as per the affidavit filed by the Institute (RIMS) and respondent No. 5 before the Supreme Court, it was stated that the work was almost completed. The learned Single Judge, however, held in the impugned judgment that the decision making process was improper.

We have heard Mr. M.S. Mittal, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 and Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the other respondents.

As noticed above, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with observation that the High Court should have decided the writ petition on merits. Before discussing any further, I would fist like to quote paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the impugned judgment which are as under:

The tenders were invited from reputed tenderers/manufactures/authorised dealers. Regarding reputation and experience there is no dispute that petitioner is a reputed manufacturer of Liquid Oxygen Gas and it has get manufacturing plant at nearby town Jamshedpur apart from other plants, and is a market leader in the installation and supply of Liquid Gas System and has installed such system in about 2800 hospitals, including AIIMS, Delhi, C.M.C., Vellore, etc. Petitioner also submitted the DGQA certificate as per the requirement along with manufacturing license of Jamshedpur plant certified with ISO : 9001 and ISO : 14001. It also produced authorisation letter of Silbermann Technologies LID, Israel, a manufacturer of liquid gases pipe line system and related products. As such it is clear that petitioner complied with all the requirements of the tender.

On the other hand, so far as the experience of R-5 is concerned, it appears from its Sales Tax Registration Certificate that it is a proprietorship firm of one Sri Shailendra Prasad Singh, carrying on business of distribution of medical, surgical, pharmaceutical goods and equipments, etc. The experience certificate of Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna produced by R-5 shows that it is with regard to supply and establishing Gas Pipeline System, and not with regard to Liquid Gas System. R-5 produced an authorisation letter of M/s. Praxair India Private Limited, Kolkata for supply of liquid medical oxygen gases in favour of ''nsp Hospitech India Private Limited, New Delhi. R-5 also produced a certificate of ISO : 9001 : 2000 issued in favour of nsp Hospitech India Private Limited, "in the area of Installation and Commissioning Gas Pipeline for medical purpose and trading of medical equipments." This certificate also does not show that it was related with Liquid Gas System. R-5 also produced an authorisation of In-Tech-Medico Inc. U.S.A. in favour of Alcon Meditech (I) Private Limited, New Delhi for "installation, commissioning and maintenance of medical goods, pipeline equipment and accessories." The Alcon Meditech (I) Private Limited, New Delhi has in turn issued a certificate in favour of nsp Hospitech India Private Limited for after sale support of medical gas pipeline components. Then R-5 produced an authorisation certificate of nsp Hospitech India Private Limited to take part in the tender on its behalf. Admittedly R-5 did not produce DGQA/DGS & D/DGK certificate.

Thus it is clear that neither R-5 nor its Principal--nsp Hospitech India Private Limited, had produced any document to show that they had experience of installation of Liquid Oxygen Gas System. Even the list of hospitals produced by R-5 show that it is a "list of--recent pipeline installation by Hospitech". Thus the decision making process in which R-5 was declared to be a qualified tenderer cannot be said to be proper. However the price bid of petitioner and R-5 was opened. It is true that in the total work of about seven Crores, the price bid of R-5 was lower to the tune of about one Crore twelve Lacs than the petitioner''s offer. It also appears from the work order issued to R-5 that it was for installation, supply and maintenance of liquid gas system but so far as experience in such work is concerned, petitioner stands much higher than R-5. In fact there is no comparison between the two.

It is also true that on 31.7.2007, when the first writ petition filed by the petitioner was disposed of, RIMS did not disclose that the work order was already issued on 25.7.2007 to R-5, otherwise different order might have been passed by this Court. It is also true that petitioner''s representation was rejected without proper consideration. Even if the work order was issued in favour of R. RIMS was not stopped from considering petitioner''s representation, and calling the parties for further negotiation before proceeding further, especially when the tender process was continuing from last couple of months and proper working of such system, is very crucial for the patients.

All said and done now the question is whether the decision of awarding work to R-5 should be interfered or not at this stage, and what relief can be granted to the petitioner? As already seen, the actions/inactions of the RIMS, cannot he held to be proper, but it is also not possible to conclusively hold that such actions/inactions were arbitrary, mala fide or discriminatory, RIMS claims that several meeting/demonstrations/discussions were held by the Committee of Doctors, before declaring R-5 also as technically qualified. It is not possible to scrutinize which factors weighed in their minds. Other committee might have taken other decision. But on such hypothesis, it is not proper to interfere with the wisdom, and substitute another decision, especially at this stage when the work has progressed to a consider able extent and major portion of money has been advanced/paid to R. If now the work order is set aside, the parties may loose of gain financially, but the effect will be dismantling and uprooting the system, fixed so far, which will not be in the interest of the patients. Public money will also be wasted. It is true that in the affidavits filed by RIMS and R-5 before the Supreme Court, it was stated that the work is almost completed. But taking the stock of whole situation, it will not be proper for this Court to interfere with the work awarded to R-5. While deciding this matter this Court has considered the following judgments of the Supreme Court for guidance Air India Ltd. Vs. Cochin Int., Airport Ltd. and Others, and B.S.N. Joshi and Sons Ltd. Vs. Nair Coal Services Ltd. and Others,

Conclusion:

In the result it is held that the decision making process was improper, but it cannot be conclusively said that it was arbitrary, mala fide or discriminatory. But prima facie RIMS has taken a great risk. It should be very careful in future. Public interest is paramount. It Is now to be seen whether the work of R-5 works properly or not and whether RIMS has acted in public interest or not.

However, if the petitioner so wishes, it will be at liberty to file suit for damages, etc.

With these findings, observations and directions this writ petition is disposed of. However, in the circumstances, no costs. Let the records be returned to Mr. Rajesh Kumar for RIMS.

As noticed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant is a part of Linde Group, Germany, having vast experience in the field and are the market leader in medical gasses in India for the last 72 years and they have installed over 2800 medical gas pipe line systems all over India on turnkey basis which includes major Government and reputed private hospitals in India. In the notice inviting tender floated by the respondent-Institute, it was clearly mentioned that the tenderers shall enclose photocopy of valid certificates issued by the Director General of Quality Assurance (DGQA)/Director General of Supplies and Disposal (DGS and D) indicating specific registration of the item quoted. The appellant, on the one hand, enclosed photocopies of these certificates, but respondent No. 5, on the other hand, did not enclose valid certificate issued by DGQA/DGS & D. In spite of that, respondent No. 5 was allowed to participate in the price bid and the work order was issued in favour of respondent No. 5 on 25.7.2007 which was disclosed for the first time in the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 2 in the writ petition on 8.9.2007. The first writ petition filed by the appellant, challenging issuance of work order in favour of respondent No. 5 was disposed of with a direction to the appellant to make representation before the Director, RIMS. In the meantime, the petitioner was informed by the Institute that a final order was already issued to respondent No. 5. The 2nd writ petition filed by the appellant being W.P.C. No. 4830 of 2007 was dismissed on the ground that the tender was already finalised and the disputed question of fact cannot be adjudicated by this Court exercising writ jurisdiction. The Letters Petent Appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed and ultimately the petitioner appellant filed SLP before the Supreme Court.

Curiously enough, the Institute (RIMS) filed a counter affidavit in Supreme Court on 28.1.2008 stating on oath that the tender work issued on 25.7.2007 has been completed and at present, on completion of work, testing is being carried out and the project work is likely to be handed over within no time. Similar counter affidavit was filed by respondent No. 5 also before the Supreme Court on 20.2.2008 stating that the work order has already been acted upon as the project is almost near completion and 85% of the amount has already been released. At this stage, it is worth to mention here that in the work order issued by the Institute, it was specifically mentioned that the work shall have to be completed within 150 days. It was only because of that false affidavit, the learned Single Judge did not grant any relief to the appellant. However, the learned Single Judge categorically recorded a finding that the decision making process of the institute was not proper. Not only that, it is evident from the facts and the conduct of the Institute that the allotment of work order was arbitrary, mala fide and discriminatory. The Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 although observed that the Govt. must have freedom of contract. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fide. In the case of Air India Ltd. Vs. Cochin Int., Airport Ltd. and Others, , the Supreme Court observed:

The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd) v. Union of India, CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., Tata Cellular v. Union of India, Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is hot amenable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene.

After having gone through the entire facts of the case and the manner the respondent authority of RIMS allotted the tender to respondent No. 5, we have no hesitation in holding that the decision making process was not only arbitrary but was affected by bias and actuated by mala fide. We fully affirm the view taken by the learned Single Judge and the tender awarded to respondent No. 5 is liable to be quashed. But at this stage if the work order is quashed it will impose heavy administrative and financial burden on the Govt. and lead to increase double expenditure to the tune of Crores of rupees. At the initial stage the work order allotted to respondent No. 5 was not quashed by this Court because of the affidavits filed by the officer of the Institute and respondent No. 5 stating that major portion of the work was completed.

When the appeal was taken up for hearing, on 26.6.2008, in course of argument, Mr. Mittal, learned Counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to the affidavits filed by the Officers of the Institute (RIMS) on 28.1.2008 in Supreme Court stating that the work has been completed but in fact, the work has not yet been completed. We, therefore, in order to ascertain the correctness and truth of the affidavit filed by the Institute and respondent No. 5 before the Supreme Court constituted one-man committee of Mr. Aparesh Kumar Singh, learned Advocate, and directed him to visit the work site and submit report with regard to the extent of work completed or is at the stage of completion. Pursuant to the said order, Mr. Aparesh Kumar Singh, on the next date of hearing i.e. 3.7.2008. submitted report. In the concluding paragraph of the report, it was reported that the main Liquid Oxygen Gas Tank of the required specification has not yet been installed. He further reported that a separate 3-Phase Electric Supply System for commissioning of the project has not yet been installed. Mr. Singh in his report stated that he was told by the representative of respondent No. 5 that the Oxygen Tank is in transit from Bangalore and the same may be reached within one week or so. In the concluding paragraph, Mr. Singh, learned Advocate, stated in his report that one of the main components of tender work from which supply of oxygen is to be insured, has not been installed. After perusal of the report, prima facie, we found that both the authorities of RIMS and respondent No. 5 misled the Supreme Court by filing false affidavits. Hence, we directed Mr. Basudeo Prasad Singh, Deputy Director (Administration), RIMS and also to respondent No. 5 to appear in person on the next date and to explain as to why appropriate orders may not be passed against them for swearing false affidavits in the Supreme Court. Pursuant to that order. Mr. Basudeo Prasad Singh, Deputy Director (Admn.), RIMS, appeared in person and tendered apology stating that such statements were made before the Supreme Court due to inadvertence and shall not be repeated in future. For better appreciation, the order passed on 1.9.2008 reads as under:

Pursuant to the orders dated 3.7.2008 and 14.7.2008, Mr. Basudeo Prasad Singh, Deputy Director (Administration), RIMS, who filed false affidavit before the Supreme Court and this Court, appeared in person and tendered apology stating that such statements were made due to inadvertence and shall not be repeated in future.

We record the statements, but the show cause filed by him shall be considered while deciding the appeal on merits.

We have heard the learned Counsels appearing for the parties.

Order is reserved.

Respondent No. 5 in a separate show cause although tried to justify the statements made in the affidavit, but tendered unconditional and unqualified apology for his statement made before the Supreme Court.

From the facts stated hereinabove it is clear that the affidavit filed by the respondents prima facie appears to be false and far from truth. The only object of concealing the truth and indulging in falsehood was only to defeat the claim of the appellant. It is a matter of concern that in the highest Court of the law affidavits containing false statement were filed which needs to be dealt with sternly. The act done by the respondents was not only to defeat the claim of the appellant but also to deceive the Court. The acts amounts to abuse of the process of Court.

The term ''abusing of Court''s process'' has been described in the book ''Borrie and Lowe, The Law of Contempt'' as under:

The term ''abusing the Court''s process'' can be applied to many different types of conduct but generally the term connotes some misuse of the Court''s process.

The most serious example of abuse of process is conduct which is intended to deceive the Court, for example, by the deliberate suppression of facts or by the presentation of falsehood, but the term also includes the bringing of frivolous or vexatious proceedings.

The deliberate suppression of fact was also held to be a contempt Misusing the Court''s process where other parties are thereby prejudiced may also amount to a punishable contempt.

In the case of Re: Suo Moto Proceedings against Mr. R. Karuppan, Advocate, , the respondent in his affidavit filed in support of a writ petition made a wrong statement and such statement was supported by an affidavit which known to him to be false. The Supreme Court with the object to eradicate the evil of perjury, empowered the Registrar General of the Supreme Court to depute an officer of the rank of Deputy Registrar or above of the Court to file a complaint u/s 139 of the Indian Penal. Code against the respondent before the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction of Delhi and to take all necessary steps for prosecuting the complaint. Their Lordship observed:

Courts are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The Courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the Court by filing and relying upon false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is dependent upon the statement of facts. If the result of the proceedings are to be respected, these issues before the Courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the Court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient'' grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.

Article 129 of the Constitution of India provides that the Supreme Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 of the Constitution contains similar provision in respect of the High Courts. Both the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts are Courts of Record having power to punish for contempt including power to punish for contempt of itself.

The well recognised definition of the Court of record "means Court a whereof the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony and which has power to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority."

In the case of Murray and Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia and Anr. (2002) 2 SCC 367, while dealing with a case relating to filing of false affidavit, their Lordships observed:

While it is true that the statement made in the affidavit has been introduced as and by way of a denial but the fact remains that such a statement has in fact been made in an affidavit before this Court. The litigant public ought to be extremely careful and cautious in the matter of making statements before Courts of law. Whether, however, the respondent has obtained a definite advantage or not is wholly immaterial in the matter of commission of offence under the Act, though the same would be a relevant factor in the context of punishment to be imposed against a contemner. It is on this score, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that there cannot be any defence neither does the respondent desire to put forth any excepting however, pleading unconditional apology before the Court. This pleading of unconditional apology obviously is at the instance of the respondents since Respondent I was present in the Court.

Having a conspectus of the whole issue and the facts, we do feel it inclined to hold that the respondents cannot escape the liability of being held guilty of contempt by reason of a definite and deliberate false statement. The statement on oath is a fabricated one and contrary to the facts and there exists no extenuating circumstance to come to any other conclusions than as above.

As regards the question of punishment, be it noted that punishment in one matter cannot be the guiding factor for punishment in another. Punishment has a corelation with facts and in each case where punishment is imposed, the same must be the resultant effect of the acts complained of--more serious the violation, more severe is the punishment--and that has been the accepted norm, in matters though however within the prescribed limits.

Their Lordships further observed:

While it is true that the contextual facts do not depict of drawing any advantage or even any attempt to gain any advantage through the statement as made in the affidavit noted hereinbefore, but there is no dispute as such on the factum of a false and fabricated statement finding its place in the affidavit. The statement cannot be termed to be a mere denial though reflected in the affidavit as such. Positive assertion of a fact in on affidavit known to be false cannot just be ignored. It is a deliberate act. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent made a frantic bid to contend that the statement has been made without realising the purport of the same. We are, however not impressed with the submission and thus unable to record our concurrence therewith. It is not a mere denial of fact but a positive assertion and as such made with the definite intent to pass off a falsity and if possible to gain advantage. This practice of having a false statement incorporated in an affidavit filed before a Court should always be deprecated and we do hereby record the same. The fact that the deponent has in fact affirmed a false affidavit before this Court is rather serious in nature and he thereby rendered himself guilty of contempt of this Court as noticed hereinbefore. This Court in our view, would be failing in its duties, if the matter in question is not dealt with in a manner proper and effective for maintenance of the majesty of Courts as otherwise the law Courts would lose their efficacy to the litigant public. It is in this perspective that we do feel it expedient to record that mere tendering of unconditional apology to this Court would not exonerate the contemnor in the contextual facts but having regard to the nature of the act of contempt, we do deem it fit to impose a fine of Rs. 2500 each so as to subserve the ends of justice against the respondent contemnors in default of payment of which they (each of them) will suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The fine be realised within a period of four weeks from the date of this order and shall be paid to the Legal Service Authority of this Court--the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

In the case of Amit Singh Rawal and Ors. v. DGHS and Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 304, the Supreme Court held :

We, thereafter, called upon the then Dean of the Medical College to file an affidavit. That affidavit as also an affidavit by the present Dean of Goa Medical College have been filed. An affidavit of the then Chief Minister of Goa had also been filed at the request of the present Dean of the Goa Medical College. The affidavits filed in this case prima facie appear to us to conceal more than what they reveal. It is a sad state of affairs and a serious matter. It appears that one or the other party is concealing the truth and indulging in falsehood. It is a matter of concern that in the highest Court of the land, effort has been made to conceal the truth and file affidavits prima facie containing false averments. Whichever party has done this, the matter needs to be dealt with sternly by law. Since the averments contained in these affidavits are quite contradictory in nature and keeping in view the fact that the parties who had filed the affidavits include the former Chief Minister of Goa, the former Health Secretary, Goa, the former Dean of Goa Medical College and the present Dean of Goa Medical College and others, we consider it appropriate and necessary to have this matter inquired into so as to pinpoint the responsibility for filing the false affidavits insofar as the "direction" is concerned.

In the case of Supreintendent of Central Excise and Others Vs. Somabhai Ranchhodhichai Patel, the Supreme Court again observed:

In spite of the facts as aforesaid, we may have assumed that the deponent and Kanubhai did not know English and whatever action was taken was based on the professional advice received from time to time as claimed and on that basis given benefit of doubt to the respondent, since it is also claimed that the application dated 7.4.2000 was in the handwriting of the advocate himself who told Kanubhal that this Court had permitted withdrawal of 50% amount without security, but for the manner in which the respondent conducted himself in the High Court and before this Court. Before the High Court he took shelter under order of the Civil Judge dated 7.4.2000 fully knowing that it was contrary to the order dated 27.3.2000 passed by this Court. Before this Court, as already stated, first he filed affidavit stating that he was not aware of the order dated 27.3.2000 passed by this Court and later he tried to explain by stating that what he meant was that he was not aware of the exact contents of the order but was aware of the substance of the order. The explanation is entirely misconceived. The admitted filing of a false affidavit which is now sought to be explained constitutes contempt by itself. It is evident that the deponent has no regard whatsoever for truth. He has taken different stands at different times to suit his convenience. Having regard to the fact that the respondent is said to be living abroad since 1997, we do not want to punish him for the actions of his attorney, to whom notice of contempt has not been issued. Under these circumstances, taking a lenient view, we are inclined to accept the apology. It is ordered accordingly.

In the case of Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Others, , the Supreme Court observed:

The actions of Respondents 3 to 5 in filing false affidavits and denying that the detenu and Sushil Kumar had been whisked away and detained illegally in their custody between 15.1.1994 and 17.1.1994 is not only reprehensible and condemnable but also requares to be dealt with rather sternly. The belated apologies offered by them, though still maintaining that the detenu and Sushil Kumar had not been detained by them, even in the face of the evidence recorded by the CBI, as Commissioner of this Court, and its report are not apologies of a truly repentant person but made obviously with a view to escape punishment. Had Respondents 3 to 5 been sincere in their apologies and had they realised their mistake, there was no reason why Respondents 4 and 5 should have subsequently indulged in acts which have the effect of aggravating their contumacious conduct. During the pendency of the proceedings in this Court, as already observed, Respondent 4 Sham Lal Goel and Respondent 5 Rajinder Singh, SHO ''tutored'' Sushil Kumar, taxi driver, and ''forced'' him to make a false statement and file a false affidavit in this Court and to falsely assert that he had never been waylaid by the Haryana Police and that the story of detention as put forward by Shri Dhananjay Sharma and Shri S.C. Puri, Advocate, was false. Subsequently, not only before the CBI but also in this Court Sushil Kumar realised his mistake and gave the correct version of the occurrence and also disclosed as to how and why he had made the false statement. It is a matter not only of regret and concern but also causes us great anguish to notice that the police officials. Respondents 4 and 5, should have indulged in tutoring Sushil Kumar and forced him to give false evidence while proceedings were pending in this Court. They have aggravated their contumacious acts. Their action was deliberate and an attempt to overreach the due process of law without compunction. Their action is an affront to the majesty of law. Under the circumstances, the question of accepting their belated apology for which a very strong plea was made by their learned Counsel, Mr. R.K. Jain, Mr. Natarajan and Mr. Lalit does not arise and we have no hesitation whatsoever in rejecting the belated apologies tendered by Respondents 3 to 5, which we do not find to be genuine, bona fide or expression of true repentance.

In his further affidavit dated 10.11.1994 which was filed in continuation of the affidavit dated 21.10.1994, Respondent 1 has stated that he had not seen the affidavit filed by Respondent 3 on 20.1.1994 before it was tendered in this Court and that he had not even seen the affidavit filed by Respondent 3 on 19.1.1994 or on 20.1.1994 and that after carefully perusing the affidavit filed by Respondent 3 on 20.1.1994 and the report of the CBI, he found no reason to differ from the opinion given by the CBI, on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, that Dhananjay Sharma and Sushil Kumar had been waylaid on 15.1.1994 and kept in illegal detention from the afternoon of 15.1.1994 to 17.1.1994 by the Hissar Police. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent 1 very frankly conceded that there was a lapse on the part of the Home Secretary in not filing the affidavit in response to the rule nisi and the directions given by this Court but he submitted that the lapse had occurred on account of a wrong understanding of the import of the order of the Court and faulty advice given to him. He submitted that Respondent 1 was truly sorry for his lapses and requested for his apology to be accepted.

In the''show-cause filed by the Officer of the institute and also respondent No. 5 they have admitted that those statements were made due to inadvertence and for that they tendered there unqualified apology. Admittedly, therefore, these respondents have made false statements in the affidavits filed before the Supreme Court. We are, therefore, of the view that these respondents cannot escape the liability of being held guilty of contempt by reason of deliberate false statement. As a matter of fact, apologies of respondent-deponents having been made to escape punishment. Though the deponents now repentant but they cannot be allowed to go scot-free for the falsehood indulged into them in the Supreme Court and for their attempt to poison the stream of justice as held by Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, .

Filing of false affidavit and making incorrect statements on oath before the Supreme Court or High Court, which are Courts of record should be dealt with seriously and must be deprecated. We, therefore, instead of referring the matter for lodging cases against these respondents, think it proper to impose fine or cost for the act done by them which was only with the object of unlawful gain.

We, therefore, without interfering with the judgment of the learned Single Judge modify it to the extent that the respondent No. 5 shall be liable to pay a sum of Rs. ten lacs by way of fine and/or cost which shall be deposited with the Jharkhand State Legal Sendees Authority within a month from today.

So far another deponent Mr. Basudeo Prasad Singh, Deputy Director (Administration), RIMS is concerned, he is directed to be very careful and we caution him to act fairly and with transparency in future.

D.K. Sinha, J.

I agree.