Chamali Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh

The petitioners have filed this petition seeking the following reliefs:-

(i) That, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased, to issue a writ, order or direction or any other appropriate writ direction to respondents No. 1 and 2 to award the compensation amount of the acquired the land ad-measuring 0.320 hectares of land bearing Survey No. 882/1 village Korba(58), Patwari Circle No. 00016, R.I. Korba-1, Tahsil – Korba, District- Korba of the petitioners taken over by the respondents along with the interest of 12 %.

(ii) That, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased, to issue a writ, order of direction or any other appropriate writ direction to respondents No. 1 and 2 that the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights for a period of more than two decade, it is expedient to award a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as cost to the petitioner.

(iii) Any other relief as deemed fit by this Hon’ble Court may also be granted in favour of the petitioner.

The facts of the present case are that land bearing survey No. 882/1, ad-measuring 0.320 hectares situated at Village Korba (58), Patwari Circle No. 00016, Tehsil and District – Korba was recorded in the name of late Vijay Kumar Singh who expired on 21.10.2022 and thereafter names of his legal heirs were substituted. The above-stated land was taken over by the Special Area Development Authority, Korba (SADA) for the construction of a road in the month of March 1996 without acquiring the land and making payment of compensation.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that no compensation was paid and no procedure for land acquisition was initiated by the authorities and the same is a violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner enshrined under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that in the year 2020, a resolution was passed by the Municipal Corporation, Korba where it was observed that on representation of land oustee, a letter has been sent to the Land Acquisition Officer to initiate proceedings according to law. He would also submit that in that resolution name of the petitioner is also mentioned. He contended that a similarly situated person had filed a writ petition which was allowed and compensation was awarded by the authorities. Thus, he would pray for similar relief.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose. They would submit that in the writ petition, particularly, in para 7, it is stated that there is no delay in filing the writ petition, whereas, the land of the petitioners was acquired in the year 1996 therefore, the instant petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

They would further contend that a petition was filed by Ashok Kumar Keshwani in the year 1999 bearing WP No. 4075 of 1999 and it was disposed of vide order dated 15.04.2013. They would also contend that in the present case, the petitioner filed this petition in the year 2024; therefore, he cannot claim parity with Ashok Kumar Keshwani, petitioner of WP No. 4075 of 1999.

Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record.

From the perusal of the documents, it appears that the land of the petitioner was acquired in the month of March 1996, but he never approached any of the authorities to claim compensation.

A writ petition was filed by a similarly situated person, Ashok Kumar Keshwani in the year 1993 and the same was disposed of in the year 2013, even thereafter, the petitioner did not choose to prefer any writ petition.

The issue of delay and laches is not res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 held as under:-

‘17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

Recently the Apex Court in the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 641 observed as under:-

‘9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words:

“ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”

Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, in light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra) and Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioners have approached this Court after a delay of 27 years whereas in para 7 of the writ petition, they have stated that there is no delay in filing the instant petition. The petitioners utterly failed to explain the delay caused in filing the instant petition. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches.

However, the petitioners would be at liberty to approach Municipal Authorities raising his grievances.