Branch Manager Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Ali Maya Sharma

Shri Satish K. Agnihotri, A.C.J.—The instant Appeal is directed against the Judgment and Award dated 29.11.2013 rendered by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, East and North Sikkim at Gangtok (hereinafter referred to as �the Tribunal"), where under, the appellant herein was directed to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,94,732.59 (Rupees five lakh ninety four thousand seven hundred thirty two and paise fifty-nine) only with interest @ 10 % per annum to the Claimant-first Respondent, herein. The claim petition was filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act) against the appellant-Insurance Company as well as the owner of the vehicle, second-Respondent, seeking compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,20,071.39.

The facts, in brief, leading to filing of the instant Appeal, are that the first-respondent, an old lady, met with an accident, while walking on the road side at Jalipool, East Sikkim on 15.07.2011, as hit by the vehicle Tata Tipper Truck bearing registration No. SK-03/3074. She sustained 60% locomotor disability, as certified by the Central Referral Hospital, Tadong. It was noticed that the first-respondent was aged about 60 years at the time of accident. The learned Tribunal holding the notional income of the claimant/first-respondent as Rs. 3,000/- per month, being the house-wife, held that the Insurance Company is fully liable, on the premise that the vehicle was fully insured at the time of accident. The Tribunal calculated the compensation on different heads i.e. loss of earning, transportation to hospital, medical expenses, future medical expenses and pain and suffering, and determined the total sum to the tune of Rs. 5,94,732.59. Resultantly, the Tribunal awarded the said sum with an interest of 10% per annum from the date of filing of Claim Petition till full and final payment is made. During pendency of this Appeal, the entire compensation amount is paid.

It is appropriate to mention that the appellant herein was ex-parte, as the appellant did not appear and participate in the trial before the Tribunal. Feeling aggrieved, the instant Appeal is filed under the provision of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Along with the appeal, the appellant has preferred an application for condonation of delay of 532 days. Reasons for the condonation of delay as projected by the appellant/applicant are that the appeal is required to be filed on or before 28.02.2014 as the impugned judgment and award was pronounced on 29.11.2013. It is stated that the application for obtaining the certified copy of the said judgment and award was made on 16.12.2013 which was made available on 28.12.2013. Thereafter time was taken to obtain opinion and as such delay to the extent of 532 days was bona fide, which deserves to be condoned. The appellant/applicant was given one more opportunity to file better particulars. Subsequently, it was stated that the file of the case reached the office of the appellant in January, 2014, thereafter, 2 - 3 months time was taken for opinion. In the meantime, certain relevant documents were to be located and the investigator took the task of locating the documents. The investigator collected the documents from all authorities including the police and completed the collection of documents by the end of September, 2014. Thereafter, the file was sent to the office of the Advocate in the month of October, 2014. Some more documents were required by the Advocate as such further documents were collected and sent back to the office of the Advocate by the end of month of December, 2014. On receipt of such documents, a draft appeal was prepared and sent to the office of the appellant at Kolkata for vetting and signing. The draft appeal was sent back to the concerned Advocate for incorporation of some more points and the same could reach the office of the Advocate only in the month of February, 2015. Again it was referred to the office of the appellant for signing in the month of March, 2015. Some more time was taken to file the appeal, which according to the appellant/applicant was subsequently filed on 26.08.2015. Thus, the delay caused on account of movement of file as afore stated is bona fide and deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/applicant would submit that the instant Appeal raises substantive question of law as to whether the claimant/first respondent is entitled to compensation on account of 60% locomotor disability to the tune of Rs. 5,94,732.59 when the earning of claimant is not proved as no certificate to that effect has been provided and also the entire calculation made by the learned Tribunal is erroneous. It is further contented that rash and negligent driving was proved on the basis of charge-sheet without any credible facts. Thus, in the light of aforesaid substantial questions of law, the delay deserves to be condoned. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein the Supreme Court has laid down general principles for condonation of delay, Mr. Jain would submit that substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical consideration i.e. non explanation of delay, may be ignored.

Mr. Jain further relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, wherein the Supreme Court held that when the State is an applicant praying for condonation of delay, certain amount of latitude is permissible.

On the other hand, Mr. N. Rai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 would submit that the appellant/applicant had not shown any bona fide reasons as explained in the application. The reasons shown are not such as may come within the ambit of "sufficient cause". Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that even otherwise there is no substantial question of law which may outweigh unexplained reasons set out by the appellant/applicant. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the appellant/applicant has not appeared before the Tribunal and as such the applicant be not permitted to raise any contentions and ground in the appeal under the provisions of Section 149 of the M.V. Act.

In rejoinder, referring to a decision of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Company Limited v. Shila Datta and others, (2011) 10 SCC 509, Mr. Jain would contend that the appellant-Insurance Company, being a party-respondent, is entitled to urge all grounds which may be available to it.

Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto.

Firstly, I take up the ground as to whether the appellant is entitled to urge any ground in the appeal when the appellant had not appeared before the Tribunal.

Indisputably, the appellant-Insurance Company was a party-respondent to the claim petition and not a mere notice and as such there is no estoppel against the appellant-Insurance Company to file an appeal and urge all contentions available to it. The Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has laid down the principles as under:

"14. When an insurer is impleaded as a party-respondent to the claim petition, as contrasted from merely being a notice under Section 149(2) of the Act, its rights are significantly different. If the insurer is only a notice, it can only raise such of those grounds as are permissible in law under Section 149(2). But if he is a party-respondent, it can raise, not only those grounds which are available under section 149 (2), but also all other grounds that are available to a person against whom a claim is made. It, therefore, follows that if a claimant impleads the insurer as a party-respondent, for whatever reason, then as such respondent, the insurer will be entitled to urge all contentions and grounds which may be available to it.

The Act does not require the claimants to implead the insurer as a party-respondent. But if the claimants choose to implead the insurer as a party, not being a notice under Section 149(2), the insurer can urge all grounds and not necessarily the limited grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. If the insurer is already a respondent (having been impleaded as a party respondent), it need not seek the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to raise grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act."

In the light of afore stated, I am of the considered view that the appellant being a party-respondent before the Tribunal is entitled to urge all contentions and grounds available to it.

On the question of limitation, as the facts posited by the appellant/applicant and stated here in above, clearly indicate that the appellant/applicant is not diligent in taking up the matter within reasonable time. The appellant/applicant very well knew the limitation as statutorily required. The Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), while laying the principles broadly, clearly laid down inter alia, that the "sufficient cause" should be understood in its proper spirit, philosophy and purpose, in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. Further it is held that lack of bona fides imputable to party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

It is not a case, where the substantial injustice as claimed by the appellant/applicant, has been caused in the facts of the case, when an old lady of 60 years was hit by a duly insured vehicle which resulted into permanent disability. The amount of compensation is also not so exorbitant which can be held as antithetical to substantial justice. The movement of files is not fully and properly explained, thus, it lacks complete bona fide. The appellant/applicant has taken months together for collection of documents without explaining as to what were the documents needed for filing the appeal. Substantial time was taken for sending the file from the office of the Advocate to the office of the appellant, when professional ethics requires the officer in-charge to sit with the Advocate with all the files and swear the affidavit in presence of the Advocate concerned. Signing of documents and affidavit from the office of the appellant would not subserve the interest of justice.

The question as to whether the State or a public authority is entitled to certain amount of latitude came up for consideration in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, the Supreme Court while dismissing the Application for condonation of delay, held as under: -

"3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that the Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest."

Further, in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: -

"11. ���.. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day�s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. ����."

In an another case, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Supreme Court, while holding that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court, held as under: -

"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time."

Subsequently, in Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs. v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448, wherein the State filed the Application before the High Court seeking condonation of delay of 1724 days in filing the Appeal against the Award passed by the Civil Judge, the Supreme Court held as under: -

"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

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It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings."

Applying the well settled principles as afore stated, the public authorities are entitled to certain amount of latitude, however, the reasons explained by them must be cogent and credible. In the case in hand, the reasons stated by the appellant do not permit much latitude as sought for by the appellant/applicant, for condonation of delay.

In the aforesaid premises, I do not find any sufficient cause necessitating condonation of delay. As a sequel, the application is rejected. Consequently, the Appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs.