Chaturbhuj vs M.A. Khan

S.K. Dhaon, J.—Sri Chaturbhuj, in his capacity as a Judicial Magistrate, convicted a person u/s 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Having regard to the young age of 20 years of the accused, Sri Chaturbhuj, instead of awarding a sentence of imprisonment, released the accused on probation with the condition that he (the accused) will maintain good behaviour for a period of one year. Feeling aggrieved, the accused Raees son of Shabbir, preferred an appeal No. 330 of 1983, which was allowed by Sri Massarat Ahmed Khan, the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge at Saharanpur. According to Sri Chaturbhuj, the learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment in the said appeal No. 330 of 1983 passed certain strictures and made certain remarks on his judicial work, while acquitting the accused. Sri Chaturbhuj made a representation to this Court for the expunction of the stricture/remarks made by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge. The Hon''ble the Acting Chief Justice on 25th April, 1984, passed the following order on the said representation of Sri Chaturbhuj:

List the matter for orders before the Court as an application u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure .

That is how the matter has come up before me.

The learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge discussed the evidence led by the prosecution, discarded the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the ground they (the witnesses) were partisan disagreed with the appraisement of the evidence made by the applicant and allowed the appeal. He acquitted the Appellant before him by giving benefit of doubt in these words:

.... In such circumstances it appears that the accused Appellant has been falsely implicated due to enmity and no case u/s 379 IPC is established against him beyond reasonable doubt and he deserves to be acquitted The appeal has got substance and deserves to be allowed. The findings of the learned lower court is perverse and against the record.

The Judicial Magistrate has sought the expunction of that portion of the judgment of the learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge which has been underlined by me above. The learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge was dealing with an appeal which had come up before him in the ordinary course. There was no extra-ordinary feature in the case. He had full power to disbelieve the prosecution evidence in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. The appeal before him was a continuation of the original proceedings which were before the Judicial Magistrate. He was called upon to rehear the case which was before the Judicial Magistrate. He was fully empowered to reappraise the evidence on the record and arrive at his own conclusion. He could ignore the conclusions of the Judicial Magistrate altogether. As he was not exercising a revisional jurisdiction, his powers to reappraise the evidence were unfettered.

The question to be considered is whether the remarks, which are subject matter of the controversy, made by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge were necessary at all for the disposal of the appeal. Were the remarks in question the ordinary incidence of the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction ? Clearly they were not. In my opinion, the remarks were irrelevant. They bad no impact on the judgment. They were not an integral part of the judgment which resulted in the acquittal of the accused. The expunction of the remarks will not in any manner affect the reasons for the judgment as pronounced by the learned Sessions Judge.

The Judicial Magistrate, it appears, is an young man who is at the threshold of his career. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that now there is a keen competition in the subordinate judicial service of this State. Any pungent remark made by a superior Court regarding the Judicial work of an Officer presiding over an inferior court is liable to affect the future career of the person concerned. The applicant, Sri Chaturbhuj, is on a firm ground when he apprehends that the remarks in question may be considered as a stigma.

Any appellate court is entitled to give a strong rebuke to the Presiding Officer of a court subordinate to it provided the facts and circumstances of the particular case really require such an action. There may be a case where a judgment under appeal may patently disclose intellectual dishonesty or gross incompetency on the part of the subordinate court. In such a situation, no exception can be taken to strong rebuke or a pungent remarks. As a rule strong remarks about a lower court must be avoided.

I have gone through the judgment in question given by the Judicial Magistrate and I am convinced that he made an honest and bonafide effort to appraise the evidence on the record before him and come to a logical conclusion. I am satisfied that the Judicial Magistrate made an honest and sincere effort to give an honest judgment.

This application succeeds and is allowed. The remarks made by the learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, in his order dated 10th August, 1983, Raees, son of Shabbir v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 1983 to the following effect:

The findings of the learned lower court is perverse and against the record " are expunged.