Chandiram Shadiza vs Lokesh Shadiza

Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J

This Miscellaneous Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred against the order dated 08.09.2025 passed by the Principal District Judge, Durg, Chhattisgarh in Civil Suit No.31-A/2025 whereby, interim injunction was granted in terms of Section 135 (2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter “the Act, 1999”), the application preferred by the respondent/plaintiff was partly allowed and the appellant/defendant was restrained from using his trademark “RIYAAN” in respect of detergent powder till three months from the date of passing of the interim order or final disposal of the suit, whichever is earlier.

Necessary facts of the case are that respondent/plaintiff filed a civil suit under Section 134 of the Act, 1999 read with Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter “the Act, 1957”) for damages and permanent injunction by making averments, inter alia, that he is in the business of manufacturing, packaging and thereafter selling of detergent powder in the name of “RIHAAN DETERGENT POWDER” which is manufactured at Shankar Industries owned by the plaintiff. The trademark No.5041282 was issued by the Authorities and the plaintiff has also registered the said product with the Authorities of Copyright Act. It has been further averred that the appellant/defendant is manufacturing and selling the product “RIYAAN DETERGENT POWDER” in the market deceptively which is similar with plaintiff’s product in colour and packaging which creates confusion to the customers of plaintiff and as a result, financial loss along with loss of reputation and investment has been caused.

In the written statement filed by the appellant/ defendant, it has been averred that plaintiff/respondent and appellant/defendant are nephew and uncle respectively and belong to same family. Earlier, business of “RIHAAN DETERGENT POWDER” was operated by both plaintiff and defendant, however, later on, a dispute arose amongst the family members and a consent agreement dated 09.11.2022 was executed and defendant started business of “RIHAAN DETERGENT POWDER”. Although, as per the terms of the settlement, defendant has complied with his part of the obligation and had executed gift deed dated 06.10.2022 and sale deed dated 09.11.2022 in favour of plaintiff but the respondent/plaintiff failed to discharge his obligation and till date not transferred the registration of “RIHAAN DETERGENT POWDER” in the name of Defendant. It has been further averred that there is no resemblance between the detergent powders as the defendant is manufacturing detergent powder under the Shiva Industries and only because there is some family dispute, with an ill intention, the suit has been filed by the plaintiff.

Learned trial Court after examining the case and upon hearing the parties reached to the conclusion that the packaging, the color, the font of the text, the placement of the text, the picture used, the placement of such pictures and the text labels and text descriptions of the goods nearly resemble each other and they are also related to the same class of goods i.e. detergent powder and prima facie, it appears that confusion may be created amongst custumers . After holding that similar trade mark has been used by the defendant deceptively, an interim injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the trial Court has committed a gross error in allowing the application as no prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiff. He further submits that in favour of appellant herein/defendant, trade mark “RIYAAN DETERGENT POWDER” has been registered way back on 28.05.2020 and after more than five years, only when the relations between the family members became sour, with an ill motive, a suit has been filed. He further places reliance in the matter of Britannia Industries Ltd. vs. ITC Limited {2017 SCC OnLine Del 7391} wherein, the Delhi High Court dealt with a dispute of two biscuit companies namely ITC which is producing “Sunfeast Farmlite Digestive- All Good” biscuits and Britannia which is producing “Nutri Choice Digestive Zero” biscuits with regard to colour combination. It has been held that colour combination stands on a different footing from a trademark. Finally, it was held that ITC was not entitled for interim injunction. Learned Senior Counsel also emphasized that recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with this issue at length in the matter of Pernod Ricard India Private Limited and Another vs. Karanveer Singh Chhabra {2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701}, and at para 36, the legal principles governing grant of injunction has been discussed, which reads as under:-

The Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not prescribe any rigid or exhaustive criteria for determining whether a mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion. Each case must necessarily be decided on its own facts and circumstances, with judicial precedents serving to illuminate the applicable tests and guiding principles rather than to dictate outcomes.

36.1 As a general rule, a proprietor whose statutory or common law rights are infringed is entitled to seek an injunction to restrain further unlawful use. However, this remedy is not absolute. The considerations governing the grant of injunctions in trademark infringement actions broadly apply to passing off claims as well. That said, a fundamental distinction remains: while a registered proprietor may, upon proving infringement, seek to restrain all use of the infringing mark, a passing off action does not by itself confer an exclusive right. In appropriate cases, the court may mould relief in passing off so as to permit continued use by the defendant, provided it does not result in misrepresentation or deception.

36.2 The grant of injunction - whether for infringement or passing off - is ultimately governed by equitable principles and is subject to the general framework applicable to proprietary rights. Where actual Infringement is established, that alone may justify injunctive relief; a plaintiff is not expected to wait for further acts of defiance. As judicially observed, "the life of a trademark depends upon the promptitude with which it is vindicated."

36.3 The principles laid down in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. {(1975) AC 396} continue to guide the Courts while determining interim injunction applications in trademark cases. The following criteria are generally applied:

(i) Serious question to be tried/triable issue: The plaintiff must show a genuine and substantial question fit for trial. It is not necessary to establish a likelihood of success at this stage, but the claim must be more than frivolous, vexatious oг speculative.

(ii) Likelihood  of  confusion/deception: Although a detailed analysis of merits is not warranted at the interlocutory stage, courts may assess the prima facie strength of the case and the probability of consumer confusion or deception. Where the likelihood of confusion is weak or speculative, interim relief may be declined at the threshold.

(iii) Balance of convenience: The court must weigh the Inconvenience or harm that may result to either party from the grant or refusal of injunction. If the refusal would likely result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff's goodwill or mislead consumers, the balance of convenience may favor granting the injunction.

(iv) Irreparable harm: Where the use of the impugned mark by the defendant may lead to dilution of the plaintiff's brand identity, loss of consumer goodwill, or deception of the public -harms which are inherently difficult to quantify- the remedy of damages may be inadequate. In such cases, irreparable harm is presumed.

(v) Public interest: In matters involving public health, safety, or widely consumed goods, courts may consider whether the public Interest warrants injunctive relief to prevent confusion or deception in the marketplace.

36.4. In conclusion, the grant of an interim injunction in trademark matters requires the court to consider multiple interrelated factors: prima facie case, likelihood of confusion, relative merits of the parties' claims, balance of convenience, risk of irreparable harm, and the public interest. These considerations operate cumulatively, and the absence of any one of these may be sufficient to decline interim relief.

Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant lastly submits that interim injunction granted in favour of the respondent/plaintiff may be set aside.

I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the order impugned along with the documents annexed with the Appeal carefully.

In the matter of Pernod Ricard (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the law relating to infringement of trademark to hold that there must be no likelihood of confusion in the minds of the average consumer and materially observed at paras 1 to 5 as under:-

The Law of trademarks has been aptly described by Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court in the following words:

“The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a trademark exploits this human propensity by making every human effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same - to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress”.

- Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co. [316 us 203 (1942).

Trademarks are central to the identity, survival, and growth of any business operating in a competitive commercial environment. They enable enterprises to establish consumer trust and preserve the goodwill built over time through substantial investments in quality, service, and brand visibility. For consumers, trademarks serve as indicators of the source and consistent quality of goods or services across different providers, thereby enabling them to make informed choices, which may, at a minimum, affect taste and preference, and at a maximum, impact their health and well-being. It is, therefore, imperative that intellectual property rights are robustly protected against infringing entities that seek to unfairly capitalize on another's goodwill, to the detriment of both the rightful owner and the end consumer.

At the heart of trademark law lies the foundational principle that there must be no likelihood of confusion in the mind of the average consumer. In cases involving composite marks, it is not necessary that the impugned mark replicate the original in its entirety; even partial imitation may amount to infringement or passing off if it evokes an association with the registered or prior-used mark in the consumer's mind.

However, the application of this principle is nuanced. Courts are not expected to adopt a mechanical, side-by-side comparison of the marks. Rather, judicial scrutiny is guided by interpretative doctrines such as the anti-dissection rule and the doctrine of the dominant mark, inter alia, other well-established tests. Although these principles are frequently applied in tandem, they do not always align perfectly, and courts have differed in their application depending on the specific facts and context of each case.

The present case offers an opportunity for this Court to clarify the appropriate analytical framework for evaluating competing trademarks. While the anti-dissection rule - which requires the mark to be considered as a whole - has statutory foundation under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the doctrine of the dominant mark is a judicially evolved principle, aimed at identifying the essential or memorable component of a mark that is likely to influence consumer perception. The purpose of this doctrine is to determine whether the impugned mark creates a deceptive association in the minds of consumers, thereby enabling the defendant to unjustly benefit from the plaintiff's established reputation. This analysis is guided by the perspective of an average consumer with imperfect recollection, who is not expected to retain or compare marks with exact precision.

In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also dealt with the issue about scope of appellate review to hold that an appellate Court cannot substitute its own finding, merely because it may have arrived at a different conclusion, unless there exists an error apparent on the face of record or the trial Court has committed a fundamental jurisdictional error going to the root of the matter. Relevant para 40.1 reads as under:-

40.1. While rejecting the appellants' contentions, the Supreme Court restored the findings of the High Court (trial Court), emphatically reaffirming the well settled legal principle that an appellate court cannot substitute its own findings merely because it may have arrived at a different conclusion. Unless there exists an error apparent on the face of the record or the trial court has committed a fundamental jurisdictional error going to the root of the matter, appellate interference is unwarranted.

In the case at hand, the trial Court has assigned cogent reasons after satisfying the 3 ingredients for granting interim injunction i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The Trial Court has also recorded a finding that the product which is manufactured by the defendant/appellant herein deceptively for which, trademark has already been granted in favour of the respondent/plaintiff is similar and that the product manufactured by the appellant is likely to deceive or create confusion amongst the consumers. In the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court is proper and this Court is in agreement with the view taken by the learned trial Court.

There is no infirmity or illegality in the finding recorded by the trial Court which would warrant interference of this Court.

Resultantly, this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself.