Chandra Wati vs Rishi Pal and Others

T.P.S. Mann, J.—Alongwith the present revision, the Court intends to dispose of Criminal Revision No. 1019 of 1999 as both the revisions arise out of order dated 19.11.1997 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kaithal whereby the accused-respondents were discharged of the offences under Sections 418/420/468/471/120-B IPC.

FIR No. 126 dated 4.6.1991 was registered at Police Station Kalayat under Sections 418/420/468/471/120B IPC on the basis of an application given by complainant-Smt. Chanderawli on 31.5.1991 to the police wherein she stated that she was owner in possession of land measuring 67 kanals 9 marlas in village Kalayat. Accused Rishi Pal in connivance with two Advocates obtained a false and bogus decree from the Court of Shri K.R.Goel, Sub Judge, Kaithal, and on its basis got ownership of the land changed in connivance with Halqa Patwari. Accused Rishi Pal had also taken tractor after obtaining loan against the said land besides purchasing a gun. The complainant had not appeared in the Court of Shri K.R.Goel, Sub Judge, Kaithal nor she gave any statement. Accused-Rishi Pal alongwith accused Smt. Mamo and Lachhman Dass had, thus, committed fraud with her.

During investigation of the case, it was found that Mamo had affixed her thumb impression by posing herself as Chanderawli. Accordingly, after completion of necessary investigation, the police submitted final report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. against the accused-respondents.

During hearing of the case for the purpose of framing charges, learned defence counsel argued that only the Court before which offences had been committed was competent to lodge complaint against the accused persons and the police could not register a case against the accused and investigate the matter.

After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, the trial Court felt convinced with the arguments submitted by the defence counsel that accused persons could not be charged on the basis of challan filed against the accused persons without there being any complaint by the Court before which the offence was committed. In coming to such a conclusion the Court placed reliance upon Raj Singh v. State of Punjab 1997(2) R.C.R. 101 in which this Court had held that no Court was entitled to take cognizance of offences under Sections 467/468/471/420/120-B/109 IPC except on a complaint in writing by the Court where these offences were allegedly committed. The trial Court also went through the merits of the case and reached the conclusion that the accused could not be charged for the offences under Sections 418/420/468/471/120-B IPC. Accordingly, the respondents were discharged of the aforementioned offences.

It may not be out of place to mention here that against the impugned order the State of Haryana filed a revision before the Court of Sessions whereas complainant-Chanderawli did not approach the Court of Sessions and, instead, filed the present revision in this Court u/s 401 Cr.P.C. During hearing of the present revision, this Court vide order dated 22.7.1999 ordered for withdrawal of the revision petition filed by the State of Haryana from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal for its hearing by this Court alongwith the present revision. Consequently, the said revision was received and numbered as Criminal Revision No. 1019 of 1999.

Learned Counsel for the complainant-petitioner as well as learned State counsel have submitted that while passing the impugned order, the trial Court placed reliance upon the judgment in Raj Singh''s case (supra). In the said judgment, it was held that where the accused persons had obtained decree from a Civil Court in respect of land belonging to the complainant by impersonation, the police was not competent to investigate the offence except on a complaint in writing by the Court where the offence was committed. While arriving at such a conclusion, K.S.Kumaran, J., as he then was, placed reliance upon Sheela Devi v. State of Punjab 1979 Chandigarh Law Reporter(Criminal) 195 (Pb.& Hry.). However, the ratio of case of Sheela Devi (Supra) was not approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh v. The State of Punjab 1983 RCR 38 and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the trial Court in the year 1997 cannot be sustained.

Learned Counsel representing the accused-respondents have opposed the prayer made on behalf of the complainant and the State by submitting that the alleged offences had been committed in the Court and, therefore, the police was not competent to register the FIR and investigate the case unless a complaint had been made in writing by the concerned Court.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order.

The observations made by the trial Court while holding that the accused persons could not be charged on the basis of the challan filed against them by the police without any complaint by the Court before which the offence was committed, are reproduced here-in-below:

I am convinced with the argument of learned defence counsel that accused persons cannot be charged on the basis of challan filed against the accused persons by police without any complaint by the Court before which offence was committed and for the same reliance can be placed upon authority in case Raj Singh v. State of Punjab 1997 (2) R.C.R. 101, in which Hon''ble High Court has held no Court is entitled to take cognizance of offences under Sections 467/468/471/120B/109 IPC except of a complaint in writing by the Court where these offences were allegedly committed by the petitioner.

Above said authority is fully applicable to the facts of the present case because in the present case prosecution version is that accused got false/bogus judgment and decree against the complainant by mis-representing and substituting some other lady in her place.

In the case of Raj Singh (supra), it was observed that Section 195(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure exclusively barred a Court from taking cognizance of the offences enumerated therein except on a complaint by the Court/public servant concerned and, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by registering the FIR and allowing the police to investigate the same if ultimately the same could not be taken cognizance of by a Court. The Court also sought support from an earlier decision of this Court in Sardul Singh v. State of Haryana 1992 (3) RCR 545 and also the observations made by D.S. Tewatia, J., as he then was, in Sheela Devi''s case (supra). The relevant portion of the judgment in the case of Raj Singh (supra) are reproduced here-in-below:

It may be that Section 195(1) specifically bars a Court from taking cognizance of the offences enumerated therein except on a complaint by the Court/public servant concerned, but no useful purpose will be served by registering the FIR and allowing the police to investigate the same if, ultimately, the same cannot be taken cognizance of by a Court. That will be an exercise in futility and on that ground, I am of the view that the FIR can also be quashed. In this regard, I am also supported by the decision of this Court in Sardul Singh''s case (supra) wherein it was held as follows :

The reading of the above referred provisions of Section 195 coupled with the procedure prescribed in Section 340 of the Criminal P.C. absolutely leave to(sic) doubt that not only cognizance of such offences without the complaint in writing of the Court concerned is barred but also the investigation into such offences because that will amount to taking over the function of the Court, where forgery was committed, by the investigating agency which is against mandate of S. 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The above referred view also finds support from the observations of Justice D.S. Tewatia (as he then was) in Sheela Devi v. State of Punjab 1979 Chand. L.R. (Cri.) 195 (Punj. and Har.). In that case also, the first information report for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B read with Section 109 of the Penal Code was quashed by holding that the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) read with Section 340 of the Criminal P.C. not only bar the taking of cognizance of the offences by the criminal Court but also the investigation into the allegations of such offences by necessary implication, as that will be a futile exercise if the Criminal Court cannot take cognizance of the offence except on the complaint in writing of the Court where such offences were committed regarding giving of false evidence or forged documents etc.

Therefore, in view of this decision and also the decision of another Single Judge of this Court in Sheela Devi''s case (supra), it is clear that this Court can quash the FIR also as it would be futile and meaningless to allow the police to investigate the case, if no Court could take cognizance of these offences which fall within the ambit of Section 195 Cr.P.C.

In the case of Karnail Singh (supra), the Hon''ble Division Bench held that the larger perspective and the precise connotation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code was not adequately projected and canvassed in Sheela Devi''s case (supra) and, therefore, the observations made therein were not good law and, thus, to be overruled. The conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench is as under:

To conclude on this aspect, I am of the view that the larger perspective and the precise connotation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code was not adequately projected and canvassed in Sheela Devi''s case (supra) and the observations made therein are not good law and have therefore, to be overruled. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner resting thereon have inevitable to be rejected.

In view of the above, the impugned order to the extent of holding that the accused persons could not charged on the basis of challan filed against them by the police without any complaint by the Court before which the offence was committed and placing reliance upon the decision in Raj Singh''s case (supra) cannot be sustained. The matter requires to be dealt with afresh by the trial Court on the question of applicability of the provisions of 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code.

Resultantly, both the revisions are allowed, impugned order to the extent of finding qua applicability of the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is set-aside and the matter remanded to the trial Court to pass an order afresh in accordance with law.

However, it is observed that this Court has not expressed its mind regarding the other conclusions taken by the trial Court while passing the impugned order.