Chandra Prakash Jain and Another vs Manish Pratap and Others

Shishir Kumar, J.—This is the Plaintiffs'' second appeal arising out of a suit filed for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants/Respondent s from interfering over the suit land, shown at the foot of the plaint.

The brief facts, as stated in the plaint, are that the suit land is agricultural land comprising of plot Nos. 156/1, 157/1, 157/2, 158/1 and 159/1 of Khata No. 17, situated in Non-Zamindari Abolition area of Pargana, Tehsil and District Saharanpur. An application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC seeking interim injunction was also filed and the parties were directed to maintain status quo during pendency of the suit. The Defendants/Respondent s filed their written statement and contested the suit claiming that the Appellants have executed a sale deed in their favour and thus they are Bhumidhar of the land in dispute and Appellants were not entitled to get any injunction. They also claimed that there was a compromise between the parties in pursuance to which Appellants have accepted them as Bhumidhar and thus compromise be made part of the decree. The Appellants brought on record many documents including judgment dated 02.11.1965. It has been stated that the trial Court did not frame any issue, but recorded a finding that the Defendants have surrendered all their rights and title in favour of one partnership firm, namely, M/s Ganga Construction and the same has not been impleaded. It has also been held that some other persons who are also parties to this partnership firm have not been impleaded and, therefore, no relief can be granted to the Appellants for the suit land. The trial Court has further held that compromise claimed by the Defendants cannot be made rule of the Court since it is not legal document. Further, trial Court has dismissed the suit on the ground that the Appellants have not come before the Court with clean hands and have made contrary statements. The appeal filed by the Appellants has also been dismissed. Hence, the present second appeal has been filed.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that in a suit for injunction certain procedure has been provided to decide the controversy between the parties. The trial Court without framing any issues has dismissed the suit on the ground that there is a compromise, though no finding to that effect has been recorded that whether the compromise was valid or not and only on the ground that the Plaintiffs/Appellants have not approached this Court with clean hands as well as changed the stand from time to time, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief. Further submission has been made that whether the suit for permanent injunction can be decided without determining the question of possession and without recording a definite finding of possession. A submission has also been made that trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court has erred in law in accepting the compromise, which is apparently illegal. He has placed reliance upon paragraphs 11 and 22 of the apex Court judgment reported in Alka Gupta Vs. Narender Kumar Gupta, the same is being quoted below:

The pleadings in the two suits make it clear that both parties proceeded on the basis that the partnership between Appellant and Respondent under deed dated 5.4.2000 was only in regard to the business run under the name and style of ''Takshila Institute'' at Bhera Enclave, Paschim Vihar, Delhi-110087. The Appellant proceeded on the basis that the property at Rohini and the business carried therein under the name of Takshila Institute, was not a part of the partnership business under deed dated 5.4.2000. Even the Respondent in his written statement in the first suit asserted that the partnership dated 5.4.2000 between Appellant and Respondent did not extend to Takshila Institute at Rohini or other places. In fact Appellant clearly contended that Respondent was carrying on business under the same name of Takshila Institute at Janakpuri, Ashok Vihar and Kalu Sarai in Delhi and also at Dehradun and Palampur, but they were not partnership businesses. The Respondent in his written statement asserted that he alone was carrying on business at those places under the name of Takshila Institute. Therefore, the Court could not, before trial, assume that the sale of Appellant''s share in the immovable property at Rohini and the goodwill and assets of the business carried on at Rohini under the name of Takshila Institute should be taken as relinquishment or retirement or settlement of share in regard to the partnership business of Paschim Vihar Takshila Institute.

We also fail to understand how costs of Rs. 50,000 could be levied. This Court has repeatedly stated that in dealing with civil suits, Courts will have to follow the provisions of CPC in levying costs.

Placing reliance upon aforesaid judgment, learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that the suit cannot be dismissed under Order II, Rule 2 in absence of issues. The Court below was obliged to frame issues and to decide the controversy accordingly, but the Court below as well as the lower appellate Court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record by dismissing the suit holding that the compromise was arrived between the parties, though it is not valid. The appellate Court has committed the same error by dismissing the appeal holding that in case any of the party is aggrieved by the decision on the basis of compromise, then he has a right to raise the issue. As regards cross objection, the Appellants have submitted that cross objection itself was not maintainable and a finding to that effect has been recorded by the appellate Court, but in spite of the aforesaid fact, the appeal filed by the Appellant has been dismissed only on the ground that as the Appellants have concealed various facts, therefore, they are not entitled for relief and to get permanent injunction. A person is not entitled to get any relief of permanent injunction if he has approached the Court after concealing certain facts. In case the Plaintiffs / Appellants were not able to prove their case, the suit should have been dismissed after framing the issues and after leading the evidences, but the Court below has committed an error apparent on the face of the record to dismiss the suit that too without framing any issues, therefore, substantial question involved in the present appeal is that whether Court below was justified in deciding the suit as it has been decided.

On the other hand, the Defendants/Respondent s have put an appearance and have submitted that the suit was filed only to harass the answering Respondent s and to extract more money, although the entire sale consideration was paid in the year 1988, when the sale deed was executed and registered. The suit has been filed without any right, title or interest in the property in question, as the possession of the property in dispute was transferred in the year 1988 by means of registered sale deed. Further submission has been made that the property in dispute belongs to one Chatar Sen Jain, father of the Appellants. Against him a case was filed u/s 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which was decided vide judgment and order dated 30.05.1969. In the order dated 30.05.1969, it was held that the Zamindari Abolition Act was extended to the area in question including Nazul land in Village-Mahipur. The proceedings were started to cancel the Bhumidhari of Chatar Sen Jain, which was rejected by the order dated 30.05.1969. The name of father of the Appellants was recorded as Bhumidhar over the land in dispute in 1376 fasli, which is evident from the Khatauni annexed thereto. The findings recorded by the Court below about the admission of the Plaintiffs claiming themselves to be the Bhumidhar is correct, which is evident from the fact and the allegation made in the plaint that they admitted themselves as Bhumidhar. In the order dated 11.03.1994, it has been decided by the competent Court of law that U.P. Tenancy Act is not applicable over the land in dispute. The compromise application (Paper No. 26-A) filed by both the parties and successive orders passed by the trial Court goes to show that Rs. 10,00,000/- was agreed to be paid. The aforesaid application was rejected by the trial Court. Ultimately, a writ petition was filed whereas the Respondent s were directed to deposit Rs. 10,00,000/- and the trial Court was directed to proceed in accordance with law, which is clear from the order dated 18.12.2009 and 08.01.2010.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent s submits that application 26-A, which is compromise application, was acted upon as it was signed by both the parties, therefore, it was up to the satisfaction of the Court to take appropriate decision in view of Order 23, Rule 3. Further submission has been made by learned Counsel for the Respondent s that the judgment and order was passed by the Court below dismissing the suit on the ground that the Plaintiffs are not able to prove their case, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief. The suit was filed without disclosing and challenging the validity of sale deed. The written statement was filed and factum of execution of sale deed and the litigation which was going on for correction of records for the last 20 years was admitted. A compromise application 26A signed by both the parties was filed before the trial Court wherein prayer was made to dismiss the suit in terms of the compromise. The Plaintiffs / Appellants filed an application (Paper No. 27-Ga) with a prayer that draft of Rs. 10,00,000/- be provided first and only, thereafter, the suit be decided in terms of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial Court rejected the application for payment of Rs. 10,000,000/- and directed to verify the compromise first and only then the payment can be made. In such circumstances, this Court has passed the order which has already been mentioned above. The trial Court proceeded to decide the compromise application, but dismissed the suit on account of non-appearance of rest of the Plaintiffs, although they were duly represented through Plaintiff No. 1, who was the attorney holder and filed the suit in the same capacity and he has singed the compromise. The trial Court while dismissing the compromise application dismissed the suit on account of conduct of the Plaintiff, as he was changing stand illegally as well as factually from very beginning. The first appellate Court dismissed the appeal as well as the cross objection also on the ground that the cross objection is not maintainable, but it has been held that the compromise application (Paper No. 26-A) has lawfully been reduced to writing and signed by the parties. It has further been held that the compromise is valid and binding between the parties. Further finding has been recorded that none of the parties can resile from the compromise, which is lawfully been reduced in witting and singed by the party unless and until it is proved that the same is based on fraud. It has further been held by the appellate Court that compromise is binding upon the parties and the Respondent s have also got no right to file cross objection.

Further, a submission has been made on behalf of Defendants/Respondent s that the validity of the compromise has not been challenged before this Court or before the Court below. Once the compromise is signed, it will be treated to be valid and binding upon the parties It is not the case of the Appellants that the compromise was unlawfully signed. Both the Courts have held that compromise was lawful, therefore, the Court below should have passed a decree in terms of compromise and in terms of the application as provided under Order 41, Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure. Since the factum of validity of the compromise is not under challenge, therefore, none of the parties can be permitted to resile from the compromise. Learned Counsel for the Respondent s placed reliance upon judgment of this Court reported in 1997 (29) ALR 46; Bhikhari Deceased through L.Rs. v. Smt. Paramjota Deceased through L.Rs. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgment, learned Counsel for the Respondent s submits that if compromise is signed by both the contesting parties, then on non-verification by one of the contesting parties, compromise or compromise decree cannot be set aside. The relevant observation made in the judgment is being reproduced below:

A situation cannot be excluded or ignored where written compromise signed by the parties is filed on the record, but one party refuses subsequently to verify the same. If one party in this way resiles from the compromise the Court under the old law, before the amendment of 1976, used to make enquiry whether such compromise was entered into or not by the parties. In this case the second stage did arise. The compromise was filed in the Court of Munsif, Deoria. It was subsequently transferred to the Court of I Vth Additional Munsif, Deoria. Ext.2 shows that an application 15C was moved by Smt. Paramjota that the compromise (paper No. 14-A-I) be recorded and the suit be decreed accordingly. Copy of this application was given to the counsel for Bhikhari, Sri. Baijnath Goel, D.W.2. The counsel for Bhikhari admitted in the cross examination that his clerk actually received the copy of application (paper No. 15-C). If in spite of receiving copy of this application neither Bhikhari nor his counsel appeared in the Court of Munsif Deoria or IV Additional Munisf, Deoria nor any objection was filed to such application or to the compromise being recorded, the enquiry began and in the absence of objection and finding that the compromise was signed by both the parties, the Additional Munsif was, therefore, not imaginary, but in accordance with the established procedure for recording such satisfaction when one party attempts to resile from the compromise.

Further reliance has been placed upon para 15 of the judgment reported in AIR 1983 All 152; Rama Shanker v. 3rd Additional District Judge, Basti and Ors. which is being reproduced below:

The second submission was that the Court had directed the compromise to be put up after the disposal of the substitution matter. Technically substitution matter was disposed of only after Sudha was held to be an heir of Uma Shanker in pursuance of the order of remand passed by this Court on 10th of Sept., 1980 in the writ petition filed by Sheshnath. The order regarding the compromise was, therefore, illegal on that ground alone. I am not impressed by this argument. By an order Dt. 12th of Aug., 1976 the Court had disposed of the substitution matters which were pending before it. It had directed the substitution of only Respondent s Nos. 11 and 12. The Court could hence lawfully proceed to dispose of the matter of compromise also. If Sudha was held to be an heir of Uma Shaker subsequently that would not per se invalidate the compromise. If Km. Sudha acquired any right in consequence of the orders passed in her favour subsequently, she could have herself challenged the order regarding the compromise. But the Petitioner cannot claim the right to challenge the compromise on the aforesaid ground. Moreover, as I have shown above no relief was claimed against Uma Shanker in the suit. Consequently, the compromise could not be challenged on the mere ground that Sudha who was held to be a legal heir subsequently had not signed the compromise. In my opinion, the suit stood fully adjusted by the compromise because the sale stood only in favour of Rama Shanker, the Petitioner, nobody else was affected by the compromise. In a case reported in AIR 1927 57 (Privy Council) it was held that a compromise to which some of the parties to a suit alone are parties is not necessarily invalid. It was observed in that case that where a party to a suit transfers his interest in the subject matter to another and the transferee is brought on the record, and the transferors name continues on the record, the compromise effected between the transferee and the opposite party relating to the subject matter was valid even though the transferor was no party to the compromise. Thus, in any view of the matter there is no substance in the second contention either.

Further reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the apex Court reported in Amteshwar Anand Vs. Virender Mohan Singh and Others, The relevant is para 32, which is being quoted below:

The pleadings of fraud in both the applications of the Appellants were in any event grossly inadequate. Both the Trial Court and the Division Bench have correctly held so. In fact the basic cause for which the Appellants initially came to the Court was a non payment of amounts as specified under the agreements by VMS. We concur with the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Appellants could execute the decree for the monies due under compromise decree dated 25th August 1993. Mere non-payment was certainly not supportive of a ground for setting aside the decree on the basis of an allegation of fraud.

Further reliance has been placed upon Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in Smt. Raisa Sultana Begam and Others Vs. Abdul Qadir and Others, Relevant is para 9, which is being quoted below:

In Ram Bharos Lall v. Gopee Beebee. (1874) 6 NWP 66, it was held by another Bench of this Court, of which Pearson, J was a member, that a Plaintiff who has withdrawn his suit is at liberty to rescind the act of withdrawal at any time before the final judgment because:

It is difficult to understand why a Plaintiff should have liberty to withdraw from a suit and not have equal liberty to rescind the act of withdrawal at any time before final judgment.

We may with respect point out the reason and it is that the right of a Plaintiff to withdraw his suit is not a divine right but a right expressly conferred upon him by Order 23, Rule 1 and no right is similarly conferred upon him to revoke or rescind the withdrawal. So long as he remains the Plaintiff he may do any act which he may do in that capacity; he cannot, after withdrawal of the suit resulting in the loss of the capacity, do an act which can be done only in that capa-city. The learned Judges distinguished Rajah Shumsher Bahadoor, (1867) 2 HCR 158 (supra) on the ground that in that case there was a long interval of time between the withdrawal and the revocation of withdrawal whereas in this case there was an interval of only one day. With great respect, we find it difficult to understand that whether withdrawal can be revoked or not depends upon the delay with which it is revoked. The question is of a right and not of delay with which it is sought to be exercised. In Raj Kumari Devi v. Nirtya Kali Debi (1910) 7 Ind Cas 892 (Cal), it was held at p 893 that

it was competent to the Plaintiff to recall her petition of withdrawal at any time before the final order had been passed.

The learned Judges relied upon the case of (1874) 6 NWP 66, and distinguished the case of Shumsher Bahadoor (1867) 2 HCR 158. It has not been pointed out by them why an order of the Court is required in order to complete or effectuate the withdrawal and have not filed any authority for imposing this condition. We have pointed out that on withdrawal certain orders may be passed by the Court but they are not for giving effect to the withdrawal, but to give effect to consequences arising out of the withdrawal. Order 23, Rule 1 does not require any order; there can be no question of an order if no application is to be made by the Plaintiff. We, therefore, respectfully disagree with the view of the Calcutta High Court. In Mukkammal v. Kalimuthu Pillay 15 Ind Cas 852 (Mad), Sundara Aiyar, J. was of the view that the Plaintiff has a right to revoke the act of withdrawal, while Sadasiva Aiyar, J. was inclined to the view that neither can he revoke his withdrawal application except on good grounds nor can he be allowed to play fast and loose with the litigation launched by him at his sweet will and pleasure. Sundara Aiyar, J. referred to the absence of any provision in the Code giving a right to a Defendant to insist that a petition of withdrawal not acted upon by the Court must be enforced as against the Plaintiff and thought that a mere petition of withdrawal does not debar the Plaintiff from proceeding with the suit unless, in the meanwhile, the suit has been dismissed by the Court. We respectfully disagree as no order of the Court is required when a Plaintiff withdraws a suit and there is no justification for saying that the act of withdrawal is not complete so long as the Court does not dismiss the suit. The bar imposed by Sub-rule (3) operates on withdrawal and not on any order by the Court dismissing the suit and must be deemed to include the prevention of revival of the suit.

In Lakshmana Pillai alias Shanmugham Pillai and Another Vs. Appalwar Alwar Ayyangar and Another, it was assumed by Oldfield, J. that an application for withdrawing a suit is conditional on the passing of an order regarding costs. But it seems to us, with respect to the learned Judge, that there is a distinction between withdrawal by a Plaintiff of the suit and his liability to be awarded the costs of the suit. The liability arises out of the withdrawal but it would be wrong to argue that so long as the liability is not imposed the withdrawal is not complete. There may be an interval of time between the withdrawal and imposition of the liability through an order without its in any way derogating from the effect of the withdrawal. The facts in Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhuria and Others, were distinguishable because the Plaintiff sought to withdraw from the suit with permission to file a fresh one and that required an order from the Court granting permission. There is a distinction between withdrawal without liberty to file a fresh suit which is at the absolute discretion of the Plaintiff and withdrawal with liberty which can be done only when the Court grants permission. In this case the Court postponed passing orders on the application for permission to withdraw with liberty and before the orders were passed the Plaintiff withdrew the application. A plain tiff may have a right to withdraw an application for withdrawal with liberty but it does not follow that a Plaintiff who withdraws the suit under Sub-rule (1) has a right to revoke the withdrawal before the Court passes some order. Then we come to Yeshwant Govardhan Vs. Totaram Avasu and Others, in which Dixit and Vyas, JJ. held that an application by a Plaintiff withdrawing the suit requires an order, that so long as no order is passed It can he withdrawn and that no reasons are required for his withdrawing the application. With great respect we find it difficult to agree. It is true that a Court has control over the proceedings initiated by a Plaintiff through a suit but the Plaintiff has been given an absolute right to withdraw from it at any stage and the Court has no control over this act of withdrawal. The learned Judges said at p. 29:

If...the Plaintiff has a right to with draw his suit, he has, equally, a right to withdraw his withdrawal, and so long as the Court has not made an order showing that the withdrawal has become complete or effective there is always a locus paenitentiae for the Plaintiff to withdraw his withdrawal.

The right to withdraw has been expressly conferred by Rule 1(1); there is no provision conferring the right to revoke the withdrawal and there is no justification for saying that the right to withdraw includes in itself a right to revoke the withdrawal. As we said earlier, certain consequences arise from the withdrawal which prevent his revoking the withdrawal, the withdrawal is complete or effective as soon as it takes place, and, in any case, as soon as information of it is conveyed to the Court, and no order of the Court is required to effectuate it or even to recognise it. Then the learned Judges referred to the order regarding costs and inferred that the Court has to make an order after the withdrawal. Whatever order the Court may, or may have to make is not regarding the withdrawal but regarding the effect or consequences of the withdrawal, which is quite a different matter. The proposition that a Plaintiff has an absolute right to withdraw his application for withdrawal is not accepted universally and we have already referred to the observations to the contrary. Lastly, we come to Masulipatam Municipality Vs. Rallabhandi Venkatappayya and Others, Umamaheshwaram and S. Qamar Hassan, JJ. observed at p. 575:

Without the stroke of the judicial pen under Order 23, Rule 1, Sub-rule (3), CPC the suit is not terminated and that in appropriate cases the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 or Order 22, Rule 10 CPC may be applied.

The order referred to in Rule 1, Sub-rule (3) is only one imposing costs upon the Plaintiff on account of his withdrawal from the suit; this provision does not contemplate any order.

The Division Bench of this Court has held that once a compromise application is filed signed by the party concerned and if withdrawal application is filed orders can be passed by the Court, but not to give effect to withdrawal, but to give effect to the consequences arising out of the withdrawal because withdrawal application does not require any order. In such circumstances, Respondent s submit that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court has dismissed the suit and appeal after recording a cogent finding and further it is to be seen that if a person is not approaching the Court with clean hands and concealed certain facts and changed stands from time to time, then the Courts have option not to grant any relief to such person.

I have considered the submission of parties and perused the record. After perusal of the record it appears that a suit for injunction was filed, but during pendency of the suit a compromise application 26-A was filed singed by both the parties, with a condition that Rs. 10,00,000/- have to be paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs/Appellants. Immediately after filing the written statement on 31.07.2008, the parties have filed a compromise application 26-A, which has been singed by the Defendant as well as by the Plaintiff. The photographs on the compromise application were also pasted. It was singed by the Plaintiff No. 1 only because other Plaintiffs have executed a power of attorney in his favour and it was also singed by the Defendants'' Advocate. In the compromise application eight conditions were mentioned and one of the condition was that Defendants will pay Rs. 10,00,000/- by draft. In contents of the compromise application the factum of execution of the four sale deeds has also been admitted. In para 3 of the compromise application the Plaintiffs have stated that they are Bhumidhar of the property and admitted the fact that in 1988 the Defendants have purchased the property in dispute. It has also been admitted that after execution of the sale deed the Defendants have become owner in possession of the property. By making an application 30-C the Plaintiff-Chandra Prakash Jain has requested to fix 20.08.2008 for the purpose of taking a decision on compromise application. On the basis of aforesaid fact, it is clear that on the basis of compromise the Plaintiffs were eager to get the suit decided. The application No. 35-C was filed that as the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- has not been received, therefore, the compromise may be treated to be null and void. In spite of the objection made by the Defendants the Plaintiffs made an application 37-C and 38C with a request that the amount has not been paid, therefore, the amount may be directed to be paid to the Plaintiffs and after that according to Order 23, Rule 3 the compromise application be decided. Subsequently, application was filed which was numbered as 49-Ga stating therein that the sale deed may be declared null and void and the Defendants are not in possession of the property in dispute. Though in the compromise application factum of execution of sale deed as well as possession has been admitted.

A finding has been recorded by the trial Court that from the perusal of the record it clearly appears that Plaintiffs have admitted this fact that they were Bhumidhar of the property in dispute and also after admission made in the compromise application now they are denying various things which was admitted in the compromise application. After recording such finding the Court below has held that as such various things are being denied in spite of the admission made in the compromise application, therefore, on the basis of compromise application the suit cannot be decided, but taking another view that as the Plaintiff has not approached this Court with clean hands and various different pleas are being taken from time to time, therefore, in view of para 29 of the apex Court judgment reported in 2009 (108) RD 191; Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup and Ors. it has been held that it is the duty of the Court to see that justice is being done and if a person has not approached the Court with clean hands he is not entitled for any relief. The suit has been dismissed by judgment and decree dated 20.03.2010 and the appeal filed by the Plaintiffs/Appellants has also been dismissed.

The Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Raisa Sultana Begam (supra) has held that there is no distinction between withdrawing a suit and withdrawing from a suit when there is only one Plaintiff and he withdraws the whole suit it can be said that he withdraws the suit, but when there are more than one Plaintiff and one of them withdraws it may be better to say that he withdraws from the suit. In common law a Plaintiff has an absolute liability to discontinue or dismiss his suit at any stage of the proceedings prior to verdict or the judgment. "In paragraph 12, the Division Bench of this Court has held that if there is withdrawal in fact but not in law. The contention of Ghufran Ahmad is not that he revokes his application for withdrawal of his suit but that there was no withdrawal of his suit in law because the withdrawal that was there in fact was vitiated by fraud practised upon him by the opposite party."

In the present case, it is not the case of the Appellants that any fraud upon the Appellants has been played. With the compromise application Plaintiff has also filed an application for withdrawal of the suit to dismiss the suit as withdrawn in view of the compromise arrived. Further the appellate Court has recorded a finding that as the compromise application was singed by the parties, it is not their case that it is based on fraud, therefore, if any of the party is aggrieved by the order of the Court, they can challenge the same before the appropriate forum.

Once an application has been filed on behalf of Plaintiffs/Appellants to dismiss the suit as withdrawn then, in my opinion, he cannot withdraw the said application unless and until it is proved that some fraud has been played upon him and in view of changing stands by the Plaintiffs/Appellants trial Court as well as the appellate Court has dismissed the suit and appeal. The contention of the Appellants to that effect may have been correct that for the purpose of deciding the controversy in a suit the appropriate issues have to be framed and it has to be decided accordingly and in case the Plaintiffs are not in a position to prove their case the suit can be dismissed. But, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was a simplicitor suit for injunction and in the compromise application the Plaintiffs/Appellants have admitted the fact that four sale deeds have been executed and the possession of the property was handed over to the Defendants/Respondent s and they were Bhumidhar of the property in dispute and the compromise was singed by every party with a condition that Rs. 10,00,000/- may be paid. Admittedly, on the basis of direction of this Court draft has been deposited and it is laying with the Court. In such circumstances, the trial Court in view of changing stands from time to time has held that the Plaintiffs have not approached the Court with clean hands, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Courts below are findings of fact, based on evidence and as no substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal, it is hereby dismissed.

No order as to costs.