C. Venkatachariar vs Narasimha Aiyangar and Others

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Salem in a suit brought by a mittadar to eject the defendants who claim to hold

under a permanent lease.

Two questions have been argued before us (1) whether the defendants hold on a permanent tenure and (2) whether, if they did so held, they

have forfeited their tenure by renouncing their character as lessees by setting up a title in a third person, within the meaning of Section 11(g) of the

Transfer of Property Act.

As regards the 1st point, we have been referred to Bajaram v. Narasinga 23rd August, 1918., Foulkes v. Muthuswami Goundan ILR (1898)

Mad. 503 : 8 M.L.J. 207 Venkataramanna Vs. K.J. Venkatapathi Nayani Varu by his agent next friend D. Vasudeva Rao, . and C. Rama

Aiyangar Vs. Anga Gurusami Chetti and Others, . in which the meaning of the words saswathom'' and ''kayom'' occurring in leases have been

construed. We do not think it necessary again to discuss the meaning of these terms or the correctness of the decision in Rajaram v. Narasingha

ILR (1891) Mad. 199 be. cause it has been abundantly established in later cases that, even if literal effect is not to be given to these words so as to

involve as a necessary inference a permanent tenancy yet the surrounding circumstances may be looked at and a permanent tenancy may be

inferred from the use of these words, In the present case, we find that the lease in the suit was a renewal of previous documents, and that,

previously to the execution of this instrument, the lessees had been held to hold on a permanent tenure in the suit of 1819. That consideration in our

opinion is sufficient to show that it was intended to confer a permanent tenure in favour of the lessees by virtue of Exhibit J in this case. Therefore

on that ground, we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge.

The next question is a somewhat interesting one which has been very ably argued by Mr. A. Krishnaswamy Aiyar for the appellant, namely

whether the denial by the present defendants of the title under which the mittadar claims the whole mitta in a previous suit brought by the mittadar,

not in respect of the suit lands, but to recover jodi in respect of certain main lands in the mitta which were also held by the defendants, is a sufficient

setting up by the lessees of a title in a third person to the suit lands. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar has argued that directly and by necessary implication

the written statement in that suit Exhibit G should be held to contain a setting up of the title in a third person to the suit lands. We asked him to cite

the strongest cases which he could in support of that proposition and he referred us to Doe Davies v. Evans (1841) 9 M. & W. 48 : 152 E.R. 21.

Doe d Calvert v. Frowd (1828) 4 Bing. 557 : 130 E.R. 883 and Doe d Phillips v. Roilings (1847) 4 C. B. 188 : 17 L.J. C.P. 268. In every one of

these cases, the denial of title, whether it was direct or inferential, was in respect of leasehold premises, and there is no case in which a denial of the

landlord''s title to some other lands has been held to operate as a forfeiture of his title to the suit lands merely because one thing would logically

follow from the other. Mr. K. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the respondents contended that the denial by the defendants of the mittdar''s right in the suit

for the jodi of the in am lands. is consistent with the plaintiff''s having the rights of a lessor in respect of the suit lands which he might have acquired

in other ways than by transfer of the mittadar''s title from the plaintiff''s predecessor to the plaintiff. The doctrine of forfeiture which is embodied in

Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act is not one to be extended, and we think we should be extending it if we were to treat the denial in the

written statement, Exhibit G, in this case as the setting up of a title of a third person to the lands in this suit. Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the

respondents desired to take other objections but we do not think it necessary to hear them, because on the ground which I have stated, we think

that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.