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Judgment
Bharati Sapru, J.—Heard Learned Counsel for the revisionist as well as learned standing counsel for the State. The present revision has been filed by the revisionist challenging the order of the Trade Tax Tribunal dated April 15, 2004, passed in Second Appeal No. 38 of 2000 for the assessment year 1996-97 (January 1997, u/s 15A(1)(a) of the Act). The questions of law referred to are hereunder :
(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct to confirm the penalty of Rs. 2,99,200 u/s 15A(1)(a) of the U. P. Trade Tax Act whereas the applicant had deposited the entire amount of tax along with penal interest within next five days ?
(ii) Whether paucity of the fund for not deposit of tax is not a ground for deleting the penalty ?
(iii) Whether in view of circular No. 245 dated April 23, 2002, the Tribunal was correct to confirm the penalty u/s 15A(1)(a) of the Act at 10 per cent ?
(iv) Whether in view of the decision of Krishna Arhat Kendra v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [2003] UPTC 522, the penalty u/s 15A(1)(a) amounting to Rs. 2,99,200 is sustainable in the eye of law ?
The facts of the case are that the revisionist was to pay the admitted tax and file its return for the month of January 1997, the last date for filing it was February 20, 1997. The amount to be paid was Rs. 47,42,006.39 on February 20, 1997. The revisionist made an application to the assessing authority to extend the time for deposit of the admitted tax. The authority concerned extended the time up to February 27, 1997. The amount was deposited as hereunder;
Date
Amount
22.02.1997
1,00,000
22.02.1997
1,00,000
24.02.1997
5,00,000
25.02.1997
4,00,000
27.02.1997
6,00,000
28.02.1997
16,00,000
04,03.1997
1,92,007
04.63.1997
12,00,000
The second application was made for extension of time on February 28, 1997 but the same was rejected. Ultimately, the revisionist deposited the balance of the remaining amount on March 4, 1997 along with interest.
The reason for five days delay given by the revisionist is that it was facing a severe financial crunch and it only paid the balance amount when payments claimed from its dealers were received.
The assessing authority initiated proceedings for penalty u/s 15A(1)(a) of the Act and a penalty order was passed on February 20, 1998. The revisionist filed an appeal u/s 9 of the Act. The appeal was allowed in part and the amount of penalty was reduced.
Against the first appellate order both the Department as well as the revisionist filed the second appeal u/s 10 of the Act and the Tribunal confirmed the penally order. While dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal recorded a finding that even though the revisionist had money it had delayed in making the payment.
The Learned Counsel for the revisionist relies on a decision in the case of Govind Sugar Mills Limited, Lakhimpur Khiri v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, (2010) 33 VST 399 (All) , in support of his arguments. In this decision this honourable court came to the conclusion that as the assessee in that case had deposited the tax along with interest for the period of delay and before any provisional assessment could be made all before proceedings for imposition of penalty could be drawn then it would not be justified to impose the penalty.
In this case also Learned Counsel has argued that since the assessee was able to make the payments along with interest for the period of delay the penalty should not have been imposed on the assessee.
Having heard Learned Counsels for both sides and having perused the material on record, I am in respectful agreement with the decision of this Court in the case of Govind Sugar Mills Limited, Lakhimpur Khiri v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, (2010) 33 VST 399 (All) and I am also of the view that since the assessee had paid interest for the period of delay, no further penalty should have been imposed on the assessee. In fact it has come on record that the assessee had paid the entire tax for the month of January, 1997 and had also paid the interest for the period of delay. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is, therefore, not justified. It is set aside. The revision is allowed as above.