Chand Mal and Another vs Angan Lal

Sir John Edge, Kt., C.J. and Tyrrell, J.—The only question which we need consider is a question, of limitation. Angan Lal received a large sum of money as special agent for that purpose of Ajudhia Prasad, his brother. The money was received on behalf of Ajudhia Prasad. The money was attached in the hands of Angan Lal by a judgment creditor of Ajudhia Prasad, the plaintiffs became the purchasers of the rights of that judgment-creditor and they sought in this suit to recover the money from Angan Lal. It was contended on behalf of Angan Lal that art. 62 of the second schedule of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877 applies. If that article did apply, the suit was barred by time. On the other hand, on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was contended that art. 120 of that schedule was the only article which applied. If that article applies, the suit was within time, inasmuch as the plaintiffs appear to us to be standings qua Angan Lal in the shoes of Ajudhia Prasad; we should have thought that the article of limitation, namely, art. 62, which would clearly have applied to a suit by Ajudhia Prasad, would also apply to the suit of the plaintiffs, but we have been referred on behalf of the plaintiffs to the case of Gurudas Pyne v. Ram Narain Sethi I.L.R., 10 Calc. 860 as an authority to show that art. 62 would not apply here. In that case the plaintiff sought to recover money which had been received by the defendant for one Musammat Moti Dasi as the price of timber sold for her. The timber, in fact, was the timber of the plaintiff who had been wrongfully, dispossessed by the husband of Musammat Moti Dasi. Then the defendant contended that art. 60 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act of 1871 applied. That article is word for word the same as art. 62 of the second schedule of the present Act. Their Lordships held that as the defendant was, when selling the timber, acting as the agent of Musammat Moti Dasi, and as he received the money for her and not for the plaintiff, art. 60 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act of 1871 did not apply, and that the article which did apply was art. 118 of the schedule, which article corresponds with art. 120 of the second schedule of the present Act. When we regard the specific words used by their Lordships of the Privy Council in that case when explaining that art. 60 did not apply, and having regard to the fact that Angan Lal received the money for Ajudhia Prasad and not for the plaintiffs or the judgment-creditors whose interest they purchased, we are bound to decide that art. 120 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act of 1877 is the article which applies to this case and that the suit is consequently within time. The other issues have been found in the Court below in favor of the plaintiffs. Those findings have not been objected to by objections filed under the Code of Civil Procedure. We must consequently accept them, as we do. We accordingly decree the appeal with costs and pass a decree for the amount claimed by the plaintiffs, namely, Rs. 9,635-4-9 with 6 per cent interest from the date of our decree and costs of both the Courts.