AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
12 paragraphs · 1,700 wordsThis writ petition is directed against an order allowing an application for amendment of the Election Petition. The election Petition was filed questioning the election of the returned candidate mainly on the three grounds:
Some votes were polled in his favour in the name of some dead persons;
Some votes were polled in the names of some persons who were absentees and who ceased to be residents of the village concerned;
Double voting in more than one constituency by the same persons.
Originally in the election petition the names of some persons who voted under those three categories were mentioned. The trial of the election petition commenced in February, 1996. After about 50 witnesses were already examined the instant application for amendment was filed seeking to introduce by way of amendment the names of some more persons who allegedly voted under those three categories- The application was resisted by the returned candidate on the ground that the petitioner cannot be permitted to plead new facts introducing a new cause of action after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing the election petition. It was also contended that on an earlier occasion when an application was filed by the contesting respondent seeking better particulars the said application was opposed by the election petitioner on the ground that all the material particulars were already given in the election petition and there was no need to give any further particulars and accordingly that application was dismissed. In view of the stand taken by the election petitioner at that time he is now precluded from pleading any further facts by way of the proposed amendment.
The lower Court, however, allowed the application for amendment observing that the power of amendment is wide enough to permit the amendment sought for and that the proposed amendment does not introduce any new cause of action as the petitioner seeks only to add some more, instances of the same corrupt practices, which were already pleaded in the election petition.
Sri B. Prakash Rao learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner herein has contended that the lower Court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercising its jurisdiction in permitting the amendment and that it has totally misdirected itself in holding that the proposed amendment does not introduce any new cause of action. He also contended that while under the general law the Court has a wide discretion in the matter of allowing amendment of pleadings, however, in the case of election petitions which are governed by special statutes, the powers of amendment are necessarily restricted and circumscribed by the provisions of the statute and a party is not entitled to seek an amendment which introduces a new cause of action after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in the statute. In support of his contentions the learned Counsel for the petitioner sought to place reliance mainly on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and another Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe and others, .
On the other hand, Sri K. Mahipathi Rao learned Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondent has contended that the lower Court has properly exercised its discretion in allowing the amendment and there are absolutely no grounds whatsoever warranting interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He also contended that the proposed amendment does not introduce any new cause of action whatsoever, but merely gives some more instances of the same corrupt practices which were already pleaded in the election petition and there is no bar for allowing such amendments. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the contesting respondent has cited the following Judgments. P.C. Purushothama Reddiar Vs. S. Perumal, ; Balwan Singh Vs. Prakash Chand and Others, , A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1976 SC 96 and Vineet Kumar Vs. Mangal Sain Wadhera, .
The election petition ins the instant case concerns the election of the Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat. The election petition is filed u/s 233 of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 read with A.P. Panchayat Raj (Election Tribunal in respect of G.P., M.P. & Z.P.) Rules, 1995. It is not in dispute that there is no specific provision in the said Rules with regard to the amendment of pleadings. Rule 7 of the said Rules, however, provides that the election petition shall be enquired into by the election Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil, Procedure, 1908 for the trial of the suits. The instant application for amendment is, therefore, filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC. It is well settled that in the matter of amendment of pleadings the Court has a wide discretion and that amendment can be ordered at any stage of the proceedings. However, it is also equally well settled that an amendment which introduces a new cause of action cannot be permitted especially after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for claiming the relief.
The question which now arises for consideration is whether the proposed amendment in the instant case has the effect of introducing a new cause of action or it merely sets out more particulars of the same cause of action which was already pleaded In Gajanan Krishaji Bapat''s case (supra), the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 86(5) of Representation of the People Act observed that while the said Section empowers the High Court to allow amendment in respect of particulars, there is a complete prohibition against any amendment being allowed which may have the effect of introducing either material facts not already pleaded or of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. The Supreme Court also pointed out that while Section 86 of the Act itself makes the CPC applicable, as nearly as may be, to the trial of the election petition, it must not; however, be ignored that some of the Rules framed under the Act itself over-ride certain provisions of the CPC and thus, the general power of amendment drawn from the CPC must be construed in the light of the provisions of the election law and applied with such restraints as are inherent in an election petition. On the facts of the said case the Supreme Court held that the High Court ought not to have allowed, the amendment sought for. Since the amendment petition was filed after the evidence was led by the parties apparently to bring the evidence inconformity with the pleadings. The Supreme Court also noticed that the evidence adduced by the election petitioners was beyond the pleadings and the amendment was sought with a view of cure the said defect. The Supreme Court, however, did not directly deal with the question which arises in the present case.
In P.C. Purushothama Reddiar''s case (supra) one of the grounds on which the election petition was filed was that the returned candidate incurred more expenditure than the authorised expenditure and as such his election is liable to be set-aside. Some details of the excess expenditure so incurred were originally set out in the election petition. By the proposed amendment the applicant sought to give some more particulars of about six other meetings held by the returned candidate in addition to what he had already stated in his election petition. The trial Court disallowed the amendment taking the view that each item of expenditure is a corrupt practice by itself and the amendment sought for cannot, therefore, be permitted. The Supreme Court, however, held that incurring or authorizing of an expenditure in contravention of Section 77 of the Act is one single corrupt practice and the trial Court erred in thinking that each item of expenditure is a corrupt practice by itself. Similarly, in Balwan Singh''s case (supra), the Election petition was filed on the ground of corrupt practices mentioned in Section 123(5), namely, that the returned candidate hired or procured the vehicles for the free conveyance of any elector to and from the polling station. Originally in the election petition the particulars of some such vehicles hired or procured by the returned candidate were set out. By the proposed amendment the applicant sought to furnish some further particulars in regard to the same corrupt practices. The Supreme Court held that it does not amount to introducing a new cause of action and as such the amendment can be permitted. In A.K. Gupta''s case (supra) the Supreme Court held that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts merely to a different or additional approach to the same facts the amendment is to be allowed even after expiry of the statutory period of limitation. It was held in the said judgment that the expression cause of action in this context does not mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. The expression only means a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. The words new case means new set of ideas. Likewise in Nineet Kumar''s case (supra) the Supreme Court held that it is well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation.
Keeping in view the principles enunciated in the above Judgments of the Supreme Court, I have no hesitation to hold that the proposed amendment in the instant case does not introduce any new cause of action, but merely seeks to supply some more instances of the same corrupt practices which were already pleaded originally in the election petition. In this view of the matter I do not find any infirmity in the order of the lower Court, and the Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. The lower Court is directed to dispose of the election petition as expeditiously as possible.
