Charan Singh Shakya vs State of M.P.

Sujoy Paul, Judge

Shri Khedkar is heard on admission. In this petition, petitioner has prayed for reinstating him on revocation of suspension to a place from where he was suspended. He prayed for other benefits arising out of suspension and also compensation. Petitioner has also prayed for setting aside the FIR Annexure-P/2.

So far relief 7(a) is concerned, a Division Bench of this Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan and Others Vs. Dr. R.K. Shahstri and Another, held that on revocation, an employee should be reinstated at the place from where he was placed under suspension.

As an interim measure, it is directed that respondents shall reinstate the petitioner at the place from where he was under suspension. So far, the remaining benefits of suspension period is concerned, under fundamental rules the competent authority is required to pass an order as to how suspension period will be treated. If the said authority intends to proceed against the petitioner departmentally, it will be open for the said authority to pass appropriate order after completion of the disciplinary proceedings. If no disciplinary proceedings or criminal case is pending or contemplated, it is obligatory for the said authority to pass appropriate orders to decide as to how suspension period would be treated. Accordingly, the competent authority is directed to pass a suitable order as per fundamental rules to decide as to how suspension period would be treated. The relief 7(d) prayed for is misconceived, no compensation for mental agony can be granted to the petitioner in a writ petition. Accordingly, relief 7(d) is not tenable and is rejected. So far, relief 7(b) regarding FIR is concerned, Shri Nakul Khedkar learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner was reinstated on 05/05/2012 and on the same date FIR Annexure-P/2 is lodged, which is not sustainable. He relies on criteria 7 mentioned by Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others,

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

A bare perusal of FIR shows that the allegations against the petitioner is that he was directed to submit charge on various occasions when he was under suspension, but he deliberately did not give charge to the other Patwari and, therefore, Section 188 IPC was invoked against the petitioner. The allegations mentioned in the FIR are prior to petitioner''s revocation of suspension and it relates to a period when he was under suspension. The scope of interference at this stage on FIR is very limited. Interference can be made if allegations are factually correct and yet no offence is made out. This is not the case here. When petitioner was under suspension, it cannot be said that he was not under obligation to handover the charge. In other words, if a person is under suspension, it is obligatory for him to provide the charge so that, in his absence the other person can continue the work, which was entrusted to the suspended employee.

In this view of the matter, I am unable to hold FIR is bad in law. In my considered opinion, criterion 7 of the judgment of Bhajanlal (supra) has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. It cannot be said that the said authority has taken action against the petitioner out of any vengeance. Since, the allegations are with regard to period when petitioner was under suspension and talks about not handing over the charge, it cannot be said that such allegations are made out of any vengeance. Accordingly, this contention is rejected and relief in this regard is also rejected.

Issue limited notices to the respondents on payment of PF within seven days.

However, it is made clear that the aforesaid discussion/observation with regard to FIR is made by this Court with regard to scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution and it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Certified copy as per rules.