Chandubhai Rambhai Patel vs State of Gujarat and Others

Rajesh H. Shukla, J.—The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 226 of the Constitution of India and under the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Tenancy Act") for the prayer inter alia that appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 14th March 2002 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN/BS 4 of 2001 (at Annexure-D) and also the order passed by the Mamlatdar dated 31.7.2000 in Tenancy Case No. Tenancy/70B/Reg. No. 12/99 confirmed by the Deputy Collector, Navsari by his order dated 18th January 2001 in Tenancy Appeal No. 14/2000, on the grounds set out in the memo of petition. Heard learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala appearing with learned Advocate Shri Dilip L. Kanojiya for the petitioner and learned AGP Shri Manan Mehta for the Respondent State as well as learned Advocate Shri Ashim J. Pandya for the Respondent.

Learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala referred to the background and the facts of the case and the earlier order passed by the High Court (Coram: Akil Kurashi, J.) on 4.8.2005. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala also referred to the papers of Tenancy Case No. 12 of 1999 at Annexure-I. He submitted that therefore the matter was required to be proceeded on merits. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala referred to the papers, including the statement recorded at Chikhli Police Station vide FIR I-CR No. 59 of 1991 (at Annexure-I) and submitted that there are admissions of the landlord that the petitioner is a tenant. For that purpose, he referred to the admissions at Annexure-C as well as other documents in the form of the examination-in-chief in the revenue proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala therefore submitted that all these proceedings and the chequered history and also the background, would clearly suggest that the petitioner was a tenant, and in any case, the petitioner be covered in the definition of "deemed tenant" as provided in Bombay Tenancy Act. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala referred to the definition as provided in Section 2(18) of the Bombay Tenancy Act and submitted that the definition provides that; "tenant" means a person who holds land on lease and includes - (a) a person who is deemed to be a tenant u/s 4". He pointedly referred to Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, which provide for "deemed tenant" and submitted that, as provided, a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant. Therefore learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala referred to the background with regard to the purchase of the land in question and submitted that both had purchased the land jointly and there is no dispute that the petitioner has been cultivating the land and is in possession of the land in question. He submitted that, as it is reflected in the record, the earlier banakhat was made in the name of the Respondent, but the fact remains that it was jointly purchased, as both were the government servants, and therefore, it was in the name of the Respondent. Further, the admissions would make it clear that the petitioner has been in possession and occupation of the land, and he has been cultivating, for which there is sufficient evidence. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala therefore submitted that, as provided in Section 17 of the Evidence Act, the admissions have to be considered as per the provisions of the Evidence Act and it would clearly establish that the petitioner is in occupation and possession of the land. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in Ram Sahai and Others Vs. Jai Prakash and Another, and emphasized the observations made in paragraph 20. Similarly, he referred and relied upon the judgment reported in Bhura and Another Vs. Bahadursingh and Another, and emphasized the observations made in paragraph 11. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Avadh Kishore Das Vs. Ram Gopal and Others, . He pointedly emphasized the observations;

It is true that evidentiary admissions are not conclusive proof of the facts admitted and may be explained or shown to be wrong; but they do raise an estoppel and shift the burden of proof on to the person making them or his representative-in-interest. Unless shown or explained to be wrong they are an efficacious proof of the facts admitted.

Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala therefore submitted that unless it is proved contrary or explained, the admissions made by the Respondent has to be accepted about the occupation and possession of the petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala referred to the order at Annexure-B and also pointedly referred to paragraph 8 to support his submission about the admissions in light of provisions of Section 17 of the Evidence Act. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala therefore submitted that the tenancy is proved by admission and it is also supported by other evidence, and therefore, the impugned order, which has ignored this relevant aspect, may be quashed and set aside. He submitted that the impugned order has been passed without providing any opportunity of final hearing and the documents have been brushed aside stating that they are marks and they are not exhibited and therefore not proved. He therefore submitted that the present petition may be allowed.

Learned Counsel Shri Asim J. Pandya for the Respondent has referred to the papers at length to refer to the background for purchase of the land. He submitted that Respondent No. 4 is the subsequent purchaser by registered sale deed dated 6.8.1990. He submitted that in 1983 Bhimjibhai purchased the land from Respondent No. 2. As the petitioner is a government servant and Respondent No. 4 is a tribal and not a government servant, and therefore, it was purchased in the name of Respondent No. 4, who was a tribal. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya submitted that there are three rounds of litigation. He submitted that earlier there was RTS proceedings where the mutation of entry was sought to be initiated by the petitioner and ultimately it was accepted that he does not claim tenancy and it was claimed that the land was purchased jointly. However, the said objections were not accepted and it was rejected. Thereafter again in other RTS proceedings u/s 17(D) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, the Mamlatdar and ALT rejected the claim of tenancy made by the petitioner. Thereafter an appeal was preferred before the Deputy Collector, which was also rejected. Thereafter, it was carried out before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by way of Appeal/Revision No. 16 of 1992 which was also rejected vide order dated 27.8.1992. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya submitted that earlier, Special Civil Application No. 8429 of 1992 was filed against the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal but it was withdrawn subsequently without proper disclosure on the ground that the survey number of the land was wrongly stated, and therefore, it was withdrawn with permission to file a fresh petition. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya therefore submitted that there was one more round of proceedings before the Mamlatdar and ALT, who vide order dated 31.7.2000 rejected such a claim. Thereafter, the matter was carried out before the Deputy Collector, who, again, by order dated 18.1.2001 rejected the same. Thereafter, it was carried out before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, which has passed the impugned order dated 14.3.2002. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya referred to the evidence/deposition of the petitioner dated 25.10.1999 on page 162 and submitted that the stand is changed and it is claimed that it was jointly purchased. He submitted that, thereafter, the new claim has been made for claiming a tenancy right without any supporting evidence. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya submitted that the submission about admissions of the Respondent has to be considered in background of the facts, and it cannot be said that there was any admission as sought to be canvassed, ignoring the documentary evidence and the findings of the authorities given earlier, specifically rejecting any such claim of tenancy. He submitted that the land is specifically allotted to the tribal, and according to Section 73A of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, there is a prohibition that transfer of such a land allotted to a tribal, and even occupation and transfer of occupation and possession, is also not allowed. He referred to the other documents produced on record to suggest that, as per village form 7/12, it was in the name of the Respondent from 2007 to 2010. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya submitted that the provisions of Section 73AA(3) regarding the possession was inserted and the possession cannot be transferred without permission. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya submitted that the word "lawfully" as provided in the definition of the "tenant", the possession has to be lawful and the burden is on the petitioner who claims to be tenant and it would apply to the person who is unauthorizedly in occupation and possession in spite of the criminal proceedings. He submitted that unless there is evidence and material on record, the present petition under Article 226 may not be entertained as the order cannot be said to be;

(i) without jurisdiction,

(ii) contrary to the statutory provisions and records,

(iii) perverse.

He therefore submitted that no reasonable man can come to a conclusion that the order is perverse. He therefore submitted that since none of the grounds and the criteria are fulfilled, the court may not exercise the discretion under Article 227. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya further submitted that in view of the concurrent findings given by the authorities, the court may not entertain the present petition under Article 227 particularly when there are shift in the stand in the proceedings before the authorities as stated above and there is no evidence to support the claim of tenancy. He emphasized and submitted that, on the contrary, in earlier round there is a positive finding against the petitioner when the tenancy was claimed. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya referred to Section 73AA of the Bombay Tenancy Act and submitted that it is a specific provision, which has been brought into statute to protect the interest of the tribal. He submitted that when there is a special law and when there are two statutes, the provisions of the special law would prevail. He also referred to the documents which has been referred to by learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala to demonstrate about the admissions. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya submitted that some isolated admission made in a criminal case cannot be relied upon and it cannot be said that it is an admission. He submitted that as observed in a judgment reported in Kishan Singh (D) through LRs. Vs. Gurpal Singh and Others, , finding recorded in criminal proceedings cannot be used in civil proceedings as both are different, and the standard of proof in both the proceedings are different. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya submitted that whether the petitioner is a tenant or not, no material or evidence is produced and sole claim is made on the basis of the so called admission by the Respondent, which has been scrutinized by the authority, and the authority has rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not a tenant. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya therefore submitted that the present petition may not be entertained. Learned Counsel Shri Pandya referred to the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in State of Maharashtra and others Vs. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri and others, in support of his submission.

In rejoinder, learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala submitted that the admission made in the court or in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings can be relied upon, and in support of his submission he has referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in Kishan Singh (D) through LRs. Vs. Gurpal Singh and Others, . Learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala also again referred to Section 17 read with Section 31 of the Evidence Act and submitted that the respondent is stopped from contending otherwise whether there is admission made in the proceedings or the quasi-judicial proceedings. He reiterated his submission and referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Avadh Kishore Dass (supra) and emphasized the observations made in paragraph 23 and also the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Invest Import, the observations made in paragraph 17.

Learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala submitted that the objections referring to the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act and particularly Section 73AA cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the High Court when no such contention has been raised earlier. He submitted that the judgment is perverse when it has not considered the background on the ground that it is a mark and not exhibited. Learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala also referred to the papers and submitted that there is sufficient evidence that the petitioner is cultivating the land. He referred to the papers and submitted that the petitioner had given an application to examine the witness, which has not been considered and no order is passed. Therefore, learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala submitted that the present petition may be allowed and the impugned order may be quashed and set aside as prayed.

In view of the rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present petition can be entertained and whether the impugned order can be sustained or not.

As could be seen from the rival submissions made at length referring to the record in detail, the main emphasis made by learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala is on the admissions or the so called admissions of the Respondent about the occupation and possession of the petitioner on the basis of this possession, which is claimed, the submission with regard to the right as a tenant or deemed tenant. Learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala has referred to the papers to also support his submission that he is cultivating the land, and therefore, again emphasized referring to the definition of "deemed tenant" that, when the person is in possession lawfully, is a "deemed tenant". On the other hand, Learned Counsel Shri Pandya has referred to the papers at length to give a detailed idea about the findings by the authorities below in earlier rounds. As, it could be observed from the findings of the authorities below that, earlier the claim was made by the petitioner that the land in question was purchased jointly. There was an objection with regard to the mutation of the entry in the name of the Respondent. However, the same has been rejected, which has lead to the further proceedings. Thereafter, there is a shift in the stand on the basis of the right based on the "deemed tenancy" or the "deemed tenant". The claim based on the basis of the tenancy or the "deemed tenancy" is also not accepted and rejected by the authorities with a detailed discussion. Therefore, the moot question, which this court is required to consider is, whether the admission, which has been emphasized, is required to be accepted as a conclusive proof (assuming that it is an admission) or the findings given by the authorities in the proceedings based on the relevant records specifically rejecting the claim on both the counts - joint purchase of the property, and subsequently, the claim based on a right as a "deemed tenant" are rejected. Again, as could be seen from the record, initially, it was sought to be purchased, and the banakhat was made. Thereafter, the banakhat is made in the name of the Respondent and the entries are also mutated, which have not been disturbed inspite of the challenge by the petitioner in earlier two rounds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Revenue Tribunal has discussed on this aspect at length and has also referred to not only the entries but also the contentions with regard to the so called admissions, and it has been observed that the authorities below have given the concurrent findings. There is a specific finding that the petitioner though claims the right, has not been able to produce any documentary evidence as required under the Bombay Tenancy Act. From 1986 the petitioner has not produced any documentary evidence with regard to the payment of any charges before the revenue authorities or the office and has been banking upon only the admission of the son of Motibhai - Respondent No. 3 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal has also considered this aspect of admission with reference to the provisions of the Evidence Act (Sections 17, 18 and 13) and has clearly observed that it cannot be a conclusive proof, and the corroboration in the form of some material and other evidence is required to be considered, particularly when there are concurrent findings given by the authorities in the form of relevant document and the material. Therefore, when the petitioner has failed to give any material or evidence though he claims the possession in support of his claim, and merely relies the so called admissions, the authorities below particularly the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in its impugned order has discussed and has not accepted in light of the material produced before it. The documents, which were sought to be relied upon by the petitioner, have not been accepted. The contention raised by learned Senior Counsel Shri S.H. Sanjanwala that it has been brushed aside on the ground that it is merely a mark and not a exhibited document, has to be read in context and background of the facts. In fact, the Deputy Collector has considered all the material as observed in the impugned order, and therefore, such a submission made by learned Senior Counsel Shri Sanjanwala cannot be accepted. It is required to be mentioned that, may be, at the time of purchase of the land in question, there might be some understanding, but the court is required to consider only the documentary evidence, and the registered sale deed is only in the name of Respondent No. 3, and when the entry was sought to be mutated, the applicant/petitioner has raised the objection in the year 1990 at that time, and in spite of all rounds of litigation, he has not be able to establish by any semblance of prima facie material. Therefore, it is too late at this stage to ignore all these concurrent findings and the material to accept the submissions made relying upon the so called admissions in this proceedings. Again, as rightly submitted by learned Counsel Shri Pandya, the scope of exercise of discretion under Articles 226 and 227, and also the judicial review, while interfering with the order passed by the court or the authority below has to be considered. It is well accepted that normally the High Court would not disturb the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the authorities below on the basis of appreciation of material on record. Further, unless the conclusion, which is arrived at is contrary to the statutory provision or rule or ignoring the relevant material or, is perverse, the same may not be disturbed. The Hon''ble Apex Court in catena of judicial pronouncement has also laid down the broad guidelines while considering such an aspect. Therefore, considering the aforesaid broad guidelines, as well as the background of the facts and the rival submissions, the present petition cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any stands vacated.