C. Raghunatha Reddy vs S. Rajasekaran and P. Devendran

V. Ramasubramanian, J.—The Petitioner in these Civil Revision Petitions is a Tenant in respect of the house and premises bearing old Door No. 8, new Door No. 13, Plot No. 303, 3rd Cross Street, West CIT Nagar, Chennai-35, measuring an extent of 4,050 sq.ft. The contractual rent for the premises was Rs. 1,100/- per month. The Petitioner is an Advocate practising in this Court.

The Landlord of the premises filed a Petition in RCOP No. 3272 of 1988 on the file of the Rent Controller, Chennai, seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for own use and occupation. But it was dismissed by an order dated 17.4.1996.

During the pendency of the said Eviction Petition, the Landlord also filed a Petition for fixation of fair rent in R.C.O.P. No. 1070 of 1995 u/s 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. By an order dated 23.5.1997, the Rent Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs. 7,565/-per month as against the contractual rate of rent of Rs. 1,100/- per month.

The Landlord filed two Appeals, one in R.C.A. No. 624 of 1997, for enhancement of the fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller and another in R.C.A. No. 867 of 1997 against the dismissal of his Eviction Petition. By an order dated 9.3.2011, the Appeal arising out of the fair rent order viz., R.C.A. No. 624 of 1997 was allowed, enhancing the fair rent to Rs. 9,688/- per month. By another order of the same date viz., 9.3.2011, the Appeal arising out of the dismissal of the Eviction Petition viz., R.C.A. No. 867 of 1997 was dismissed.

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the Eviction Petition by both the Courts below, the Landlord filed a Revision in CRP (NPD) No. 3088 of 2001 on the file of this Court. He also filed CRP (NPD) No. 3089 of 2001 as against the order of the Appellate Authority enhancing the fair rent to Rs. 9,688/-. Both these revisions were allowed to be dismissed for default on 4.6.2007.

In the meantime, the Landlord sold the property to the Respondents herein by a Sale Deed dated 2.12.2005. After their purchase, the Respondents filed a Petition for eviction in RCOP No. 2199 of 2006 complaining of wilful default in payment of the monthly rent. The nature of the default complained by the Respondents in that Eviction Petition was that the Petitioner/Tenant did not pay the difference between the fair rent and the contractual rent from November 2001 upto October 2006. Pending the main Eviction Petition, the Respondents also filed an application u/s 11(4) of the Act, seeking a direction to the Petitioner/Tenant to deposit into Court, the arrears of rent calculated on the basis of the difference between the fair rent and the contractual rent. This was in M.P. No. 187 of 2007. But both the main Eviction Petition and the Miscellaneous Petition were dismissed for default on 10.4.2007.

Thereafter the Respondents filed two applications in M.P. Nos.483 & 484 of 2007 respectively for the restoration of the main Eviction Petition which was dismissed for non-prosecution and for condoning the delay of 30 days in seeking restoration. Both these Petitions were dismissed by the Rent Controller by an order dated 7.11.2007. But the Appeals filed by the Respondents in R.C.A. Nos.851 & 852 of 2007 were allowed by the Appellate Authority by an order dated 9.6.2008. Thus, the Petition for eviction stood restored.

After the main Petition for eviction was restored, the Rent Controller took up the Application u/s 11(4) of the Act, viz., M.P. No. 187 of 2007. In the said Application, the learned Rent Controller passed an order on 30.4.2009, directing the Petitioner/Tenant to deposit the fair rent already fixed, for the period from January 2006 to March 2009. Since the said order was not complied with by the Tenant, the Rent Controller passed the consequential order on 15.6.2009, terminating the proceedings and ordering the eviction of the Petitioner.

As against the consequential order passed in the main Eviction Petition, the Petitioner filed an Appeal in R.C.A. No. 353 of 2009. As against the conditional order passed in M.P. No. 187 of 2007, the Petitioner filed an Appeal in R.C.A. No. 354 of 2009. In the Appeal R.C.A. No. 353 of 2009, arising out of the eviction ordered in the main Petition, the Appellate Authority granted an interim stay in M.P. No. 477 of 2009.

However, the Respondents took out an application in M.P. No. 498 of 2010 u/s 11(4) of the Act in the Appeal R.C.A. No. 353 of 2009 itself. After contest, the Appellate Authority passed an order on 23.2.2011 in M.P. No. 498 of 2010, directing the Petitioner/Tenant to pay the fair rent from January 2006 to January 2011. The Petitioner filed an Application in M.P. No. 183 of 2011, seeking extension of time to comply with the order passed in M.P. No. 498 of 2010. But the Petition for extension of time in M.P. No. 183 of 2011 was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by an order dated 8.4.2011. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority stopped further proceedings and ordered eviction in terms of Section 11(4) of the Act.

The Respondents then filed an Execution Petition in E.P. No. 295 of 2011, for executing the orders, of eviction. In the Execution proceedings, the Executing Court ordered delivery on 11.7.2011. Since there was an obstruction, a Petition for police protection and a Petition for breaking open, were filed. They were ordered and ultimately delivery was effected and delivery was also recorded and the Execution proceedings terminated by the Executing Court on 27.7.2009.

Thereafter, the Petitioner has come up with the above 7 Civil Revision Petitions. The order against which each of the Revision Petitions is filed, is tabulated below for easy appreciation:

(i) CRP (NPD) No. 3089 of 2011 arises out of the order dated 8.4.2011 passed in M.P. No. 498 of 2010 by the Appellate Authority, u/s 11(4) of the Act, directing the Petitioner/Tenant to pay the rental arrears calculated on the basis of the fair rent already fixed.

(ii) CRP (NPD) No. 3090 of 2011, challenges the dismissal of the main Appeal R.C.A. No. 353 of 2009 on 8.4.2011 arising out of the order of eviction passed in RCOP No. 2199 of 2006.

(iii) CRP (NPD) No. 3091 of 2011, challenges the order dated 8.4.2011 passed in R.C.A. No. 354 of 2009 arising out of the conditional order passed by the Rent Controller in M.P. No. 187 of 2007 u/s 11(4) of the Act.

(iv) CRP (NPD) No. 3092 of 2011 arises out of the delivery recorded by the Executing Court on 27.7.2011 in E.P. No. 295 of 2011.

(v) CRP (NPD) No. 3093 of 2011 arises out of the dismissal of the stay Petition filed by the Petitioner/Tenant in E.A. No. 75 of 2011 before the Executing Court under Order 21, Rule 26, C.P.C.

(vi) CRP (NPD) No. 3094 of 2011 arises out of the dismissal of the Application filed by the Petitioner/Tenant in E.A. No. 76 of 2011 before the Executing Court, requesting the Executing Court not to record delivery of possession and for recalling the warrant of delivery already issued.

(vii) CRP (NPD) No. 3095 of 2011 arises out of the dismissal of an Application filed by the Petitioner/Tenant in E.A.SR No. 15274 of 2011, seeking the appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to take an inventory of all the movable properties inside the premises which formed the subject matter of the proceedings between the parties.

Thus, it is seen that out of the 7 Revision Petitions, one arises out of an order passed u/s 11(4) of the Act, two revisions arise out of the dismissal of two Appeals arising out of similar orders passed u/s 11(3) and Section 11(4) of the Act, by the Rent Controller and four revisions arise out of the Execution proceedings. Since the arguments advanced in the first three Revision Petitions arising out of the proceedings u/s 11 of the Act, stand on a different footing than the arguments advanced in the other four Revision Petitions arising out of the Execution proceedings, I shall deal with them separately.

I have heard Mr. C. Raghunatha Reddy, the Petitioner in all the Civil Revision Petitions, who chose to argue the Revision Petitions, as a party-in-person, despite having filed all the Revisions through a Counsel. I have also heard Mr. M.S. Krishnan, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents/ Landlords.

Revisions arising out of main proceedings:

As pointed out in the sequence of events narrated above, the main Eviction Petition RCOP No. 2199 of 2006 was filed complaining of wilful default in payment of the fair rent as fixed in the previous proceedings. Though the claim for the difference between the fair rent and the contractual rate of rent, was claimed by the Respondents for the period from November 2001 to October 2006, the Rent Controller directed payment of the arrears calculated only from January 2006 onwards. This was on account of the fact that the Respondents/Landlords purchased the property only in December 2005. Admittedly, the order for payment of arrears of rent calculated on the basis of the difference between the fair rent and the contractual rent, was not paid by the Petitioner/Tenant. Consequently, the further proceedings were stopped and eviction was ordered.

As against the conditional order, directing the Tenant to pay the arrears of rent for the period from January 2006 to March 2009 and the consequential order terminating the proceedings and directing eviction, two Appeals came to be filed by the Petitioner/Tenant. In the Appeal also, an order u/s 11(4) of the Act, was passed. Without challenging the order dated 23.2.2011 passed in the application u/s 11(4) of the Act, by the Appellate Authority, the Petitioner merely filed an Application for extension of time in M.P.No. 183 of 2011. It was dismissed on 8.4.2011. Only thereafter he came up with the above Revisions.

The contentions of Mr. C. Raghunatha Reddy, the Petitioner appearing in person, are as follows:

(i) The order fixing the fair rent had not attained finality, in view of the pendency of a Civil Revision Petition. Therefore, there can be no Petition for eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of the fair rent. Hence, the entire proceedings are ab initio void, since they were based only upon the allegation that there was a default in payment of the fair rent.

(ii) In any case, the Petition for eviction in the R.C.O.P. No. 2199 of 2006 was dismissed only on 10.4.2007 after the dismissal of M.P. No. 187 of 2007 filed u/s 11(4) of the Act. The Respondents filed M.P. Nos.483 & 484 of 2007 for condoning the delay and for restoration of the main R.C.O.P. No. 2199 of 2006. Both these Petitions were dismissed by the Rent Controller. However, the Appeals arising out of the same in R.C.A. Nos.851 & 852 of 2007 were allowed by the Appellate Authority. Consequently, R.C.O.P. No. 2199 of 2006 was restored to file. But there was no Petition for restoration of the Application u/s 11(4) in M.P. No. 187 of 2007. Therefore, it is the contention of the Petitioner that the Rent Controller committed a grave error in taking up M.P. No. 187 of 2007 and passing an order, directing the Petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent, when the said M.P. No. 187 of 2007 was not even restored. Consequently, all subsequent proceedings for which the order M.P. No. 187 of 2007 formed the basis, have to fall like a pack of cards.

(iii) In any case, after the Appellate Authority granted a stay in M.P. No. 477 of 2009 in R.C.A. No. 353 of 2009 arising out of the order of eviction in R.C.O.P. No. 2199 of 2006, there was no question of the Appellate Authority entertaining an Application u/s 11(4) of the Act, in M.P. No. 498 of 2010.

I shall now deal with each one of the above contentions.

Whether the fair rent reached finality:

The first contention of the Petitioner that the fair rent fixed by the Court had not attained finality and that therefore, there cannot be a Complaint of wilful default in payment of the same, is hopelessly misconceived. The reasons are as follows:

(i) The Petition for fixation for fair rent R.C.O.P. No. 1070 of 1995 was allowed on 23.5.1997, fixing the fair rent at Rs. 7,565/-. The Petitioner does not say that he filed an Appeal against the said order. The Landlord filed an Appeal in R.C.A. No. 624 of 1997. It was allowed on 9.3.2001 by the Appellate Authority and the fair rent was refixed at Rs. 9,688/- per month. As against the order of the Appellate Authority, the Landlords alone filed a revision in CRP (NPD) No. 3089 of 2001. The said Revision was also dismissed for non-prosecution on 10.4.2007. Therefore, the Petitioner has not even an apology of a reason, for not paying the fair rent at least after 10.4.2007.

(ii) As stated earlier, the order of the Appellate Authority refixing the fair rent at Rs. 9,688/- per month was dated 9.3.2001. The Petitioner claims that he filed a revision with an enormous delay. According to him, the delay was condoned way back in the year 2004. Though a period of 7 years have now lapsed, the Petitioner doest not even know the fate of the Revision. The Revision said to have been filed by the Petitioner has not even been numbered for the past more than 7 years after the alleged condonation of delay. The Petitioner is an Advocate practising in this Court. He admits that his revision is not numbered for more than 7 years after the condonation of the delay. Therefore, the contention that the fair rent did not reach finality merely on account of the pendency of a Revision filed by the Landlord, is to say the least, very frivolous.

(iii) Recently I had an occasion to consider this issue of finality to Fair Rent proceedings, in Girdharilal Chandak and Bros (HUF) Vs. S. Mehdi Ispahani, Ali Ispahani and S. Mohamed Ispahani, . The question that fell for consideration in that case was whether the mere pendency of a Revision without even a stay Petition, can be said to have arrested the finality to the order of the 2 Courts below. It was held by me in the said decision dated 2.8.2011 as follows:

If a person does not seek stay of an order passed by a Court below, it would only indicate either of the two things viz., (i) that he is willing to comply with the order or (ii) that he has no objection to the orders of the Court below being put into execution. The failure of a person to seek from an Appellate forum, a stay of the order of a subordinate forum, cannot mean anything else than the above two factors. Take for instance, a case where the decree for recovery of money is passed. If out of fear that an Appellate Court may impose a condition for the grant of stay, the Judgment-debtor chooses not to seek stay of the decree for money at all, it would either mean that he has no objection to the decree being put to execution or that he is even willing to pay the decretal debt subject to his rights in the First Appeal. The failure of a person to seek a stay from an Appellate Court, cannot lead to a disastrous consequence viz., that though he would not seek stay, there will automatically be a clog on the right of the decree holder to execute it. Such an interpretation, can never be permitted.

Order 41, Rule 5 (1) CPC, makes it clear that an Appeal shall not operate as a stay of the proceedings under a decree or order Appealed from, except so far as the Appellate Court may order. It also makes it clear that the execution of a decree need not be stayed merely by reason of an Appeal having been preferred from the decree. As a matter of fact, the Explanation to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order 41, goes a step further by stating that even an order granted by the Appellate Court for the stay of execution will be effective only from the date of communication of such order to the Court of first instance. However, it permits the Court of first instance even to act upon an Affidavit sworn to by the Appellant, to the effect that an Appellate Court had stayed the execution of the decree. In other words, the stay is made operative only prospectively.

In Smt. Kamala Devi Vs. Seth Takhatmal and Another, , the Supreme Court pointed out that Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C., embodies the general principle of law that an Appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree. To hold that Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C., embodies only the general principle of law, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the opinion of the Judicial Committee in Juscurn Bold v. Pirthi Chand Lal, 1918 LR 46 Indian Appeal 52, to the following effect:

Under the Indian Law and Procedure, a original decree is not suspended by presentation of an Appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on Appeal is one of dismissal.

Therefore, the Petitioner cannot even contend that the principles of Order 41, Rule 5, CPC, cannot be invoked to the proceedings under the Rent Control Act, in view of the above observations of the Supreme Court that Order 41, Rule 5, embodies only a general principle of law. In any case, in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., , which arose out of the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 8 that it is well settled that mere preferring of an Appeal does not operate as stay on the decree or order Appealed against nor on the proceedings in the Court below. The Court pointed out that a prayer for the grant of stay of the proceedings or on the execution of the decree or order Appealed against has to be specifically made to the Appellate Court. In paragraph 9 of the Report, the Supreme Court further reiterated that "to secure an order of stay merely by preferring an Appeal is not a statutory right conferred on the Appellant". To come to the above conclusions, the Supreme Court relied upon the provisions of Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C., despite the fact that the proceedings in that case also arose only under the Rent Control Act. Therefore, if a person who seeks an order of stay and suffers a refusal, is himself obliged to pay the fair rent, the Petitioner who did not even seek a stay of the orders of both the Courts below, cannot be placed better of.

Therefore, the contention raised by the Respondents that the First Petitioner was guilty of wilful default in payment of the fair rent fixed by the two Courts below, was rightly sustained by both the authorities, in view of the very failure of the Petitioner to seek stay of those orders in the Revision filed by them...............

The above issue can also be looked at from another angle. Take for instance a case, where a Revision is filed against orders fixing the fair rent and the Tenant also seeks stay of the orders of the Court below. For the grant of stay, if this Court imposes a condition and the Revision Petitioner fails to comply with those conditions, it would automatically result in the vacation of the stay order. Once a stay is sought and it is also granted on condition and once the conditional order is not complied with, the default on the part of the Tenant would automatically become a wilful default. If this is the position even with regard to a person who obtains a conditional order of stay, the case of a person who does not even seek stay, cannot be placed in a better position. In other words, to say that a person who seeks stay and suffers a conditional order is worse off than a person who does not seek stay would be a travesty of justice. Therefore, the Courts below were right in looking at the issue in plain and simple terms in the sense that on account of the very action of the Petitioner in not seeking a stay, the Petitioner became liable to pay the fair rent.

Therefore, the Petitioner cannot contend that the fair rent fixed by the Appellate Authority had not reached finality, merely on account of the pendency of a Revision filed by the Landlord, when the Petitioner himself did not prosecute a Revision for the past 10 years, after having filed it belatedly. It must be remembered that the Appellate Authority fixed the fair rent on 9.3.2001. To say that the said order had not reached finality for the past 10 years, is obnoxious. The Petitioner who had not even got his revision Petition allegedly filed against the fair rent numbered for the past 10 years, cannot be heard to contend that the order had not attained finality.

Whether restoration of main Petition resulted in restoration of Miscellaneous Petition:

The second contention of the Petitioner is that the Respondents got only the main Petition R.C.O.P. No. 2199 of 2006 restored to file. This restoration, according to the Petitioner, will not automatically restore M.P. No. 187 of 2007, since the Miscellaneous Petition was dismissed first and the main Petition dismissed later. Therefore, it is the contention of the Petitioner that all further proceedings which were based upon the order passed in M.P. No. 187 of 2007 were vitiated.

But as rightly pointed out by Mr. M.S. Krishnan, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, it was held more than 7 decades ago in Saranatha Ayyangar v. Muthiah Moopanar, AIR 1934 Mad. 49, that as a general rule, the restoration of a Suit would result in restoration of all incidental matters. Ramesam, J., as he then was, observed: "it is as if when the Suit is dismissed, the record of the Suit was sent to the Record Room and when restored, the whole bundle was brought back to the Court file with all the matters contained in it. If there is anything expressly appearing against the view that all the interlocutory matters are restored, then one would hold that they are not so restored. In the absence of such a thing, I would hold that the Suit and all incidental matters are restored to file."

The above decision was cited with approval recently by a Division Bench in B. Gurubackiam v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2011 (1) CTC 1. After referring to two decisions of the Supreme Court and a decision of this Court and that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Division Bench pointed out in that decision that when a Suit or proceeding, dismissed for default, is restored subsequently, all ancillary orders or proceedings shall stand revived, unless there is something on record to show the contrary.

In the case on hand, what was restored was only an Application u/s 11(4), in M.P. No. 187 of 2007. It is not even a case where any interim order earlier passed, was treated as restored, upon the restoration of the main Petition for eviction. All that the Rent Controller did was, to treat the Miscellaneous Petition MP. No. 187 of 2007 as having been restored to file, upon the restoration of the main Petition for eviction. Thereafter, the Rent Controller conducted an enquiry and passed an order nearly after 10 months. Even while doing so, the Rent Controller allowed the Application only partly. It is seen from the prayer in M.P. No. 187 of 2007 that it was for payment of arrears of rent from November 2001 onwards. But by the order dated 30.4.2009, passed after more than 10 months of restoration of the main Petition for eviction, the Rent Controller directed payment of the fair rent only from January 2006 and not from November 2001. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner that M.P. No. 187 of 2007 cannot be said to have been restored, is totally untenable.

Stay by the Appellate Authority and its effect:

The next contention of the Petitioner is that after a stay was granted and after it was also made absolute in M.P. No. 477 of 2009 in R.C.A. No. 353 of 2009 (arising out of the order of eviction passed in the main Petition), there was no scope for the Appellate Authority to entertain a Petition u/s 11(4) of the Act.

But the said contention is unsustainable. As seen from the sequence of events, an order was passed by the Rent Controller on 30.4.2009 in M.P. No. 187 of 2007, directing the Petitioner to pay the fair rent with effect from January 2006, though the liability of the Petitioner to pay the fair rent was from the year 1995, when the original Petition was filed. In other words, the Petitioner was given the benefit of non-payment of the fair rent for a period of 11 years from 1995 till 2006. Since this order was not complied with, the Rent Controller passed a consequential order on 15.6.2009, terminating further proceedings and ordering eviction.

As against the conditional order in M.P. No. 187 of 2007, the Petitioner filed an Appeal in R.C.A. No. 354 of 2009. There was no stay in that Appeal. But in the Appeal R.C.A. No. 353 of 2009 filed against the eviction ordered in the main Petition, the'' Petitioner got a stay in M.P. No. 477 of 2009. Thus, it was a stay of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. At the most, it was a stay of further proceedings before the Rent Controller. It was not a stay for demanding the fair rent even before the Appellate Authority. Nor was it a restraint for the Appellate Authority to pass any order u/s 11(4). Hence, there was no bar for filing an Application u/s 11(4) before the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the third contention is also unsustainable.

Revisions arising out of Execution proceedings:

As stated earlier, 4 revisions arise out of Execution proceedings. While one Revision arises out of the recording of the delivery of vacant possession in the Execution Petition E.P.. No. 295 of 2011, two Revisions arise out of the dismissal of execution applications filed by the Petitioner for stay of further proceedings and for recalling the warrant of delivery. The fourth Petition arises out of the dismissal of an Application for the appointment of a Commissioner, to take inventory of the movables lying in the premises.

The contention of the Petitioner in all these first 4 Revision Petitions are as follows:

(i) The action of the Executing Court in proceeding with the E.P., without even ordering notice to the Petitioner, was not proper, since the decree for eviction was not a contested decree.

(ii) In any event, the Petitioner entered appearance through a Counsel and filed a Vakalat on 14.7.2011. Without reference to the Vakalat, the Executing Court advanced the hearing, ordered police protection, permitted the breaking open of the lock for ensuring delivery. Therefore, the whole action is vitiated.

(iii) When the Executing Court had found that there was an obstruction by the wife of the Petitioner, the Court ought to have followed the procedure prescribed by Rules 97 & 98 of Order 21, C.P.C. But the Executing Court did not follow the procedures.

(iv) The order of the Court below recording delivery of vacant possession on 22.7.2011 was highly improper, when even as per the report of the bailiff, there were articles of the Petitioner kept inside the premises. Therefore, order which proceeds on a false premise, cannot be allowed to stand.

In so far as the first contention is concerned, it is not correct to say that the orders of eviction passed by the Courts below were ex parte orders. It may be seen from the sequence of events, which I have narrated above (i) that an order was passed on 30.4.2009, granting time to the Petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent from January 2006 to March 2009, on or before a particular date; (ii) that the said order was passed after contest; (iii) that the said order was not complied with, forcing the Rent Controller to stop further proceedings and to order the eviction, on 15.6.2009; (iv) that the Petitioner filed Appeals in which an order was passed on 23.2.2011 after contest, directing him to pay the arrears of rent; (v) that the said order was also a contested order; and (vi) that the Petitioner even filed a Petition for the extension of time to comply with the conditional order, but the same was dismissed. Therefore, it is clear that the order of eviction passed u/s 11(4) of the Act, as a consequence to the failure of the Petitioner to comply with the conditional order u/s 11(3), was a contested order and not an ex parte order. Consequently, under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC, the Executing Court was entitled to proceed with the execution without ordering notice. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order 21, CPC, inserted by way of Madras High Court Amendment, makes it mandatory for the Executing Court to issue notice of the execution to the judgment-debtor only under three contingencies viz., (i) when execution is laid after 2 years of the decree (ii) when execution is laid against the legal representatives, and (iii) when the Judgment-debtor has been declared insolvent. In the case on hand, there was a contested decree and the execution was laid within 2 years. Therefore, there was no impediment for the Executing Court to proceed.

The second contention that the vakalat filed on 14.7.2011 had been overlooked, cannot also be accepted. The Executing Court had already issued a delivery warrant on 11.7.2011. Therefore, the Petitioner, who is not only a legal practitioner by himself, but who had also engaged another Counsel (both before the Executing Court and before this Court), ought to have moved necessary Petitions under Order 21, Rule 26 at that stage itself. Without doing so, the Petitioner cannot contend that the Vakalat filed through the Counsel was overlooked.

The next contention of the Petitioner is that whenever a decree holder is obstructed or resisted by any person, while taking steps for the possession of the property, he is obliged to make an application under order 21, Rule 97(1) of the Code for the removal of the obstruction. As and when such an Application is filed, the Court is obliged to adjudicate upon the application, sub-rule (2) of Rule 98 of Order 21, empowers the Court even to order detention of the Judgment-debtor or the obstructor in Civil Prison, if the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause.

According to the Petitioner, the fact that there was obstruction was borne out even by the Application filed by the Respondents/decree holders on 13.7.2011. They had stated in that Application that the Petitioner''s wife refused to open the door and shouted at them and created a scene. This, according to the Petitioner, amounted to resistance or obstruction to execution and that therefore, the Respondents ought to have taken recourse to the procedure prescribed by Rule 97 of Order 21, CPC.

It is the further contention of the Petitioner that if the Respondents had taken recourse to the procedure prescribed under Rules 97 & 98 of Order 21, he would have been in a position to show ''just cause'' in terms of Rule 98(2) of Order 21, CPC. According to the Petitioner, the certified copies of the orders of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller had not been made available to the Petitioner when the Execution proceedings were progressing. Therefore, his contention is that if an Application under Rule 97(1) of Order 21, CPC, had been filed and if he had been put on notice, he would have shown the non-availability of certified copies of the orders of the Courts below as a ''just cause'' under Rule 98(2) for obstructing to the execution. Since this opportunity has been lost and since the procedure prescribed by law had been violated, the Petitioner contends that the whole Execution proceedings are vitiated.

In support of his above contentions, the Petitioner relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court:

(i) Brahmdeo Chaudhary, Adv. Vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another, .

(ii) Shreenath and Another Vs. Rajesh and Others, .

(iii) Tanzeem-e-Sufia Vs. Bibi Haliman and Others, .

In all the decisions relied upon by the Petitioner, the Supreme Court pointed out (i) that the resistance/obstruction to delivery under Order 21, Rule 97, CPC, could be by any person including or other than the Judgment-debtor; (ii) that such a person is entitled to face the consequences, when proceedings are initiated under Rules 97 & 98 of Order 21, CPC; and (iii) that the procedure prescribed under the above Rules lay down a complete Code for resolving the disputes.

But it is seen from the decision in Brahmdeo Chaudhary, that the question that arose for consideration in that case was whether the person in possession should first hand over possession and only thereafter move an Application under Order 21, Rule 99, CPC or not. It is in that context that the principles of Rules 97 & 98 were discussed by the Supreme Court in that decision.

In Shreenath, the Supreme Court very elaborately pointed out the hurdles faced by a decree holder in his long arduous journey through mountainous terrains with ridges and furrows. The Court also pointed out in paragraph 3 of its decision that in interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding justice is to be adopted. This is what has to be done in the case on hand. Therefore, the principles enunciated in that decision are more in favour of the Respondents.

In Tanzeem-e-Sufia, an independent right was claimed by the person in possession. The High Court refused to hear him on the ground that he had already filed a title Suit. It was in that context that the Court laid down the above principles. Therefore, it is not in every case that the Executing Court should stretch all the provisions of Order 21 with a lot of elasticity. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Shreenath, the procedural law should be interpreted by the Courts to advance the cause of justice and not to subvert it.

In S.N. Kuba v. P.P.I. Vaithyanathan, 1988 TLNJ 1, a Division Bench of this Court was concerned with a case where a person put into execution, a decree for possession. But on account of a Judgment of the Supreme Court striking down Section 13(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the suit property covered by the decree had became subjected to the Rent Control Act. Nevertheless the decree holder obtained delivery and that too before the Vacation Court, in execution of the Civil Courts decree. When the matter came up before the Division Bench of this Court, the Division Bench opined that if Subordinate Court had rendered justice to the parties on the facts of this case, the same shall not be interfered with by the High Court in a Revisional jurisdiction. I find that ultimately justice has been done in this case, since it had been a very long wait for the Respondents/Landlords and their predecessors in title. The battle between the Petitioner and the original Landlords started 23 years ago in 1988, when a Petition for eviction was filed. The Petition for fixation of fair rent itself was failed in 1995. The Petitioner/Tenant did not file any Appeal against the order of the Rent Controller, fixing the fair rent at Rs. 7,565/- by his order dated 23.5.1997. Even after the Appellate Authority enhanced the rent to Rs. 9,688/-, by order dated 9.3.2001, the Petitioner, who is a practitioner in law, filed a Revision after 3 years and got the delay condoned in 2004. After 2004, the Petitioner did not even care to get the revision numbered. But he took umbrage under the revisions filed by the Landlord which also got dismissed in 2007. The liability of the Petitioner to pay fair rent at the rate of Rs. 9,688/- per month as against the contractual rate of rent of Rs. 1,100/- per month with effect from the year 1995, still remains. The building involved in the litigation is in a prime locality in West CIT Nagar, Nandanam, Chennai-35, measuring an extent of about 4,050 sq.ft. Therefore, by conducting a research on the procedural provisions of law, the Court should not lose sight of substantial justice.

I am conscious of the fact that the Revision u/s 25 of the Rent Control Act, is much wider in scope than a Revision u/s 115, CPC. I am also conscious of the decision of a learned Judge of this Court in Ranganatha Mudaliar v. M.S. Yakoof Khan, 1983 (1) MLJ 191, where it was held that when a statutory Revision is pending, no finality is reached to the orders of both the Courts below. But the same would not go to the rescue of a person, who is not an ordinary litigant, but a legal practitioner and who failed and neglected to pay the fair rent, even after the dismissal of the Revision Petitions filed by the Landlord way back in the year 2007.

The next contention of the Petitioner is that when the report of the bailiff points out to the existence of movable properties, the order of the Court below recording delivery of vacant possession is contrary to law and facts. But it is seen from the order of the Executing Court dated 22.7.2011 that the movable articles available inside the premises were handed over by the bailiff to the First Respondent after obtaining a bond. They were also kept in one portion of the premises under lock and key. Once the movable properties have also been taken possession under a bond and the Respondents/Landlords kept them in one portion, it cannot be stated that there was no delivery of vacant possession. As a matter of fact, the Respondents/Landlords did not throw the articles in the road. They did not take those articles and kept them somewhere else. If they had done so, there could have been no objection to the literal interpretation of the word ''vacant possession''. Therefore, the interpretation now advanced cannot be accepted.

The Petitioner also relied upon two decisions of the Allahabad High Court, one in Mt. Champa Devi Vs. Mt. Asa Devi, and another in Sita Ram Sahu and Others Vs. Kedarnath Sahu, . He also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Budhia Swain and Others Vs. Gopinath Deb and Others, . They are relied upon for the proposition that every Court or even a Tribunal has jurisdiction to recall an order passed earlier, so as to render justice between the parties. According to the Petitioner, since police aid was ordered without notice to him, the said order ought to have been recalled in the Application filed by him for the purpose.

But as stated earlier, the decree was a contested decree. As a matter of fact, the first 3 Revision Petitions which I have dealt with in the first part of this order, arise out of the main proceedings for eviction. I have found that the Petitioner has no case even on merits even in the main proceedings for eviction. Therefore, the recourse taken by the Respondents to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 22, C.P.C., and proceeding with the execution without notice cannot be found fault with. Hence, the said contention also does not deserve any consideration.

Before parting with the case, I am constrained to point out that it has always been the practice of every judgment-debtor who fails to comply with any decree of any Court to rely upon all Rules of procedure and contend that the decree holder violated all of them. In other words, the Judgment-debtors have no law to comply with, but the decree holders have an obligation to go through every step in the process without tripping down. A Court, especially while dealing with a Revision, cannot defeat substantial justice by picking holes in the procedure followed for the execution of a decree. The Petitioner who is a legal practitioner has no explanation to offer as to why he did not pay the fair rent fixed by the Court at least after 2007. Today the Petitioner claimed in open Court that he was prepared to deposit the entire rental arrears calculated on the basis of the fair rent, within 24 hours. He also claimed that he was prepared to buy the property itself and that behind his back, the Respondents purchased the property from the erstwhile owners.

I do not wish to say anything on the above. The law should go to the aid of only those who comply with the same. The battle of the erstwhile Landlord started 23 years ago. By looking into legal niceties, I do not wish to put the clock back and recreate one more round of litigation, especially when the Respondents have taken delivery of the property.

Therefore, all the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed. However, it is open to the Petitioner to file necessary Application before the Rent Controller for delivery of the articles left inside the Petition-building.