B.V. Ramakrishna Raju vs Mrs. B. Bharathi

L. Narasimha Reddy, J.—The marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place in the year 1965. They were blessed with one son and two daughters. The marriage of the first daughter was performed on 21.05.1998. Shortly thereafter, the appellant filed O.P. No. 370 of 1999 in the Family Court, Hyderabad, against the respondent, for divorce, u/s 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ''the Act''). He pleaded that after the marriage of their elder daughter, the respondent came under the influence of her brother and henchmen, and with that, she revolted against him without any cause. He pleaded that the behavior of the respondent turned out to be quarrelsome, and unable to bear the harassment caused to him, he gave a portion of two rooms in his house to the respondent, as a licensee from June, 1998 onwards. He alleged that he is not in talking terms with his wife and children, ever since June, 1998, and he was subjected to harassment and cruelty, particularly, on account of a complaint lodged by the respondent with the police against him in November, 1998, alleging that he is harassing her for dowry. He, ultimately, pleaded that there is no scope for change of attitude in the mind of the respondent and, accordingly, prayed for divorce. The respondent filed a counter, opposing the O.P. She stated that it is the appellant, who harassed her, on one pretext or the other, including the one of demand of additional dowry and landed property. She stated that the appellant has driven her away from the house. In addition to opposing the O.P., the respondent filed O.S. No. 176 of 1999, against the appellant, for maintenance for herself and children.

Through order, dated 26.03.2003, the trial Court dismissed the O.P. No. 370 of 1999 and decreed the O.S. No. 176 of 1999, granting maintenance to the respondent at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per month. A sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- was granted, towards marriage expenses for the second daughter.

This appeal, u/s 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, is filed against the decree in O.P. No. 370 of 1999.

Sri E. Phani Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the trial Court did not properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence and dismissed the O.P. He contends that the very fact that the parties are living separately from the past 1� decades, is sufficient to grant a decree for divorce. The learned counsel submits that though there were no serious disputes between the parties, the humiliation and harassment caused by the respondent to the appellant would constitute cruelty.

Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that even if one goes by the contents of the O.P. filed by the appellant and the evidence on record, it would be just impossible for any Court to grant a decree of divorce. He contends that on a totally small and trivial issue, as to whether a cot should be shifted from one room to another, the appellant picked up a quarrel; so much so, he has driven out, not only his wife, the respondent, but also his children, from the residence. He contends that the appellant has subjected the respondent to cruelty and desertion, and being a housewife, having respect to the values of the family, the respondent has put up with the harassment caused to her.

The appellant claimed the relief of divorce against his wife, the respondent, pleading the ground of cruelty. The O.P. was heard along with the suit filed by the respondent for maintenance and other ancillary reliefs. The nature of contest between the parties is, indeed, amazing.

On behalf of the appellant, P.Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. P. 1 to P. 71 were filed. On behalf of the respondent, R.Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. R. 1 to R. 12 were filed. The salary certificates of the appellant were taken on record as Exs. X. 1 and X. 2.

The issues framed in the trial Court were only referable to the suit and no point, as such, was framed in respect of the O.P. The trial Court found that the ground of cruelty is not proved. Therefore, the point that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellant has proved the ground of cruelty against the respondent.

This is a rare case in which a person, that too, holding a senior post in the office of the Accountant General, thought of seeking divorce from his wife, 35 years after the marriage. The curious part of it is that an event, which, by any standard is trivial, if not silly, is cited as the basis. Filing of a complaint by the respondent against the appellant before the police, alleging that he demanded additional dowry, is also mentioned.

The cruelty, which a party to a marriage can plead, may be the result of certain specific acts, on the part of the other spouse, or it can be the culmination of various acts and omissions spread over a long period. In the O.P., the appellant was not specific about the acts of cruelty. In the O.P., he stated:

(c) The petitioner''s son, who was born in 1970, had studied upto B.Sc., and subsequently, having developed bad company of friends, he left the house during the year 1991 and as on date, there is no contact with the petitioner. The petitioner''s 1st daughter''s marriage was performed on 21.05.1998 with Mr. P. Kumar Raju.

(d) The petitioner and the respondent have last resided together in the premises shown in the description above. That immediately within one week, after the marriage of the first daughter, the respondent herein under the influence of her brother and henchmen revolted against the petitioner without any good cause or bona fide reason. The petitioner tolerated the abnormal behavior of the respondent with a fond hope that she would realize the petitioner''s love and affection towards her, but however the respondent continued to be under the influence of her brother Mr. V. Rama Raju.

(e) The petitioner, who was commanding good respect in society including at his place of service, could not adjust to the quarrelsome nature of the respondent, who became a puppet in the hands of her brother and that upon the request made by the respondent, the petitioner had given a portion of two rooms in the petitioner''s house to be occupied by the respondent as a licensee since June 1998 onwards, after getting separated at her option in May, 1998.

Two other reasons stated in the O.P. are that from June, 1980 onwards, the respondent is living separately together with the second daughter, and that she filed a complaint in November, 1998, alleging harassment for additional dowry. Rest of the narration is about the exchange of notices.

The affidavit filed by the appellant as P.W. 1 in lieu of chief-examination far exceeded the scope and content of the O.P. The following extract from the cross-examination of P.W. 1 would give an indication as to the origin of the dispute and nature of grievance of the appellant:

The dispute between me and my wife cropped up about one week after the marriage of my eldest daughter for the first time when she asked for shifting of a cot from one room to another and when I stated on that day, it was not auspicious and it can be changed, she got it shifted despite I objected through 3rd persons and I asked her to leave the room. There were no any differences between us even prior to that or later other than this. When I questioned for her shifting despite my objection she got called her brothers and others and rowdy elements. I did not lodge any police complaint about any rowdy elements brought by my wife against me. It is not true to say that I am a man of uncontrolled emotions and provocations and for nothing I raised galata and bet my wife and broken her mangalasuthram and I made it into pieces which is now shown to me in pieces and sent her out and that it is only then her brothers came to persuade me.

At another place, he said:

It is true that the letters written by my wife relied on by me no where discloses any disharmony between me and my wife so also from the contents of my letters to her filed by me.

One rarely comes across a person, who treats an incident mentioned in the above paragraph as the basis for snapping the matrimonial relationship, that lasted for 3 � decades. The first step which the appellant took for the shifting of the cot from one room to another by the respondent was that he has driven away the respondent and their daughter from the house, as is evident from Para (e) of the O.P. extracted above.

There cannot be a more cruel behavior or conduct than this. Without stopping and repenting at that, he has filed the O.P. for divorce.

The nature of harassment caused to the respondent is evident from the following suggestions made to the appellant in his cross-examination:

It is not true to say that there are documents in my office to show that the property belongs to my wife as declared by me. It is not true to say that on 3.11.1977 I harassed my wife and insisted her to transfer property in my name. It is not true to say that the entire house is under the possession and enjoyment of my wife. In the year 1998, I purchased washing machine in my name. Prior to that, we used to wash the clothes without the assistance of the machine. It is not true to say that in the year 1998, I pressed the neck of my wife caught held of her tuft and also attempted to cut the throat of the respondent with vegetable knife and that the brother of the respondent and my son came to rescue the respondent. I do not know whether my wife has lodged police complaint during such circumstances vide crime No. 270/98 before P.S. Panjagutta, Hyderabad. Witness adds that I came to know about the lodging of such complaint only through their pleadings in O.S. No. 176/99. It is not true to say that I have influence of police as such I got managed the final report without filing the charge sheet.

He admitted that he did not attend the marriage of his second daughter, inspite of knowledge and information, and that he did not contribute anything for it. P.W. 2 is the maternal uncle of the appellant. Except stating that he too did not attend the marriage of the second daughter of the appellant, and that he arranged for the piles operation of the appellant, he did not state anything, which is relevant for the purpose of this case. It was suggested to him that the appellant is addicted to vices, and his plea that he used to go to Ramakrishna Mutt is not true. P.Ws. 3 and 4 are the employees of A.G. office and subordinates to the appellant. Their evidence is absolutely of no use.

Coming to the evidence of the respondent, not only she reiterated the contents in the counter filed in the O.P., but her two daughters have supported her case. If one looks into the contents of the cross-examination of R.Ws. 2 and 3, the daughters of the appellant and the respondent, lack of culture on the part of the appellant would be manifest. For all practical purposes, it can be said that the appellant treated his two daughters as his enemies. The documentary evidence was mostly in relation to the claim made by the respondent about the amounts and property. Even if the O.P. and the evidence of the appellant herein are taken on their face value, one just cannot think of granting a decree for divorce, dissolving the marriage that subsisted for 35 years. It is only the unguided superiority of the appellant and his feeling that being husband of a woman and father of children, he can do whatever he thinks, that appear to be the cause for the present state of affairs.

This Court is, indeed, shocked at the frivolous nature of the grounds pleaded by the appellant for seeking divorce against the respondent. It also demonstrates typical male chauvinism. The only strength of the appellant is the weakness of the respondent, which is generated, on account of her unstinted respect for family values. The appellant has mistook the respect given to him for licence to do whatever he wants. This can be the result of total lack of culture and regard for the scruples. He has grossly misused the facility created under the Act for proper and extreme situations. His conduct deserves to be deprecated.

Hence, the appeal is dismissed, with costs of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) payable to the respondent, within two (2) months, from today. The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand dismissed.