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Judgment
84 paragraphs · 1,993 wordsKailasam, J.—This petition is filed to revise the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ariyalur, issuing summons to witnesses to give
evidence in Section 145, Crl. P. C. proceedings. The petitioners are B party in Section 145 proceedings in the lower Court. The A party filed an
application for issue of summons to karnam and the Sub-Inspector of Police to give evidence and it was ordered by the trial Court. The contention
of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the lower Court is not entitled to examine persons as witnesses, who have not filed affidavits u/s
145(4), Crl. P. C.
Section 145, Crl. P. C. was amended by amendment Act XXVI of 1955: u/s 145, as it stood before the amendment, it was found that the
enquiry took considerable time. In order to obviate the delay, an amendment was introduced to Section 145. According to the old section
whenever the case was a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning a land, the Magistrate was to make an order requiring the
parties to attend Court and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute.
After receiving the written statements the Magistrate was required to peruse the statements, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be
produced by them respectively, consider the effect of such evidence, and, if possible, decide which of the parties was at the date of the order in
such possession. With a view to expedite the proceedings, under the amended section, it is provided that the Magistrate shall call upon the parties
to put in written statements in respect of the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and in addition further require them to put in such
documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims. Thus in addition to
requiring the parties to file written statements, under the new procedure, the parties are also required to put in documents and to adduce, by putting
in affidavits, the evidence of such person, which they rely upon. Instead of receiving all such evidence as may be produced by the parties, under the
new procedure, the Magistrate is required to peruse the statements, documents and affidavits put in by parties and conclude the enquiry. The
Magistrate is empowered, if he thinks fit, to summon and examine any person whose affidavit has been put in as to the facts contained therein.
Under this new Sub-section the enquiry is to be concluded on perusing the statements, documents and affidavits put in by the parties. Discretion is
given to examine any person who has put in an affidavit. Under the Sub-sections above enumerated in the new procedure the enquiry has to be
concluded without taking evidence except under the discretion of the Magistrate by examining persons who have put in affidavits. But the original
Sub-section (9) as it stood before the amendment is retained in full. Sub-section (9) reads as follows:
The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under this section, on the application of either party, issue a summons to any
witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or thing.
Under this Sub-section, the Magistrate is empowered in his discretion at any stage of the proceedings on the application of the parties to summon a
witness to attend or to produce any document. The submission of Mr. R. Santanam, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that Sub-section (9) to
Section 145, Crl. P. C. should be read along with other Sub-sections to that section and that the discretion given to the Magistrate under Sub-
section (9) can only be exercised either for the purpose of examining a witness, who has filed an affidavit under the proviso to Sub-section (4) or
for examining a witness to show that no dispute as complained existed under Sub-section (5) to Section 145. To substantiate his contention the
learned counsel relied on various decisions.
In Bhagwat Singh and Others Vs. State and Another, it was held that the phrase ""hear the parties"" in Sub-section (4) could only mean that
arguments should be heard and would not include oral examination of the parties and their witnesses. It was further held that Sub-section (9) did
not confer any right upon a party to examine a person as its witness but it only laid down the procedure to be followed in procuring the attendance
of its witnesses. According to Dessai, J. in Bhagwat Singh and Others Vs. State and Another, , whether a party has a right to examine a witness or
not has to be ascertained from provisions other than Sub-section (9) and Sub-section (4) is the only provision to confer a right upon a party to
examine a witness orally in the Court, and sub-section (9) must be read with the first proviso to Sub-section (4). Thus, in the view of the learned
Judge the powers given to the Magistrate under Sub-section (9) can only be exercised by the Magistrate to summon and examine only persons
who have filed affidavits. I regret I am unable to follow this decision for Sub-section (9) is absolute in its terms, and does not provide that it is
subject to the conditions laid down in Sub-section (4). Under Sub-section (9) the Magistrate is empowered at any stage of the proceeding u/s 145
on the application of either party to summon any witness directing him to attend or to produce a document. The procedure under subsection (4) as
amended envisages the Magistrate coming to a conclusion on the documents and affidavits filed by the parties without the oral evidence. Sub-
section (4) does not relate to witnesses, whom the parties would like to summon through Court. There may be evidence, oral and documentary, in
the case, but it could not be made available except by summoning through the Court the witnesses concerned to give evidence or to produce the
documents. Sub-section (4) does not in any way state that this type of evidence cannot be produced at all in Section 145 proceedings. The first
proviso to Sub-section (4) cannot be read to restrict the powers of the magistrate to summoning the witnesses, who have filed affidavits. Sub-
section (4) deals only with statements, documents and affidavits put in by parties and not evidence of third parties, which can only be obtained by
issuing summons through Court. I am unable to share the view of Desai, J. in Bhagwat Singh and Others Vs. State and Another, that the power of
the Magistrate to summon witnesses is confined only to summoning persons, who have filed affidavits. This decision was approved and followed
by a Bench of the Punjab High Court in S. Jodh Singh and Others Vs. Mahant Bhagambar Dass and Others, . The Bench also dissented from the
view of the Rajasthan High Court in Bahori Vs. Ghure and Another, . The learned Judges refrained from expressing any opinion on the view of
Rajasthan High Court that the Magistrate has in any event powers u/s 540, Crl. P. C. to summon witnesses but held that the observations of the
Rajasthan High Court regarding, Sub-section (9) are obiter and that they were not able to agree with the opinion so expressed. The Bench also
observed that, if the contention that a party had a right to apply for summoning witnesses, whose affidavits had not been filed, was accepted, the
very object of Sub-sections (1) and (4) as amended would be nullified and that the procedure instead of being shortened would become doubly
cumbersome. The Bench further observed that the continued existence of Sub-section (9) in its present form was certainly not very apt and
required looking into by the legislature but that they had no doubt that the right to adduce oral evidence must be confined within the limits imposed
by the first proviso to Sub-section (4). I regret I am unable to follow this decision. After amendment of Section 145, Sub-section (9) as it stood
before is retained and it must be given its full meaning and cannot be disposed of as not being very apt.
In B. G. Rao v. State, 1962 1 Cri. L.J. 61 (Ori) Harasimham C. J. of the Orissa High Court followed the decisions in Bhagwat Singh and
Others Vs. State and Another, and S. Jodh Singh and Others Vs. Mahant Bhagambar Dass and Others, but dissented from Bahori Vs. Ghure and
Another,
In Bahori Vs. Ghure and Another, Sarjoo Prosad, C. J. expressed his view that the first proviso to subsection (4) is merely an enabling
provision, of law which entitles the Magistrate to summon and examine any of the persons whose affidavits have been filed on behalf of the parties;
but the proviso does not preclude the Magistrate from calling as a witness any other person that he thinks proper to examine. The learned judge
observed that it would indeed be surprising if the proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145, Crl. P. C. was capable of bearing the interpretation
which was sought to be placed upon it by the learned counsel that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to examine a person, who had not filed an
affidavit as a Court witness. He also found that the powers of the Court u/s 540 were not impaired. I am in respectful agreement with the view of
the learned Judge in Bahori Vs. Ghure and Another, that the discretion of the Magistrate at any stage of the proceeding to issue summons to a
witness on the application of the parties to attend or to produce a document is not in any way restricted by the first proviso to Sub-section (4) of
Section 145. The view in Bahori Vs. Ghure and Another, was followed by Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kanhaiyalal and Others Vs. Devi
Singh, where it was observed that Sub-section (9) was wider than the first proviso to Sub-section (4) and that there was no such restraint on the
Magistrate or on the scope of the examination on oath, if at any stage of the proceeding on the application of either party the Magistrate at his
discretion issued summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or thing. The Court expressed its dissent with we
now taken in Bhagwat Singh and Others Vs. State and Another, .
In a recent decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mirza Mohd. Aziz Vs. Safdar Husain and Another, Mulla, J. following the decision In
Bahori Vs. Ghure and Another, held that there was no bar to a Magistrate examining a witness u/s 540 Crl. P. C. and that the proviso to Section
145(4) was confined in its operation to the witnesses who were named by the parties to the dispute. The decision in Bhagwat Singh and Others
Vs. State and Another, which hold a contrary view, is not referred to in Mirza Mohd. Aziz Vs. Safdar Husain and Another, .
The power conferred on the Court u/s 540 to summon any person as a witness at any stage of the enquiry is not in any way affected by any of
the provisions in Section 145, Crl. P. C. The powers under Sub-section (9) to summon a witness directing him to attend or produce a document at
any stage of the proceedings on the application of the parties are not in any way affected by the first proviso to Sub-section (4). The Magistrate
can summon any witness u/s 145 (9) to give evidence or to produce a document, even I though he may not have filed an affidavit u/s 145(1) of the
Crl. P. Code.
The order of the Magistrate issuing summons to the Karnam and the Sub-Inspector of Police is, therefore, correct and this petition is dismissed.
