Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board vs S. Ruban Peter and others

Dr. A.S. Anand, C.J.—The short, but meaningful, question which we are called upon to decide at this stage, is regarding the exclusion of the

jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to deal ''service matters'' after the coming into force of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter called the Act, for short) with effect from 1st November, 1985 and in particular as to ''who'' are

the persons who are required to approach only the ''Tribunal'' for the adjudication of disputes concerning their services and to whom the writ

jurisdiction of the High Court is no longer available for the adjudication of those disputes. The question arises in the following circumstances :

A number of writ petitions came to be filed in this Court, which are still pending adjudication, seeking the issue of certiorarified mandamus to

quash the letter dated 15th April, 1989 written by the Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board, Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Board) and a

command to the Board to publish the list of candidates in order of merit obtained by them through the process of selection. It appears from the writ

petition that about 1,86,000 candidates applied for appointment to non-technical popular categories pursuant to advertisement notice No. 1 of

1987 issued by the Board. There was preliminary scrutiny of applications and about 1,80,000 candidates were called for the written examination.

1,44,000 candidates appeared for the written examination on 15th November, 1987 in 397 centers in 27 different cities/towns. On the basis of a

news item appearing in ''the Indian Express'' dated 16th November, 1987 alleging that there had been leakage of the question paper, a complaint

was lodged by the Assistant Secretary of Board to the police which led to some investigation being carried out but with no results. Subsequently,

on 7th September, 1988, the Board published the results of the written examination. Later on, candidates numbering two and half times the number

of estimated vacancies were called for interview by individual intimations. The Committee which interviewed candidates on various dates at

different places found that nearly half of the candidates, who had secured very high marks in the written examination, could secure very poor and

even one digit marks, in certain cases, in the interview. Some of the candidates gave answers to the same questions wrongly than what they had

given in the written examination. This, in a way, confirmed the apprehension about the leakage of the question papers. Out of 1946 eligible

candidates for interview, the Board considered and decided to select the best from among them by holding a second written examination which, in

the opinion of the Board, had become imperative in view of the circumstances of the case. As a consequence, the Board issued the impugned letter

dated 15th April, 1989 calling the candidates for a second written examination. This letter has been questioned through writ petitions on various

grounds detailed therein. The writ petitions were admitted and certain ex-parte interim directions were issued. The Board thereupon filed vacate-

stay petitions. The main contention urged on behalf of the Board before the learned Single Judge was that the writ petitions were not maintainable

in view of Section 14(1)(a) of the Act since in all matters concerning ''service'' the High Court had been divested of its jurisdiction and such

''disputes'' could only be agitated before the Central Administrative Tribunal, set up under the Act. This contention was negatived by the learned

Single Judge who held that even though the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted u/s 14(1)(a) of the Act with reference to the matters stated

therein, the matters involved in the writ petitions, which arose at the ''pre-recruitment stage'', fell outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the High

Court had the jurisdiction to go into the questions raised in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. Aggrieved, the appellant Board has filed these appeals

and the only questions we are called upon to decide at this stage is the one noticed by us above.

Before dealing with the precise question and the contentions raised at the Bar, it is desirable to take a note of the historical background under

which the Act was passed and the Central Administrative Tribunal established.

After the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the number of litigations before the Courts including the High Courts increased

enormously. The pendency of the cases in the High Courts led to pressing problem of backlog Nation''s attention was attracted to the pendency as

well as to the delay in the dispensation of Justice. Ways and means to relieve the High Courts of the load engaged the attention of all concerned. It

was found that cases of the ''Government Servants'' had steadily been on the increase and that the employees had to wait a long time for

adjudication of their grievances. As early as in 1969, the Government of India setup a Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Shah of

the Supreme Court to make recommendations suggesting ways and means for ''effective, expeditious and satisfactory disposal of matters relating

to service disputes of Government servants''. The Committee recommended the setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle the pending cases.

The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) also took note of the serious situation and recommended the set up of Civil Service Tribunals to

deal with ""appeals of Government servants against disciplinary action"". The Government, however, found that the major chunk of ''service

litigation'' related to matters other than disciplinary actions and that led to the passing of 42nd Amendment of the Constitution and the enactment of

art 323A of the Constitution authorising the Parliament to provide for an alternative adjudication machinery for deciding ""service litigation"". The

Article provides :

323-A. (1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to

recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State

or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of Government of India or of any Corporation owned or

controlled by the Government.

(2) A law made under Clause (1) may -

(a) provide for the establishment of an Administrative the Tribunal for the Union and a separate Administrative Tribunal for each State or for two

or more States.

(b) Specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said

Tribunals.

(c) Provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed by the said Tribunals

(d) exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints

referred to in Clause (1);

(e) provide for the transfer to each such Administrative Tribunal of any cases pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the

establishment of such Tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings

are based had arisen after such establishment;

(f) repeal or amend any order made by the President under Clause (3) of Article 371D.

(g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provision as to fees) as Parliament may deem necessary for the

effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of such Tribunals.

(3) the provisions of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force"".

By virtue of the authority thus vested by Article 323-A (supra), the Parliament passed the Act and the Central Government notified the same to

come into force with effect from 1st November, 1985.

The preamble of the Act reads as follows :

An Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of

service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local of other

authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any Corporation or Society owned or controlled by the

Government in pursuance of Art. 323-A of the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The Central Administrative Tribunal as well as Administrative Tribunal for various States came to be constituted for adjudication and trial of

disputes and complaints in regard to ""service matter"" including those concerning ''recruitment'' etc. The Act detailed the jurisdiction and powers of

the Tribunal and provided for the mechanism, procedure and authority of the Tribunal to deal with such disputes and trial etc. It also provided for

the transfer of all ""pending matters"" from all the Courts, including the High Court, but excluding the Supreme Court, to the Tribunal and excluded

the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of matters which fell within the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal.

S. 14 of the Act deals with jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The relevant part of S. 14 of the Act

(necessary for this discussion) reads :-

Jurisdiction, Powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal -

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the

jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to -

(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any Civil Service of the Union or a Civil post under the Union or

to a post connected with defence services, being in either case, a post filled by a civilian;

(b) all service matters concerning -

(i) a member of any All-India Service or (ii) a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any service of the Union or any civil post under the

Union; or (iii) a civilian not being a member of an All India Service or a person referred to in clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post

connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State

or any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or any Corporation or society owned or

controlled by the Government :

(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred

to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b) being a person whose services have been placed by the State Government or any local or other

authority or any Corporation or society or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment.

Explanation-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to ""Union"" in this sub section shall be construed as including references

also to a ""Union Territory.

A bare look at the provision of S. 14 of the Act discloses that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is rather wide and takes the place of Courts,

excepting the Supreme Court. The Tribunal has the power to go into the matters of recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any All-India

Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in

either case, a post filled by a civilian. The second part of the section deals with, firstly, all service matters concerning a member of any All India

Service, secondly, person appointed to any civil service of the Union or any Civil post under the Union, and thirdly, to a civilian who was holding a

civil post in the defence service or a post connected with defence. The matters which can be taken up by the Tribunal are thus matters which come

within the term ""service matters"" generally speaking. This term has been defined in S. 3(q) of the Act and reads as follows :

Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -

(q) ""service matter"", in relation to a person means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of

any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of

any Corporation or Society owned or controlled by the Government, as respects -

(i) remuneration including allowances, pension and other retirement benefits :

(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;

(iii) leave of any kind;

(iv) disciplinary matters or

(v) any other matter whatsoever.

Section 3(q) (supra) is also of a very wide-ranging amplitude and specifically defines ""service matters"" in relation to a person as concerning all

matters pertaining to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State, local or other authority within the

territory of India or under the control of Government or other authority, as the case may be. These matters, however, in relation to any such person

should relate to his remuneration, pension and other retirement benefits, tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature

retirement and supermunuation, leave of any kind and disciplinary matters, and, lastly, any other matter whatsoever. Significantly, the expression

''service matters'' defined in Section 3(q) does not expressly include, in its fold, ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' which find

mention in Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, but disputes arising out of ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' would be covered by clause

(v) of Section 3(q) (supra).

According the learned Counsel for the appellant, the expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' occurring in S. 14(1)(a) of the

Act includes, within its fold, matters arising before the actual ''recruitment'' of a ''person'' and even such ''person'' who had not been ''recruited'' to

any All-India Service or any Civil Service of the Union, State, local body or authority etc or who does not hold a civil post under the Union or a

post connected with defence, or in the defence services, held by civilians, cannot approach the High Court after the coming into force of the Act

and that such matter can be agitated by such ''person'', also before the Administrative Tribunal only. Argued the learned Counsel, that the Tribunal

has been constituted under the Act as a complete and effective substitute of the Courts including the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction and

therefore such ''persons'' cannot approach the High Court for redressal of their grievance after 1st November, 1985 and they must seek relief only

from the Tribunal set up under the Act.

In support of this submission, learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of

India 1987-I-LLJ-128 and, in particular, of the observations of the apex Court to the effect that the constitution of the Tribunal was aimed at

providing ""an effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority for judicial review"" (p. 137). He submitted that the Tribunal is intended to

supplant the High Court in matters covered by the Act since the ''Administrative Tribunal is created in substitution of the High Court and the

jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 is taken away and vested in the Administrative Tribunal.''

On the basis of the observations, as noticed above, and the fact that the validity of the Act was upheld by the Supreme Court, learned Counsel

urged that even ''pre-recruitment'' matters would come within the jurisdiction of the tribunal and any person aggrieved of a pre-recruitment matter

also can only approach the Tribunal. Learned Counsel went on the submit that matters which are ''pre-recruitment'' also have a direct bearing to

ultimate ''recruitment'' and ''service'' and, therefore, the person complaining about any matter at the ''pre-recruitment'' stage also must knock at the

doors of the Tribunal only.

In our opinion, however, reliance by the learned Counsel on the observations in Sampath case (supra) in support of the proposition urged by

him is not justified. We cannot agree with him that in view of the ""law"" laid down in that case, the questions posed by us in the earlier part of the

judgment are no longer res-integra. It is in this connection relevant to consider as to what is binding precedent.

Indeed, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts but while

considering the scope of Article 141 it must be borne in mind that it is the law laid down by the apex Court and not every observation which can

form a binding precedent, divorced from the context in which it was made. The precise question for consideration before the Supreme Court in

Sampath''s case (supra) was whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters and vesting exclusive jurisdiction in such

service matters in the Tribunal is unconstitutional. It was in that connection that the apex Court pointed out that it is necessary that those who

adjudicate upon the questions in Tribunals should have some modicum of legal training and judicial experience. They opined that what was needed

was manning of the Tribunal by persons who were highly competent and experts besides having legal training and experience to inspire confidence

of the public. The question as to what matters could come up before the Tribunal for consideration or who was the ''person'' who could approach

the Tribunal and to whom the writ jurisdiction of the High Court was not available was not a subject matter of consideration by the Supreme

Court. The observations of the Supreme Court, as pointed out by learned Counsel for the appellant, thus, in our view, cannot be allowed to be

read as if laying down general propositions, divorced from the facts and circumstances of the case and the questions agitated and decided by the

apex Court. It is necessary to confine those observations to the extent they are relevant for determining the validity of the Act and not any further.

As a matter of fact, the apex Court itself has, on occasions more than once, deprecated the practice of picking up a ''word'' or a sentence''

from a Supreme Court judgment and treating it as the complete exposition of law on the subject, unmindful of the facts and circumstances of the

case in which the ''word'' or the ''sentence'' had appeared. They have cautioned the High Courts in treating such ''words'' and the ''sentence'' as

binding precedent. What is binding is the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court on the basis of the true principle underlying the decision and

not the reasoning. In Prakash Amichand Shah Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, their Lordships observed :

''Before embarking upon the examination of these decisions we should bear in mind that what is under consideration is not a statute or a legislation

but a decision on the case before the Court while the principle underlying the decision could be binding as a precedent in case which comes up for

decision sub-sequently. Hence while applying the decision to another case, the Court which is dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the

true principle laid down by the previous decision. A decision takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. The

scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation"".

Thus, considered on the basis of the aforesaid principle of law, we find that since the question involved in Sampath''s case (supra) was absolutely

different in its ambit and scope, reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court to urge that even ''pre-recruitment'' matters can be agitated

before the Tribunal by persons ''who are not in service'' is misplaced. By deciding on the validity of the Act, the apex Court did not determine as to

in which cases the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226/227 had been excluded, nor even the question as to which persons can approach

the Tribunal for redressal of the grievances arising out of matters connected with ''service''.

As already noticed it was with a view to ease the problem of backlog of cases in the High Courts and to afford an alternative adjudicative

mechanism to the employees serving the Government or the local authority etc, and arising out of their service as detailed in Section 3(q) (supra)

that the Union Government constituted the Administrative Tribunal to be the arbiter of such controversies and to resolve the disputes and

complaints concerning the conditions of the ''in-service employees''. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court has therefore to be

restricted only in respect of matters envisaged by Article 323 of the Constitution of India. Indeed, the desirability of providing an alternative

adjudicative machinery to ''members of various services'' for getting their disputes relating to services matters settled was spelt out by the apez

Court in K. K. Dutta v. Union of India 1980-II-LLJ-182 where their Lordships observed :

There are few other litigative areas than disputes between members of various services inter se where the principle that public policy requires that

all litigation must have an end can apply with greater force. Public servants ought not to be driven or required to dissipate their time and energy in

Court-room battles. Thereby their attention is diverted from the public to private affairs and their inter se disputes affect their sense of oneness

without which no institution can function effectively. The Constitution of Service Tribunal by State Government with an apex Tribunal at the Centre,

which in the generality of the cases should be the final arbiter of controversies relating to conditions of service, including the vexed question of

seniority, may save the Courts from the avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service matters''.

A The expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' occurring in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 14 of the Act on which

emphasis has been laid by learned Counsel for the appellant to urge that High Court''s jurisdiction has been excluded even in cases which are at the

''pre-recruitment'' stage and that persons who are not ''in service'' can also only approach the Tribunal after 1st November, 1985, if the grievance

of such persons has any correlation with non-recruitment to services, has to be read in the context in which it appears in the said Section and

cannot be divorced from the sub-sequent expressions in the clause and other provisions of the Act. The use of the expressions ''recruitment and

matters concerning recruitment'', in our opinion, would imply that the ''in-service'' candidates can raise disputes before the Tribunal even in respect

of matters relating to recruitment, but no person who is not ''in-service'' can approach the Tribunal for redressal of any grievance. Various clauses

of S. 3(q) (supra) unmistakably show that the types of disputes referred therein can only be raised by persons ''in service'' as they relate to none

else. It is a salutary principle of construction of statutes that to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in it, that phrase is not to be

viewed in isolation. The statute must be read as a whole. Indeed, this principle cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what by itself is clear

and explicit, but the given phrase must be so construed, as far as it is possible, that any absurdity and mischief may be avoided. The consideration

of the expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'', occurring in S. 14(1)(a) of the Act, divorced from the context in which it

appears and without examining the provisions of other sections of the Act, can lead to absurdities. If the argument of learned Counsel for the

appellant were to be accepted that the Tribunal can be approached even by persons who are not in service provided they have a grievance against

''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'', then it would imply that even a person who is not personally aggrieved would also be entitled to

maintain an application under the Act in public interest. This is not possible. Such a person can only approach the High Court in exercise of the writ

jurisdiction, and not the Tribunal. Of course, public interest does require administration to be maintained smoothly and efficiently, but we are afraid

the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be extended to adjudicate upon disputes in public interest, since the jurisdiction, authority and powers

conferred on the Tribunal are only to be exercised as contemplated by the provisions of the Act. Construed in this light, it is not possible to hold

the jurisdiction of the High Court would be not available to persons who are not in service when they have a grievance relatable to some service.

Before the Tribunal only the ''in service'' persons can agitate in respect of matters covered under the Act.

We find support for our view from the provisions of S. 19 of the Act also. It provides :

Applications to Tribunals : 1. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the

jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.

Explanation :

For the purposes of this sub-section, order means an order

made :

(a) by the Government or a local or other authority, within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or by any

Corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government; or.

(b) by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or Corporation or society referred to in

clause (a).

(2) Every application under sub-S.(1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee (if any, not

exceeding one hundred rupees) in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes, as may

be prescribed by the Central Government.

(3) On receipt of an application under sub-S.(1), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the application is a

fit case for adjudication on trial by it admit such application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after

recording its reasons.

Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under Sub-S.(3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of

grievances in relation to the subject matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise

directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules"".

This Section on its plain reading provides that a person aggrieved by an order made by the Government or a local or other authority or under the

control of the Government of India or by any Corporation owned or controlled by the Government or by an officer, or committee or other body or

agency of the Government or local authority or Corporation owned or controlled by the Government pertaining to any service matter within the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make an application to the Tribunal for redressal of his grievance. The expression ""person aggrieved"" occurring in

Section 19 of the Act implies any such person who is already in service and whose rights have been violated by an order pertaining to any matter

within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. A person who is not ''in service'' cannot be said to be a ''person aggrieved'' within the meaning of S. 19 of the

Act. A person can be said to be ''aggrieved'' only if he has suffered a legal grievance in the sense that his interest, recognized by law, has been

directly and prejudicially affected. A person who is disappointed only of a benefit which he might have received if the order had been made

differently, unless the denial of the benefit violates his legal right or infringes some interest inhering in him, cannot be called an ''aggrieved person''

(see with advantage Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, ).

Undoubtedly a person who is not in service cannot be said to be ""an aggrieved person."" u/s 19. Inviting applications for a post does not by itself

create any right to the post in any candidate who in response to the advertisement makes an application. He only offers himself to be considered

for the post. It does not create any right in the candidate to the post. Even the pre-recruitment formalities, such as medical examination, direction to

deposit some money as security, does not amount to a promise to appoint the applicant. Mere expectancy of being taken in service or the pre-

recruitment formalities having been gone through, does not create any promise which the employer would be estopped from ignoring. Of course, in

public service, a candidate who is otherwise fit, able and appropriate person for appointment, should not be ignored on any extraneous

consideration; but at the same time, he or she cannot claim that he or she has acquired some right to be appointed to the post for which he or she is

a candidate just because he or she had applied for the post and had even gone through the pre-recruitment formalities. No such candidate can

approach the Tribunal for redressal of any grievance and for such a person the invoking of the jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution has not been excluded. It would also be relevant in this connection to take notice of the application form as prescribed under the Act

to raise a dispute before the Tribunal.

The application for raising a matter before the Tribunal in Form 1 as framed u/s 19 of the Act goes to show that dispute can be raised only by ''in-

service'' candidates and not by persons who are not ''in-service.'' The applicant has in paragraph 1 of the Form, to give the designation of the office

in which he is employed and in paragraph 2 he has to provide the particulars of the order against which the application is made. He has also to

declare in paragraph 9 that he has availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant Service Rules before approaching the Tribunal.

The application form also, thus, supports and fortifies our view that the jurisdiction of the High Court has not been excluded in respect of persons

who are not ''in-service'' and who are not ''aggrieved'' persons within the meaning of S. 19 of the Act and that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is

limited only to resolving the disputes raised by any ''aggrieved person'' in respect of matters covered by S. 14 of the Act read with S. 3(q) of the

Act and that such disputes can be raised only by or against the ''in-service'' candidates''.

In order to determine whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India after 1st

November, 1985, what is to be examined is, firstly whether the dispute is the one raised by an in service candidate and is covered by the

provisions of the Act; secondly, whether the application is made by an ''aggrieved person'' in respect of an order covered by S. 19 and thirdly,

whether grievance relates to a service matter as contemplated by S. 3(q). In case the answer to all the three questions is in the affirmative, then,

and then alone, the High Court''s jurisdiction is excluded and the Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction to deal with such matters. The Tribunal, then,

would be vested with the jurisdiction to deal with matters and give complete and effective relief including the relief of declaring any particular Act,

rule or action as invalid or ultra vires the Constitution or the law.

A plain reading of Article 323-A of the Constitution (supra) shows that the Parliament was authorised to create Administrative Tribunal to

adjudicate disputes and complaints not only with regard to conditions of service of the persons appointed and working under the Central

Government or the State Government or other authorities etc but also that the Tribunals would hear and adjudicate matters relating to recruitment

of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union etc. The Act was enacted pursuant to the powers

contained in Article 323-A (supra). The Tribunal constituted under the Act itself, therefore, could provide for the adjudication or trail of disputes

and complaints with respect to ''recruitment and conditions of service'' of persons already appointed to public services and posts in connection with

the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India

or of any Corporation etc. Since S. 14 and other provisions of the Act noticed above derive their strength from the Act enacted by virtue of the

powers contained in Article 323-A of the Constitution (supra) the expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' as occurring in S.

14 of the Act cannot travel beyond the provision of Article 323-A of the Constitution, which, as already noticed, authorised the Parliament to, by

law, provide Tribunals for adjudication of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and service conditions of the employees who are

already in service of the Union etc. It is fundamental that no subordinate legislation can either override or widen the provisions contained in the

Constitution and considered in that light also, it becomes obvious that the use of the expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment''

occurring in Section 14 must be confined and related to persons who have been appointed to public services who hold posts in connection with

affairs of the Union etc. A Full Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Padma Sharma & Ors v. The State of H.P. and others 1989 (3)

AISLJ. 129 had occasion to consider the question of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Administrative Tribunal for the State and the import of the

expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State as occurring in

Section 15(1)(a) of the Act (which section is in parimateria to Section 14(1)(a) of the Act relating to the Central Administrative Tribunal). In the

case before that Court, the writ petitioners had sought direction that they be admitted to one year Junior Basic Training Condensed Course on the

basis of their qualification as diploma holders in Nursery and Infant Training Course. A memorandum had been issued by the Director of

Education, Himachal Pradesh, outlining a scheme for one year Junior Basic Training Condensed Course for Nursery qualified candidates of the

State. This scheme had been communicated to the Headmasters and Heads of some institutions. The scheme contained in the memorandum

mentioned several conditions, after giving out the eligibility, the age limit and the authorities and the criteria of selection for admission to the Course.

Condition No. 3, amongst various conditions mentions at the end of the memorandum was in the following terms :

After successful completion of training, employment will be provided to the candidates on their return subject to availability of posts and they shall

have no claim for appointment as a matter of right for recruitment. They shall have to appear before the prescribed selection board in case their

names are sponsored by the Employment Exchanges. The cost of the training will have to be borne by the candidates.

On behalf of the petitioners, it was urged that the acquisition of eligibility for being considered for recruitment, by admission to the J.B.T.

Condenced Course was one of the ''matters concerning recruitment'' within the ambit of Clause (a) of Section 15(1) of the Act. The Court was

called upon to decide as to whether the dispute of the type raised by the petitioners could be considered by the High Court in exercise of the writ

jurisdiction or was required to be transferred for adjudication to the Tribunal. The Full Bench observed :

Merely because the Condensed Course had been started to enable ineligible person to become eligible for appointment as trained teachers and

had been started by the Government with a view to enable such persons to be considered for recruitment, though not necessarily leading to their

appointment, the admission to the Condensed Course cannot be treated as a ''matter concerning recruitment'' within the meaning of Clause (a). If

the submission made on behalf of the respondents is accepted, it would amount to giving a meaning to the word ''recruitment'' which would not be

in consonance with the accepted meaning of that term as understood in the Service Jurisprudence"".

Their Lordships, then, went on to say :

Recruitment to a service or a Civil post connotes the idea of enlistment, acceptance, selection or approval for appointment to a service or a civil

post.

The acquisition of eligibility for appointment, by itself, does not amount to recruitment as understood in service law"".

The Full Bench said :

The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was enacted as ""an Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and

complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts .......

and finally held :

We are of opinion that a petition like the present where the petitioners are seeking redressal in the matter of their admission to the J.B.T.

Condensed Course does not deal with a matter concerning recruitment to a civil service or a post under the State of Himachal Pradesh. It cannot

be directed to be transferred for consideration to the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal. The petitioners are entitled to consideration

of their petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by this Court"".

The view expressed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court fortifies our opinion.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the conclusion is irresistible that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India to deal with the service matters with effect from 1st November, 1985 is excluded only is so far as the employees already in

service of the Government, local authority etc. are concerned, provided they relate to matters which strictly fall within Section 14 read with Section

3(q) of the Act and not in other cases and it is only an ''aggrieved person'' as contemplated by Section 19 of the Act who is required to approach

the Tribunal only for adjudication and trial of such disputes and complaints etc. In all other cases, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article

226/227 of the Constitution remains in tact even after 1st November, 1985. The question posed in the early part of the judgment is thus answered

accordingly. The learned Single Judge, under the circumstances, was right in rejecting the preliminary objection and holding that the question raised

in the writ petitions, which arose at the pre-recruitment stage by persons not already ''in service'' could be gone into by the High Court in exercise

of the writ jurisdiction. We accordingly uphold the judgment under appeal and dismiss these appeals, but without any order as to costs.