Channabasavappa vs M.P. Nataraj and Others

Anand Byrareddy, J.—These appeals are disposed of by this common judgment, as the said appeals arise out of a common judgment of the trial court in two civil suits decided together, namely, O.S. No. 137/1995 and O.S. No. 2/2005.

The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 2/2005 had contended that the Pontiff of Virakta Mutta, Bettadapura, had created a Trust, known as ''Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendraswamy Free Boarding Home Fund'', as on 25.4.1927. The object of the Trust was to provide free boarding and lodging facilities to poor students of the Veerashaiva community, pursuing their studies in Mysore city. In this regard, he had endowed several items of properties under a Trust Deed and had nominated seven respectable persons of the Veerashaiva community as Trustees.

The boarding home and hostel was being run in a premises belonging to the Virakta Mutta, Bettadapura located at Jhansi Lakshmibai Road, Mysore, over the years. The hostel was said to have been shifted to a place at Ramachandra Agrahara, K.R. Mohalla, about four years prior to the suit.

It was the case of the plaintiffs that the Trust was being mismanaged in violation of the stipulations in the Trust Deed. It was particularly urged that with the induction of the first defendant as a Trustee, serious differences had arisen among the Trustees, resulting in the institution and the beneficiaries suffering. It was contended that in terms of the Trust Deed, in such event of mismanagement and crisis, the eighth defendant, a lingayath Association was to take over the management of the Trust completely and remove all the Trustees, which the said defendant had failed to do and therefore were before the court seeking the removal of all the trustees and for appointment of other Trustees.

Defendant No. 1 had filed a written statement to state that he and defendants 3 to 7 were the managing trustees. That the Pontiff of the Virakta Mutta, who had created the Trust had left behind a will, and that he was unable to lay his hands on a copy of the same. And that it was mentioned there that none of his successors would be inducted as a Trustee. However, the second defendant, who was the present pontiff, had forced himself on the Trust and got himself nominated as one of the Trustees and had taken all the movables and documents into his custody and was squatting on the property. And that he had prevailed on the other Trustees to make him the Chief patron and had started to dominate over all the other Trustees. Later, he had compelled the Trustees to name him as the President of the Board of Trustees. That he had taken over the finances of the Trust and was dealing exclusively with the affairs of the Trust. The second defendant had utilized the funds of the Trust to be offered as a security for a loan to establish a Pharmacy College.

He had then sought to assert ownership over the premises in which the hostel was situated and that he had initiated criminal proceedings against the Trustees for protesting against such atrocities. And that the trustees had approached the court with a petition under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Hereinafter referred to as ''the CPC, for brevity) seeking leave of the court to file a suit, in O.S. 137/95, which was the connected suit.

Defendants 3 to 7 had reiterated the allegations made by Defendant No. 1, in their separate written statement.

Defendant No. 2 had filed his written statement to contend that the suit filed was not in accordance with the requirement of Section 92 CPC. It was admitted that he had leased the premises situate at the Jhansi Lakshmi Bai Road for purposes of running a Nursing School and Hostel. That he had put the Trustees in possession of the premises. The trustees were making false and malicious allegations against him. And that it was true that the Trust was not being run in accordance with the intention of the Author of the Trust. And it was admitted that the first defendant was instrumental in mismanaging the affairs of the Trust. The other Trustees were also not ensuring the proper management of the Trust. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial court had framed the following Issues:

"1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants 1 to 8 trustees are acting prejudicial to the interest of Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendraswamy Free Boarding Home Fund Trust?

2) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants have mismanaged the trust properties and tarnished the image of Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendraswamy Free Boarding Home Fund Trust?

3) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants 1 to 8 needs to be removed from Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendraswamy Free Boarding Home Fund Trust?

4) Whether the plaintiffs prove that fresh trustees for Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshkendraswamy Free Boarding Home Fund Trust needs to be appointed?

5) What order or decree?"

The court below has answered issue Nos. 1 to 3 partly in the affirmative and issue No. 4 in the affirmative and the defendant No. 2, the appellant was ordered to be removed from the Trust.

The suit in O.S. No. 137/1995 was filed by Shriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Desikendra Swamy Free Boarding Home Fund Trust, represented by its trustees. It was stated that the pontiff of the Viraktha Mutta, is a mutta of a sub-sect of the Veerashaiva community owing allegiance to the Jagadguru Sri Jayadeva Murugarajendra Mutta of Chitradurga.

Shri Chikkaveera Desikendra Swamy, who was the pontiff of the Viraktha mutta during the year 1924, is said to have established the Trust with the object of providing free boarding and lodging for poor students of the Veerashaiva community in Mysore City. He had constituted a Board of Trustees under a registered deed as on 25.4.1927.

It was the claim of the plaintiffs that the trust deed had provided eight trustees, including a registered body known as "Mysore Lingayath Education Fund Association" represented by its Secretary, which is now known as "the Karnataka Veerashaiva Vidya bivridhi Nidhi Samsthe", the second defendant. That according to the founder of the trust, two persons belonging to the Bale family of Yadathore and two persons from Choukahalli village, one person each from Ravandule, Harala halli, Periyapatna, two persons from Mysore and the registered body named above, constituted a Board of trustees. However, the pontiff of the Virakta Mutta, Shri Chikkaveera Desikendra Swamy did not choose to be a member of the Board of Trustees and also did not specify that his successors should be in the Board of Trustees. Thus, the Pontiff had divested himself of the management of the trust.

The first defendant, having evinced interest in the affairs of the trust, had prevailed on the members of the trust in appointing him as the "Patron-in-Chief", which was fulfilled and he was named as such. Thereafter, the first defendant was also conferred the President ship of the Trust by the Board of Trustees. The first defendant was authorized to deal with financial matters of the Trust.

That the first defendant and some of the members of the Board of Trustees objected that a trustee who was appointed, when he was Government servant, cannot continue as a trustee, after his retirement from Government Service. Therefore Dr. H. Thipparudra Swamy, who had been so appointed, had not participated in any proceedings subsequent to that objection. That the remaining members of the Board of Trustees on 4.11.1990 resolved that no trustee, who was inducted as a trustee, when he was in service, could continue after retirement. The first defendant was authorized on 4.11.1990 to deal with the financial transaction of the Trust. It is in that meeting the first plaintiff was made a Trustee.

As stated earlier, late Shri Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy had started a hostel for students in the name of "Bettada Purada Shri Chikkaveera Desikendra Swamy Free Boarding Home Fund" in the suit schedule property which was acquired for the purpose of a Free Boarding Home and Hostel and not for the Mutta. It was claimed that there was a will executed in that regard. The possession of the suit schedule property was handed over to the Board of Trustees to run the Free Boarding Home and Hostel and is known as the Trust property and in the assessment register, the suit schedule property is shown to be the property of the Trust.

It was contended that the author of the Trust had indicated the manner in which the vacancy on the Board of Trustees had to be filled. According to the deed, when a vacancy arose, the remaining trustees were to fill up the vacancy from among the members of the Veerashaiva Community. They had to elect one among them as the President and another as the Secretary. The position of a "Mahaposhaka" or Honorary President was not envisaged in the Trust Deed. The author of the trust, after creating the trust as stated earlier, had divested himself of the management of the Trust and except the status as a founder of the Trust, he had no other rights. The first defendant who was the successor as the Pontiff of the Bettadapur Mutta, did not inherit any right or by virtue of the being the Pontiff of the Mutta get any right or a say in the affairs of the Trust.

It is claimed that the first defendant is said to have formed an institution on 25.10.1991, namely, "Shri Chikkaveera Desikendra Swamy Vidyapeetha". In the meeting of the Board of Trustees on 7.11.1993, the first defendant as the president of the institution, was inducted as a trustee in place of the second defendant. The first defendant, having control of the records of the Trust and on the security of the bank deposit of the trust, had pledged the fixed deposit receipts with a bank to secure a license to start an institution to train students in the D. Pharma course. The first defendant had also got his name entered in the Assessment Register of the City Corporation to indicate that he was the owner of the suit schedule property. The other trustees having noticed these illegal acts had resolved to recall the said resolution by replacing defendant No. 2 as a trustee by defendant No. 1, representing an institution formed by him.

The plaintiffs had resisted the illegal acts of the first defendant and the first defendant asserted that the suit schedule property was not the property of the Trust. When the plaintiffs had resisted, the first defendant is said to have asserted that the suit schedule property was not the property of the Trust and as a successor, he was entitled to utilize the suit schedule property for educational purposes.

It is claimed that the first defendant, with the help of one Revanna, had even made attempts to forcibly evict the students who had been admitted to the hostel threatening the life of students.

It is claimed further that the Bettadapura Mutta is considered as "Saka Mutta of Jagadguru Shri Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Mutta of Chitradurga and therefore the accounts of the Trust had to be submitted to Sriman Jagadguru Jayadeva Murugarajendra Mahaswamy Mutta, who after discussion with the trustees, had orally instructed the first defendant to desist from converting the user of the suit schedule property for a purpose other than as a free boarding home. In disregard of the advice of Shri Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Mutta of Chitradurga, the first defendant had inducted students to the Nursing College and tried to oust the students, who had been admitted to the hostel.

The defendant No. 1 had filed a written statement denying the averments of the plaintiff except as admitted and explained hereunder:

That there existed a Veerashaiva Mutta at Bettadapur, was not disputed. It was accepted that the first defendant was the present Matadhipathi of the said Mutta.

It was admitted that Chikkaveera Desikendra Swamy had created a Trust and had constituted a Board of Trustees under a registered instrument dated 25.4.1927.

The composition of the Board of Trustees as detailed in the Deed of Trust, was not disputed. However, the allegation that all the properties of the Trust including the suit schedule property was the property of the Board was denied. It was contended that the suit schedule property was at no point of time the subject matter of dedication and it never constituted the property of the Trust. It was also contended that the plaintiffs had not chosen to divulge details about other properties of the Trust and therefore, it was clear that the attempt of the plaintiffs is to gain the suit schedule property.

The allegation that the defendant began to evince interest in the activities of the Trust since the year 1988, with an ulterior motive, was denied as false. It was asserted that the plaintiffs were estopped from raising contentions contrary to their own admitted conduct in naming the first defendant as the "Maha Poshaka".

It was contended that the first defendant never desired or aspired for the President''s position on the Board of Trustees. It was contended that he was the Pontiff, who had embraced a religious order and he had virtually severed connection with civil life and as such he did not aspire for any position.

However, as regards the conferment of authority on the first defendant to deal with financial matters of the Trust was not disputed.

It was clarified that the first defendant had no role in the passing of the resolution dated 04.11.1990. In fact, the said resolution was adopted by the members of the Board. The custody of accounts books etc., was then with the Office Manager, and it continued to be so even after 4.11.1990. It was contended that the defendant had gathered that plaintiffs had managed to forcibly take other several important books and files of the Trust.

It was contended that late Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy had created a Trust called "Bettadapura Sri Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy Free Boarding Home Fund" and it was incorrect to allege that he had started a hostel in the suit property which he had acquired earlier. It was pointed out that in the Trust Deed, the suit schedule property is not shown to be one of the items of the properties dedicated for achieving the objectives of the Trust. The allegation that the possession of the suit property was handed over to the Board of Trustees on 25.4.1927 was denied.

It was emphasized that the suit property had at no point of time been dedicated to the Trust and as such, there was no question of any document coming in to existence indicating the dedication of the property for the cause of the Trust at all. The question of the Trust perfecting its title to the suit property by adverse possession did not arise. It was contended that the plaintiffs had not revealed the particular point of time from which the possession of the Trust became adverse to the interest of the real owner of the property.

The defendant was not claiming to be a trustee any longer as he had been removed by a resolution of the Board.

It was contended that some of the plaintiffs themselves being parties to the resolution dated 18.1.1992, were not entitled to contend to the contrary.

The defendant having pledged the fixed deposit receipts with the State Bank of Mysore, to secure a Bank guarantee to start the D. Pharma course was denied, was in good faith and with the concurrence of the members of the Board, that the defendant was constrained to secure a Bank guarantee on the strength of the funds of the Trust for the benefit of a sister educational institution, and that too without any fraudulent intention. The changes effected in the Municipal records relating to the suit property was not disputed. It was contended that the defendant resorted to such action only for the purposes of keeping the records in tact.

The defendant had no knowledge whatsoever about the complaint dated 27.5.1994 said to have been lodged with Laxmipuram Police. It is to be noted that there were no students in the suit premises as on 27.5.1994 and the question of the defendant threatening to evict them never arose.

That Bettadapura Mutta was a part of Shri Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Mutta was denied. It was contended that Bettadapura Mutta was an independent Mutta, which functions on its own. It was further contended that even though the Trust Deed stipulated that the accounts of the Free Boarding Home Fund Trust should be forwarded to Murugarajendra Mutt as well as Bettadapura Mutt, it had never been implemented in practice from inception. At any rate, the question of bringing the violations to the notice of Jagadguru Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Swamy never arose, for the simple reason that the defendant had never indulged in any such acts at all.

It was contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim declaratory reliefs as prayed for and as such, they were not even entitled to claim the consequential reliefs of permanent injunction and mandatory injunction.

The court below, on the basis of the above pleadings, had framed the following issues:--

"1) Whether the defendant No. 1 prove that the suit schedule property is the property of Bettadapura Mutt, of which the 1st defendant is the Mattadipathi?

2) Whether the suit is not maintainable as pleaded by the 1st defendant in the written statement?

3) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the 1st defendant was inducted as a Trustee who took control of the books of accounts and other papers as Chairman after 4.11.1990?

4) Whether the plaintiffs prove that 1st defendant had indulged in acts amounting to breach of trust and therefore he is liable to be removed from the Board of Trustees?

5) Whether the plaintiffs have taken possession of the plaint schedule property as Trustee of ''Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendraswamy Free Boarding Fund Hostel?

6) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the declaratory reliefs sought for?

7) Whether the 1st defendant proves that he has independent authority to deal with the suit schedule property pursuant to which he was inducted S.C.V.D.S. Trust in to the suit property on 1.6.1994?

8) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of injunction sought for?

9) What decree or order?"

ADDITIONAL ISSUE:

"Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit schedule property was dedicated for the objects of Sriman Niranjana Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy Free Boarding Fund of is being used for such activities of the said Trust?" The Trial Court has answered Issues 3 to 6, 8 and 9 and additional issue No. 1 were held in the affirmative and issues 1, 2 and 7 were held in the negative. And had declared that the suit schedule property was the property of the Trust and granted an injunction against the first defendant therein from interfering with the same and the plaintiffs were held entitled to remove the first defendant from the Board of Trustees.

The learned Counsel for the appellant contends as follows:--

"That while granting leave to file a suit under Section 92 of the CPC, any person merely claiming to be from the Community or from the vicinity is not entitled to seek for a leave, unless a substantial interest is disclosed in the affairs of the Trust and that any acts of the Trust has affected their interest. It should also be established that the Trust is a Public Trust and without these findings, the leave ought not to have been granted and the suit should have been dismissed at the threshold. The materials on record clearly show that the Trust was constituted for the benefit of people who are capable of being identified with reference to their cast and therefore, the Trust did not constitute a Public Trust besides the evidence of P.W. 1 to PW4, and there are no activities of any nature extending the benefit to the public at large or under any Section thereof. This clearly reflects that this was a suit, which was not maintainable and the suit ought to have been dismissed.

It is contended that in O.S. 2/2005, the trial court has framed in all five issues. The issue No. 1 was as to whether the defendants were acting prejudicial to the interest of the Trust and the second issue was as to whether they had mismanaged the Trust Properties. These issues were never considered or dealt with and no finding had been recorded on these two issues. The materials on record clearly disclosed that the Trust was in existence since 1927 and the second defendant was inducted as a Patron-in-Chief of the Trust in 1988 and had subsequently taken various decisions. It was the specific case of the plaintiffs that it was only the first defendant who was the root cause of disputes arising within the Trust leading to litigation. Exhibit P-2, the Trust Resolution Book, had clearly indicated that all the decisions, which were taken were taken by the majority of the Trustees and at no point of time till the disposal of the suit, any Trustee had raised a dissent in a manner contemplated under the Trust Deed either moving for annulling, withdrawing or otherwise of the resolutions. All the acts that were alleged to constitute either mismanagement or acts which were prejudicial to the interest of the Trust were collective decisions, not attributable only to the second defendant. In fact, most of the decisions were taken even in his absence. In so far as the leasing of the schedule property was concerned, that was not the pleadings made out by the plaintiff, but something which was contained in the written statement of the first defendant. But even according to the plaintiff, the first defendant had sparked controversy and litigations within the Trust and the Trustees. If at all, any finding had to be recorded that any one of the decision was either against the object of the Trust or otherwise, which was jointly resolved by the Trustees, who participated in each one of the meetings, but in the case on hand, no finding is recorded about any of the resolution as being against violative of the intents under the Trust Deed or that the same had been subversive to the interest of the Trust. The plaintiffs had not demonstrated any mismanagement and the defendants'' statements of mismanagement is a statement against themselves, as they were the parties to the said decisions and if any findings were recorded against mismanagement, the court is not left with the option to pick and choose between them or at least between those who had attended the Board Meeting. The only finding recorded in respect of this suit is found at Para 35, where it was said that the relief sought for was identical and since the court had already come to the conclusion against the second defendant, the relief against the other defendants was rejected. In other words, the court was in a hurry to pass judgment in both the suits and this haste had resulted in the non-consideration of all the material issues.

The specific case of the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 137/1995 is that the schedule property was acquired by Sri Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy, the Senior Pontiff of the Viraktha Mutta, Bettadapura. The plaintiffs had themselves specifically contended that there was no document available as to how the schedule property was conveyed to the Trust nor did the Trust Deed contained any dedication or endowment of the suit schedule property for the purposes of obligations of the Trust. In other words, there was no obligation or dedication imposed upon the schedule property for it being used for any particular purpose. The defendant had specifically contended that the property was acquired by the Senior Pontiff and the property was since not bequeathed, dedicated, obligated or otherwise conveyed or transferred in favour of the first plaintiff Trust formed in the year 1927. Upon the demise of the Senior Pontiff, the first defendant being the successor is entitled to claim the said property.

The documents produced by the plaintiff, namely, the Trust Deed as per the Exhibit P1 and the resolution book as per Exhibit P2 and neither the oral evidence nor the other documents produced in any way demonstrate that the property, which was admittedly acquired by Shree Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy, Senior Pontiff, had been dedicated to the Trust or objects thereof. The case of the first defendant is that the schedule property was permitted to be used for such purpose and it is only for that limited purpose that the first plaintiff Trust was constituted and therefore, the schedule property continued to be the property of the Mutta. The first defendant had produced Exhibits D7 to D9, which were the Katha extracts and demand register extracts issued by the competent authority in respect of the schedule property.

It is contended that when issues are framed, each one of the issues will have to be decided distinctly unless the Court finds or records a finding that dealing with the issues jointly is necessitated or warranted under the circumstances. Under Order XIV Rule 2 of the CPC, the court is required to pronounce the judgment on all the issues. The trial court has prejudged the additional issue framed and thereafter has proceeded to consider the issue No. 1, whereas it should have been the other way round, as the specific case of the plaintiff was that the property was acquired by Senior Pontiff. Instead of dealing with the issues, the trial court framed certain points for consideration for itself and these points for consideration were not in consonance with the issues framed or the material pleadings put forth by the parities before the Court. No doubt that the Court is entitled to frame an issue at any time before passing of the decree, it cannot traverse beyond the pleadings or contend certain prejudged aspersions in framing such points for determination.

It is contended that in so far as issue Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned, there are no individual acts of the first defendant, which had been directed in the plaint as having caused an act of breach of Trust, but is the collective decision of the Board of Trustees taken from time to time from the years 1988 to 1994, to which some of the plaintiffs themselves were parties, are said to be acts constituting breach of the Trust. It is not in dispute that on 11.12.1988, the Board of Trustees had passed a resolution to appoint the first defendant as a patron-in-chief and decided to notify the absented Chairman Treasurer. The plaintiffs 3, 5 and 6 were out of the total strength of five persons on the said day. It is found elsewhere in the resolution book that the other Board of Trustees had never participated in any of the meetings. Subsequently on 13.6.1989, the first defendant was appointed as the Honorary President of the Board of Trustees and the first defendant was authorized to deal with the financial transaction of the Trust by resolution dated 4.11.1990. It was observed that the second defendant had never participated in the affairs of the Trust and even the Board of Trustees had not evinced much interest in the affairs of the Trust and therefore, by a resolution dated 18.01.1992, the management of the trust was entrusted to Sri Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy Vidyapeeta Trust, represented by its President the first defendant, by replacing the second defendant. Again on 7.11.1993, the second defendant was replaced by the said Trust. Subsequent resolutions are passed where some of the rooms which were used or permitted to be used for running the hostel was decided to be leased in favour of Shree Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy Vidyapeeta for augmenting income to the Trust. It is also the pleading that after 1993-94, a portion of the property has been used to house a Nursing School and also as a hostel for the students of the Nursing School, which is established and run by the Bettadapura Mutta. These materials were available on record and it was not the case of the plaintiffs 3, 5 and 6 that they had not consciously participated in the proceedings and in fact, they constituted a majority who took the decisions and as is apparent from Exhibits P2, the resolution book. Exhibit P2, the Trust resolution book, had clearly indicated that all the decisions which were taken were taken by the majority of the Trustees and at no point of time till the disposal of the suit, any Trustee had raised a dissent in a manner contemplated under the Trust Deed either moving for annulling, withdrawing or otherwise of the resolutions.

It is contended that the plaintiff had raised mutually destructive pleadings. Firstly, it was contended that the property belongs to the Trust and at the same time, it was contended that the Trust had perfected its title by adverse possession. The same statements are made even in the examination in chief of P.W. 1. Therefore, the plaintiffs had raised mutually destructive pleas and it was not permissible for the court to grant a decree as is now been granted. Without there being any discussion as to the contentious issues, more particularly, the mutually destructive pleadings raised. It is settled law that claiming adverse possession is as good as admitting the ownership of the other party and that was consistent with the plea of the plaintiff that the Senior Pontiff had acquired the property and in the absence of proof of dedication, the first defendant is deemed to have succeeded to the same. It is keeping this in mind the plaintiff being over cautious, had made such a plea in the plaint.

The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the appeals be allowed and the suits be dismissed."

The learned Counsel for the respondents - defendants seek to justify the judgment. More particularly, much emphasis is laid on the aspect that the suit property as well as such properties that would come into the possession of the author of the Trust were specifically dedicated to the Trust - as was evident from a reading of the Trust Deed and since admittedly, the hostel was being run in the suit schedule property till it was unlawfully usurped by the appellant - the trial court was justified in granting the reliefs as prayed for.

On the above rival contentions and on a perusal of the record it is seen that the law is well settled that when the issues are framed, more particularly in a suit of this nature, where the nature of evidence that is required to be adduced and the manner in which the materials are to be considered is with great circumspection, the trial court has dealt with the matter so callously without adverting itself to the issues framed. There is a flagrant violation of Order XIV Rule 2 and Order XX Rule 5 of the CPC, in failing to record the findings on each one of the issue and the trial court has however insulated the other defendants without any just and reasonable cause.

It is seen that the trial court had framed as many as 8 issues and an additional issue was also framed. Nowhere is it stated that the decision of any of the issues is sufficient to record the decisions on the other issues framed. Order XX Rule 5 read with Order XIV Rule 2 of the CPC, mandates that in a suit where issues have been framed, the court should state its findings or decisions with reasons there of upon each separate issue unless the finding upon anyone or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit and a judgment should be pronounced on each one of the issues. Therefore, the requirement under Law is that when materials pleaded were put forth and the court has recommenced the same, as being the material points to be decided in determination of a suit, such issues will have to be dealt with separately, unless the decision on any of the issue is in itself sufficient for non-consideration of any other issue. The approach of the trial court as is apparent is in haste. The trial court has run over the mandate of law in its anxiety to complete the judgments and the pronouncement thereof. No findings is recorded at the first instance that all the issues are taken up for consideration together as it involves common consideration or that it is sufficient for decision of the other issues. Whether the suit is maintainable or not is distinct issue requiring a distinct consideration and having no relation to issue No. 1 or additional No. 1. The findings there on could not have been sufficient to decide the issue No. 2. So far as the issue No. 3 is concerned, that is with reference to the first defendant being inducted as a Trustee and is not with reference to the endowment of the property and that was against a distinct issue to be considered. Issue No. 4 was also distinct as it amounted to the allegations of the breach of Trust. As could be noted from the entire reading of the judgment, after the Court predetermines while framing its own points for consideration that the first defendant had not proved that he is entitled to claim the suit property. After such findings, the trial court observes that the issue Nos. 3 to 6 on the basis of oral and documentary evidence is proved and decides this most contentious issues, in one sentence without giving reasons or appraising itself on the materials available on record. The mandate under law has been flouted and the judgment appears to be rendered in haste..

There are no individual acts of the first defendant which has been directed in the plaint as having been caused an act of breach of Trust, but it is the collective decision of the Board of Trustees taken from time to time from the years 1988 to 1994, to which some of the plaintiffs themselves were parties, are said to be acts constituting breach of the Trust.

It is also the pleading that after 1993-94, a portion of the property has been used to house a Nursing School and also as a hostel for the students of the Nursing School which is established and run by the Bettadapura Mutta. These materials were available on record and it was not the case of the plaintiffs 3, 5 and 6 that they had not consciously participated in the proceedings and in fact, they constituted a majority who took the decisions and as is apparent from Exhibit - P2, the resolution book. Exhibit P-2, the Trust Resolution Book, had clearly indicated that all the decisions which were taken were taken by the majority of the Trustees and at no point of time till the disposal of the suit, any Trustee had raised a dissent in a manner contemplated under the Trust Deed either moving for annulling, withdrawing or otherwise of the resolutions.

In the resolution book, none of the decisions were taken up as being proposed by the first defendant. The same were the agenda which was placed by the Board of Trustees and considered by a majority of the Board of Trustees and the majority constituted the plaintiffs themselves and the appellant was only a member Trustee. If adverse findings were to be recorded, such findings had to be recorded even against the plaintiffs. In so far as issue No. 5 is concerned, the plaintiffs themselves had contended that the property was in the possession of Shree Chikkaveera Dehsikendra Swamy Vidyapeeta Trust, that was further reinforced by the findings recorded by the trial court itself that certain rooms had been leased in favour of Shree Chikkaveera Deshikendra Swamy. These materials placed on record was sufficient to hold that the plaintiffs could not have been in possession of the suit schedule property.

In so far as issue No. 6 is concerned, the trial court has also not given any finding nor has it applied its judicial mind in deciding the issue.

It is demonstrated that there was no dedication of the schedule property in the Trust or to the Trust, the property admittedly being acquired by the predecessor in interest in the Mutta of the first defendant, the first defendant is entitled by law of succession as a successory pontiff to exercise rights over the schedule property.

Further, the plaintiffs had raised mutually destructive pleas and it was not permissible for the court to grant a decree as has now been granted. Without there being any discussion as to the contentious issues, more particularly, the mutually destructive pleadings raised. It is settled law that claiming adverse possession is as good as admitting the ownership of the other party and that was consistent with the plea of the plaintiff that the Senior Pontiff had acquired the property and in the absence of proof of dedication, the first defendant is deemed to have succeeded to the same.

The decree directing the removal of the appellant was infructuous as it is on record that the appellant has been removed from the Trust and was no longer a Trustee. Incidentally, it is also brought on record that the appellant has offered alternative accommodation as a voluntary gesture keeping the needs of poor students in view - which the respondents have negated off-hand.

In so far as the suit in O.S. 2/2005 is concerned, the same having been decreed in part, permitting the removal of the appellant as a trustee was infructuous as he was already removed. There was also no determination if the Trust was a public Trust for the said suit to be maintainable. And in the absence of any material to indicate that the appellant was in control of the finances, the direction to furnish accounts was also not tenable.

Hence, the appeals are allowed and the suits are dismissed.