C. Purushothaman and another vs Appunni Nair

Raghavan, J.—The landlords are the petitioners. The landlords filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground of (1) wilful default in the payment of rent for the period from October to December 1966, (2) that the tenant has committed acts of waste so as to impair materially the value and utility of the building and (3) the landlords requires the premises by way of additional accommodation. The defence of the tenant is that he has not committed wilful default, that he has not committed acts of waste, that he is using the premises for non-residential purposes and the application of the landlord is not maintainable. The Rent Controller found that the respondent has not committed wilful default, that he has not committed acts of waste and that the landlords do not bona fide require the premises for their own use and occupation. In the result, the landlords'' application was dismissed.

The landlords filed H.R.A. 118 of 1969 to the court of Small Causes Madras, and the appellate authority confirmed the decision of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. The landlords have filed the present revision petition and the contention raised is that the courts below failed to appreciate the difference between a landlord applying for possession under S. 10 (3) (a) and under S. 10 (3) (c) and that in an application under S. 10 (3) (c) the question of the residential or non-residential nature of the building will not arise. The further contention of the landlord is that the application is bona fide, as the petitioners desire to live separately after the marriage of the second petitioner on account of ill-feelings among the women folk. The further contention of the learned counsel is that the appellate authority considered the question as to the relative hardship of the parties, that the tenant, who is running a hotel in the portion of the properties sought to be evicted, has been there from 1949, that there are 9 or 10 employees in the hotel, that it will not be possible for the tenant to secure alternative accommodation and he will be ruined if the eviction from the premises is ordered. The further contention of the tenant is that this is only an attempt to increase the rent and that there are no bona fides in the landlords'' application. The finding of the appellate authority is not that there is no need for the landlords for additional accommodation. Once the need of the landlord for additional accommodation is established, then no other question in an application under S. 10 (2) (i) will arise. The question of bona fides need not at all be considered. It is enough to refer to the judgment of Ramaprasada Rao, J. in Anandhayee Ammal v. S.M. Khaja & Co. (1967) 1 M.L.J. 368 in this connection. The distinction between S. 10 (3) (a) and 10 (3) (c) was clearly brought about in the judgment of the Andhra High Court in K. Parasuramiah v. Pokuri Lakshmamma (1695) 1 A.W.R. 253. The head note in the said decision runs as follows:

The principle underlying S. 10 (3) (c), which is a departure from the principle adopted in S. 10 (3) (a), appears to be that a landlord should be permitted to re-adjust his requirements if he is occupying a portion of the same building, and it is for that reason that S. 10 (3) (c) is not hedged with the restrictions found in S. 10 (3) (a), as the legislature wanted the landlord to have a little freedom to readjust his needs if he is occupying the same building along with the tenants.

Under S. 10 (3) (c) if the landlord satisfies the Controller that he wants additional accommodation in the same building, a portion of which is already under his occupation, it is open to him to readjust the additional accommodation in the manner convenient to him and it cannot be insisted that the additional accommodation sought for should be used by the landlord for the same purpose for which the tenant sought to be evicted was using it.

When once the bona fide requirement of the landlord is ascertained under S. 10 (3) (c) or the landlord brings himself within that provision, then the onus is on the tenant to allege and prove the various factors which he wants the Rent Controller to take into account for weighing the relative hardship which may be caused to the tenant in case he is evicted, and establish that it outweighs the advantage which might accrue to the landlord.

I am in respectful agreement with the principle enunciated in the above decision. In the present case the landlord has established his bona fides in seeking additional accommodation. While that is so, there are no other outweighing circumstances which could prevent the landlord from claiming the property for the use for which he wanted. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Time for vacating the premises eight months from this date.