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Judgment
Mack, J.—This revision petition raises an interesting question of court-fee. The plaintiffs sued for a declaration that the decree in O.S. No.
456 of 1938, in which they and their deceased elder brother were parties, was a nullity, and not binding on them, and for an injunction, restraining
the plaintiff in that suit, which was a temple, from executing that decree against them. That suit was one to recover possession of about 24 acres of
land, of which, it is averred in the plaint and it is also common ground before me, the plaintiffs are still in possession. On the plaint, the plaintiffs
paid ad valorem court-fee on half the value of the Immovable property under the proviso to Section 7(iv)(c). Their suit was dismissed; and they
filed an appeal, paying the same court-fee under this provision. The learned District Judge held that the correct court-fee payable by them on the
plaint and the appeal memorandum was u/s 7(iv)(a) on the full value of the subject-matter of the suit as one for cancellation of a decree.
His decision was based on the Full Bench decision in C.R. Ramaswami Aiyangar, represented by his mother and next friend Lakshmi Ammal
Vs. C.S. Rangachariar and Others, . That was a case of a Hindu minor plaintiff who sued with his mother as next friend really to set aside
alienations made by his father including decrees passed against him but seeking to ignore them as not binding on him. It was held inter alia that in
respect of decrees passed against the plaintiff in suits in which he had been eo nomine impleaded as a party, he must pay the court-fee prescribed
by Section 7(iv)(a). In the present plaint, the plaintiffs'' main contention is that they were, in fact, minors both at the time of the institution of O.S.
No. 456 of 1938 and also at the time of the decree passed against them. The learned Government Pleader concedes that if the matter ended there,
then their present suit would be one for a declaration that the previous decree was a nullity and not binding on them and would not come within the
mischief of Section 7 (iy)(a). He urges, however, that, as found by the learned District Judge, the plaintiffs, even after attaining majority on their
own showing on the date they had given in their plaint, were impleaded as majors in an appeal to the District Court, and also In a second appeal to
the High Court. It is urged on their behalf that the appeals were filed by their deceased elder brother who was negligent in the conduct of that
litigation and failed to file documents which would show that the plaintiffs had permanent occupancy rights in this land as against the temple
landholder. Court-fee is usually determined on the plaint averments. If at the time of the decree in O.S. No. 456 of 1938, the present plaintiffs
were, in fact, minors, though impleaded in that litigation as majors, the decree would be a nullity so far as they were concerned, and they would be
entitled to ask for a declaration without an obligation to cancel the decree and to pay court-fee u/s 7(iv)(a). This is a case rather on the border line
and midway between that on whi Manakkat Tekkepeedikayil Kooleri Naduvile Purayil Abdulla and eleven Ors. Vs. Subramanyan Pattar and
Others, and a suit for cancellation of a decree which should be governed by Section 7(iv)(a). A via media has been adopted for court-fee
valuation, namely, Section 7(iv)(c) which cannot be said in the circumstances to be incorrect or inappropriate. I hold that the plaint and the appeal
have been correctly valued for purposes of court-fee and allow the revision petition without any order as to costs.