Boopathy and another vs State

R. Balasubramanian, J.—Accused Nos. 1 and 2 in C.C. No. 18/94 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode and the appellants in

C.A. No. 43/94 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Erode are the revision petitioners in this case. They were charged and tried for

offences u/s 498-A of the India Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Each one of them was convicted to undergo R.I. for six

months together with a fine of Rs. 500/- carrying a default sentence for the former offence and to undergo R.I. for six months together with a fine

of Rs. 500/- carrying a default sentence for the latter offence. The appeal filed by the accused was also dismissed. Hence, the present revision.

I heard Mr. S. Uthirasamy, learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and Mr. R. Karthikeyan, learned Government Advocate on

the Criminal Side for the respondent. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners contended that on the materials placed before the Court,

neither the offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act nor the offence u/s 498-A of I.P.C. could be made out. He would also argue that P.W. 2,

who is the wife of the first accused, had given a statement in expectation of her death, but she survived. In that statement, she did not implicate

anybody in her attempt to commit suicide and that has been elicited in cross-examination. Therefore, the offence u/s 498-A of the I.P.C., also is

not made out. On the contrary, Mr. R. Karthikeyan, learned Government Advocate on the Criminal Side submitted that for the purpose of holding

that an offence u/s 498-A of I.P.C. is made out, it is not necessary that in every case, the woman should have been driven to commit suicide or to

cause grave injury etc. etc. The prosecution can succeed if the harassment of the woman, where harassment was with a view to coercing her or

any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand etc. etc., is established. The learned Government Advocate would state that, that is what is

provided under the explanation to Section 498-A of the I.P.C. The explanation defines the meaning of the word ''cruelty'' and the clauses (a) and

(b) are disjunctive and not adjunctive. According to him, if anyone of the requirements of the above two mentioned clauses are established, then

the accused can be held guilty for the offences u/s 498-A of I.P.C. As far as the offence u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the

learned Government Advocate would state that irrespective of the time namely whether before marriage or at the time of marriage or after the

marriage, if it is proved that a demand for dowry is made, then it can be held that the accused is guilty. In support of his contention, the learned

Government Advocate cited before me a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of India reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 1090 : 1995 CLJ

4184, State of H.P. v. Nikku Ram.

I applied my mind very carefully to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel on either side as well went through the judgment and the

records. The evidence discloses that the marriage between P.W. 2 and the first accused took place on 6-12-1992. There is no evidence in this

case to show that at any time prior to marriage or at the time of marriage any dowry was asked for. However, the evidence available on record

clinchingly establishes that from 15-2-1993 onwards the accused started taunting P.W. 2 for bringing less dowry. Her evidence also shows that the

accused told her that they incurred considerable expenditure by borrowing money to celebrate the marriage of the first accused with P.W. 2 and

that they are not in a position to repay the debts. On this basis, P.W. 2 claims, that the accused went on putting pressure on P.W. 2 to go home

and bring Rs. 10,000/- as well as 10 sovereigns. P.W. 2 expressed the difficulties of her father and she offered to rejoin her employment so that

some money could be earned and the debts could be cleared. For that, the accused are stated to have told her that as she was keeping the doctor

(she was previously employed in a hospital; keeping the doctor means that she is the mistress of the doctor), she was very keen to go back to the

job and thus saying, they prevented her from going for employment. P.W. 2 had gone to her father''s house namely P.W. 1 and told him what all

happened in the house of the accused as stated above. This evidence of P.W. 2 fully establishes the fact that the demand for dowry was made by

the accused to P.W. 2 at least from 15-2-1993 onwards. In this context, the judgment cited by the learned Government Advocate on the Criminal

Side comes handy to decide against the accused. Honourable Supreme Court of India in that case, after extracting the definition of dowry as

defined in the Dowry Prohibition Act, went on to state as follows :-

Despite the aforesaid definition having stated that the property or valuable security given or agreed to be given has to be as ""consideration for the

marriage"", demands made after the marriage could also be a part of the consideration, according to us, because an implied agreement has to be

read to give property or valuable securities, even if asked after the marriage, as a part of consideration for marriage. When the Dowry Prohibition

Act was enacted, the Legislature was well aware of the fact that demands for dowry are made, and indeed very often, even after the marriage has

been solemnized, and this demand is founded on the factum of marriage only. Such demands, therefore, would also be, in our mind, as

consideration for marriage.

The aforesaid definition makes it clear that the property or the valuable security need not be as a consideration for marriage, as was required to be

under the unamended definition. This apart, the addition of the words ''any time'' before the expression ""after the marriage"" would clearly show that

even if the demand is made long after the marriage the same could constitute dowry, if other requirements of the section are satisfied.

Therefore, from the above judgment of the Supreme Court of India, it is clear that if a demand for dowry is made even after the marriage, it could

also be a part of the consideration, thereby bringing it within the definition of dowry.

As far as the offence u/s 498-A of I.P.C. is concerned, the evidence of P.W. 2 is overwhelming about the harassment meted out to her by the

accused right from the date of marriage. It seems to be unbearable and the harassment was always with a view to coerce her to meet the unlawful

demand for payment as well as for 10 sovereigns. Her entire evidence has been fully corroborated by the evidence of her father namely P.W. 1

and their evidence clearly remains intact and unshaken. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the offence as provided for u/s 498-A

of the I.P.C. is clearly made out. Both the Courts below, on appreciating the entire evidence, had come to the correct conclusion against the

accused for the offences u/s 498-A of the I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Therefore, I find no merits in this revision. In the result, the revision fails and it is accordingly dismissed.

Petition dismissed.