Chairman, Jila Shakari Kendriya vs The M.P. State Co-Op. Trib.

The petitioners Bank have filed this writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, calling in question tenability of an order dated 16.1.2001, passed by the M.P. State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal in Second Appeal No. 431/99.

Facts in brief necessary for deciding this writ petition goes to show that the respondent Kamalchand was working in the Bank in question. On 20.11.1983 he was charge sheeted and it was alleged against him in the charge sheet that on two occasions, when he visited Village Talwadiya for recovery proceeding he was found in a drunken state. On account of being found in a drunken state on two occasions, first two imputation of the charges in the charge sheet were relating to these facts and third allegation in the charge sheet was that he did not submit his reply to the explanation sought for from the Bank. On account of aforesaid three allegations of misconduct, the charge sheet was issued, a departmental enquiry was conducted, Enquiry officer found the charges to be proved and therefore, vide order dated 22.7.1995, the competent authority reverted him to the post of L.D.C. from his substantive post of supervisor. Challenging this order of punishment, dispute was raised by the respondent under Section 55(2) of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, initially before the Dy. Registrar, Cooperative Society, Khandwa and when the same was dismissed, the matter was taken up in appeal before the Joint Registrar, Indore and after this appeal was also dismissed, the matter travelled to the Tribunal at the instance of the respondent employee. The Tribunal examined the matter and found that the Enquiry officer''s report is based on hearsay evidence and the statement of certain persons recorded behind the back of the delinquent employee. The Tribunal after examining the original enquiry report and the enquiry proceedings, found that no witnesses in support of the allegation were examined in the departmental enquiry conducted, instead the previously recorded statements of the eye witnesses were presented before the enquiry officer and the enquiry officer accepting the same to be correct, recorded the finding of guilt. It was found by the Tribunal that this was not proper. It was held that the eye witnesses should have been produced before the enquiry. They should have been examined before the delinquent employee and in the absence of their appearing and presenting themselves for cross examination, the finding recorded based on the statement of the eye witnesses which was recorded earlier vitiate the entire enquiry and on this ground, the Tribunal found that the allegation of consuming liquor while on duty is not proved. It was held that the approach of enquiry officer was erroneous and based on the same, punishment imposed was not correct. Accordingly, it was held that first two charges are not proved. As far as the third charge is concerned, it was held that non-submission of explanation is not a major misconduct is not at all misconduct as contemplated in the departmental rules and therefore, for the same, no punishment could be imposed.

Even though, learned counsel for the petitioners tried to emphasis that this approach of the Tribunal interfering in the concurrent orders passed by the Dy. Registrar and the Joint Registrar is unsustainable. We are of the considered view that this contention cannot be accepted as the concurrent orders passed by the authority are totally perverse and contrary to the law and the Tribunal exercising its appellate powers in a proceeding can always interfere into the matter. In a departmental proceeding, the charges have to be proved based on the evidence that was adduced in the departmental enquiry. In the present case, no evidence was adduced in the departmental enquiry, instead based on some previous statements of certain witnesses the enquiry officer held the charges to be proved and before doing so, neither the witnesses were examined in the departmental enquiry before the enquiry officer nor they were produced for cross examination by the delinquent employee. That apart, while issuing notices to the respondents, this court has only indicated that the question involved consideration is as to whether a dispute under Section 55(2) can be entertained beyond the statutory period of 30 days. It is therefore clear from the order dated 13.8.2003 that except for the question of limitation, for all other ground, notice was not at all issued and all other grounds were considered on 13.8.2003 itself and discussed.

That being so, with regard to the aforesaid ground canvassed i.e. all other grounds except limitation we see no reason to interfere into the matter.

With regard to the question of limitation i.e. the tenability of a dispute under Section 55(2) after a period of 30 days are concerned, this question has been considered and decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Gwalior Dugdha Sangh Sahkari Maryadit and Another Vs. Narendra Pal Singh Rana and Others, and it was held in the aforesaid case that even though, there is no specific provision in the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act for applicability of the provisions of Sections 5 to 14 of the Limitation Act, but it is held that by virtue of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, all the provisions of Sections 5 to 14 of the Limitation Act will apply for proceedings under Section 55 of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act and accordingly, there is a provision for condonation of delay and the delay can be condoned by a Cooperative Court. That being so, we are of the considered view that in the light of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this court in the aforesaid case, the delay in raising a dispute can be condoned. In this regard, we may refer to various judgments of this court and the Cooperative Tribunal where delay has been condoned and dispute entertains namely Amarsingh v. M.P. State Cooperative Marketing Federation and others, 2003 Revenue Nirnaya 41, where the delay in filing has been condoned by applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a dispute under Section 55(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the only question of law on the basis of which this petition was to be considered and notices issued is answered against the respondents.

In view of the above, we see no merit in the writ petition, the same is therefore dismissed.