C. Hari Sankar and Others vs Deepa Lakshmi and Another

G.M. Akbar Ali, J.—The petition in Crl. O.P. No. 25077 of 2010 is filed to call for the records in C.C. No. 5496 of 2008 on the file of the

learned III Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai and quash the same. The Criminal Revision Petition in Crl. R.C. No. 1113 of 2009 is

filed to set aside the order dated 30.10.2009 passed by the learned III Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai in MP No. 5496 of 2008

in C.C. No. 4471 of 2008.

The petitioners are the accused against whom a charge sheet has been filed by the 2nd respondent Inspector of Police, W-12, All Women

Police Station, Chennai for an alleged offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 294-B, 406, 506(II) IPC, 3, 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

The necessary facts to decide the petition and the revision are as follows:

On 24.10.2004, the marriage between the petitioner and the de facto-complainant Deepalakshmi was arranged and the engagement function was

performed at Andhra Club, T. Nagar, Chennai. The 1st respondent was an Australian citizen. Therefore, on 25.10.2004, the marriage was

registered at the office of the Sub Registrar, George Town, Chennai. However, the marriage was solemnized as per the Hindu Rights and Customs

on 22.11.2004.

From 22.11.2004 to 5.2.2005, the petitioner and the 1st respondent were residing at Thambu Chetty Street, Chennai in the residence of the

petitioner and sometimes at Amman Koil Street, Kondithoppu in the residence of the 1st respondent. During the above said period, the petitioner

met with a motor accident and sustained injury on the right leg and was operated upon. Therefore, the 1st respondent alone left for Australia on

5.2.2005. The petitioner obtained Visa subsequently and joined the 1st respondent on 6.3.2005.

However, the 1st respondent had gone to USA on her employment and the petitioner joined the 1st respondent only on 5.4.2006. In the first

week of March 2007, the 1st respondent left USA to visit her parents in Australia and on 29.3.2007 the petitioner returned to India.

However, problem started between the spouses and the 1st respondent issued a lawyer''s notice stating that the marriage had irretrievably

broken down w.e.f. 20.7.2007. She also visited Chennai and preferred a complaint against the petitioner and his parents on 29.2.2008. The 1st

respondent applied for a divorce in Australia on 4.9.2008 and obtained an order of divorce on 18.11.2008 dissolving the marriage that took place

on 25.10.2004.

Meanwhile, the 1st respondent gave a complaint to the 2nd respondent stating that she has been subjected for cruelty and harassment at the

hands of her husband and in-laws, who were only eying her income and making more demands and thereby committed various offences as

aforesaid.

The Inspector of Police. W-10, AWS Chennai registered a case in Cr. No. 1 of 2008 which was investigated by Inspector of Police, B-4

Police station and ultimately, after investigation, the charge sheet was filed by W. 12, All Women Police station. The learned III Metropolitan

Magistrate, George Town, Chennai took the case on file in C.C. No. 5496 of 2008 and aggrieved by which, A.1 viz., the husband of the

complainant has filed the present application to quash the proceedings on various grounds.

Pending proceedings in C.C. No. 5496 of 2008, the petitioner and his parents filed a criminal MP. No. 4471 of 2008 u/s 239 Cr. P.C. seeking

discharge on the ground that the proposed charges are baseless. The learned III Metropolitan Magistrate enquired the application and ultimately

dismissed the application on 30.10.2009. Aggrieved by which, all the accused have filed the revision petition in Crl. R.C. 1113 of 2009 on various

grounds.

Since the issues involved in both the applications are one and the same and parties are one and the same, both the matters are taken up

together and a common order is passed.

The point for consideration is whether the proceedings can be quashed u/s 482 Cr. P.C. and whether the trial Court is correct in dismissing the

discharge petition.

As far as the petition filed u/s 482 Cr. P.C. is concerned, the main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner did

not commit any illegal act or offence either in India or in abroad. The learned counsel submitted that u/s 188 of Cr. P.C. if the alleged offences are

committed in foreign countries by the citizens of India, the action shall be enquired into or tried in India only with the previous sanction of the

Central Government.

The learned counsel further pointed out that in the present case the 2nd respondent has conducted the investigation into the alleged offences

committed in America and Australia without previous sanction or permission of the Central Government. Similarly, the learned III Metropolitan

Magistrate, has also taken the complaint on file on 5.9.2008 without previous permission or sanction by the Central Government.

The learned counsel also contended that there is no application of mind while taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Metropolitan

Magistrate.

As far as the criminal revision is concerned, the learned counsel pointed out that the learned Magistrate failed to note that any offences relating

to dowry prohibition act must be investigated by the Dowry Prohibition Officer and as per the Rules framed under the Act, the police officer

competent to investigate is only the Dy. Superintendent of Police and in the present case, it was investigated by Inspector of Police, which has

vitiated the case.

The learned Magistrate has not applied his mind while taking cognizance and there is no material to show that there are cognizable offences

made out by the investigating officer.

The learned counsel pointed out that there is no prima facie case made out and therefore, the petitioners are entitled for discharge as the

continuation of the proceedings will be an abuse of process of law.

To fortify his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following case laws:

Preeti Gupta and Another Vs. State of Jharkhand and Another,

Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi and Others Vs. State of Gujarat,

Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana,

Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi),

Unreported judgment of the Apex Court in Crl. Appeal No. 2122 of 2009 Pashaura Singh v. State of Punjab and Another

On the contrary, Mr. Ullasa Velan, the learned counsel for the de facto-complaint submitted that both the petitions are not maintainable and

have to be dismissed in limine. The learned counsel pointed out that the provisions u/s 188 Cr. P.C. are not applicable to the facts and

circumstances of the case. The learned counsel pointed out that there are prima facie materials to show that the petitioners, who are the husband

and in-laws of the de facto complainant, have demanded dowry even prior to the marriage and after the marriage, they continued to demand when

the de facto complainant was in abroad and whenever she came to India.

The learned counsel pointed out that the de facto-complainant was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the husband not only in foreign soil

but also in India and the parents of the husband who continued to live in India had also subjected the de facto-complainant for harassment and

cruelty. The learned counsel pointed out that when the offences are committed in India, taking cognizance of the offence is legal in the provisions

u/s 188 Cr. P.C. is not attracted.

The learned counsel pointed out that even assuming that some of the offences were committed while the de facto-complainant was in abroad, it

is not necessary to obtain prior sanction or permission from the Central Government. To strengthen his arguments, the learned counsel relied on the

following case laws:

i) M.N.A. Achar v. Dr. D.L. Rajagopal and 4 Others (1977) MLJ (Crl) 167

ii) Pratibha Rani Vs. Suraj Kumar and Another,

iii) Wazir Chand and Another Vs. State of Haryana,

iv) State of Bihar and Another Vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another,

v) Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch Vs. Kuppusamy and Another

vi) State of Maharashtra Vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj and Others,

vii) Didigam Bikshapathi and Another Vs. State of A.P.,

viii) Mahesh Choudhary Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another,

ix) Koppisetti Subbhrao @ Subramaniam v. State of M.P. (2009) 3 MLJ (Crl) 1058 (SC-NOC)

x) Muhammad Rafi Vs. State of Kerala and Another,

The admitted facts are as follows:

The marriage between the 1st petitioner and the respondent/de facto-complainant took place on 25.10.2004 and the marriage was registered at

the office of the Sub Registrar, George Town, Chennai. From 22.11.2004 to 5.2.2005, the petitioner and the 1st respondent were residing at

Thambu Chetty Street, Chennai in the residence of the petitioner and sometimes at Amman Koil Street, Kondithoppu in the residence of the 1st

respondent. During the above said period, the petitioner met with a motor accident and sustained injury on the right leg and was operated upon.

Therefore, the 1st respondent alone left for Australia on 5.2.2005. The petitioner obtained Visa subsequently and joined the 1st respondent on

6.3.2005.

However, the 1st respondent had gone to USA on her employment and the petitioner joined the 1st respondent only on 5.4.2006, In the first

week of March 2007, the 1st respondent left USA for Australia to meet her parents and on 29.3.2007, the petitioner returned to India.

However, problem started between the spouses and the 1st respondent issued a lawyer''s notice stating that the marriage had irretrievably

broken down w.e.f. 20.7.2007. She also visited Chennai and preferred a complaint against the petitioner and his parents on 29.2.2008. The 1st

respondent applied for a divorce in Australia on 4.9.2008 and obtained an order of divorce on 18.11.2008 dissolving the marriage that took place

on 25.10.2004.

Meanwhile, the 1st respondent gave a complaint to the 2nd respondent stating that she has been subjected to cruelty and harassment at the

hands of her husband and in-laws, who were only bothering about her income and making more demands and thereby committed various offences

as aforesaid.

However, the de facto-complainant has filed a divorce petition and has obtained divorce in Australia and she has also given a complaint which

is investigated and charge sheet filed.

The crux of the charge sheet is as follows:

(i) At the time of betrothal on 24.10.2004, the petitioner and his parents demanded a dowry of 100 sovereigns of gold jewels, 5 kgs of silver and

15 sovereigns of gold for bridegroom, Rado watch and cash of Rs. 50,000/- and all the expenses of the betrothal should be borne out by the

parents of the bride.

The 3rd petitioner, the mother-in-law of the de facto-complainant told the parents of the bride that if the demands were not fulfilled, the marriage

will be stopped. Therefore, they fulfilled all the demands except for a Rado watch, a Pierre Carden watch at the cost of Rs. 10,000/- was given.

(ii) Between 22.11.2004 and 5.2.2005, the 1st petitioner and the de facto-complainant lived together. In January 2005, the de facto-complainant

was compelled to pay the monthly phone bills including the internet expenses.

(iii) In February 2005, the de facto-complainant left for Australia. Her father Elleswara Rao spent all expenses for the 1st petitioner''s visa

amounting to Rs. 1,50,000/- approximately. The 1st petitioner also demanded a sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the de facto-complainant for his

personal expenses which was paid through City Bank Account.

(iv) From 16.3.2005 to 5.4.2006, the 1st petitioner and the de facto-complainant lived in Australia. In March 2005, the 2nd petitioner, i.e. the

father-in-law of the de facto-complainant called her over phone from Chennai and demanded to buy a Car for the 1st petitioner. Australian dollars

20000/- was paid from the de facto-complainant''s savings account for purchase of car.

(v) In May 2005, the 1st petitioner demanded to provide him money to undergo a refresher course which costs Australian dollar 785 which was

paid by her. She was forced to spend Australian dollar 8000 to join another computer course.

(vi) The 1st petitioner subjected the de facto-complainant to severe harassment both mentally and physically.

(vii) From 5.4.2006 to March 2007, the de facto-complainant and the 1st petitioner lived in America. In April 2006, the 1st petitioner assaulted

the complainant with a dinner plate. In August 2006, in a friend''s place, the 1st petitioner poked with his fingers in the right eye of the de facto-

complainant which caused permanent injury.

(viii) on 17.11.2006, when they were traveling in a car, the 1st petitioner attempted to strangulate the de facto-complainant. In December 2006,

the 1st petitioner demanded to buy a car for his use and the de facto-complainant incurred an expense of US dollars 7000. In January 2007, the

1st petitioner demanded the de facto-complainant-ant to provide US dollars 1350 to join a consultancy course in US. In January 2007, the father-

in-law demanded Rs. 10 lakhs for buying Tamil Nadu Housing Board property in the name of the 1st petitioner and when she refused she was

subjected to cruelty by the petitioners. The 1st petitioner took away the laptop of the de facto-complainant, worth about US dollars 1300, her

social security document and medical records and withdrew US dollars 800 and did shopping using credit card and returned to India without even

informing her.

I. the de facto-complainant tried to contact her husband. The petitioners abused her over phone. On 15.2.2008, the relatives of the de facto-

complainant went to the house of the petitioners for reconciliation. Her in-laws demanded that they should transfer the properties in the name of her

husband.

The above acts of cruelty and demand of dowry will amount to the above said various offences.

Out of the above said acts of cruelty and demand of dowry are alleged to have taken place in the foreign soil during the period from 16.3.2005

to 5.4.2006, when the couple were in Australia and from 5.4.2006 to March 2007 when they were in America.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that u/s 188 of Cr. P.C., to investigate and prosecute the offences which are alleged to have

taken place in the foreign soil, the sanction of the Central Government is mandatory. Section 188 of Cr. P.C. reads as follows:

Offence committed outside India.

When an offence is committed outside India

(a) By a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or

(b) By a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India.

He may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found:

Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding Sections of this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India

except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.

The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision in Samarudeen Vs. Assistant Director of Enforcement and Others, wherein the

learned single Judge of Kerala High Court considered two decisions of the Kerala High Court which held ""though the offence was committed

outside India as the offender is the citizen of India and now he is found local jurisdiction of Kerala, the local police has jurisdiction to investigate the

case"" and deferred with holding:

Considering the fact that this Division Bench decision dealt with the matter without referring to various other provisions of the Cr. P.C. as

pointed out supra. I am of the view that this decision does not have the effect of binding precedent; hence I steer clear of. It looks as if the learned

Judges were more influenced by the law propounded by a learned single Judge of this Court in Remla and another Vs. S.P. of Police and Others,

and they did not bother to examine the matter in proper perspective and in depth. May be the relevance of Chapter 12 Cr. P.C. and its provisions

were not brought to the notice of their Lordships. With utmost respect to the learned Judges who dealt with the decisions in Remla v. S.P. of

Police (supra), and Muhammed v. State of Kerala, (1994) 1 KLT 464, I am of the view that they are not binding precedents, and they are not

applicable to the facts of the present case. I am conscious of the fact that Singh Judge of this Court is bound by a decision of the Division Bench

decision as a decision rendered without reference to all the relevant provisions of the statute does not have the legal effect of a binding precedent.

In view of the provisions of Chapter 12 and the language of Section 188 Cr. P.C. it necessarily follows that even for the purpose of

investigation even if it is deemed to come within the ambit of the phrase ''dealt with'' used in Section 188, it requires previous sanction of the

Central Government.

It is significant to remember that Section 3 IPC deals with any person liable by any Indian law to be tried for an offence committed beyond

India. It does into deal with the power of the Indian police to investigate a crime committed outside India. It should also be remembered that

Section 3 and 4 of the IPC are provisions of the substantive law, and they have nothing to do with the procedural law. In my considered opinion

the statement of law in the decision in Remla v. S.P. of Police (supra), and in Muhammed v. State of Kerala (supra), is not a correct statement of

law. The local police has no jurisdiction to investigate the offence alleged to have been committed by the fourth respondent at Dammam in Saudi

Arabia .

The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on Crimes (HC) 3 1988 (600) where another learned single Judge of Kerala High Court has

dealt with Section 188 of Cr. P.C. for an offence of cheating and held as follows:

Offences committed outside India do not fall within the turret of all limits of any Court in India. That means such offences are not to be investigated

by the police either Section 188 of the Code is an exception to this rule. For that exception to come into operation the provisions contained in that

Section must be strictly complied with. The Courts power to inquire into or try an offence committed outside India as per that Section depends on

previous sanction of the Central Government. The consequences of that is the police officers'' power to investigate an offence committed outside

India would also depend on the previous sanction of the Central Government u/s 156(3) the Magistrate can order investigation of a case which the

Court can inquire into and try under Chapter XIII. If the Magistrate has no territorial jurisdiction over the place where the offence was committed

then the police cannot also investigate the offence in pursuance to an order u/s 156(3) of the Code. In the instant case, the petitioner has nowhere

stated in the complaint that the Central Government has accorded sanction for the inquiry into or trial of the offence alleged in the complaint. In this

circumstance the offence which is alleged to have been committed by the petitioner outside the territorial limits of India could not have been taken

cognizance of by the Court below or directed to be investigated by the police. The learned Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in ordering the

police to inquire into the complaint u/s 156 of the code.

He also relied on a decision in Syed Asgar Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Home Department and Others, wherein 188 Cr. P.C. was

discussed and the Court held

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, since the procedure that is being adopted is totally inconsistent and contrary to the mandatory provisions

i.e., Section 188 of the Cr. P.C., the writ petition is liable to be allowed.

The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted before taking cognizance of the offence, the learned Magistrate is bound to ascertain

whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. The learned counsel pointed out that taking cognizance is not a formal action of taking the

case on file, but depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and relied on S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer Vs. Videocon

International Ltd. and Others, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:

""Taking Cognizance"" does not involve any formal action of any kind. If occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected

criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence

and not of an offender, Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and

no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance.

For the same preposition, he also relied on the decisions in Tula Ram and Others Vs. Kishore Singh, Devendra and Others Vs. State of U.P.

and Another, Panchabhai Popotbhai Butani v. State of Mah and Others 2010 CIJ 63.

The learned counsel relied on Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, wherein the Apex Court has held as

follows:

An offence of cheating cannot be said to have been made out unless the following ingredients are satisfied:

i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission.

ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or

iii) to consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not

do or omit.

For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at

the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his

promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence u/s 420 of the Penal Code can be said

to have been made out. We may reiterate that none of the ingredients of cheating as defined in Section 415 of the penal code is existence of an

intention (sic a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time) of making initial promise or existence thereof from the very beginning of formation of

contract.

On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied on a decision in Ajay Agarwal Vs. Union of India and others, wherein

the Apex Court has held obtaining the previous sanction from the Central Government is not a condition precedent for taking cognizance of an

offence. The learned counsel also relied on an unreported judgment of a Full Bench Judgment of the Apex Court in SLP Crl. 7640 of 2008, an

order dated 2.9.2011, the Apex Court has dealt with 188 Cr. P.C. and also referred Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India and Others (supra) and held

as follows:

Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India and Others (supra), wherein it had been held obtaining the

previous sanction of the central government was not a condition precedent for taking cognizance of offences, since sanction could be obtained

before trail begins.

The question which we had been called upon to consider in this case is whether in respect of series of offences arising out of the same transaction

some of which were committed within India and some outside India, such offences could be tried together without the previous sanction of the

central government as envisaged in the proviso to Section 188 of code of criminal procedure.

(Para 7)

The Supreme Court further held, para 10.

Although the decision in Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India and Others (supra) was rendered in the background conspiracy alleged to have been

hatched by the accused, the ratio of the decision is a fetter on the powers of the investigating authority to inquire into or try any offence mentioned

in the earlier part of the Section except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, The fetters, however, are imposed only when the

stage of trial is reached, which clearly indicates that no sanction in terms of Section 188 is required till commencement of trial. It is only after the

decision to try the offender in India was felt necessary that the previous sanction of the Central Government would be required before the trial

could commence.

Accordingly, and to the stage of taking cognizance, no previous sanction would be required from the Central Government in terms of the

proviso to Section 188 of Code of Criminal Procedure, However, the trial could not proceed beyond the cognizance stage without the previous

sanction of the Central Government. The Magistrate is therefore, free to proceed against the accused in respect of offences having been committed

in India and to complete the trial and pass judgment therein without being inhibited by the other alleged offences for which sanction would be

required.

Heard both sides and perused the materials available on record.

This Court is bound by the decision of the Full Bench of the Apex Court. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that no sanction in terms of

Section 188 is required till commencement of the trial. It is only after the decision to try the offender in India, the previous sanction of the Central

government would be required before the commencement of the trial. In the case on hand also, the question before this Court is whether in respect

of series of offences arising out of the same transaction some of which were committed within India and some outside India, such offences could be

tried together without the previous sanction of the central government as envisaged in the proviso to Section 188 of code of criminal procedure.

Therefore, upto the stage of taking cognizance no previous sanction would be required from Central Government. However, the trial cannot be

proceeded further without the previous sanction of the Central Government. The Apex Court has also further held that the learned Magistrate is

therefore free to proceed against the accused in respect of offences having been committed in India and passed the judgment.

Therefore, the law is now well settled that upto the stage of taking cognizance the previous sanction u/s 188 Cr. P.C. is not required, but if

some of the offences are committed in foreign soil the trial cannot be commenced without the prior sanction.

However, if the offence involves both those committed in foreign soil and also within the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate in India, the

trial can be proceeded for the offences committed in India and trial can not be proceeded for the offences committed out side India, without

sanction from Central Government.

As stated earlier, the charge sheet has been laid for an offence under Sections 498-A, 294-b, 406, 506(ii) IPC and Section 3, 4 and 6 of

Dowry Prohibition Act. It is alleged that the betrothal took place on 24.10.2004 and there was a demand of dowry of 100 sovereigns of gold

jewels, 5 kgs of silver and 15 sovereigns to bridegroom, Rado watch and cash of Rs. 50,000/-. It is also alleged that on 22.11.2004 when the

marriage took place at T. Nagar in the bride''s room the 1st respondent and her parents gave 100 sovereigns of gold, 5 kgs of silver and 15

sovereigns of jewels to bride groom and Pierre Carden watch, worth Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- in cash to the 3 accused in the presence of

Malluppu Sukumar and Jayaraman. According to the prosecution, this constitute an offence u/s 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, which is alleged

to have been committed in India.

From 22.11.2004 to 5.2.2005, the de facto-complainant/1st respondent and the 1st petitioner were living at Chennai and the 1st petitioner

compelled her to pay the Internet expenses and phone bill, which in my considered view, will not either amount to cruelty or demand of dowry.

It is further alleged that the 1st respondent left for Australia in February 2005 as she had been employed at Australia and for the 1st

petitioner/husband, the father of the de facto-complainant spent a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- for visa expenses and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid

towards personal expenses. In my considered view, this will not amount to demand or payment of dowry as it was the understanding between the

spouse to live together at Australia. Spending money for visa expenses without demand can never be termed as Dowry.

As illustrated above, the period from 16.3.2005 to 5.4.2006 the couple lived in Australia and certain acts of cruelty and demand of money are

alleged to have been committed. Similarly, from 5.4.2006 to March 2007, the spouse lived in America. Again certain acts of cruelty and demand

of dowry are alleged to have been committed.

During these two periods, it is alleged that offences were committed u/s 498-A and 406 IPC and Section 3, 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition

Act. It is also alleged that when the spouses were in America, the 1st petitioner attempted to strangulate the de facto-complainant and in January

2007 the petitioners 2 and 3, who are the in-laws, demanded Rs. 10 lakhs to purchase a property and threatened with dire consequences and

thereby all the petitioners committed an offence punishable u/s 506(i) IPC.

In the celebrated case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, the Apex Court has clearly laid down the guidelines,

where the inherent powers u/s 482 of the Court could be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

Therefore the alleged offence u/s 506(II) IPC said to have committed over phone by the petitioners do not prima facie constitute and offence.

The period between 16.3.2005 to 5.4.2006 and 5.4.2006 to March 2007 the offences are said to have taken place in foreign soil.

It is alleged that on 15.2.2008, the 1st respondent and her parents went to the petitioners'' house at Thambu Chetty Street, Chennai and the

petitioners 2 and 3 abused them and pushed them out of the house and therefore, the petitioners 2 and 3 have committed an offence u/s 294-b

IPC.

Therefore, the initial demand and payment of dowry on 22.11.2004 at T. Nagar, Chennai in the presence of two witnesses if prima face taken

to be true, is an offence committed by the petitioners for an offence under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and the alleged offence

committed on 15.2.2008 by the petitioners 2 and 3 at Thambu Chetty Street Chennai is an alleged offence under Sections 294-b IPC.

Following the principle laid down by the Full Bench of the Apex Court (cited supra), the Magistrate is therefore free only to proceed against

the accused in respect of the above said two offences alleged to have been committed in India and the Magistrate cannot proceed with the trial

without the previous sanction of the Central Government, against the offences said to have been committed in foreign soil.

Therefore, the entire proceedings in C.C. No. 5496 of 2008 need not be quashed. The learned Magistrate may proceed with the trial relating

to the offences alleged to have been committed in India for an offence u/s 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the petitioners and for an

offence u/s 294-b against the petitioners 2 and 3.

However, in respect of the offences alleged to have been committed outside India the learned Magistrate shall not proceed with the trial

without the sanction of the Central Government as envisaged in the proviso to Section 188 Cr. P.C. With the above observations, the petition in

Crl. O.P. No. 25077 of 2009 filed u/s 482 Cr. P.C. and Criminal Revision Petition in Crl. R.C. No. 1113 of 2009 are disposed of with a

direction that the learned III Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai may proceed with the trial relating to the offences alleged to have

been committed in India against the petitioners as illustrated above, and in respect of the offences alleged to have been committed outside India the

learned Magistrate shall not proceed with the trial without the sanction of the Central Government as envisaged in the proviso to Section 188 Cr.

P.C.