Chander Bhushan Anand vs Devender Kumar Singla

Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.—This revision petition is directed against the order dated 19.7.2010 passed'' by the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh, by which an application filed by the tenant u/s 18A(5) of The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short, the Act) for leave to defend has been dismissed.

In brief, the landlord filed an application for eviction before the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh u/s 13A of the Act, alleging therein that he has purchased the demised premises from earlier owner, namely, G.K. Bhalla on 30.10.2001 and has retired on 31.10.2001 from government service. He requires the demised premises as he is suffering from chest problem and is getting treatment from P.G.I., Chandigarh.

This application was contested by the tenant by filing an application u/s 18A(5) of the Act, seeking leave to defend, inter alia, on the ground that a petition u/s 13-A of the Act at the instance of the landlord is not maintainable which has been filed only a day after his retirement, sale deed (transfer of ownership rights) has not even been entered in the record of estate office, Chandigarh and as he was not inducted by subsequent purchaser, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between them.

The learned Rent Controller rejected the first argument regarding ownership of the landlord over the demised premises on the basis of a finding recorded by this Court in 2010(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 649 : 2010 (2) R.C.R. (Rent) 124 : Civil Revision No. 1171 of 2009 titled as Pratibha Jhangi v. Devinder Kumar Singla decided on 22.3.2010 in which a co-tenant of the Petitioner against whom similar application u/s 13-A of the Act was filed by the present Respondent had taken a plea that merely by sale deed dated 30.10.2001, the Respondent had not become the owner of the demised premises because regarding the part of property occupied by her no conveyance deed has been executed by the Estate Office, Chandigarh. It was held by the learned Rent Controller that this Court had observed in the aforesaid case that:

the transfer of title of immovable property is governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Whatever instructions may have come to be issued by the various administrative authorities in the context of documentation of the change of title, it does not affect the essential legal proposition that a title of immovable property would change the moment it is done by means of registered documentation which had concededly been done in this case. Whether a No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office had been obtained for transfer of aforementioned property or nor is a matter between vendor and vendee on the one hand and the Estate Office on the other hand. The change of title as between the vendor and vendee was perfect and unalterable the non-obtaining of No Objection Certificate from the Estate Office notwithstanding.

As regards bona fide necessity is concerned, the learned Rent Controller has held that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement which cannot be dictated by tenant.

Aggrieved against the impugned order, the present revision has been preferred in which learned Counsel for the Petitioner has raised the argument that if the landlord has become the owner of the demised premises one day before the date of his retire-meat, he would not be entitled to maintain a petition u/s 13-A of the Act. In this regard, he has relied upon two judgments of this Court in the cases of Ajmer Singh v. Ranjit Singh 1986 (2) R.C.R.(Rent) 564 and Manoj Kumar Aggarwal and Anr. v. Vijay Kumar 2009 (4) R.C.R. (Civil) 272 and also a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. D.N. Malhotra v. Kartar Singh 1988 (1) R. C.R. (Rent) 176 : 1988 (1) P.L.R. 394. He has also submitted that in order to maintain a petition u/s 13A of the Act, the owner has to prove that he has been receiving the rent from the tenant and would not become the landlord automatically. In this regard, reliance is placed upon two judgments of this Court in the cases of Krishan Kumar Khurana v. Dharam Pal Kakkar 1997(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 433 : (1997) 1 P.L.R. 752 and Rajinder Lal v. Bhushan Monga 2003 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 242 : (2003 ) 1 P.L.R. 472.

In reply, learned Counsel for the Respondent/landlord has submitted that the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because in all those cases, the landlord had become the owner after the date of retirement, whereas in the present case, the Respondent had become the owner/ landlord a day prior to his retirement which is sufficient to maintain a eviction petition u/s 13-A of the Act. In this regard, he has relied upon a decision in the case of Deepak Suri v. Commodore K.S. Sandhu, 2003 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 698. As regards induction of tenant and receipt of rent is concerned, he has referred to Section 2(c) of the Act, to contend that a person would be the landlord if he derives his title from the earlier landlord. In this regard, he has relied upon two judgments in the cases of Randhir Singh v. Sudesh Kumar 2004 (2) R. C.R. (Rent) 553 : 2005 (1) CCC 710 (P&H) and Ram Samp v. Piare Lal 2000 (2) R.C.R.(Rent) 95 : 2000 (2) P.L.R. 418.

I have heard learned Counsel for both the parties and have perused the record with their assistance.

The term "landlord" and "specified landlord" are defined separately u/s 2(c) and 2(hh) in the Act, which are reproduced below:

2(c) "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit, of any other person or as a trustee, guardian receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord"

2 (hh) "specified landlord" means a person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union of India or of a State.

The Act provides a right to a specified landlord to recover immediate possession of a residential or scheduled building by filing an application u/s 13-A of the Act, which could be contested by the tenant only by means of an application u/s 18A of the Act. The object is very loud and clear that retiree employee should get the accommodation immediately after his retirement.

The question posed in this case by the learned Counsel for the tenant/Petitioner is that the Respondent/landlord who had acquired the ownership of the demised premises by virtue of a registered sale deed a day prior to his retirement could not have maintained the application u/s 13-A of the Act and supported his submission with the judgment cited as Ajmer Singh (Supra), Manoj Kumar Aggarwal (Supra) and Dr. D.N. Malhotra (Supra). All these judgments are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because in the case of Ajmer Singh (Supra), the government servant had purchased the property two months after his retirement. In the case of Manoj Kumar Aggarwal (Supra), the landlord had retired on 31.3.2005 and rented out the premises on 1.4.2005. The question was thus as to "whether the landlord who had rented out the premises after his retirement can seek eviction of the tenant". It was held that relationship of landlord and tenant should exist at least a year prior to the date of retirement only then, he could invoke the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller u/s 13-A of the Act. In the present case, the tenant was also occupying the demised premises when the landlord had purchased the property a day before his retirement. Therefore, he stepped into the shoes of the owner. In the case of Dr. D.N. Malhotra (Supra), the landlord had retired from service in 1965 and rented out the premises in 1968 and in these circumstances, it was held that he cannot be considered to be the specified landlord u/s 2(hh) of the Act.

On the contrary, the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent/landlord in the case of Deepak Suri (Supra) is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because in that case, the landlord had purchased the demised premises from his father only a day prior to his retirement. It was held by this Court that the application is maintainable u/s 13-A of the Act, which was dissected as under:

(i) Landlord within one year after the date of his retirement could apply to the Rent Controller;

(ii) he is required to produce a certificate of a competent authority showing that he is covered by Section 2(hh) and that he was discharging his duty on a post in connection with the affairs of the Union of India or of a State;

(iii) he is further required to file an affidavit stating that he did not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area; and (iv) the provision has been tampered with a non obstante clause which would imply that despite any other provision, this section would be available to a landlord covered by Section 2(hh).

In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as all the judgments cited are pertaining to the situation where either the property was purchased after retirement or the tenant was inducted thereafter. Hence, the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent in Deepak Suri''s Case (Supra)) is found to be answering the question raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner against him and as such, the first contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner is hereby rejected.

Coming to the second question about the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that if a tenant is not inducted by the person falling the petition or it is not proved that he had ever received rent from him, then there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and a petition u/s 13-A of the Act is not maintainable. The judgment relied upon by him are in the cases of Krishan Kumar Khurana (Supra) and Rajinder Lal (Supra) which are distinguishable in view of the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent in the cases of Randhir Singh (Supra) and Ram Sarup (Supra) because in the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the effect of Section 2(c) of the Act has not been argued before the Hon''ble Benches which is very much relevant and material in this regard as Section 2(c) provides that a person who derives title from the earlier landlord would also be considered to be the landlord. To my mind, it is amply clear that a person could be the owner and landlord both but a landlord may not be the owner but where a person steps into the shoes of the earlier owner by virtue of transfer of the demised premises by a registered sale deed, he would certainly derive titled from him in terms of Section 2(c) of the Act and would also step into his shoes for the purpose of maintaining an application u/s 13-A of the Act. Thus, the second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is also rejected.

Lastly, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the Respondent had enough accommodation after ejectment of co-tenant Pratibha Jhangi, therefore, it is only his -greed in seeking eviction which cannot be termed to be bona fide need. In this respect, he has relied upon decision in the case of Mrs. Kushal Takhar v. Gurinder Singh 2009 (1) RCR 33. In this regard, learned Counsel for the Respondent has argued that in the cited case, the landlord had the entire first and second floor which was held to be a replica of the ground floor. Therefore, leave to defend was granted.

In this case, the co-tenant who was in occupation of garage and room in the ground floor has already been ordered to be evicted and rest of the premises were required by the landlord for his personal use and occupation. To my mind, this is not the ground to grant leave to defend.

In view of my above discussion, I do not find any merit in this revision petition and the same is hereby dismissed, though without any order as to costs.