Chandrasekharan Pillay vs M. Krithivasan and Others

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.—The question that has come up for consideration is whether the order passed by the dentral Administrative Tribunal rejecting Contempt Petition (Civil) filed u/s 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with Rule 17 of the Contempt of Court (C.A.T.) Rules, 1992 is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Petitioner herein filed Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 9 of 2000 to initiate action for contempt of Administrative Tribunal''s proceedings against General Manager, Southern Railway and Divisional Railway Manager, Southern Railway who were made eo nomine parties in the Contempt Petition.

Petitioner had filed O.A. No. 483 of 1991 for a declaration that -principles of reservation could be applied only on cadre strength. He also sought for a declaration that seniority among employees belonging to reserved and non-reserved categories of employees in the lower category would be reflected in the higher post notwithstanding the earlier promotion obtained on the basis of reservation. That O.A. was disposed of along with several other cases-granting the following reliefs:

(a) Principle of reservation operates on the cadre strength.

(b) Seniority vis-a-vis reserved and unreserved categories of employees in the lower category will be reflected in the promoted category also notwithstanding the earlier promotion obtained on the basis of reservation. Applying these principles, Respondents-Railways will work out the reliefs. We are issuing the direction, as the apex court thought that the judgments in force should be implemented (Interim Orders in C.A. 2017/1978).

(c) These directions shall be carried out within six months from today.

(d) Applications are allowed. Parties will bear their costs.

Aforementioned O.A. was disposed of by the Tribunal on 6th September 1994.. One of the applicants in O.A. No. 483 of 1991 later filed Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 94 of 1995 in O.A. No. 483 of 1991. The said petition was however withdrawn by the Petitioner therein on 26th July 1995. He filed Anr. application C.P. (C) No. 68 of 1996 along with several Ors. for implementing the order in O.A. No. 483 of 1991 and other connected matters. Administrative Tribunal rejected all those applications on 25th February 1997 stating that the decision in Sabharwal''s case was to be followed and was applied in these cases. The contention of the Petitioners that Respondents have disobeyed the directions of the Tribunal and have committed contempt, was not accepted.

Petitioner has now filed Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 9 of 2000 for almost identical reliefs. Notice was issued by the Tribunal and reply statement was filed on behalf of the Respondents. After considering the entire matter the Tribunal held as follows:

Some of the applicants in the common order approached this Bench of the Tribunal by filing Contempt Petition No. 68 of 1996 and connected petitions. The same question was considered there. It was held there that the contention of the Petitioners that Respondents have disobeyed the directions of this Tribunal and have committed contempt, cannot be accepted. In the light of the same, it is only to be accepted the stand of the Respondents that they have not committed any contempt since they have complied with the order.

Accordingly, the contempt petition is dismissed.

The above Order was passed on 28th September 2000. Challenging the said Order this Original Petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Respondents. It was stated that contempt petition was filed after more than five years of the original Order of the Administrative Tribunal, Further it was also stated that contempt application was earlier filed and was dismissed by the Tribunal. Counsel also stated that on merits also Petitioner had not made out any case to initiate contempt of the Tribunal''s proceedings. Counsel also raised a contention that the petition itself is not maintainable before this Court.

The question to be considered is whether the Petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against an Order passed by the Tribunal rejecting an application filed u/s 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. This question has been exhaustively considered by the Apex Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of A. P. and Ors. (2001) 1 S.C.C. 516. The Apex Court pointed out that Parliament in accordance with Article 323-A of the Constitution had enacted Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 to provide for adjudication or trial by the Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. On coming into force of the Act and Constitution of the Central Administrative Tribunal all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts, including the High Courts in relation to the matters specified in Section 14(1) of the Act came to be conferred on the Tribunal. Jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution. All decisions of the Tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution would be subject to scrutiny of the Division Bench of the High Court within those territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned is situate. Matters which are ear-marked for consideration by the Tribunal by the Constitution are to be considered particularly by the Tribunal and not by the High Court. It is also not open to the litigant to directly approach the High Court against those matters which are ear-marked for consideration by the Tribunals even in cases where question of vires of statutes or legislation is under challenge.

The Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, after holding clause 2 (d) of Article 323-A and clause 3 (d) of Article 323-B to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution as unconstitutional, held that the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and that the courts and tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution on the High Courts and Supreme Court. The Apex Court therefore held that all the decisions by the Tribunals whether under Articles 323-A or 323-B of the Constitution will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. It is now well settled that all the Orders passed by the Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 14(1) of the Administrate Tribunals Act are amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

The question that arises for consideration in this case is whether an Order passed by the Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred upon it u/s 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India This issue came up for consideration before the Apex Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad''s case (supra). That was a case where application for contempt jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal u/s 17 of the Act was filed seeking initiation of proceedings against the Principal Secretary, Irrigation and C.A.D. Department complaining of wilful disobedience of an Order passed by the Administrative Tribunal in favour of the applicant. The Tribunal initiated contempt proceedings State of Andhra Pradesh and Principal Secretary filed writ petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to take cognizance of the contempt case. The said matter was heard along with Anr. petition invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court without approaching the Tribunal u/s 17 of the Act complaining wilful disobedience of the Order passed by the Administrative Tribunal After exhaustive survey of the various legal issues and also examining the powers of the High Court and Supreme Court under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India and also examining the Constitution Bench decision in L. Chandraknmar s case (supra) the court held as follows:

It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has not declared the provisions of Article 323-A(2)(a) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been compared to like ''courts of first instance'' and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals having been held to be equivalent to courts or Tribunals subordinate to the High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them was either to make a reference to the High Court or to file a complaint under Sections 193, 219 and 228 I.P.C. as provided by Section 30 of the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, the right to file an apnea to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Tribunal punishing for contempt u/s 17 of the Act was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Association or L. Chandra Kumar or any other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring the same on any court or Tribunal and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of the High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning Tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or supplementally on any court or Tribunal which is not a concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2) (6) of Article 323-A specifically empowers Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power to punish for contempt, being conferred on the Administrative Tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of Tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High Court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals u/s 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not ''courts of record''. While holding the proceedings u/s 17 of the Act the Tribunal remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985.

The Apex Court also examined the question whether an Order passed u/s 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 by a Member of the Tribunal sitting single can be appealed against. In this context the Apex Court further held as follows:

The question of any Order made under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate Government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of two or more Members of the Tribunal therefore does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable u/s 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that Orders of the Tribunal holding the contemner guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction between Orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and Orders punishing for contempt u/s 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is this: as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter statutory remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself.

Aforementioned decisions of the Apex Court have laid down the law that any Order passed by the Tribunal u/s 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act would be appealable only to the Supreme Court and not to High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances, we are of the view that this petition is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed.