High CourtsDivision Bench

Chajju & others vs Revenue Minister & others

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 3 January 1968 · Citation: (1970) KashLJ 105

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.M.F.Ali, C.J and Anant Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 — Section 30
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 128 of 1966
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

34 paragraphs · 792 words

Ali, C. J.

(1) This is an application against an order passed by the Revenue Minister dated 1266 acting under cl (6) of S. 30 of the Big Landed Estates

Abolition Act, 2007 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). The facts out of which the petition arises may be briefly stated as follows :

(2) The petitioners filed an application before the revenue authorities challenging mutation NJ. 91 dated 29102010 by which the land in dispute had

been transferred to the nonapplicants as tillers of the soil. The application was rejected by the mutation officer and also by the learned

commissioner and thereafter the petitioners filed a revision before the Financial Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner after going through the

record and after taking the statement of the Patwari, came to a finding of fact that as the petitioners were in possession of the land during the Kharif

year 2007 (Bikrarai), they should be mutated as tillers of the soil. The Financial Commissioner accordingly accepted the application of the

petitioners and set aside the orders of the court below and held that the petitioners had proved their ownership rights as tillers of the soil. Against

this the respondents went up in revision to the Government under cl. (6) of S. 30 of the Act and the Revenue Minister by his order which is

impugned in this case remanded the case for a fresh local inquiry by the Tehsildar.

(3) In support of the rule Mr Bhalgotra raised a short point. He submitted that under cl. (6) of S. 30 of the Act it was not open to the Government

to entertain any revision against the order of the Financial Commissioner unless the case involved a substantial question of law or a question of

public interest. In the instant case the case was concluded by findings of fact and therefore the Revenue Minister had no jurisdiction to reverse the

decision of the Financial Commissioner.

(4) In our opinion the contention is well founded and must prevail. It would appear that under cl. (5) of S 30 of the Act the Financial Commissioner

has been given a very wide power to revise any orders passed by Revenue Officers under the Act. Under cl (6) the Government has been given

the power to revise the order of the Financial Commissioner in extra ordinary circumstances such as when a case involves a substantial question of

law or a question of public interest. Thus cl. (6) of S: 30 invests an extraordinary power in the Government which should be sparingly exercised

only if the conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled. The condition, namely that there should be a substantial question of law or one of public

interest appears to be a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government under this sub section.

(5) Mr. Karim submitted that the last lines of this clause which give the power to the Government 'to call for the record of the case and pass such

orders therein as it thinks fit' would denote that the Government have got unlimited power to revise the orders passed by the Financial

Commissioner. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. The last lines of subcl. (6) cannot be divorced from the first portion of sub

cl.' (6) which gives the essential conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government. Reliance was placed before us on a judgment of Bhat

J. in Writ Petition No. 77 of 1Q66 where the learned Judge appears to have accepted this argument only casuallybecause the learned Judge

observed that since the point was not raised before the lower court it did not arise for decision before him. We are, however, unable to agree with

the view expressed by Bhat J. on this point. The section, read as a whole, unmistakably shows that extraordinary powers to ""be exercised by the

Government can be exercised by the Government only if the condition's precedent mentioned in subcl. (6) of S. 30 of the Act have been fulfilled.

In the instant case there is neither any substantial question of law nor any question of public interest involved, which as we have already said is

concluded by findings of fact.

(6) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of the Revenue Minister is vitiated by a clear error of law apparent on the face of the record as

it was passed in direct violation of the powers given to the Government under cl. (6) of S. 30 of the Act. The application is therefore allowed and

by writ of certiorari the order of the Revenue Minister dated 1266 is quashed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.