Chhaju Ram vs Kishore Chand

Dua, J.—Kishore Chand applied u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act for the ejectment of Chhajju Ram on the ground of

non payment of rent from 4th January, 1964 to 3rd July, 1964. A sum of Rs. 240 was also claimed by way of rent for this period at the rate of Rs.

40 per month. In the application, as the order of the Rent Controller dated 24th November, 1964 shows, plea was taken that an earlier application

had been filed by the landlord for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent from 4th September, 1963 to 3rd January,

1961. The rent for that period is stated to have been paid. In the present proceedings, since the respondent did not tender the rent due on the first

hearing, the ejectment was ordered by the Rent Controller on 24th November, 1954. The tenant Chhajju Ram took the matter on appeal to the

Appellate Authority, Ferozepore. According to the order of the Appellate Authority, the tenant had also pleaded that after the commencement of

the tenancy, the tenant learnt that the owner of the premises was Dyal Bagh Store Ltd., and the rent was payable to the real owner. On the basis of

this plea, it was urged that since the appellant had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, the Rent Controller could not have decided the

case without going into that question and that in any case, time for payment of arrears of rent should have been allowed up to the end of the date of

first hearing. Both these contentions were repelled as without substance. From the order of the Appellate Authority, it is clear that Chajju Ram had

been served with the process of the Rent Controller for 23rd October, 1964 and he put in his appearance on that day. The Rent Controller being

on tour on circuit, the case was adjourned to 23rd November, 1964. On that day, the Rent Controller was present, but Chhajju Ram did not pay

the arrears of rent. The Rent Controller adjourned the case to the following day, namely, 24th November, 1964 for permitting Chhajju Ram to put

in a formal written statement. On that day, Chhajju Ram did not put in his written statement, but again did not tender the arrears of rent as claimed.

The Appellate Authority has expressly observed in the order that the record of the Rent Controller does not show that Chhajju Ram had

expressed his intention to pay or tender the arrears of rent on any one of the dates of hearing. There was in the circumstances no paint for the Rent

Controller to give any more time to Chhajju Ram up to the end of the Court hours on 24th November, 1964. The order of the Rent Controller was

accordingly upheld.

On revision before me, the learned counsel for the petitioner had to begin with, appealed to me on the ground that it is a fit case in which I

should direct the Rent Controller to go into the merits of the pleas. At the bar, it has been stated that the arrears of rent were duly paid during the

pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. It is obvious that the power of this Court, when hearing a revision Under the Punjab Urban

Rent Restriction Act. is circumscribed by the provisions of the statute and it cannot pass any order it chooses on grounds of sympathy.

In so far as the legal position is concerned, the learned counsel has submitted that under the law, the tenant is entitled to pay or tender arrears of

rent at any time during the Court hours on the first hearing of the application for ejectment. The argument seems to suggest that the Court must

necessarily wait till the Court hours come to close before any order prejudicial to the tenant can be passed on the basis of non-payment of or

omission to tender the arrears of rent. The submission is certainly both bold and ingenious, but on the present record, I do not think it is necessary

to express any final opinion on its correctness, because indisputably the first day of hearing excluding 23rd October, 1964 would be 23rd

November, 1964. On that date of hearing, it is not suggested that the arrears were either paid or tendered. The counsel at the bar suggests that it

was perhaps not done because a copy of the application was not with the tenant. Although this assertion has not been sought to be verified from

the record, nevertheless, even on 24th November, 1964, arrears were neither paid nor tendered. It is also not shown that the tenant asked for time

from the Court for paying or tendering the amount. As a matter of fact, it is also not clear as to at what time the Rent Controller actually passed the

order, for may be, that the order was passed after waiting for practically the whole of the Court time on the date of hearing. It is also note-worthy

that in the grounds of revision in this Court, it is not the petitioner''s case that the Rent Controller had acted wrongly on illegally in not waiting till the

end of the Court time on the date of first hearing before passing orders on the petitioner''s failure to pay or tender the arrears. Reference at the bar

has been made to a Single Bench decision of this Court in Mukh Ram v. Shri Ram (1951) 53 P. L. R. 561, where it is held that if a tenant

endeavors to deposit the amount of arrears of rent on the date of first hearing fixed for the ejectment proceedings and is unable to do so due to the

rules in regard to deposits involving lengthy procedure and, therefore, deposit is actually made the following day, then the case is covered by the

proviso to section 13(2) of the Rent Act, which demands a liberal construction. This decision obviously has nothing to do with the point which

arises before me. It is not shown, and indeed no attempt has been made to show that the petitioner before me was disabled by any rules from

paying or tendering the amount on the first date of hearing. The principle which underlies the decision in Mukh Ram''s case (supra) is a corollary to

the rule that act of a Court does no injury to a suitor. In the reported case, the actual deposit was rightly considered to relate back to the first date

of hearing when the tenant endeavored to deposit the amount by doing everything in his power on that day.

It has then been suggested that the Rent Controller is not bound to pass an order of eviction on the failure of the tenant to pay or tender the

arrears of rent on the date of first hearing and that the Controller has a discretion to adjudicate upon the merits of the controversy in spite of such

failure. Whether or not the Rent Controller has any such discretion need not be determined in this case, because our the pleadings there is no case

made out for trial, as indisputably, mere mortgage of the property in favor of a third party can by no means be considered, by itself, to absolve the

tenant of the liability to pay the rent to the owner-landlord under the agreement of tenancy. It has not been shown that there was any variation in

the terms of the tenancy or that the landlord had asked the tenant to attorn to someone else. The counsel for the petitioner has also made no

attempt to show how his client can deny his liability to pay the rent to the landlord. Needless to point oat that it is not the petitioner''s case before

me that no rent was due from him on account of the lease of the premises in dispute. The impugned orders are not shown by the petitioner''s

learned counsel to be either illegal or improper, and indeed, in my opinion, these were the only possible orders that could and should have been

made on the material on the record.

As a last resort, Mr. Aggarwal has made a strong appeal for granting his client time because he has put up some structure on the premises. In

my opinion, if a tenant chooses to put up a structure on the premises, which he is not in a position to remove, when required under the law to

vacate, then it is for him to see that he does not commit any breach of his solemn obligation under the terms of lease, entailing his eviction. The

tenant is expected to perform his part of the contract by discharging his obligation of payment of rent with reasonable regularity and must not by his

habitual breaches compel the landlord to have resort to legal Tribunals for redress of his grievance of nonpayment of rent. The fact that the

petitioner twice drove the landlord to institute legal proceedings for ejectment on account of default in payment of rent, is clearly indicative of the

fact that the tenant has not been regularly paying the rent agreed-a breach for which no cogent justification is forthcoming. The defense of creation

of mortgage in favour of some other party, again, seems to be an unjustifiable excuse because it is not the tenant''s case that he has been made to

pay the rent to the mortgagee leave alone the plea that he has bona fide paid it to the said party. I would, therefore, feel disinclined to grant any

substantial period of time to the tenant. Clearly, the original order was passed as far back as 24th November, 1964 and the tenant knew nearly a

year ago that he would have to vacate the premises under the law. Extension of time at this stage is not a matter of right, but depends on equitable

considerations : see Balkishan v. Subash Chnnd (1961)63 P.L.R. 723 at page 729. And there is hardly any equity in the tenant''s favour; nor can it

be said that he is suddenly being asked to vacate the premises. Equitable considerations from Tribunals of justice and equity are more easily

attracted by honest and straightforward tenants just as they are similarly attracted by honest and straightforward landlords, and this perhaps is

instinctive with such Tribunals in common with Courts of justice and squinty, being apparently inspired by affinity of outlook. However, I would

give him 15 days more for vacating the premises, but this does not mean that the execution proceedings cannot be initiated forthwith; it is only the

actual eviction which should be effected after 15 days from today. I am doing so as a special case to enable him to remove the alleged

superstructure.

The revision accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.