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251 paragraphs · 5,866 wordsS.S. Subramani, J.—In W.P. No.7477 of 1998, petitioner seeks issuance of Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to strictly follow
the areas earmarked in G.O. Ms. No.135, Municipal Administration and Water Supply (M.Ele.) dated 11.6.1996 while granting licence to run
retail shop for selling IMFL in Coonoor area, and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper. In the affidavit filed in
support of the Writ Petition, it is said that - in Coonoor Municipality, auction for sale of IMFL liquor was conducted, and petitioner was the highest
bidder for Shop No.72 for Rs. 14,01,000/-. The petitioner also deposited the entire amount, and, as per auction conditions, after the bid, he has
located a shop in Ward No.21. It is said that as per G.O. Ms. No.135, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department (M.Ele.) dated
11.6.96, the Government of Tamil Nadu has bifurcated the ward division in the Municipalities on the basis of the strength of Municipal Councils.
As per the above said G.O., the Coonoor Municipality has been divided into 30 wards and the shop No.72 for which he has made a bid and
deposited the sum of Rs.14,01,000/- is located in Ward No.21. As per the above said G.O., the Coonoor Municipality has allocated the area
coming under Ward No.21 as detailed in paragraph 3 of the affidavit. One of the areas is V.P. Street. According to petitioner, he is entitled to
locate his retail shop No.72 in any place mentioned in Ward No.21 and he has selected a shop in V.P. Street. The additionally impleaded third
respondent-Madhusudhanan is the highest bidder in respect of Shop No.71 in Ward No.21. According to the petitioner, third respondent has to
locate his shop only in any one of the areas coming under Ward No.20. But, with political influence, he is trying to locate his Shop No.71 in V.P.
Street which belongs to Shop No.72 (Ward No.21). It is under the above circumstances, petitioner wanted to compel the Authorities to strictly
adhere to G.O. Ms. No.135, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department (M.Ele.) dated 11.6.1996 and thus prevent the third
respondent from locating the shop in any portion of new Ward No.21 which include V.P. Street also.
When the matter came up for admission on 2.6.1998, I ordered notice of motion. Interim injunction was also granted till 31.7.1998. It is said
that even before the Writ Petition was filed on 25.5.1998, the additionally impleaded third respondent was granted licence to conduct liquor shop
at V.P. Street. The matter was not pursued thereafter. The interim injunction was also not extended. While so ,the very same petitioner filed
W.P.7694 of 1998, seeking issuance of Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents therein to issue Form III licence in his favour to run Shop
No.72 (Ward No.21) at V.P. Street, Coonoor Municipality and thus render justice.
Third respondent in the earlier Writ Petition was not made a party to W.P.No.7694 of 1998. Similar averments were made in W.P.7694 of
1998 also. The reason for filing the second Writ Petition was that the respondents are refusing to issue licence to the petitioner herein to conduct
liquor shop at V.P. Street, in Ward No.21. According to him, since V.P. Street is included in Ward No.21, and the area is included within his
Ward, he is entitled to do business therein. Even though various demands were made and representations were also given to respondents, to grant
him licence to locate a shop in V.P. Street, the same was not issued.
In that case, when the Writ Petition came for admission, I directed the learned Additional Government Pleader to take notice, and the case was
adjourned by a few days for getting instructions. In that Writ Petition, petitioner produced only the latest division of Wards of 1996 in which V.P.
Street was included in Ward No.21. The case was posted on 24.6.1998, and none of the Counsel appeared due to advocates'' boycott Petitioner
appeared in person and pleaded before Court that even though he has deposited more than Rs.14 lakhs, respondents are not issuing licence. On
the basis of materials placed at that lime, I gave the following direction:-
It is seen from the auction list that V.P. Street is included only in Ward No.21 and no portion of it is included in Ward No.21. So, only the
petitioner is entitled to conduct his business in V.P. Street. It is also seen that in the earlier petition an order of injunction was also granted which is
still in force. But, in spite of that order, the authorities have granted licence in favour of Madusudanan within the V.P. Street. The action of the
respondents, therefore, cannot be justified. I Only direct the respondents to consider the application of the petitioner to issue Form III licence to
run shop No.72 in Ward No.21 at V.P. Street, Coonoor Municipality and pass order within 24 hours from the time of production of copy of this
Order. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of. Consequently, W.M.P. 11697 of 1998 is closed. No costs.
My Order extracted above is dated 24.6.1998, whereas the Writ Petition (i.e., W.P.7694 of 98) was filed on 8.6.1998.
Third respondent in W.P.No.7477 of 1998 has filed W.P.No.10451 of 1998 for issuance of writ of certiorari, calling for the records of the 2nd
respondent dated 20.7.1998 IMFL Licence No.72/98-99 granted herein to the 4th respondent to locate his IMFL shop No.72/98-99 at No.164,
V.P. Street, Coonoor Municipality and quash the same.
The grievance of the petitioner in that case is that the auction was conducted only on the basis that V.P. Street comes within Ward No.20 and
not in Ward No.21. There was misrepresentation of fact before Court and the Order in W.P.No.7694 of 1998 was obtained without impleading
necessary parties. It is further submitted in the Writ Petition that as per original auction list, in Ward No.20 there should be two liquor shops, and
he obtained licence for one. But, now, petitioner in the earlier case has established a liquor shop at V.P. Street, and, therefore, the total number of
liquor shops in Ward No.20 has exceeded the limit prescribed by the Collector, i.e., three liquor shops have come into existence. According to the
petitioner in that case, liquor shop No.72 has to be located only in Ward No.21 (as per division of wards prevalent as on 1995), and this material
fact was suppressed before this Court. All liquor shops in Coonoor Municipality have been established only taking into consideration the Division
of Wards that was prevalent during 1995. Even the petitioner in W.P.7477 of 1998 was awarded licence to locate a shop in Ward No.21 in some
other place, and he ought to have represented the matter before this Court, when I passed the Order on 24.6.1998. After having obtained licence
for a shop in Ward No.21, without disclosing the same, the Court was persuaded to issue an Order to grant licence for running a shop at V.P.
Street. It is further contended that even in the earlier Writ Petition, his name has been included as one of the persons doing business in V.P. Street.
He ought to have been made a party to W.P.7694 of 1998 and if only an opportunity had been given to him, he could have substantiated that the
petitioner in W.P. 7694 of 1998 is not entitled to any relief. Since material fact was suppressed before this Court it has to be presumed that be has
committed fraud. On the basis of that Order, the Authorities have given licence to run IMFL Shop in V.P. Street. The same is sought to be
quashed in W.P. No.10451 of 1998.
When W.P.10451 of 1998 came for admission, I ordered notice of motion and also directed the petitioner to serve notice on respondents
privately. Petitioner in W.P.Nos.7477 and 7694 of 1998, namely, C.Sugumaran was also one of the respondents (4th respondent) therein. Even at
the time when this Writ Petition came for admission, I raised a doubt regarding its maintainability unless and until my Order in W.P.7694 of 1998 is
cancelled. Thereafter, petitioner in W.P.10451 of 1998 filed Review Application No.35 of 1998 in Writ Petition No.7694 of 1998 on similar
grounds which he has taken in W.P.10451 of 1998.
On the Review Application, I directed learned counsel for petitioner to give notice to respondents privately and also to counsel, if any,
appearing for them. On receipt of notice, learned Additional Government Pleader produced before the entire file, and learned counsel for 4th
respondent also entered appearance.
It is agreed by learned counsel for all the parties that the decision in W.P.No.7694 of 1998 will govern the decision in the other cases also, and
they conceded that Review Petition may be taken as the leading case. Reference to parties in this Order will be according to their rank in Writ
Petition No.7694 of 1998.
Review Petitioner (R. Madhusoodhanan) is not a party to W.P.No.7694 of 1998. But he claims to be a ''person aggrieved'' in view of my
Order dated 24.6.1998.
Learned counsel for petitioner (C.Sugumaran) challenged the maintainability of the Review Application. According to him, when the Review
Petitioner is not a party, he is not entitled to file the Review Application. It is also contended that the very same Review Petitioner has filed
W.P.10451 of 1998, a parallel remedy cannot be encouraged. That itself will be sufficient to dismiss the Review Application, is his contention.
While narrating the facts, I said that the very same review petitioner has filed W.P.10451 of 1998 with a prayer to quash the licence granted to
the petitioner (i.e., 1st respondent in Review Application). Licence was granted pursuant to my Order in W.P.7694 of 1998. When a licence is
given pursuant to an order of Court, whether the same could be quashed by filing another Writ Petition, is the question that has to be considered.
In Ram Janam Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, , a similar question came for consideration and Their Lordships have held that the
remedy of persons who were not impleaded in the earlier proceedings are by way of filing a Review Application or by filing an appeal against the
Order which, according to them, has affected their rights. In paragraph 8 (relevant portion), Their Lordships have held thus:-
.. Admittedly, none was impleaded even in a representative capacity. But it can be urged on behalf of the respondent that he had not sought any
relief against any individual. He had sought the intervention of the High Court to declare Rule 3 (1) of 1973 Rules and Rule 3 (b) of 1980 Rules as
ultra vires so far they made applicable the benefit of those rule to only specified class of persons and restricted to others who were similarly
situated. As such respondent was not required to implead private respondent, (sic appellant), who might be affected by the verdict of the Court.
Even if this stand is accepted, can it be said that persons who have been affected by the judgment of the High Court in the connected Writ
Application cannot challenge the correctness thereof either by filing a Review Petition before the High Court or by filing a SLP before this Court?
According to us, the answer is in negative. The appellant has a locus standi to challenge the said judgment although he was not a party to the same
and the SLP filed on his behalf cannot be rejected on that ground. The delay in filing the SLP has also been fully explained in the facts and
circumstances of the case, which is condoned
(Emphasis supplied)
A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court also had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in 1989 (2) KLT 112
(Ramachandran v. Food Corporation of India) that case, one set of direction was given by the learned Judges. Respondent therein was bound to
implement the same. Persons who were not made parties to the Writ Petition challenged the order by filing another Writ Petition. The question that
arose for consideration was, whether the Writ Petition was maintainable, and what is the correct procedure to be adopted in such cases. It was
held in that case thus:-
.. It is not disputed that in O.P.No.4420/78 and in W.A.No.251/82 affirming the said judgment in the O.P., respondents 3 and 4 were not parties.
Assuming for the sake of argument that respondents 3 and 4 were necessary parties in the earlier cases, the question for consideration is as to what
is the proper procedure to be adopted in a case like this. As things stand, there is one set of directions issued in O.P. No.4420/78 affirmed in
W.A.No.251/82 directing the Food Corporation of India to assign notional dates of promotion to the appellants as and when vacancies in the
category of Assistants Grade II arose after they stood transferred to the south zone. The said decision having been implemented and Exts.P3 and
P3 (a) having been passed by the Corporation, at the instance of respondents 3 and 4 the learned single Judge has issued a direction in
O.P.No.71/82 quashing those orders which were made in obedience to the directions issued by this Court to the Corporation and issued a further
direction to the Corporation to examine the matter afresh after due notice to all the parties. Thus we arrive at a situation where there are two
conflicting directions, one in O.P.No.4420/78 affirmed in W.A. No.251/82 directing the Food Corporation of India to do certain things and
another direction issued by the learned single Judge in O.P.No.71/83 commanding the Corporation to do something at variance with what has
been directed by this Court in the earlier case. So far as the Corporation is concerned, it cannot satisfactorily comply with the conflicting directions
issued by this Court in two sets of cases. In a situation like this, if a particular person is a necessary party and a decision has been rendered without
impleading the necessary party, the proper course to be adopted is not to seek contrary directions at the hands of this Court under Art.226 but to
make an appropriate petition to reopen the earlier judgment on the ground that he was a necessary party and that the adverse decision rendered
affects him and to get himself impleaded as a party and get the judgment rendered behind his back reviewed. That is the procedure which has to be
followed as laid down by this Court in W.A.No.683 of 1982, wherein it is observed as follows:-
It is necessary to point out that the decision in O.P. No. 1392/80 has become final, it having been affirmed by a Division Bench on appeal in W.A.
No.693/82. The said decision, therefore operates as res judicata in this appeal even though the appellant was not a party to the said proceedings
(vide Josep Pothen Vs. State of Kerala, The proper course open to the appellant is to get the previous decision re-opened, as otherwise the
appellant would be barred by the principle of res judicata. That this is the correct principle to be followed is what was ruled by the Supreme Court
in Shivdeo Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, Hence on this short ground the appeal is liable to be dismissed, as the decision in
W.A. No.693/82 operates as res judicata. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the said decision it has to be held that the learned single Judge could not have allowed the Writ Petition and quashed Exs.P3 and P3 (a)
which have been passed in obedience to the judgment of this Court in W.A.No.251/82. It is also not possible to understand the judgment of the
learned single Judge as having the effect of reopening the earlier decision of this Court, for the obvious reason that the earlier judgment rendered in
O.P.No.4420 of 1978 stood affirmed and merged in the judgment rendered in W.A.No.251/82 by a Division Bench. Hence the learned single
Judge would not have reopened a judgment rendered by a Bench of two Judges of this Court in W.A.251/82. Whatever may be the form in which
respondents 3 and 4 sought relief at the hands of this Court, this Court could apply the principles indicated above and give appropriate reliefs to
the parties...
In this connection, it is better to take note of a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rajendra Prasad Yadav and Others Vs. State
of M.P. and Others, In paragraph 57 (aft page 700), Their Lordships posed a question, ''Can a Court issue writ of quo warranto to disobey the
Writ of Mandamus already issued by the High Court and allowed to become final?''. Their Lordships answered it by saying, ''In our view, it cannot
be issued as long as the Writ of Mandamus is not complied with and remains in operation''. If this is the legal principle, and if the Review Petitioner
succeeds in showing that he is an aggrieved person and he was a necessary party to W.P. No.7694 of 1998, my order is liable to be reviewed.
When a Writ of Mandamus issued by me in W.P. 7694 of 1998 is even now in force, the relief of writ of certiorari sought for in W.P.10451 of
1998 cannot be issued, and W.P.10451 of 1998 becomes infructuous.
So, the first question that has to be considered is, whether the Review Petitioner is an aggrieved person, and if only he is considered as an
aggrieved person, he is entitled to file the Writ Petition.
In all these Writ Petitions, the question in issue is regarding the powers of the Respondents-Excise Authorities under the Tamil Nadu
Prohibition Act. Both the petitioners, namely, C.Sugumaran and R. Madhusoodhanan claim that they are auction purchasers of the right to run
IMFL shops. It is settled law that the State alone has got the privilege in dealing with liquor. The privilege and monopoly retained by the State is
auctioned and the various bidders do the business in the areas specified by the Government. The State which is entitled to do business in all these
areas sell that privilege for consideration to various auction purchasers. An offer is made taking into consideration the area defined by the State in
accordance with the Tamil Nadu Liquor (Retail Vending) Rules. The State represents to the various bidders that they will be allowed to do
business in the specified area without any obstruction by any other person. Number of shops to be established in a particular area is also notified
by the Government. The Government also assures the bidders that the number of shops will not be increased from what is prescribed in the auction
notification. It is on the basis of these representations by the State, for valuable consideration, each and every auction purchaser becomes the
holder of the privilege to sell liquor in that area. To do that business in that particular area, the State also gives licence. In fact, what is the right of
the State over this liquor business was recently considered by the Honorable Supreme Court in the decision reported in State of Orissa and others
Vs. Narain Prasad and others, etc. etc., In paragraph 35, it has been held thus:-
... In the context of excise enactments, the expression ''privilege'' really means the licence or permit granted by the State. We may explain: the State
is entitled to prohibit the trade in intoxicating liquors altogether; it can impose a total ban; no citizen can claim any fundamental right to manufacture
or to trade in these liquors; it is, however, open to the State to lift the ban partially and allow the trade in liquor to be carried on in the manner
prescribed; the State says that a citizen can trade in liquor only under a licence to be granted by it for the consideration specified in that behalf and
that the trade therein can be carried on only in accordance with the regulatory provisions prescribed by it in that behalf. It is this grant of
licence/permit, which is called or is described sometimes as grant of ''privilege''..
Sections 20 and 20A of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act provide for grant of licence and matters which are to be taken into consideration by
licensing authorities. Without getting a licence, no person is entitled to deal with liquor and even if he is entitled to possess or deal with liquor, that is
also based on certain conditions stated therein. Sec. 54 of that Act enables the Government to make Rules for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of the Act, and it is only in exercise of the powers given u/s 54 of the Act, Government has framed the Tamil Nadu Liquor (Retail
Vending) Rules. 1989. Rule 4 provides for establishment of a particular number of shops in the State, and it is for the Government to decide the
number of shops to be established. Sub-Rules (2) and (3) of Rule 4 enable the Commissioner in consultation with the Collector to decide the
number of shops to be located in each District, and, so far as the District is concerned, the Collector has to decide the areas in which the shops are
to be opened. ''Area'' is defined under Rule 2 (b) as the locality determined by the Collector within which a retail vending shop shall be opened.
After fixing the area and number of shops in each area, under Rule 5, a notice of auction will be published in Form No.1. On the basis of notice of
auction, any person who intends to bid will have to identify the same. He has to specify the area in respect of which he intends to bid and he has to
deposit the earnest money for the said purpose. Rule 7 deals with the conduct of auction. Auction is also conducted on the basis of the area
notified and the number of shops. Rule 9 provides for bidding of every shop in the area, and Rule 13 provides for the grant of licence. Licence is
granted to the highest bidder and his offer is confirmed and the privilege is sold to him, and thus he gets the right to do business in liquor, in the
building located within the area for which be was the successful bidder. Rule 17 deals with shifting of business place. In case the building becomes
inconvenient, or the successful bidder is not in a position to do business in the building chosen by him, he may seek for shifting of the shop to
another building. But that building also must be within the area in respect of which he was the bidder. Rule 18 also provides for location of the
shop. From a reading of these provisions and various Forms which are statutory in nature, it is clear that the auction is conducted on the basis of
number of shops and after identifying the area within which the shops are to be located. Under normal circumstances, one person cannot prohibit
another from doing a lawful business in the same locality or even in the neighborhood. But in the case off liquor, that principle may not apply. Even
though that is also a business to be conducted after getting licence, that business is subject to certain conditions prescribed by the Government.
Therefore, any competitor in the business is entitled to say that a third person shall not interfere in his business, nor another person shall be allowed
to do business within the area for which he was the successful bidder. This is something special to liquor business. As I said already, it is the sale of
the monopoly by the State. The auction purchaser becomes the assignee of the monopoly and he alone gets the exclusive right to conduct business
in a particular area. It is on the basis of this principle, we have to consider whether the Review Petitioner is ''aggrieved person''.
According to the Review Petitioner, the auction notice was published on the basis of old division of wards. It could be seen from the auction
notice that shops have been located on the basis of old division of wards. In 1998, when the auction was notified, two more shops were
additionally included than the previous auction. Shop No.68 was included in Ward No. 15. In the same Ward, one more shop was directed to be
established at Mount Road. Likewise, in Ward No.20, Shop No.71 is to be located. In the same Ward, at V.P. Street, one more shop was
permitted to be established. Shop No.72 is included in Ward No.21. This is what we find from the auction notice. Originally there was only one
shop in Ward No.20 and the same was increased to two, one shop to be established at V.P. Street. It is on that basis, the Review Petitioner bid at
the auction. From the typed set of papers filed along with the Review Petition, it could be seen that licences to various auction purchase were also
granted only on the basis of old division of Wards. The first respondent in Review Petition, even though he has bid only for Shop No.72, which is
to be located in Ward No.21, contends that his shop must be located in accordance with reallocation of wards by the Municipality in 1996. The
details of reallocation of wards were produced by him when he filed the Writ Petition. In reallocation of wards, V.P. Street is located in Ward
No.21. If all the bidders have to locate their shops in accordance with old division of wards, the petitioner (C. Sugumaran) alone cannot claim an
exemption. If the contention of 1st respondent is to be accepted, then the number of shops in Ward No.20 becomes more, i.e., instead of two
shops, there will be three shops in that area. That is not what is contemplated in the auction notice. As I said already, Rule 4 provides for the
number of shops in the entire state. The Commissioner, in consultation with the Collector, will decide the number of shops to be established in each
District, and the Collector will decide as to what are the areas in which the shops are to be located. The number of shops cannot exceed from
what has been determined by the Authorities. The Review Petitioner has filed a list of licences given to various successful bidders in various Wards.
A reading of the same makes it clear that the same is identified in old division of wards. Review Petitioner has produced photo copy of the licence
issued to one Mani for Ward No.15, and to one V. Subramaniam. That is also in connection with the same Division, and also to one Selvaraj and
Prince concerning Ward No.15. Petitioner has also produced copy of licence issued to one Nagarajan for Ward No.13, which also shows that it
is in connection with old division of wards. From the auction notice it is further clear that there will be only one shop in V.P. Street. If another shop
is to be established as claimed by petitioner (C. Sugumaran), that will affect the monopoly right of the Review Petitioner and that makes him an
''aggrieved person''. Therefore, he is competent to file the Review Application mentioned above.
The further question that arises for consideration is, whether there are grounds to review my earlier order.
I have already extracted the order passed by me on 24.6.1998 in W.P. 7694 of 1998. Review Petitioner was not made a party to that W.P.,
and what I heard was only the submission of petitioner therein. He produced before me only the new division of wards as now identified by the
Municipality in the year 1996. Even though he was aware that the auction was not on the basis of old division of wards, he suppressed that fact
before this Court and on such misrepresentation he obtained an order from this Court. Another fraud committed by petitioner (C. Sugumaran) is
that in the earlier Writ Petition W.P.No.7477 of 1998, he has made the Review Petitioner a party respondent (i.e., third respondent) knowing full
well that he has been given a licence to run a shop in V.P. Street. Anticipating that the Review Petitioner would oppose the running of a shop in
V.P. Street, without prosecuting W.P.7477 of 1998, he filed W.P. No.7694 of 1998 and obtained the order extracted above. If only the auction
notice and the various licences granted to other persons and the case put forward by Review Petitioner had been brought to the notice of this
Court, the Order dated 24.6.1998 would not have been passed. As I said already, W.P.No.7477 of 1998 was filed on 25.5.1998, and my order
in W.P. No.7694 of 1998 is dated 24.6.1998. Petitioner himself was given a licence to do business at Ward No.21 before I passed the order. He
was given licence on 11.6.1998. Licence was given to him to do business at Ottuppattarai in Ward No.21 according to old division of wards.
Building was also located to run the business. Even though the same was obtained after the filing of the Writ Petition, atleast at the time of hearing,
a duty was cast on the petitioner to submit to this Court that such a licence was given to him to do business in Ward No.21. This fact was also
suppressed at the time when I passed the order. When this was brought to the notice of the petitioner, he submitted that after he filed the Writ
Petitions, the excise authorities pressurised him to take a licence in old Ward No.21 and he also instructed his counsel to report the matter when
the matter was being heard by this Court. It is only because of the advocates'' boycott, the matter was not represented, it is his case. I do not
agree with this submission. At the time when I passed the Order, I heard the petitioner in person and he argued the matter before me. This fact
could have been divulged by him at that time. On the other hand, the suppressed this material fact and obtained an advantage. His contention that
he was pressurised to take a licence to run business at Ottuppattarai cannot be believed. The building where he has to do business was also
identified. Petitioner has no case that the building was not located by him. I have already said that the Review Petitioner is an aggrieved person on
account of the petitioner obtaining an advantage behind his back by playing fraud on Court. I do not think the petitioner C. Sugumaran should be
allowed to continue to do the business at V.P. Street and thereby obtain the benefit of the fraud committed by him, any more.
Originally, the petitioner located the building at No.154 in Ward No.21 - V.P. Street. That building belongs to the Municipality. The
Municipality did not give its consent to conduct liquor shop. Therefore, licence could not be granted. Thereafter, he shifted to the building at V.P.
Street in Door No. 1/21. He obtained licence for running the business in Door No.1/21 at V.P. Street. Though the petitioner has grievances
against the Municipality for not issuing licence to do business at Door No.2 1/21, all those grievances are irrelevant, once it is found that he is not
entitled to business in V.P. Street at all. He has to confine his activities only at three places, namely, P.W.D. Road, Krishnapuram and Umari
Cottage.
What is the effect of an Order obtained by practising fraud on Court has been considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision
reported in 1994-1-L.W.21 S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, Their Lordships said that
person whose claim is based on falsehood hits no right to approach the Court, and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. In
paragraph 6 of the judgment, Their Lords his further went on and said thus:-
.. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to
gain by another''s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage... A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents
executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be
guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party"". (Emphasis supplied)
On the basis of the available materials, I find that my Order dated 24.6.1998 is liable to be reviewed, and I allow the Review Application. My
order dated 24.6.1998 stands set aside, and the Writ Petition, viz. W.P.7694 of 1998 is reopened.
In view of my finding the area will have to be identified on the basis of old division of wards, naturally, the petitioner in W.P. Nos.7477 and
7694 of 1998 is not entitled to any right. He wants to conduct business in V.P. Street, which is included in Ward No.20 as per auction notice,
though it might have been included in Ward No.21 as per new division of wards by the Municipality. Consequently, Writ Petition Nos.7477 and
7694 of 1998 are dismissed.
It is pursuant to my Order in W.P.7694 of 1998 dated 24.6.1998, licence was granted to the petitioner- C.Sugumaran, to do business in V.P.
Street. Since I have set aside my Order, naturally, first respondent will not be entitled to conduct the business in V.P. Street. The licence granted to
him is liable to be revoked.
In the result, W.P. No. 10451 of 1998 is allowed. Respondents 1 to 3 are directed to cancel the licence issued to the 4th respondent therein,
who is the 1st respondent in the Review Application. They are also further directed to see that the fourth respondent does not carry on business in
any portion of V.P. Street which is included only in Ward No.20. The licence already granted to him to carry on business at Ottuppattarai was
cancelled after he obtained licence to do business at V.P. Street. When he is found not entitled to do business at V.P. Street, respondents 1 to 3
are bound to restore the licence to the petitioner C. Sugumaran to do business in Ward No. 21. It is for him to locate the building, and if the other
conditions are also satisfied, respondents 1 to 3 shall issue licence to him to carry on business in the building approved by them. I direct
respondents 1 to 3 in W.P. 10451 of 1998 to close the shop at V.P. Street conducted by petitioner C. Sugumaran within 24 hours, after removing
the stocks. In the result, W.P. Nos.7477 and 7694 of 1998 filed by C. Sugumaran shall stand dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs.2,500/-in
each. W.P. No. 10451 of 1998 shall stand allowed, however, without any order as to costs Connected W.M.Ps. in all these Writ Petitions are
closed.