High CourtsSingle Bench

Chaman Lal vs State of Punjab

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 30 August 2006 · Citation: (2006) 08 P&H CK 0398

HON’BLE JUDGES
Satish Kumar Mittal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 21, 406, 467, 468, 471
RESULT
Dismissed
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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 952 words

Satish Kumar Mittal, J.—Petitioner Chaman Lal (accused) has filed this petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR No. 73 dated 18.9.1998 registered under Sections 406/467/468/471 IPC at Police Station Amargarh; order dated 26.5.2003 passed by the JMIC, Malerkotla, framing the charge against the petitioner under Sections 406/467/468/471 IPC; and the order dated 13.8.2003 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Sangrur, whereby the revision filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order has been dismissed.

2.

In this case, the aforesaid FIR was registered on the complaints made by Bhagmal Danni and Krishan Kumar Kaushal, who are not the Members of the Governing Body of Managing Committee Mandir Thakur Dawara (Sanatan Dharam, village Bagrian) on the allegations that Mandir Thakur Dawara was owning certain land and a society was constituted by the villagers to run the affairs of the said Mandir. The said society was registered with the Registrar of Firms and Societies under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act''). Chaman Lal petitioner was elected as President of the said society. In the complaint, it was alleged that the petitioner had misappropriated the funds of the Mandir Thakur Dawara by preparing false bills and receipts. After completion of the investigation, challan was filed against the petitioner and charge was framed against him under Sections 406/467/468/471 IPC. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application for discharge. The trial Court rejected the prayer made by the petitioner for discharge and after considering the material/evidence collected during the investigation and finding them to be sufficient, framed charge against the petitioner under Sections 406/467/468/471 IPC. The said order was challenged by the petitioner by filing revision before the Addl.Sessions Judge, Sangrur, which was dismissed vide order dated 13.8.2003. Hence, this petition.

3.

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since it was alleged that the petitioner had misappropriated the amount of the society, which was registered under the Act, for managing the affairs of Mandir Thakur Dawara, no FIR could have been registered against the petitioner as according to Section 21 of the Act, no cognizance of the offence under the Act could have been taken by the court except on a complaint in writing by the Registrar or any other person authorized by him in writing in this behalf. The instant FIR has not been registered on the complaint made by the Registrar or any other person authorized by him. Bhagmal Danni and Krishan Kumar Kaushal filed the instant complaint to the police in their individual capacity. They have no locus standi to file such complaint. Therefore, the FIR is liable to be quashed. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in Palar Ram and Ors. v. State of Haryana 1992(3) RCR 122.

4.

After hearing the counsel for the parties and going through the contents of the FIR as well as the aforesaid two orders, I do not find any substance in the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Section 21 of the Act, as applicable in the States of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh, came to be incorporated vide East Punjab Act 6 of 1949, which is reproduced below for facility of reference:

21.

Cognizance of offence.- No Court inferior to that of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act nor shall cognizance of any such offence be taken except on a complaint in writing by the Registrar or any person authorized by him in writing in this behalf.

5.

This Section is applicable only to the offence committed under the Act, but in the instant case the alleged offence committed by the petitioner is under Sections 406/467/468/471 IPC for which charge has been framed against him. This offence cannot be said to be the offence committed under the Act. The revisional Court has considered this aspect of the matter while observing as under:

Mere perusal of this Section goes to show that this Section is confined to the filing of the complaint by the Registrar of the Society and by no one else, in case some offence by some one is committed under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. As the wording clearly shows that no court inferior to that of a Magistrate of Ist Class shall try any offence under this Act, the word "under this Act" used in this Section is very very significant and it can very safely and correctly inferred from the reading of this Section that there is absolutely no bar imposed on any one from setting the machinery of law into motion if he notices the commission of a cognizable offence by other individual. Ld. trial Magistrate has elaborately discussed all these propositions in his well reasoned order and has correctly dismissed the application filed by the revisionist for his discharge and has correctly ordered framing of the charge against the revisionist u/s 406/467/468/471 of IPC.

6.

In view of the aforesaid, I do not find any illegality in the said order. The judgment cited by the counsel for the petitioner does not lay down any such position that even if the offence has been committed under Sections 406/467/468/471 IPC, an FIR cannot be registered, if the given offence is alleged to have been committed by the office-bearers of the registered society under the Act. In that case, the FIR was quashed on the ground that the allegations in the FIR against the accused were vague. Thus, I am of the opinion that merely on the aforesaid ground the FIR and the subsequent proceedings cannot be quashed.

7.

Hence, the petition is dismissed. However, the trial Court is directed to expedite the trial.