Chettikulam Sri Ekambareswaraswami and Sri Dhandayudhapaniswami Temples vs Arunachala Goundar and Another

King, J.—The subject-matter of this petition is a promissory note executed by one T. D. Palaniappa Mudaliar in favour of the first

respondent for Rs. 100 on 14th August, 1933. Palaniappa Mudaliar describes himself therein as managing dharmakartha of a certain temple at

Chettikulam, and recites also that he is borrowing the money as manager of the temple and that repayment is to be made ""from out of the

properties of the said temple''''. The first respondent sued upon the note and obtained a decree both against Palaniappa Mudaliar personally, and

against the properties of the temple. This is a petition by the temple with the contention that it should not have been held liable.

That the money was actually borrowed, and expended for temple purposes, and that the loan was necessary are facts which are not now

disputed. Nor can it be seriously urged that if Palaniappa Mudaliar was in fact authorised to borrow, his transaction will not bind the temple. It is

contended, however, that he was not so authorised--on two grounds:

(i) because the other two trustees did not join in executing the note; and

(ii) because he did not obtain the previous sanction of the Temple Committee as he was bound to do under the terms of a scheme which had been

framed to regulate the management of the temple.

There is no rule of law which requires all the trustees of an institution actually to sign a promissory note. It is enough if those trustees who do not

sign have authorised the transaction. It is found as a fact in this case that the two remaining trustees did authorise it. The transaction was therefore

the transaction of them all.

The second objection is more substantial, but the respondent meets it by saying that after the loan was incurred it was ratified by the Hindu

Religious Endowments Board itself. This ratification is found to be true by the District Munsif. There is no clear indication in the evidence whether

the Temple Committee was in existence either when the loan was incurred or when it was ratified--though it is probable enough that the reason

why ratification was sought from the Board was the non-existence at that time of the Committee. I need not, I think, pursue this matter further as

this is only a revision petition in which interference by this Court is discretionary, and when ratification has been secured from so high an authority

there can be no ground for holding that the debt was in any way improper from the point of view of the temple. This petition accordingly fails and is

dismissed with costs.