Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi And Ors vs Indu Bhushan Prasad

Heard learned counsel for the appellant Central Coalfields Limited and the learned counsel for the private respondent.

The appellant Company is aggrieved by the impugned order dated 13.11.2013, passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, in W.P.(S) No. 3752 of 2012, whereby the Hon'ble Single Judge has quashed the departmental proceeding against the respondent, mainly on the ground of inordinate delay, and has directed for consideration of the promotion of the respondent to the higher post, which had been denied to him on the ground of pendency of the departmental proceeding, with effect from the date, the juniors to him were so promoted.

The facts of this case lie in a short compass. The respondent was appointed on 18.01.1996, as Accountant (T & S Grade-A), in the appellant Company. By letter dated 10.11.2003, as contained in Annexure-1 to the memo of appeal, the respondent was put under suspension and asked to show-cause as to why he should not be subjected to a disciplinary proceeding, for the charges mentioned therein, which related to passing certain bills pertaining to the certain repair works carried out in the residential quarters of the Company, which had allegedly led to the loss of Rs.8,88,593.64/- to the Company. According to the respondent's case he replied to the said letter without any delay.

A police case was also instituted, being Bermo P.S. Case No. 130 of 2003, against the proprietor of Rohtas Engineering Construction, who appears to have carried out the repair works, in which the respondent was also implicated as an accused. The trial proceeded in the said criminal case, which ended in the acquittal of the accused persons, by judgement dated 15.04.2009, passed by the competent Court, in T.R. No. 151 of 2009, corresponding to G.R. No. 838 of 2003.

In the meantime, after the respondent was granted bail in the said criminal case, his suspension was vacated on 18.03.2004, and he was transferred to Dhori area. During this period, the exercise of granting promotion to the eligible persons was also undertaken by the Central Coalfields Limited, in which the case of the respondent was also considered, and he was also found fit for being promoted to the next higher post. However, he was not allowed to join his post. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent, approached this Court in W.P.(S) No. 7014 of 2011, with a prayer to direct the Company to consider his case for grant of promotion, which was disposed of by order dated 02.01.2012, directing the appellant Company to take decision within a period of twelve weeks after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the respondent herein. The representation of the petitioner was however, rejected by order dated 26.05.2012, on the ground inter alia that the charge-sheet dated 10.11.2003 was still pending against him. The fact however, remains and which is also not disputed, that since 10.11.2003 till 26.05.2012, when the representation of the respondent was rejected, no further action had been taken in the departmental proceeding against the respondent.

Aggrieved by the rejection of his representation, the respondent approached this Court again in W.P.(S) No. 3752 of 2012. The Hon'ble Single Judge, taking into consideration the undue delay in conducting the departmental proceeding, which was detriment to the respondent herein, as he had been denied his due promotion due to the pendency of the said proceeding, in spite of the fact that for the same charges he had been acquitted in the criminal case, by the Trial Court, as also in view of the fact that this respondent was not at all responsible for the delay in the departmental proceeding, quashed the departmental proceeding by order dated 13.11.2013, passed in W.P.(S) No. 3752 of 2012. The Hon'ble Single Judge also quashed the order dated 26.05.2012, rejecting the representation of the respondent for granting him due promotion, and directed the appellant Company to take an uniformed decision in the matter of promotion of the respondent, from the date when his juniors had been promoted on 30.6.2008, and pass necessary orders granting promotion to the writ petitioner with all consequential benefits.

In the impugned order, the Writ Court has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.V. Mahadevan Vs. MD. T.N. Housing Board, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636, quoting with approval, its earlier decision in State of A.P. Vs. N. Radhakishan, as reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, wherein the law has been laid down as follows:-

"19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined princi­ ples applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and hon­ est administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delin­ quent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delay­ ing the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has viti­ ated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delin­ quent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic prin­ ciple of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceed­ ings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings.

Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considera­ tions." (Emphasis supplied).

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Writ Court, the present L.P.A. has been filed by the appellant Company. Learned counsel for the appellant Company has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Writ Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, in view of the settled principle of law by the Apex Court, in Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y.P. Education Society and Ors., reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515, wherein the law has been laid down as follows :-

Enquiry at belated stage

"14. The court / tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court / tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question must be carefully examined taking into consideration the gravity / magnitude of the charges involved therein. The court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the court must weight all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. ------------------." (Emphasis supplied).

Placing reliance on this decision, learned counsel for the appellant Company submitted that only on the ground of delay the departmental proceeding could not have been quashed by a Writ Court.

Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has opposed the prayer submitting that there is no illegality in the impugned order passed by the Writ Court, inasmuch as the respondent was not at all responsible for the delay in the departmental proceeding, and it is an admitted fact that the respondent has been acquitted by the Trial Court for the same charges. The appeal preferred against the judgement of the Trial Court has also been dismissed by the Appellate Court. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order passed by the Writ Court.

Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, we have tried to cull out the reasons for the delay in the departmental proceeding, to satisfy ourselves whether there was any reasonable ground for such prolonged delay, and whether the respondent was prejudiced by such delay. Admittedly, the Memo of Charge was served upon the respondent on 10.11.2003 itself. Till the date of quashing disciplinary proceeding by the impugned order dated 13.11.2003 passed in W.P.(S) No. 3752 of 2012, not a single step forward had been taken in the said disciplinary proceeding. The Writ Court has taken note of the fact that it was the appellant Company itself, which had not proceeded ahead in the departmental proceeding for the last ten years, except stating that against the acquittal of the respondent by the Trial Court, the Company had preferred appeal before the Appellate Court, which also, as pointed out herein above, subsequently stood dismissed.

This could not be any ground for keeping the departmental proceeding pending for the last ten years, without taking even one step ahead after serving the charge-sheet. An interesting fact, that has been noted in the impugned order by the Writ Court, is that in the departmental proceeding the appellant Company was not in a position to decide as to which Disciplinary Authority shall appoint the Enquiry Officer.

Admittedly the police case instituted against this respondent related to the forgery of the amount of Rs.8,88,593.64/-, which is the same amount for which the memo of charges were served upon the respondent, for initiation of the disciplinary proceeding. In the said criminal case the respondent has been acquitted by the Trial Court and the appeal filed by the Management against the judgement of acquittal, has also been dismissed. In the meantime though the respondent was found fit to be promoted to the next higher post by the Promotion Committee, by order dated 30.06.2008, and the persons junior to the respondent were promoted to the higher post, but the respondent was denied the promotion only on the pretext of the pendency of the departmental proceeding, which was being delayed on the absolutely non est grounds as detailed above. In fact, it appears that the disciplinary proceeding was not even started, as even the Enquiry Officer could not be appointed by the appellant Company.

We are of the considered view that in the facts of this case, the Hon'ble Single Judge has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.V. Mahadevan's case (supra), which clearly stated that if the prolonged delay causes prejudice to the charged officer, and it can be shown that he was not to be blamed for the delay, and there is no explanation for delay in conducting the disciplinary proceeding, the same is fit to be quashed.

The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in Anant R. Kulkarni's case (supra), is also fully applicable to the facts of this case, but of no help at all to the appellant Company, rather it helps the respondent instead. Even in this case, it has been held that it is for the Court to carefully examine the facts and circumstances of the case in question, and to take into consideration the gravity / magnitude of the charges involved therein, and to weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to just and proper conclusion, whether the proceedings could be terminated on the ground of delay. In the case in hand, we find that there was no plausible explanation to unnecessarily delay the disciplinary proceeding for more than ten years. The respondent was certainly prejudiced by such undue delay in the disciplinary proceeding, in view of the fact that in spite of being found fit for promotion, he was denied the same, and the persons junior to him were promoted. Admittedly, the respondent was not responsible for that delay in any manner whatsoever.

For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any illegality and / or irregularity in the impugned order dated 13.11.2013, passed by the Writ Court in W.P.(S) No. 3752 of 2012, worth any interference in exercise of the L.P.A. jurisdiction.

There is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed.