High CourtsSingle Bench(2013) 10 P&H CK 0196

Chaman Lal vs State Bank of India

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 29 October 2013 · Citation: (2014) 2 SCT 466

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ajay Tewari, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
C.W.P No. 7360 of 2001 (O&M)

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

4 paragraphs · 534 words

Ajay Tewari, J.—By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal from service. Brief facts are that the petitioner joined as a Cashier in the respondent-bank in 1957. On 19.5.1984, he was placed under suspension on account of some irregularities committed by him by granting advances to persons established outside the area of operation of his branch. Consequently, an FIR was registered against him and after trial he was convicted, vide judgment dated 23.4.1988 under Sections 420, 471, 120B of the IPC but was released on probation u/s 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The petitioner filed an appeal against his conviction before this Court. However, on the basis of conviction, the respondent-bank dismissed the petitioner from service vide order dated 29.11.1988. Vide order dated 24.3.1998, this Court set aside the order of conviction and remanded the matter back for fresh trial. Thereafter, the petitioner represented to the respondent bank for re-instatement and was reinstated on 27.11.1998. On the same day, the enquiry was revived and, he was dismissed from service, vide order of even date (Annexure P-12). Appeal and review petition filed against the dismissal order having been dismissed, vide orders Annexures P-14 and P-16 respectively, the petitioner is before this Court.

2.

The precise grievance raised by the petitioner is that after his conviction was set aside, neither the inquiry report was sent to him for his comments alongwith the show cause notice nor the notice asking him to show cause against the proposed punishment of dismissal was ever served upon him. In this regard, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., .

3.

Counsel for the respondent has argued that the Hon''ble Supreme Court specifically made the ruling in B. Karunakar''s case (supra) prospective and in the present case, the incident occurred prior to the said decision.

4.

In my opinion, the argument raised by counsel for the respondent is mis-placed. What their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court intended by giving prospective ruling in B. Karunakar''s case (supra) was that it would apply to all pending inquiries but would not serve as a handle to dismissed employees to attack prior dismissal orders on the ground of infraction of law laid down therein. In the present case, the disciplinary proceedings had not been concluded and consequently, the observations of their Lordships would apply with full force. In these circumstances, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned order of dismissal from service of the petitioner is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authorities for a fresh decision in terms of the decision in B. Karunakar''s case (supra). It is, however, made clear that setting aside the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner would not result in any benefit/s being granted to him and the same would be dependent on the order to be now passed in accordance with law. Since the matter has been pending in this Court for 12 years, the disciplinary authority is directed to finally decide the matter within three months from the receipt of a certified copy of this order, provided the petitioner cooperates with the disciplinary authority.